Modes of judgment formation
The formation of human judgments in psychology is mostly described by two-process models. It is therefore assumed that people use different processes and / or systems when making judgments. Within the framework of the Heuristics and Biases program by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky , humans are described as being who strive to save cognitive resources when making judgments. According to this, humans mainly use heuristics in order to be able to make judgments sparingly. Other approaches, such as the information integration theory by Norman H. Anderson , assume that humans use much more complex processes when making judgments. This contradiction of theories is resolved by two-process models. According to these, the person is able to use a wide variety of cognitive strategies. The motivation , goals and cognitive resources ultimately decide which type of strategy is chosen and to what extent. In the following, such two-process models of human judgment as well as the role of intuition and the less popular one-process model are explained in more detail.
Models
Automatism vs. control
A central differentiation of information processing processes takes place automatically and controlled between the two poles.
- Automatic processes run unconsciously, uncontrolled and therefore hardly need any attention .
- In contrast, controlled processes are conscious, controlled and require a high level of attention.
An exact and strict division into the two poles is difficult, for this reason one speaks of the degree of automation of a process.
Heuristic vs. Systematically
One of the most elaborate two-process models is the Heuristic Systematic Model by Shelly Chaiken and Alice H. Eagley . Systematic information processing is understood to mean a comprehensive analytical orientation in which all available information is checked with regard to its relevance and integrated into your judgment on the basis of complex decision rules. Heuristic information processing is understood as a more limited mode of judgment in which less cognitive efforts and capacities are required. In detail:
- Systematic processes are data-driven and require a lot of cognitive resources. The prerequisites for their application are accordingly high levels of motivation and distinctive skills.
- Heuristic processes are more theory-driven and hardly require any data or cognitive analysis. They therefore run with a high degree of automation.
Both systematic and heuristic information processing processes are used to obtain the most valid settings possible for a judgment object. Which of the two processes is more likely to come into play in a judgment can be determined by the involvement in a problem. If a person is heavily involved in a problem or topic, they are more inclined to judge systematically. So you can be convinced of a coherent argumentation and the comprehensibility of a message. People with little involvement, however, judge differently: they are more likely to be guided by the sympathy and credibility of the communicator and consequently act more heuristically.
In a table, these two types of information processing can be summarized as follows , according to the Heuristic-Systematic-Model :
| Heuristic | Systematically |
|---|---|
| low analysis | analytical |
| low cognitive effort | high cognitive effort |
| theory-guided | data-routed |
| automatically, unconsciously | controlled, conscious |
| Use of categories, schemes, stereotypes and heuristics | Application of logical analysis strategies such as B. Probability Theory |
intuition
Another factor that is important in human judgment is intuition . It differs from the two-process models mentioned above and forms its own form of human information processing.
For a long time, human intuition was equated with the concept of the use of heuristics in making judgments. It is doubtful whether people also under circumstances of intuitive judgment, such as B. under time pressure, actually use heuristics. This does not seem to be the case when there is previous experience of the judgment object. For this reason, the heuristic view of intuitive judgments is opposed to a learning perspective. This describes intuition as a thought process in which tacit knowledge is called up and expresses itself as a spontaneous feeling (such as, for example, affection and dislike) when judging. This tacit knowledge is acquired in everyday life through processes of associative learning . To put it more simply, this means that people are constantly unconsciously establishing connections between events or stimuli and storing these as implicit knowledge. The processing of implicit knowledge takes place automatically and unconsciously - it depicts the entirety of our experiences and accordingly influences our judgments.
One-process model
One-process models are less popular in research. The Unimodell of Arie W. Kruglanski for example, from the fact that the judgment can be imaged in a single process instead of two. Accordingly, judgment processes are basically rule-based and are based on the formation of if-then relationships . Judgments made are therefore based on the evidence or relevance of information for establishing such a connection. Various cues and stimuli that we receive during the process of judging can therefore either be of a heuristic or content-systematic nature, because they are processed in the same way. The intensity of the processing is decisive for whether we judge heuristically or systematically. The main factor that determines the intensity of judgment is motivation .
literature
- Betsch, Tilmann, Joachim Funke , Henning Plessner: Thinking - Judging, Deciding - Problem Solving. General Psychology for Bachelor's. Berlin 2011, Chapter 4.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Betsch, Tilmann, Joachim Funke, Henning Plessner: Thinking - Judging, Deciding - Problem Solving. General Psychology for Bachelor's. Berlin 2011, p. 43
- ↑ Betsch, Tilmann, Joachim Funke, Henning Plessner: Thinking - Judging, Deciding - Problem Solving. General Psychology for Bachelor's. Berlin 2011, p. 43
- ↑ Betsch, Tilmann, Joachim Funke, Henning Plessner: Thinking - Judging, Deciding - Problem Solving. General Psychology for Bachelor's. Berlin 2011, pp. 43–44
- ↑ Betsch, Tilmann, Joachim Funke, Henning Plessner: Thinking - Judging, Deciding - Problem Solving. General Psychology for Bachelor's. Berlin 2011, p. 44
- ↑ Betsch, Tilmann, Joachim Funke, Henning Plessner: Thinking - Judging, Deciding - Problem Solving. General Psychology for Bachelor's. Berlin 2011, pp. 44–45
- ↑ Betsch, Tilmann, Joachim Funke, Henning Plessner: Thinking - Judging, Deciding - Problem Solving. General Psychology for Bachelor's. Berlin 2011, p. 45