NOAR Linhas Aéreas flight 4896

NOAR Linhas Aéreas flight 4896
	An identical Let L-410UVP-E20 from NOAR
Accident summary
Accident type	Loss of control
place	Recife , Brazil
date	July 13, 2011
Fatalities	16
Survivors	0
Aircraft
Aircraft type	Let L-410UVP-E20
operator	NOAR Linhas Aéreas
Mark	PR-NOB
Departure airport	Recife Airport , Brazil;
Stopover	Natal Airport , Brazil;
Destination airport	Mossoró Airport , Brazil;
Passengers	14th
crew	2
	Lists of aviation accidents

The NOAR Linhas Aéreas flight 4896 (flight number: N0 4896 ) was a domestic flight of the Brazilian regional airline NOAR Linhas Aéreas from Recife Airport to Mossoró with a stopover at Augusto Severo Airport in Natal . On July 13, 2011, a Let L-410UVP-E20 had an accident on this flight , killing all 16 people on board.

machine

The affected machine was a Let L-410UVP-E20 made in the Czech Republic . The machine had the factory number 2722, received the manufacturer's test mark OK-SLR and was delivered to the NOAR Linhas Aéreas in June 2010. The Let carried the aircraft registration PR-NOB . The twin-engine regional airliner was equipped with two Walter M601E turboprop engines . At the time of the accident, the machine had an operating performance of 2126 operating hours with 3033 take-offs and landings.

Passengers and crew

For the flight to Massoró, 14 passengers were seated in the plane. The cockpit crew consisted of a flight captain and a first officer. No flight attendants were provided on the flight.

Before departure

During the discussion before departure, the master explained to the first officer that he would consider the possibility of aborting take-off if a technical defect should occur during the take-off run before reaching the decision speed and that there is still enough runway length available to brake the machine should stand. He added that if a defect should occur after reaching the decision speed and with the landing gear already retracted, he would continue with the start. In this case it is the duty of the first officer to monitor the instruments and to carry out the emergency procedures prescribed above 400 meters. In such a case, curves would be flown in the direction of the functioning engine.

the accident

The take-off run of the machine began at 6:51 a.m. Shortly after take-off and only three seconds after the master had instructed the landing gear to be retracted, an abnormal noise could be heard from the engines. The machine continued to fly for 50 seconds with the landing gear extended, and only after the master repeated his instructions for the fourth time did the first officer retract the landing gear. During the take-off run, the pilots did not agree on how to proceed. After diagnosing engine damage, the first officer repeated three times that the take-off should be aborted and stated that engine performance had decreased. The master replied that there was no longer enough runway length to brake the machine after an aborted take-off.

The first officer then contacted air traffic control and reported problems with one of the engines. The master then instructed the first officer twice to request a landing on runway 30. At that time, however, there were only runways 18 and 36 at Recife Airport. Regardless of this, the first officer applied to air traffic control for a landing permit for runway 36.

After applying for permission to land, the first officer asked the captain to lower the aircraft nose. The captain replied to the first officer that he should calm down. Shortly afterwards, the background noise in the cockpit changed significantly. The master instructed the first officer to move the propeller of engine no. 1 to the spring position.

A Walter M601 engine

The master then instructed the first officer to contact air traffic control. The first officer asked what to tell them. The captain ordered him to explain air distress . The first officer replied, “We are in dire straits. We have the clearance to land on runway 36, so let's go ”.

Subsequently, the messages “Don't sink! Don't sink! ” And “ Too low, terrain ” . At 06:52, the master again asked the first officer to move the propellers of the left engine to the spring position, whereupon the master replied that he had already done so. Seven seconds later, the first officer asked the captain to loop back to the airport. The captain replied that he was already doing this. Ten seconds later, the warning messages from the ground proximity warning system stopped again. Shortly afterwards, when the first officer announced at an altitude of 81 feet (approx. 25 meters) that the landing gear would be extended again, the messages were heard again. The captain tried to pull the engine up. At 6:53 am, the first officer said "120 feet" (approx. 37 meters). The warning messages of the ground proximity warning system then sounded again. The first officer instructed the master to hold the thrust, whereupon the master replied that he was already giving full thrust.

The first officer told the captain, not too much to raise the aircraft nose to a stall to prevent. He then asked the captain if they wanted to land on the beach, which the captain answered with a harsh "no". At 6:53 am, the first officer said they were only 120 feet tall and that it was not high enough to make it to the runway. He suggested that they land on the adjacent sandy beach. The captain replied that they would not land on the beach, but instead on the "field".

After a further 13 seconds the first officer picked up the radio and reported to air traffic control "NOAR 4-8-9-6 will ... will make an emergency landing on the beach ... It is not possible to reach the runway .." . Land here in the sand ... land in the sand, that has no ... ". Shortly afterwards, the proximity warning system went silent again.

The captain told the first officer again that they would not land in the sand and the first officer shouted that they would collide with buildings. From this point on, the stall warning system sounded and remained active for the next 19 seconds until the stall finally occurred. In the meantime, the ground proximity warning system was occasionally activated.

At 06:54, the copilot told the master again that he should land “please” on the beach, to which the master replied roughly that he would not do that.

The first officer insisted on his request, stressing that they would not make it to the runway, whereupon the captain replied, “Enough now! Let that be my business! "

In the next instant the first officer shouted twice in quick succession that there had been a stall. Then the recording stopped.

Eyewitnesses observed how the machine lost altitude and after a steep descent in a field just 200 meters from the beach, it hit about 1700 meters behind the runway. After the impact, the machine burned out. Both crew members and all 14 passengers were killed.

Accident investigation

The investigation of the accident came to the conclusion that the first officer's recognition of the dangerous situation had a decisive influence on communication in the cockpit and that the consequences of the accident could have been reduced if the master followed the first officer's advice and dared to land on the beach would have. Instead, the captain's stubborn behavior led to a collapse in crew resource management .

Investigators concluded that the captain's actions were determined by a high level of confidence in his own performance, resulting from years of experience in the aviation sector, and a refusal to accept opinions that did not correspond to his own.

consequences

After the accident, NOAR Linhas Aéreas, which was only founded in 2009, ceased operations.

swell

-8.1525 -34.909444Coordinates: 8 ° 9 ′ 9 ″ S , 34 ° 54 ′ 34 ″ W.