Operation Promise kept

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Hezbollah's Operation Promise Keeped on July 12, 2006 ( Arabic عملية الوعد الصادق, DMG ʿAmaliyyat al-Waʿd aṣ-Ṣādiq ) represented the most extensive and in its consequences the most far-reaching armed operation of Hezbollah since the year 2000. The operation triggered the Second Lebanon War or the Israeli "Operation Change of Direction".

course

According to Israeli sources, between May 2000 and May 2004, Hezbollah carried out 14 attempts at infiltration, 105 shelling of aircraft, 42 attacks with anti-tank missiles, five attacks with artillery rockets, seven fire attacks and 10 uses of explosives against Israeli targets. Eleven Israeli soldiers and six civilians were killed, 53 soldiers and 14 civilians were wounded.

The operation in July 2006 deviated from the routine of the previous missions in several respects. For one, the target was outside of the Shebaa farms claimed by Hezbollah , on the area of ​​which previous operations had focused. On the other hand, the operation was accompanied by extensive rocket fire in northern Israel. In contrast to all operations since 2000, Operation “Keeped Promise” was also successful in bringing Israeli hostages.

Hezbollah decision or result of external pressure

Immediately after the "Promise Keeped" operation, there was speculation, especially in Israel and the USA , that Iran had ordered it to be carried out in order to divert attention from the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program. However, the Hezbollah operation did not have a positive impact on Iran's interests on this point; the nuclear program continued to be discussed in an international context. In addition, Hezbollah had not planned the operation as a major confrontation that could have created a diversion, and was surprised by the Israeli response. Overall, it is therefore very likely that the initiative for the operation came from Hezbollah and that the implementation was mainly intended to pursue its interests at the Lebanese level.

The choice of the time of the operation, however, could have been the result of external influences. Coordination of the operation, at least with Iran as the most important sponsor and ally of the organization, is likely. The daily newspaper “ Die Welt ” reported that at the end of June 2006 a meeting between leading representatives of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah had taken place. Hezbollah's approach to Iran is said to have been agreed during the talks. As far as is known, however, coordination meetings with Iranian authorities are routine.

The journalist Seymour Hersh claims that the Israeli intelligence agency overheard an encrypted conference call of the Hamas leadership, from which it emerged that Hamas had turned to Hezbollah for assistance after the decision to take an Israeli soldier hostage. Since Hezbollah regularly used an escalation between Palestinian actors and Israel as an opportunity to escalate itself, such a request would probably not have been decisive for Hezbollah's decision.

The decision to implement was not fundamentally outside of Hezbollah's routine behavior. Since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, there have been several attempts at infiltration, but these have only been successful once. In October 2000, Hezbollah took three Israeli soldiers hostage. Nasrallah declared 2006 the "Year of the Prisoners' Release". Secretary General Nasrallah openly declared his intention to take Israeli soldiers hostage in order to arrange an exchange of prisoners. The very name of the operation “Keeping Promise” suggests that the hostage-taking in July 2006 was part of Hezbollah's long-term strategy.

Hezbollah goals

Hezbollah had two main objectives with the operation:

  • Release of prisoners: The only stated aim of the hostage-taking was to force the release of three Lebanese prisoners who, according to Hezbollah, are in Israeli custody. The most prominent prisoner, Samir Kuntar , was serving a life sentence in Israel for an attack on an Israeli family in 1979. Yahya Sakaf , whose release Hezbollah is also demanding, wasprobably not in Israeli custody. Sakaf participated in an attack on an Israeli bus in March 1978 that killed 35 Israelis. It is believed that Sakaf was also killed in the ensuing clashes with Israeli security forces; however, his body could not be identified.
  • Neutralization of the internal Lebanese pressure to disarm: the continuation of the talks as part of the “National Dialogue” in Lebanon was planned for July 25, 2006, during which the question of disarming Hezbollah was also to be dealt with. With a successful operation against Israel and the release of the Lebanese detained in Israel, Hezbollah could have strengthened its position in the talks. In addition, based on the experience of past disputes, it was to be expected that no criticism of Hezbollah was to be expected during ongoing disputes with Israel. Indeed, practically all political actors within Lebanon declared their support for Hezbollah during the war.

Hezbollah strategic assumptions

Hezbollah based its decision on a number of assumptions about Israel's expected response and the consequences of the operation.

In general, Hezbollah assumed a limited Israeli response. Prime Minister Siniora met Hussein Khalil immediately after the hostage-taking and referred to the Israeli response to the hostage-taking in the Gaza Strip. Khalil replied that the situation could not be compared and that the situation between Israel and Lebanon could be expected to calm down within 48 hours. Hassan Nasrallah and Mahmud Qomati also later stated that they did not expect the Israeli response to this extent. It was only after the Israeli operations continued with the same intensity on the third day that the organization began evacuating its facilities. However, because of its general preparations for a confrontation with Israel, Hezbollah was able to respond to Israeli actions.

In addition, the following factors likely influenced Hezbollah's decision:

  • Gaining legitimacy through coupling to the Palestinian issue: Hezbollah legitimizes its actions by presenting it as part of the all-Islamic and Arab struggle against Israel. In the past, Hezbollah used Palestinian offensives such as the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada or the wave of attacks in the spring of 2002 to take limited action against targets in northern Israel.
  • Past prisoner exchanges successful: In November 2003, the Israeli government approved a prisoner exchange in which 430 Arabs in Israeli custodywere exchangedfor Elhanan Tannenbaum , who wastaken hostage by Hezbollah in 2000,and the bodies of Israeli soldiers kidnapped in October 2000. In 1997, the Israeli government approved the release of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and several dozen other prisoners in exchange for the release of two Mossad workers captured in Jordan. The majority of Israeli society has supported such exchanges in the past.

Hezbollah strategy

Initially, the taking of Israeli soldiers hostage was likely only intended to generate political pressure to release prisoners. After it became clear that Israel responded with an extensive military response, Hezbollah proceeded according to the principles of classic guerrilla strategy.

In order to be perceived as the victor over Israel, Hezbollah had to survive as an actor until the point when Israel had to abandon the operation, either due to international pressure or at high cost. In the past, Israel was unable to conduct operations that dragged on for more than a month. The " Operation Schutzschild " 2002, which was the most intensive Israeli military operation since the Lebanon war in 1982 , was prematurely terminated due to international pressure.

Hezbollah's physical survival was assured in the event that Israel did not occupy all of Lebanon or destroy the Hezbollah leadership through targeted killings. In order to create the perception of a victory, in addition to the physical survival of the organization and its key leaders, a continuation of Israel's own rocket fire and a continuation of the hostage-taking of Israeli soldiers were required. The existing rocket stocks would have enabled Hezbollah to bombard Israel over a period of around four months at a constant frequency. Hezbollah was also able to successfully deny the Israeli armed forces direct access to the hostages.

literature

swell

  1. ↑ "Terrorist Attacks from Lebanon Against Israeli Targets Since the Israeli Pullout in May 2000" ( Memento of the original from May 12, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , IDF, June 8, 2004. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www1.idf.il
  2. ↑ Seymour M. Hersh: “Watching Lebanon,” The New Yorker, August 21, 2006.
  3. ↑ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “Hezbollah's Apocalypse Now,” Washington Post, July 23, 2006.
  4. ↑ Amos Harel / Avi Issacharoff: "Israel's response to kidnappings had little effect", Ha'aretz, September 5, 2006.
  5. ^ Rainer Hermann: "Hizbullahs Kampf um Sympathien", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 6, 2006.
  6. ↑ Anthony Shadid, “Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations,” Washington Post, October 8, 2006.
  7. ↑ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb: “Hezbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict. Part One: Motives, Strategy, and Objectives, "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2006.
  8. ↑ Anthony Shadid, “Inside Hezbollah, Big Miscalculations,” Washington Post, October 8, 2006.
  9. ^ Avi Hein: "Israel-Hezbollah Prisoner Exchange" , Jewish Virtual Library, January 29, 2004.