Lebanon War 1982

Lebanon War

Part of: Middle East conflict

Israeli troops in southern Lebanon in June 1982

date	June 6, 1982 to September 1982
place	South Lebanon
Casus Belli	Attack on Ambassador Shlomo Argov on June 3, 1982
output	Withdrawal of the PLO (1982) Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (1982–1985) Israeli security zone with the SLA (1985–2000) Syrian de facto occupation of Lebanon (1976–2005) Control of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and southern Beirut ( 1980 – today)
consequences	South Lebanon Conflict (1982-2000)

Parties to the conflict
Israel South Lebanese Army Forces Libanaises	PLO Syria Murabitun militia Amal militia Lebanese Communist Party
Commander
Menachem Begin Ariel Sharon Rafael Eitan	Yasser Arafat Ibrahim Qoleilat
Troop strength
Israel Defense Forces : 78,000 soldiers 1,250 tanks 1,500 transport tanks 275 combat aircraft	Syrian Armed Forces : 25,000 soldiers 300 tanks 300 transport tanks 225 combat aircraft PLO : 15,000 soldiers 300 tanks 150 transport tanks Murabitun militia : 5,000 fighters
losses
675 dead, unknown number of wounded	~ 9798 dead unknown number of wounded

The 1982 Lebanon War was a military conflict in Lebanon between the Israeli army and allied militias on the one hand and PLO fighters and Syrian troops on the other. It was the first major Arab-Israeli conflict that Israel began without its very existence being immediately threatened. Israel called the operation "Peace to Galilee ". However, the Israeli offensive was seen as a war of aggression , including by many Israelis .

The 1982 Lebanon War took place against the backdrop of the Lebanese Civil War ; this contributed not insignificantly to the escalation and was significantly influenced by Israel's intervention.

prehistory

PLO

The prehistory of the war was the fighting between the Palestinian PLO and the Israeli military . These struggles had already started in 1967, when the PLO launched attacks on Israeli territory , supported by large numbers of Palestinian refugees in Jordan . After the Syrian-backed PLO was driven out of Jordan by the Jordanian army, the PLO established itself in Lebanon and continued its attacks on Israel from there (see also the Avivim school bus attack , Ma'alot massacre ).

Syrian intervention

On the one hand, like other Arab states committed to the cause of the Palestinians, on the other hand concerned about being drawn into another, potentially devastating war with Israel, the Syrian regime observed the instability of the neighboring country, which had been shattered by the Lebanese civil war, with suspicion. If the PLO had gained the upper hand there, or if the Christian-dominated areas had split off from the rest of Lebanon and subsequently, as might have been assumed, allied themselves with Israel, an open war would probably have been inevitable. This prompted Syria's head of state Hafiz al-Assad to send his troops to Lebanon on June 1, 1976 in order to prevent such developments and to control the actors in Lebanon in a kind of arbiter role. The Syrian troop presence of around 30,000 men was legitimized by the Arab states (with the exception of Libya and Iraq ) and the PLO at the Riyadh Conference under the name “Arab Defense Force” or simply “ADF” and the indivisibility of the Lebanon codified by the conference participants. Israel and the US were vague about their views on Syrian intervention, but were willing to accept the Syrian presence as long as the Syrians did not cross an unspecified “red line”.

The Syrian troops stayed away from the south of Lebanon, so that the areas there remained largely under the control of the PLO.

New presidents and "Operation Litani"

With the election of a right-wing Israeli government under Menachem Begin , Israel's approach changed fundamentally from 1977. It now openly supported the Saad Haddad militias, known as the " South Lebanese Army " (SLA), in order to use them to pacify the Lebanese area from which the PLO attacks originated. In addition to full logistical support for the SLA, Israeli troops crossed the border in 1977 to help the SLA drive the PLO out of Marj Uyun . But since Syrian troops in Lebanon made no attempt to prevent the infiltration of militias from the north into the contested sectors, and in some cases made pacts with the PLO, Israel now also got involved in the north of Lebanon and supported the Phalange militia of Bashir Gemayel . These Christian militias had started to militarily control certain areas of Lebanon with a predominantly Christian population on their own, which Syria refused to accept and responded with heavy shelling of Christian residential areas in Beirut.

After a serious terrorist attack by the PLO in March 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani and occupied parts of southern Lebanon as far as the Litani River , but had to evacuate them again under international pressure and especially under pressure from the United States and left its positions to the SLA. As a result, the United Nations set up a security zone through the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon on the Israeli-Lebanese border. However, this did not end the fighting between the PLO and SLA, nor did it prevent the PLO from attacking Israeli territory. Between 1975 and 1982 around 108 Israelis died from PLO attacks.

In January 1981, Ronald Reagan was elected US President. His politics and rhetoric were directed against all states that cooperated with the Soviet Union, including Syria, whose leaders had signed a friendship pact with the Soviet Union in 1980. Since the US has traditionally been Israel's most important partner, Reagan's inauguration fundamentally postponed the leeway for those involved in the Lebanon conflict. Israeli politicians were therefore increasingly convinced that they would have the backing of the US for a renewed intervention in Lebanon - even if such an action should lead to conflicts with Syrian troops on Lebanese soil.

Missile Crisis and Syrian Debilitating

After an attack on Syrian ADF troops by Christian militias in March 1981, the Syrians took action against Christian militia positions near Zahlé in April 1981 , so that they in turn asked for Israeli support. The subsequent downing of two Syrian helicopters by the Israeli Air Force prompted the Syrians to send heavy anti-aircraft batteries to Lebanon. They stationed 2K12 "Kub" anti-aircraft missile systems of Soviet design on Lebanese territory, which was hardly acceptable to Israel, as it was feared that the missiles could render PLO terrorists in Lebanon virtually immune to Israeli retaliatory attacks from the air. Only political pressure from the US prevented the Israeli military from taking action against the missiles.

On July 17, 1981, after fighting between militias intensified, Israeli fighter planes attacked office complexes in Beirut that were being used by the PLO. Because of numerous civilian casualties, the US stepped in and put Israel under pressure with a temporary arms embargo . The US brokered a ceasefire between the actors in Lebanon, which the PLO also observed.

Domestically under strong pressure from the Islamic uprising , conditions similar to civil war developed in Syria, which culminated in the Hama massacre in February 1982 and caused the Syrian leadership to withdraw some of their troops from Lebanon to use them against the Islamists. The Syrian long-range air defense systems in Lebanon have been concentrated on the Lebanese side of the Syrian border in the Bekaa Plain . The annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights by Israel in December 1981 went unanswered.

"Green light" from Washington

Since they were convinced that the brokered ceasefire would not last long, Israeli representatives presented the American Secretary of State Alexander Haig in May 1982 with various scenarios for Israeli intervention with ground troops in southern Lebanon in order to secure an offensive in the event of American approval to be. Combat operations with Syrian troops were not planned. The US only wanted to agree to an Israeli intervention if it was an “appropriate reaction” to an “internationally recognized provocation” by the PLO.

The limited approval from Washington was interpreted as a green light, but the tight conditions that the US placed on Israeli action already indicated Americans' concern that the conflict could escalate.

The Arab powers, which could have answered an Israeli action with war, had largely neutralized themselves. Jordan was embroiled in a low-intensity armed conflict with Syria, Egypt was incapacitated by the murder of its President Anwar as-Sadat in October 1981 and the ongoing negotiations for the return of the Sinai Peninsula by Israel, and Iraq and Iran were united War involved.

Trigger and War

In early April 1982 there were two attacks in Paris. First, strangers shot at the Israeli embassy with automatic weapons, a few days later an unknown assassin shot and killed the Israeli diplomat Yaacov Bar-Simantov in the street. Groups from Lebanon took responsibility for both actions.

On May 9, 1982, Katyusha rocket launchers fired more than 100 rockets from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.

On June 3, 1982, there was an attempted attack on Israel's ambassador Shlomo Argov in London by a group of assassins who were later identified as members of the Abu Nidal organization . Although the PLO rejected responsibility for the acts of the breakaway Abu Nidal group and warned Israel against military action , Israel interpreted the attack as a breach of the 1981 ceasefire agreement. The Israeli Air Force began launching massive air strikes against PLO positions in Lebanon on June 4, which in turn resulted in renewed artillery fire on Israeli territory.

An Israeli cabinet decision on June 5 authorized Defense Minister Sharon to send Israeli troops across the border to southern Lebanon to destroy the PLO's infrastructure there and end the rocket attacks. The terms under which the minister was given this mandate precluded combat operations with Syrian troops unless they in turn opened hostilities. Furthermore, it is assumed that only the PLO should be fought and expelled from an area of ​​about 40 km across the border. The hope was to avoid clashes with Syrian ground forces inland, while at the same time denying the PLO access to an area it needed to launch its rocket attacks on Israeli territory.

However, Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan later denied having received a 40 km restriction on the advance, and the war objectives gradually changed in the course of the following operation to the complete destruction of the PLO infrastructure throughout Lebanon and the expulsion of the Syrians in order to be able to install such a pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon.

course

Beginning

Overview map of the course of the invasion

On June 6, advanced Israeli troops crossed the UNIFIL demilitarized zone and advanced into Lebanon. The UN Security Council then passed resolution 509, which demanded the immediate withdrawal of the troops, but remained without consequences.

Nine divisions with around 78,000 Israeli soldiers were marched, divided among 22,000 soldiers for an operation along the coast of Lebanon, which also included amphibious landings, two divisions in the center and the largest force on the right, eastern flank, with five divisions and 800 tanks marching towards the Bekaa Plain to secure the flank of the operation from a possible Syrian intervention.

Although important PLO commanders fled when the Israeli troops approached and left the units under their command without leadership, individual PLO associations offered uncoordinated but bitter resistance. The Israeli advance on the coastal road and the merger with the troops landed near Sidon were delayed by several hours.

The refugee ship MV Transit was sunk by an Israeli submarine.

In the middle sector, Israeli commandos drove PLO units from the old crusader fortress of Beaufort in a six-hour battle by the morning of June 7 .

The main Israeli force advanced rapidly in the direction of Lake Qaraoun at the southern end of the Bekaa Plain, but stopped on June 7 in front of the positions of Syrian troops who had previously stayed away from the fighting. A permit to attack the Syrians had not yet been given.

June 7th

Israeli tanks land north of Sidon on June 7th

On June 7, the Israeli Air Force massively attacked targets along the main road leading from the contested areas to Beirut in order to prevent the PLO from reinforcing or withdrawing movements, including using cluster bombs .

As the ground forces advanced on a broad front, the Israeli Navy landed division strength troops north of Sidon early that morning . They occupied the bridge over the Awali River, united with the soldiers who had advanced on the coastal road, liaised with the formations of the two divisions that had advanced in the middle, thus including Sidon. Fighting between closed PLO associations and Israeli troops was now concentrated on PLO camps and their surroundings near Sidon, Tire and Nabatea , which were swiftly bypassed by the main Israeli forces and in which the PLO fighters defend themselves for up to a week . Numerous foreigners from 26 nations were picked up by the Israelis who were believed to have come to Lebanon for training in terror camps .

Without permission to attack the Israeli units and in view of the rapid onset of resistance by the PLO in southern Lebanon, the strategic situation of the Syrian troops deteriorated noticeably. The Syrian positions moved from the southern entrance to the Bekaa Plain on Lake Qaraoun to the north along the various entrances to the plain where they had stationed their heavy anti-aircraft missiles. Advancing Israeli forces began to flank these positions, and heavy artillery was brought in, which already had some of the vulnerable Syrian anti-aircraft batteries within range.

8th June

The Qaraoun lake seen from south to north. On the eastern side of the ridge in the foreground is the village of Machghara on the western side of the place Jezzine.

A T-62 tank captured by the Syrians in 1982 , exhibited in Israel

On June 8, the Israeli air force shot down a total of six Syrian aircraft that were traveling outside of the area in which Israeli ground forces were moving. The further action of the Israeli divisions parallel to the Bekaa Plain further dovetailed the positions of Syrian and Israeli troops. The mountain village of Jezzine , at an intersection of important road connections, now moved into the focus of the main Israeli armed forces. After a Syrian tank convoy was reported moving along the mountain roads to Jezzine, the Israeli chief of staff Eitan asked the defense minister to attack the convoy from the air so as not to allow Syrian troops to enter the town, which is important for the Israeli advance. Eitan dispatched tank troops from the 460th Brigade under Colonel Hagai Cohen to secure the site and intercept any Syrian tanks that survived the airstrike. The two associations clashed in Jezzine. Several Syrian T-62 tanks were destroyed with the loss of eight tanks on the Israeli side and the site was captured.

US Special Envoy Philip Habib opened talks with the Israeli government in Jerusalem on June 8 to explore ways to end the conflict, and then traveled to Damascus to persuade Syria's President Assad to continue the armed conflict with Israel avoid - a concern that was already obsolete by the time he arrived.

June 9th

On Wednesday June 9th, Defense Minister Sharon received clearance from the cabinet to attack Syrian troops and his troops carried out a massive surprise attack on Syrian forces in the Bekaa Plain. The divisions marched against the Syrian positions that night and at first made rapid progress in the Chouf district, but soon became involved in battles with other Syrian T-62 tanks and infantry. In Ain Zhalta , the advance was halted by Syrian troops for several hours when the Israeli vehicle columns descended into the town via a mountain road at around 11 p.m. and were attacked by Syrian forces at brigade strength.

The artillery and a massive air strike destroyed the bulk of the Syrian air defense positions in the plain, and the Israeli ground forces advanced on the district capital Joub Jannine in order to take possession of the important intersection there. With the elimination of the powerful, ground-based air defense, the Israeli air force achieved air sovereignty. Attempts by the Syrian air force were detected early on by Israeli Hawkeye reconnaissance aircraft and dozens of Syrian aircraft were shot down.

As a result of the attack on Syrian units and the fact that advancing Israeli troops were already fighting against PFLP militias in Damur and were thus more than 70 kilometers away on Lebanese territory, a complete escalation of the conflict in sight, US President Ronald Reagan now turned directly to Israel's Prime Minister Begin, calling for a ceasefire to come into effect on June 10 at 6 a.m. Defense Secretary Sharon spoke out against it and recommended not to see US Secretary of State Alexander Haig until midnight on June 10th.

June 10th

On June 10, three Syrian companies , PLO associations and PSP militias faced the advancing Israeli associations on the coastal road a few kilometers south of Beirut airport . Here, supported by the favorable terrain, they were able to hold up the Israeli advance for a few days, so that other associations gained time in which to prepare the defense of Beirut.

The previously outmaneuvered Syrian formations in the southern Bekaa Plain broke away from the Israeli troops, sometimes leaving cut troops behind and with heavy losses, and moved into defensive positions to prevent opposing formations from crossing the mountain ridges running in north-south direction were able to swarm across the pass roads on a broad front into the plain. The main goal of both sides was to control the connecting road between Damascus and Beirut, which formed the supply axis for supplying the Syrian and Syrian-allied associations.

Taking advantage of the terrain that forced the heavy Israeli tank units onto a few usable roads between mountain ridges, Syrian Gazelle helicopters with HOT anti-tank missiles and anti-tank troops with Milan missiles and bazookas attacked the columns again and again according to a raid tactic, thus delaying the Israeli advance. Nevertheless they could do little against the air sovereignty, numerical superiority and better equipment of the Israeli units and achieved only limited success. Shortly after the heads of the Israeli troops had passed Joub Jannine, one of their advanced tank units broke through Syrian lock positions in Sultan Yacoub El Thata, a few kilometers northeast. Parts of the 58th Syrian Mechanized Brigade managed to reoccupy the abandoned position and lock in some Israeli tanks. After the loss of 30 soldiers and several tanks, the mass of Israeli soldiers were able to leave their vehicles behind, but three soldiers and several undamaged Magach tanks fell into the hands of the Syrians.

In the central sector of the front, Israeli troops reached Ain Dara , where they became involved in heavy fighting with the Syrian 61st Brigade, which was trying to hold the nearby Damascus-Beirut road.

June 11th and 12th and a fragile armistice

The USA, probably under pressure from the Soviet Union, now finally pushed Israel to a ceasefire. Israel offered the Syrians a ceasefire so that, despite their defeat, they did not have to appear as supplicants and could save face. The ceasefire entered into force on June 11, 1982 at 12 noon, but explicitly did not include the PLO.

Syrian reinforcements of the 3rd Armored Division had advanced from Damascus to reinforce their 1st Armored Division in the Bekaa Plain and shortly before the ceasefire came into force, Israeli airborne troops under General Jossi Peled blocked several modern T-72 tanks from the Syrians destroyed with TOW missiles mounted on off-road vehicles .

The ceasefire was extended to the PLO on June 12, but did not last in the Beirut area. Heavy fighting took place in Beirut between PLO units, Christian militias, and the Israeli and Syrian military. Eventually Beirut was trapped by Israeli troops, but they did not enter the city itself.

At first, the commander of the 211th Brigade, Colonel Eli Geva, had resisted direct orders to lead his troops into the city and had instead taken his leave; In a political intervention, US President Reagan finally persuaded the Israeli prime minister not to occupy the city after he himself had been put under pressure by Arab heads of state who considered the occupation of an Arab capital by Israel to be unreasonable. An unstable truce was finally reached on June 25th. Constant skirmishes between militias and attacks by Israeli forces from the air, however, resulted in numerous civilian casualties and severe destruction in the city.

August

US Marines and French paratroopers monitor the departure of PLO units

Heavy bombing of suspected PLO positions in the city center in early August caused the US to force Israeli approval to send multinational forces to Lebanon to oversee the PLO's withdrawal from the country.

On August 21, 1982, French paratroopers landed in Beirut and began to monitor the withdrawal of PLO fighters and their allies together with subsequent troops from Italy and the USA and 100 soldiers from Great Britain . Around 10,700 militia fighters and 3,603 Syrians left Beirut. Bashir Gemayel , commander of one of the Christian militias, was elected President of Lebanon.

Withdrawal of the PLO, siege and massacre of the Phalange militia

At the end of August, the PLO set up its new headquarters in Tunis . However, the stabilization of Lebanon hoped for by Israel did not materialize. On September 14, 1982, President Gemayel fell victim to a bomb attack. Israeli troops then entered Beirut and trapped the Palestinian refugee camps in the city, but did not enter them.

From September 16, there was a two-day massacre in the refugee camps Sabra and Shatila by supporters of the Maronite Phalange militia Gemayels under the command of Elie Hobeika (then liaison officer between Kata'eb and IDF). Estimates of the number of victims are controversial and range from 300 to 3,000. After the Lebanese regular army refused to occupy the camps, Defense Minister Sharon instructed the Israeli military to leave any resistance to the camps to the militia.

Political Consequences

In February 1983, a commission of inquiry set up to investigate the events of the Lebanon war in Israel under public pressure found that Prime Minister Begin had failed to adequately monitor the actions of his subordinates and condemned the behavior of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff in particular Rafael Eitan difficult. Both had to resign afterwards and Premier Begin resigned in September of that year.

Syria's influence in Lebanon had declined significantly. The Syrian regime itself, however, suffered no lasting damage from its defeat. The Soviet Union made up for all losses of military equipment that the Syrian troops had suffered within a short period of time. Hundreds of Soviet soldiers and officers were injured or killed in anti-aircraft positions bombed by Israel during the war. At the same time, Damascus stylized itself as the only power in the Arab region that had bravely and at great sacrifice opposed Israel and the USA on behalf of the Palestinian cause, while the other powers in the region remained inactive, which further solidified the position of the Assad regime .

Israel initially occupied southern Lebanon with its army until February 1985 and then established an area there that it referred to as a "security zone" from then on. It was not until May 25, 2000 that the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon. The security zone only partially fulfilled its purpose. There were repeated attacks with rockets on northern Israeli cities, now by the Iran-backed Hezbollah , which gained strength after the withdrawal of the rival PLO.

Media reception

politics

In particular, the Israeli air strikes on positions in Beirut in August generated strong media coverage abroad. French President François Mitterrand even compared the attacks with the destruction of Oradour-sur-Glane by Waffen SS troops in June 1944.

Movies

In 1991 the Israeli film gmar gavi'a (Hebrew: גמר גביע, English title: Cup Final ) was released. He describes the experiences of an Israeli prisoner of war in Lebanon. The events of the Lebanon War of 1982 are the subject of the animated documentary Waltz with Bashir by Ari Folman , who in this film deals with the memories of the war that he and his comrades repressed. Also the film Lebanon by Samuel Maoz discussed the war effort of its author.

Computer games

The Israeli Airforce computer game , developed by the Israeli software company Pixel Multimedia , offers the option of choosing Carpet bombing over Beirut .

See also

• Tire bombings
• Attack on the US base in Beirut in 1983
• Bomb attack on the US embassy in Beirut in 1983

literature

• Rashid Khalidi : Under Siege: PLO Decisionmaking During the 1982 War. Columbia University Press, New York 2014, ISBN 978-0-231-16669-0 .
• Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , 2001, Steiner (Franz), ISBN 978-3-515-07867-2 .
• Michael Brecher: A Study of Crisis , 1997, University of Michigan Press, ISBN 0-472-10806-9 .
• H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , 1987, National Defense University Press, ISBN 978-0-7881-2334-4 .
• Sam Katz: Armies in Lebanon 1982-84 , 1985, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 0-85045-602-9 .
• Itamar Rabinovich: The War for Lebanon: 1970–1985 , 1985, Cornell University Press, ISBN 0-8014-9313-7 .

Web links

Commons : Lebanon War 1982  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

• "Just" War case study: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1982 , Christopher A. Arantz, Master thesis, 2002.

Evidence and references

Remarks

1. ↑ In the USA, the use of American weapons against civilian targets in Lebanon by Israel, which had been provided as part of military aid, threatened to break the support for this aid. As described by P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider in Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues on page 104.
2. ↑ So Thomas H. Davis interpreted in 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 invasion on page 84 the limited approval of the Americans as "Dark Yellow Light" ( dim yellow light ).

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 321
2. ↑ Michael C. Desch: Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism , 2008, The Johns Hopkins University Press, ISBN 978-0-8018-8801-4 , p. 31
3. ↑ ^{a b} Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 320
4. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 271 and following
5. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 292
6. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 295 and following
7. ↑ Christopher A. Arantz: "Just" War case study: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1982 , p. 11
8. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 305
9. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 251
10. ↑ Itamar Rabinovich: The War for Lebanon: 1970–1985 , p. 116
11. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 313
12. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 319
13. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 84
14. ^ Itamar Rabinovich: The War for Lebanon: 1970-1985 , p. 131 and following
15. ^ Press release of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency of April 5, 1982, Edwin Eytan: "Yaacov Bar-simantov, 42, an Israeli Diplomat, Murdered by a Terrorist" ( Memento from January 15, 2013 in the Internet Archive )
16. ↑ Michael Brecher: A Study of Crisis , p. 296
17. ^ ^{A b} H. Thomas Davis: 40 km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 75
18. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 321
19. ↑ ^{a b} Itamar Rabinovich: The War for Lebanon: 1970–1985 , p. 122
20. ↑ Sam Katz: Armies in Lebanon 1982-84 , p. 18
21. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 77.
22. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , pp. 78, 79, 81
23. ↑ ^{a b} Sam Katz: Armies in Lebanon 1982-84 , p. 16
24. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 81
25. ↑ Israel admits it sank Lebanese refugee boat in 1982 was error, killing 25 - TV. The Times of Israel, November 22, 2018.
26. ^ Lebanon War: Israeli submarine sank Lebanese refugee ship in 1982. Die Zeit, November 23, 2018.
27. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 82
28. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 84
29. ↑ Louis Williams: The Israel Defense Forces: A People's Army , 2000, iUniverse, ISBN 978-0-595-14353-5 , p. 275
30. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 86
31. ^ ^{A b} Raful Eitan: A Soldier's Story: The Life and Times of an Israeli War Hero , 1992, SPI Books, ISBN 1-56171-094-6 , p. 259
32. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 86
33. ↑ ^{a b c} Sam Katz: Armies in Lebanon 1982-84 , p. 17
34. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 90
35. ↑ ^{a b c} H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 92
36. ^ Martin Van Creveld: The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force , p. 295
37. ↑ Yezid Sayigh: Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 , 2000, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0-19-829643-0 , p 527
38. ↑ ^{a b} Sam Katz: Armies in Lebanon 1982-84 , p. 19
39. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 93
40. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 324
41. ↑ ^{a b} H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 95 and following
42. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 103
43. ^ H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 97
44. ↑ ^{a b} H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 100
45. ↑ ^{a b} Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 326
46. ^ John Campbell: Margaret Thatcher: The iron lady , 2003, Jonathan Cape, ISBN 978-0-224-06156-8 , p. 337
47. ↑ ^{a b c d} H. Thomas Davis: 40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion , p. 102 and following
48. ↑ http://waltzwithbashir.com/film.html
49. ^ In the Circle of Friends , Novaya Gazeta, August 28, 2018
50. ↑ Martin Stäheli: The Syrian Foreign Policy under President Hafez Assad , p. 357 and following
51. ^ Raphael Israeli: Poison: Modern Manifestations of a Blood Libel , Lexington Books, 2002, ISBN 978-0-7391-0208-4 , p. 150
52. ↑ Article in the ZEIT