Rational Choice (election research)

The rational choice approach to electoral behavior research is a model for explaining voter behavior. In addition, there are socio-structural and socio-psychological approaches in election research .

The rational choice approach assumes a rational decision by the voter. A voting decision is considered rational if the voter expects the best possible achievable consequences from it in view of the given circumstances he perceives and in the light of his own preferences.

The best-known representative of this approach is Anthony Downs with his 1957 published economic theory of democracy (original: An Economic Theory of Democracy ). According to Downs, the rational voter only pursues his own interests (self-interest axiom ).

In order for the voter to be able to decide from which candidate or from which party he can expect the greatest benefit (or the least harm), he needs as complete information as possible about the candidates or parties available for election , about their actions in the past and possible behavior in the future (retrospective or prospective voting). In order to get this information, however, the voter would have to make a considerable effort. The rational voter will only undertake this effort, known as information costs, if the expected benefit is greater than the effort. Therefore, the rational voter will often be satisfied with incomplete information and will therefore make his voting decision with a certain degree of uncertainty .

One way to limit this uncertainty is to pass some of the information costs on to others; H. Use information prepared by the media, interest groups or parties.

In addition to the information costs and the effort for the voting decision itself, as with any other action, there are also opportunity costs for the act of voting, i.e. lost benefits from possible other actions that could have been undertaken instead of voting (whoever votes can e.g. B. do not travel on election day).

Election paradox

One problem with these considerations, however, is that they do not take into account the fact that a single voter almost never decides the outcome of the election. Voters therefore have no reason whatsoever to associate a certain sequence of actions with their voting. Which party and which candidates win the election does not depend on their individual vote. So it is also not rational for voters (in the sense explained above) to take part in the election: Since their own vote is very likely not decisive for the outcome of the election, the individual can stay away from the election without consequences and thus save himself from having to the effort involved in choosing without having to forego any potential benefit. This consideration has entered the specialist literature under the heading "paradox of choice"; One can speak of a paradox insofar as the success of democratic elections in the sense of a majority decision seems to depend on the irrationality of the citizens.

William Riker and Peter Ordeshook have set up the following equation (exemplary for a choice between two parties) to illustrate the electoral paradox:

{\ displaystyle R = p \ cdot BC}

With

${\ displaystyle R:}$ reward (the benefit from voting), probability (the probability that one's own vote will decide the election), benefit (the difference in utility between a victory for the preferred and the competing party), costs (the cost of voting: information costs, time expenditure, etc. ).
${\ displaystyle p:}$
${\ displaystyle B:}$
${\ displaystyle C:}$

If, as in federal elections, there are very many eligible voters, then there is a tendency against . Even if the costs of voting are low, they outweigh the benefits. Consequently, participation in the election is irrational. ${\ displaystyle p \ cdot B}$ ${\ displaystyle 0}$ ${\ displaystyle R <0}$

Downs was also aware of this problem and therefore postulated a long-term benefit of voting that was independent of the specific election outcome: the maintenance of a democratic system . Since the maintenance of a democratic system does not depend on the turnout of an individual voter, the problem is not solved. The fact that the voting decision of an individual voter has no consequences makes the use of an instrumentally rational voter model implausible from the outset, regardless of the potential consequences one is looking at. Downs himself deviates from this model without expressly admitting it when he argues that voters see it as a duty of democratic citizens to support the democratic system through their participation in the elections.

Voter turnout norm

Other writers have tried other ways to solve the problem. Since maintaining democracy is a collective good, from the benefit of which even non-voters cannot be excluded, in their opinion a further incentive in the form of individually noticeable direct consequences is required in order to make the decision for the ballot rational. James S. Coleman sees this in a social “voter turnout norm”; H. the mutual expectation of those entitled to vote that they will vote in the election. Since the individual (non-) voter has to reckon with reproaches and expressions of disapproval and has to justify himself if he does not follow the voter participation norm, the costs of not voting are higher than those of voting.

In principle, the voter participation norm is suitable to explain a high voter turnout; however, it does not explain the decision to cast a certain vote.

It is also controversial whether the recognition of the existence of social norms in turn violates the assumptions of the rational choice approach.

Expressive choosing concept

Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky therefore propose the concept of expressive choice . Accordingly, an action benefit does not always have to be an instrumental (consequence-related), but can also be an expressive one, which comes about through the expression of a personal preference - similar to the cheering calls at a sporting event. Expressive use is already realized through an expressive action itself, regardless of whether an instrumental use occurs. This approach overcomes the electoral paradox because a substantial expected value for the election success of the preferred party is not necessary in order to benefit from the election act. According to Brennan and Lomasky, the expressive benefit can even occur in an act of choice that is directed against one's own (e.g. economic) interests. The choice of protest parties can not only be explained by the expressive component, but also has a rational character in the narrower sense, since it can induce the established parties to change course.

literature

Klaus Armingeon: Reasons and consequences of low voter turnout. In: Cologne journal for sociology and social psychology. Vol. 46, Issue 1, 1994, ISSN 0023-2653 , pp. 43-64.
Klaus Armingeon: Interregional and international differences in voting decisions. Voting behavior in Swiss cantons in comparison with Western Europe. In: Political quarterly. Vol. 39, No. 2, 1998, ISSN 0032-3470 , pp. 282-300.
Kenneth J. Arrow : Social Choice and Individual Values (= Cowles Commission for Research in Economics. Monograph 12, ZDB -ID 254454-4 ). Wiley et al., New York NY 1951.
Geoffrey Brennan, Loren Lomasky: Democracy and Decision. The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 1993, ISBN 0-521-35043-3 .
Anthony Downs : An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row, New York NY 1957.
Dennis C. Mueller: Public Choice III. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 2003, ISBN 0-521-81546-0 .
Riker William, Ordeshook Peter: A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. In: American Political Science Review. Vol. 62, 1968, ISSN 0003-0554 , pp. 25-42.
Volker G. Täube: The paradoxical figure of the “rational voter”. A theoretical and empirical inventory. Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin, Berlin 2002, ISBN 3-932089-83-9 .
Gordon Tullock , James MacGill Buchanan : The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations for Constitutional Democracy (= Ann Arbor Paperbacks. Vol. 100, ZDB -ID 1135723-x ). The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor MI 1962.