Battle of Dyrrhachium
| date | July 10, 48 BC Chr. |
|---|---|
| place | Dyrrhachium |
| output | Victory of Pompey |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 45,000 | 15,000 |
| losses | |
|
1000 |
|
The Battle of Dyrrhachium on July 10, 48 BC. BC was one of a series of meetings between Caesar and Pompey that ended with Pompey's defeat at the Battle of Pharsalus a month later. In Dyrrhachium, on the other hand, Caesar could barely avoid a military catastrophe.
prehistory
Outbreak of civil war between Caesar and Pompey
On January 10, 49 BC BC Caesar crossed the previously insignificant border river Rubicon , which separated Italy from the province of Gallia cisalpina , and began the civil war. In forced marches he advanced to Rome, which was evacuated by Pompey and most of the Senate, as there was no prospect of success in Italy. Pompey fled with his supporters to Greece to organize the further resistance against Caesar there. Caesar, unable to follow Pompey due to a lack of ships, conquered Hispania and Sicily and organized the construction of a fleet to follow Pompey to Greece.
Caesar acted quickly: after Pompey and the opposing senators had withdrawn with their legions to Greece, he defeated Pompey's two legates, Afranius and Petreius, in Spain in the months that followed. After he had arranged the situation in Italy and Rome, he was at the end of December 49 BC. BC again at Brundisium. He had ordered 12 legions and his entire cavalry there to cross the Adriatic to Greece. However, only transport ships that were not designed for combat were available to him to send his troops. This fact alone ultimately prevented the war from ending quickly.
Another problem for Caesar was that his legions were severely decimated and exhausted. The climate change between Gaul, Spain and Italy, the unhealthy and wet autumn and winter in Italy and ultimately the long and brisk march from Spain to Brundisium took their toll.
Pompey, on the other hand, had more than six months to prepare for Caesar's arrival, to recruit troops and to train them. The only shortcoming was the inexperience of the troops. Only the two legions that Caesar gave him in 50 BC. Chr. Had to return or cede, a veteran legion from Cilicia and the remains of the Spanish legions, had combat experience.
His recruits and the close relationships in the east from his earlier campaigns had also earned him a large fleet. This was under the command of Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus , the old enemy of Caesar. Thus the Republicans had maritime sovereignty and blocked Brundisium and the Adriatic Sea.
Across the Adriatic
It was the winter solstice and no one expected Caesar to attempt to cross the Ionian Gulf in this bad weather. However, he weighed the benefits of speed and surprise against prudence and security. On January 4, 48 BC The wind changed and his small fleet set sail.
Since no one had any idea how strong the port cities of western Greece were, they headed for the small port of Palaeste (Palissa), which is believed to be north of today's Dhërmi . The seven sub-manned legions and the 500 horsemen disembarked there. Caesar immediately sent the transport ships back to Brundisium under the command of Calenus, in the hope that Mark Antony would follow immediately with the rest of the troops. However, on the return voyage the fleet found itself in heavy weather, and adverse winds drove some of the ships into the arms of Bibulus' fleet, who was quite angry that Caesar had escaped. He let out his anger on the opposing fleet. Only a part of the ships reached Brundisium.
Caesar himself sent a captive cavalry prefect, Vibullius Rufus, to Pompey with an offer of peace. The content read that both sides had suffered enough losses of Roman soldiers in the past few months - Pompey had lost around 130 cohorts in Spain and Italy, and Caesar had lost Curio and his legions in Africa and Gaius Antonius in Illyria - and man should lay down arms to peacefully find an agreement.
However, this move is more than a tactical move. It looks embarrassing to make such a proposal with a vastly outnumbered army, cut off from its supplies and reinforcements. But the political benefit to Caesar is undeniable. In the event of an agreement, he would have been considered the peacemaker, and in the event of a refusal he had tried a step towards an understanding.
Conquest of Epirus
Despite this diplomatic attempt, Caesar did not stay in Epirus to wait for Antony, but marched towards Apollonia and to the Dyrrhachium, which is still further north, the largest depot and arsenal of the Pompeian troops in western Greece. Pompey, now informed and surprised by Caesar's landing, also drove his troops in forced marches to Dyrrhachium.
The first city on Caesar's path, Oricum , opened the gates to Caesar. This example was followed by Apollonia and then all of Epirus . Pompey, marching day and night, was the first to reach Dyrrhachium. But his forced march was like a panic escape, desertions ensued, and many exhausted soldiers remained behind. Labienus , with his well-known severity and cruelty, undertook to restore discipline in the army.
Caesar withdrew to Apollonia and camped on the banks of the Apsus River . This enabled him to protect the Epirean cities that had defected to him and await the arrival of the rest of his troops. Pompey marched after him and set up camp on the opposite bank. Due to the proximity of the two camps, group agreements and fraternities took place in the weeks that followed, and hopes for peace negotiations rose among soldiers on both sides. But once again Labienus provoked a bloody incident and provided a shield for the republican troops.
Sea blockade
The first attempt by Antonius and Calenus to cross the troops failed, but they suffered no losses.
Bibulus had the problem of keeping Caesar and his reinforcements away from the sea, but not having any contact points in this region where he could reload water and wood. The weeks were tough for his fleet, because supplies could not always be brought in by ship and supplies were exhausted. Bibulus, who during the praetur and the consulate had always distinguished himself as Caesar's partner by incompetence - here he seemed to have found his destiny. But once again, luck came to Caesar's aid. Bibulus fell ill and died.
His successor Libo gave up monitoring the various points of contact on the Greek coast and instead blocked Brundisium directly. He was lured into an ambush by Antonius and lost a large part of his fleet. So he had to withdraw, and the way for Calenus and Antonius was free.
Antony's fleet got into unfavorable winds and drifted past Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. As they feared a storm and the enemy fleet, they headed for the nearest possible port: Nymphaeum , near Lissus north of Dyrrhachium.
Antonius landed three legions of veterans and one legion of recruits, as well as 800 horsemen. The Pompeians put 16 ships against the rocks in pursuit, with Antonius only two ships got off course and stranded near Lissus, one with about 220 recruits and the second with about 200 veterans. The recruits surrendered to the garrison and were executed anyway, whereupon the veterans successfully defended themselves and caught up with Antonius. Lissus was handed over to Antonius by the Roman citizenship, who condemned the execution and owed Caesar from the past to be grateful.
Union with Antonius
Caesar and Pompey found out about the landing of Antony around the same time. Now the race began again. Although they had seen the ships sail past, neither of them knew whether and where they had landed.
Now they both had their plan: Caesar wanted and had to unite with Antonius, and Pompey wanted to prevent this and attack and destroy the reinforcements.
Pompey, who did not have to cross the apse, was faster again and lay in wait with his army for Antony. But he had been warned by the Greeks and did not fall into his trap. Instead he made contact with the approaching Caesar, who arrived the following day. Pompey immediately withdrew, fearing that these two armies would lock him up in his position and cut off all supplies.
It is noteworthy that Pompey, with a numerically vastly superior army, did not dare to attack his successor Caesar or directly on Antonius before they could unite. Even after that, he retained this trump card, in addition to the dramatic shortage of supplies at Caesar. His son Gaius Pompeius destroyed all of Caesar's ships in an attack on Oricum, so that Caesar could no longer expect supplies from the sea.
Then he sent Calvinus with the XI. and XII. Legion and part of the cavalry in the direction of Thessaly to stop Metellus Scipio, who was expected from Syria, and to relax his supply situation himself. Pompey was far superior, but relied on a strategy of sitting out and wanted to starve Caesar.
The battle
Pompey hesitates - Race to Dyrrhachium
Caesar followed him, and at Asparagium (near Dyrrhachium) he met the opposing camp. The next day he had his troops line up and offered Pompey a battle for the first time. Pompey stayed in his camp and did not accept the battle.
When Caesar found that Pompey remained seated in his position, the next day he bypassed the camp on detours and difficult to walk streets and tried to reach Dyrrhachium. So he wanted to either bring Pompey here to retreat or even cut him off from this city, which was his largest supply depot.
Since Caesar had withdrawn in the opposite direction, Pompey initially suspected a lack of supplies. But when his scouts told him which way he had now taken, he marched once again in forced marches to Dyrrhachium. This time Caesar won. He reached the city early in the morning, just as Pompey's vanguard was also advancing in the distance, and made camp.
Blockade at Petra
Pompey was thus cut off from Dyrrhachium and set up camp on a hill called Petra (today called Shkëmbi i Kavajës ). This position at least enabled him to have a tolerable anchorage for ships and thus to be able to supply himself from the sea. Both prepared for a siege. While Pompey organized his supplies through the fleet, Caesar brought supplies from Epirus and from the north. But he was forced to act after the supplies were insufficient.
The hill Petra was surrounded by a chain of hills, which Caesar now secured with fortified positions. Then he began to link these positions together. Pompey was slowly being trapped.
With this, Caesar tried to achieve three things: firstly, this situation enabled him to supply food and supplies safely from all sides, secondly, he was able to incapacitate the great cavalry of the opponents and restrict or prevent the fetching of food and thirdly, this also gave him the opportunity to To undermine Pompey's reputation with the peoples and rulers allied with him, since he let himself be surrounded by a small army and refused the battle.
Pompey did not want to leave the sea and Dyrrhachium because all his war equipment, projectiles, weapons and launchers were stored here and he had organized all supplies for the army via this port.
It is now extremely questionable why Pompey did not at least send his large cavalry away in this situation, on the one hand to be relieved of their supplies and, almost more importantly, to disrupt Caesar's supplies and attack the allies. With Petra it was of no use to him at all.
The only way he could have prevented the enclosure was a decisive battle, but apparently he had other plans. So for the time being he had no choice but to occupy and fortify hill by hill himself in order to take away as much land as possible from Caesar's troops. He did quite well in this, for he established 24 fortified bases around an area of about 15 miles in circumference. That left him enough space to fetch food through the pabulatores ; there was enough fields and space here to graze the horses.
Just as the Caesarians connected their bases with one another on the outside, Pompey began the same in the inner ring. Pompey won this race again, outnumbered and with the shorter distance. The trapped use this advantage to disrupt the work of the Caesarians again and again. Initially with archers and slingshots, there were repeated minor skirmishes.
Skirmishes and fortifications
Caesar tried to include Pompey as closely as possible, and so there were also battles for individual positions: The IX. had conquered a Pompeian position and began to fortify it. Pompey had to act and began to hinder the work from the surrounding hills. The attack was opened by archers and slingers, who enclosed the position, supported by light infantry. In addition there was the bombardment by throwing machines. The Caesarians had to fight and work at the same time, and many were wounded. Caesar ordered an immediate retreat. This was thwarted by the intense pursuit of the Pompeians.
Pompey is said to have boasted in front of his people: "Scold me a worthless general when the opponent manages to retreat here without great loss, where he has come so recklessly here."
The IX. was ordered to make the route of retreat inaccessible in order to prevent the attacks while retreating, and then to withdraw. The Pompeians attacked the retreating all the more obstinately. Antonius, the commander of the Legion, stopped his men and started a counterattack. The legionnaires formed and stormed the hill again. They chased the Pompeians ahead of them, forced them to flee and killed many.
Now they were able to retreat without hindrance and completed the digging work on an adjacent hill.
Unusual warfare
This type of warfare was new in many ways. The size of the theater of war and the number of fortified positions, the number of fortification lines and, of course, this whole mode of siege.
One point of view, however, was completely unusual: up to now a dejected, inferior or weak opponent has usually been besieged. The purpose was usually to cut off supplies, starve them and make them give up.
Here, however, Caesar surrounded fresh, unused troops, who had everything in abundance, with a far smaller number of troops. Ships with supplies for Pompey arrived daily, while Caesar lacked everything. The soldiers were satisfied with barley and legumes and discovered a type of root, chara, which was mixed with milk to make bread and then eaten. When Pompey saw these loaves of bread baked from Chara, he came up with the comparison with the "wild animals" ...
Caesar's legionaries, on the other hand, hoped that their misery would end as the grain in the hinterland began to ripen. "We would rather feed on tree bark than let Pompey slip away."
One learned from defectors that not everything was going well with Pompey either. All cattle had already perished and the horses could only be kept alive with hardship. The state of health of the legionnaires was worrying, due to the cramped conditions, the stench of the carcasses and the strenuous digging work, which the Pompeians were not used to. Caesar's legionaries liked to joke that they would have to move a mountain before Caesar would let them fight ...
But the water shortage particularly affected the trapped. Caesar had all rivers and streams that flowed to the sea there diverted or dammed, so that one had to dig laboriously for water in depressions and swamps.
Both sides invented new methods of warfare. Archers approached the bonfires at night and shot arrows in the direction of the camp sites. The result was that you made a fire in one place but camped in another.
In addition, there were always battles over individual forts. On one of these events, Publius Sulla appears to have missed the opportunity to decide the war. This place was not preserved during the “civil war” itself. Caesar himself had retreated to attack Dyrrhachium and had given Sulla supreme command of the siege facilities. In a massive attack on a fort by Pompey himself, Sulla came to the aid of the cohort attacked. He quickly pulled together troops of around two legions and repulsed the attackers without any problems. This retreat turned into a hopeless escape, but instead of pursuing it, Sulla was satisfied with what had been achieved. Pompey laboriously gathered the troops and holed up on a hill. He had it fortified for five days, but then led the troops back behind the walls of his own camp.
With a little more energetic pursuit, Sulla could have defeated the Pompeians and probably even destroyed them. Here he let the same opportunity pass by as soon as Pompey would also pass. Caesar did not reproach him, however, because Publius Sulla had obeyed his orders, and here too an ambush would have been possible.
At the same time Pompey had attacked in other places in order to split up the enemy, but was defeated every time. The Centurio Scaeva was particularly able to distinguish himself, which is mentioned by numerous writers. Volcacius Tullus defended his position with three cohorts against a whole legion and even drove them out, and elsewhere Germanic tribes suddenly stormed out of the entrenchments and attacked the advancing and unprepared Pompeians, killing many and driving them out.
Caesar had made three unsuccessful attacks on Dyrrhachium at the same time and then broke off this operation.
Treason
In the days that followed, he repeatedly led his army into the space between the fortifications and had them deployed for battle. After the numerous offensives against his positions, Caesar had the hope that Pompey would finally seek the decision.
The latter, influenced by public opinion and worried about his reputation, also had his legions deployed, but in such a way that they were positioned directly at the walls and were protected by throwing machines, slingers and archers. There was no battle; Pompey had at least seen his face a little and Caesar avoided attacking this position.
But the situation for Pompey's cavalry became more and more dramatic. It was imperative that he act and force a breakout. This time he was lucky; Chance came to his aid, or rather: betrayal. Apparently the only change of sides in the direction of Pompey was to have dire consequences for Caesar.
Evidence of embezzlement has been found for two allobrogens who had served under Caesar for many years in Gaul. Although Caesar postponed a decision and condemnation and apparently even wanted to leave her in office and dignity, they fled to Pompey. The reason was probably the contempt that the troops showed them when the situation came to light, the shame about their own offense and the fear that Caesar would still punish them.
At Pompey they were welcomed with open arms, because their position meant that they knew all of Caesar's defenses. They were able to provide precise information on the places where the fixings were faulty or incomplete, knew the timing and spatial distribution as well as the different levels of care taken by the guards.
Pompey's attack
The most suitable place for the planned attack was quickly identified. The farthest position from the main camp had a fortified wall against the enemy - a trench 15 feet wide and a palisade embankment 10 feet high and 15 feet wide - but a second wall facing the sea was incomplete. Caesar had only started this in the last few days, at a distance of 600 feet from the First, in the opposite direction, in order to prevent an attack from the sea. There were parts of the IX. Legion under the command of Quaestor Lentulus Marcellinus.
Pompey had entrenchments assembled and wickerwork made as protection against projectiles. He had this material brought onto ships at night with archers and light infantry. He himself pulled together a total of 60 cohorts and advanced with them against the position described above. At the same time, the ships rowed around the position and the troops landed on the beach.
Pompey attacked the position with heavy fire, filled the trenches and brought ladders and siege equipment. The wicker walls protected them from stones, the only projectiles the Caesarians had. The Caesarians got more and more distressed and could only hold their position with difficulty. The Pompeians landing from the ships now fell to the IX. through the gaps in the fastenings into the back. She was driven out of positions and forced to flee.
Marcellinus sent additional cohorts to support when he heard of the attack, but they could not stop the fleeing, nor were they up to the pursuing opponents themselves. Everything that was thrown at the troops only increased the panic, as the fear spread to the fresh troops and the routes of retreat were blocked by the crowds. The legionary eagle could only be saved with great difficulty and with the loss of all the centurions of the first cohort.
Pompey advanced further and further and approached the camp of Marcellinus. Then Mark Antony marched 12 cohorts from the next section. His appearance unsettled the attackers, who did not know how massive the advancing aid was, and Antonius managed to prevent the escape of the IX. to stop and regroup them.
Counterattack by Caesar
When Caesar arrived with further reinforcements, he found that Pompey had set up camp along the sea. So he could fetch food unhindered and had free access to the ships. The game started all over again, and he also built a camp nearby and fortified it.
About 500 paces from Pompey's camp was a fort that had been empty for a few days and has now been reoccupied by Pompeian troops. Their strength amounted to about a legion. This fort had already been fought over in various disputes and, unlike many others, was built like a castle with an inner citadel, in other words with a larger outer and a smaller enclosed wall, through several extensions. This fortification was surrounded by forest and built close to the beach.
Caesar put everything on one card to make amends for the defeat he had suffered. He left two cohorts in the camp and continued to dig in to give the impression that the camp would continue to be built. With the rest of the assembled troops, 33 cohorts, he attacked the fort.
The attempt to overpower the crew failed. She offered fierce resistance and withdrew, albeit with heavy losses, to the inner citadel. They could hold this position.
Caesar had divided his attack forces into two wings. With the left wing he attacked this fort directly, the right wing was supposed to bypass the position and take the gate and ramparts from the other side. These, however, erred in the direction and distance and, as they advanced through the forest, came across the wall of the Pompeian camp.
Panicked Escape - Pompey's Failure
A simple "getting lost" was the reason why Pompey was now warned. The Caesarians attacked on the assumption that it was the castle. Here too they initially succeeded, were able to take and tear down the walls and penetrate the camp. The entire cavalry followed them.
Pompey acted, gathered the five legions working here and counterattacked. At the same time he sent his cavalry against the advancing Caesarian horsemen.
Caesar's troops were now in dire straits, because the garrison of the citadel also noticed the attackers and in turn attacked the besiegers in order to unite with their own troops.
The situation was made worse by Caesar's cavalry. Pressed by the superior cavalry of the enemy and fear of being trapped and no longer being able to withdraw, they began to flee. The entire right wing followed them to the stormed ramparts of the Pompeian camp, which they had previously torn down. But here they did not hold their position, instead they jumped in panic from the ramparts into the ditch. A large number of the soldiers were not killed by the enemy, but rather trampled by their own people.
The left wing, on the one hand surprised by the counterattack of the citadel garrison, on the other hand unsettled by the flight of its own right wing, now feared being cut off too, and turned to flee. Thus a mass exodus developed against which Caesar was powerless.
That Caesar's army was not defeated here is due to Pompey's reaction. He feared an ambush and did not dare to advance as far as the ramparts, after he had just seen his people flee from there. Not even his riders could use the passage, as there were still Caesarians who could not move away after the escape route was blocked by the fleeing soldiers behind them.
Pompey has to be credited with the fact that he had no knowledge of the opponents' panic flight and therefore had no reason to vigorously pursue it.
consequences
Caesar lost about 1,000 legionnaires that day. Most of them were not killed by the enemy, but were trampled down by their own comrades. What made things so bad for him was the fact that among the dead were several well-known knights, five military tribunes and - particularly badly - 32 centurions. Labienus had the prisoners cruelly executed with scornful remarks.
Pompey was proclaimed emperor and celebrated "his" victory. The events led to high spirits and arrogance among the troops. One did not think of pursuing the enemy, or how to proceed, how to put an end to the war. You already felt like a winner.
There was no reflection whatsoever as to how this victory had come about or that it had not been achieved.
Caesar withdrew to Thessaly. This was followed in August by the battle of Pharsalus , in which Pompey was defeated.
swell
- Caesar, De bello civili , Third Book.
literature
- August Goler von Ravensburg: Civil war between Caesar and Pompey in 50/49 BC and the battles at Dyrrhachium and Pharsalus (1861) , Publisher: Kessinger Publishing, ISBN 978-1-16843-070-0 .
- Georg Veith : History of the campaigns of C. Julius Caesars , publisher: Let Me Print, ISBN 978-1-24635-794-3 .
- Luciano Canfora : Giulio Cesare. Il dittatore democratico , publisher: Laterza, October 2006, ISBN 978-8-84208-156-2 .
Web links
- The Dyrrhachium Campaign between Caesar and Pompey (PDF-German; 14.0 MB)
- Political and cultural development of Rome (The Republic in Crisis: Section 6)
- Battle of Dyrrhachium (UNRW-History - Roman Empire, English)
- Julius Caesar: The Life and Times of the People's Dictator
- Siege of Dyrrhachium by Jona Lendering (Caesar's History of the Civil War, 3.2-19, 23-31, 39-74, English)
- Battle of Dyrrhachium, 20 May 48 BC (Military History Encyclopedia on the Web)