End to the best explanation

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A conclusion to the best explanation (Inference to Best Explanation, IBE for short) is an abductive conclusion, with which a certain hypothesis is distinguished over other hypotheses. This happens either intuitively or according to a rationally reconstructable method. The systematics of such reconstructions are a topic of current philosophy of science and epistemology . The explanatory hypothesis can be identified with a scientific theory.

functionality

The starting point where an inference to the best explanation is applied is a set of observational data to be explained by a theory. This can be, for example, a series of illnesses for which there has not yet been an appropriate diagnosis, or a series of circumstantial evidence in a criminal case that causes a court to believe someone is the perpetrator. But it can also be that observations contradict an existing theory. In the 19th century, the astronomers James Challis and Urbain Le Verrier discovered that the orbit of Uranus could not be calculated correctly with the existing information. They concluded that at least one other planet must exist in the solar system. In fact, after that, Neptune was discovered in 1846. The science theorist Bas van Fraassen gives a simple example of an event that needs to be explained: a scratching on the wall, small footsteps and the lack of cheese. A conclusion to the best explanation would be a mouse in the house, since this has a plausible probability and can explain the three phenomena well.

There are authors who equate the conclusion to the best explanation with abduction . However, this is partially disputed. Statements can also be regarded as the best explanation when observations confirm a theory. For example: All observed A's were B's, so all A's are always B's. This conclusion has the form of an induction and can be regarded as the conclusion to the best explanation if it can be justified, i.e. if one examines the evidence of the statement. Such a reason can e.g. B. lie in the fact that the number of observations is very large. However, there is still a possibility of error. A well-known example is the assumption accepted in Europe that all swans are white, which was valid until black swans were discovered in Australia. Scientific examples in which inferences about the best explanation have not worked are the assumption of ether in physics and phlogiston and polywater in chemistry.

When the observed phenomena do not agree with a known theory, explanations usually follow the method of abduction.

A general abduction closure works like this:

  1. Premise 1: An event or phenomenon that requires explanation E
  2. Premise 2: A hypothesis H such that: H explains E.
  3. Conclusion : H is true.

Usually one looks for different explanations (hypotheses, theories) for newly observed phenomena and then selects the correct one that is associated with the highest degree of trust. The selection process for the best explanation can vary. Which choice is actually made is not determined by the conclusion on the best explanation itself, but by the existing background knowledge and the available methods for evaluating the alternatives.

First of all, a distinction can be made between a selective abduction and a creative abduction. The selective abduction is a choice from several known explanations that are present in the background. With creative abductions there are usually a myriad of explanations. There are various ways of filtering out a good theory from such a bundle. For example, conclusions by analogy based on similarities are known. As far as the theories / hypotheses can be evaluated with probabilities, these can be used. In the case of completely unknown phenomena, one can nevertheless come to the conclusion that the explanation that appears best is not sufficient. Reasons for this can be that individual observations contradict the theory, that the theory does not appear sufficiently coherent , that the extent of speculation appears too high because the number of observations is still small. A look at Occam's razor can also play a role here. The simpler and less complex a theory is and the fewer uncertain quantities are included, the more likely it is to be rationally believable.

literature

  • Gerhard Schurz : Introduction to the philosophy of science . WBG 2006 (p. 52f)
  • Bas van Fraassen : Laws and Symmetry , Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989, 142-70
  • Holger Klärner: The conclusion to the best explanation , de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, ISBN 978-3-11017721-3
  • Peter Lipton : Inference to the best explanation . Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London (2nd A.) 2004, ISBN 0-415-24202-9
  • Kenneth Schaffner: Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine . Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993
  • Wesley Salmon: Causality and Explanation . New York: Oxford University Press 1998

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Bas van Fraassen: The scientific image. Oxford University Press 1980, pp. 19-40, here 19-20
  2. ↑ Holger Klärner: The conclusion to the best explanation, de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 12
  3. ↑ Gilbert Harman: Inference to best Explanation ( Memento of the original from April 18, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. , The Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 1. (Jan., 1965), pp. 88-95, here, 90-91 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / people.cohums.ohio-state.edu
  4. ^ Karl Popper: Logic of Research, 9th improved edition. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1989, 4-8
  5. ↑ Jaakko Hintikka: "What is Abduction? The Fundamental Problem of Contemporary Epistemology", Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society, Vol. XXXIV (1998), no. 3, 503-533, here 528
  6. ↑ Gerhard Schurz: Common Cause Abduction and the Formation of Theoretical Concepts , Preprints Universität Düsseldorf 2008, 3-4
  7. ^ Gerhard Schurz: The importance of abductive reasoning in epistemology and philosophy of science , series of publications at the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Salzburg, Preprint 1995, 2
  8. ^ Peter Lipton: Inference to the Best Explanation, Routledge, London 1991, 58