Self-concept

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The self-image , how you perceive yourself, is measured against the ideal , i.e. how someone would like to be. Self-image and ideal image are summarized in the self-concept , which is always formed under the influence of interaction processes and by internalizing the judgments of others, but is relatively stable.
Knowledge of personal characteristics, skills, preferences, feelings and behavior is part of the self-concept.

In the current educational - psychological research are Herbert W. Marsh and Richard J. Shavelson important representatives of the self-concept research. You have worked significantly on researching school self-concepts , which are personal characteristics that influence learning and school choices.

Origin and social impact

Genetic (dispositional) and environmental, social factors interact with each other in the development of the self-concept . Inherited factors include temperament , certain personality dispositions, etc. (the proportion of genetic influence is disputed in research).

The social factors that determine the self-concept include: a. the following:

  • Social identity: The social identity is characterized by the fact that one feels that one belongs to certain social groups , for example the group "Germans", "Students", "Vegetarians" etc. Particularly when the group is a minority, people of their social identity are stronger deliberately.
  • Social role : The roles that people take on more or less voluntarily in daily life also determine their self-image . Certain social requirements are linked to certain roles, according to which one usuallybehaves unconsciously and thus adapts to the role. For example, teachers behave differently towards their students than towards their spouse. Or when people have children and now take on the role of parents, their behavior often changes towards a stronger “role model”.
A famous experiment that showed the adoption of role-specific behavior, even contrary to the original attitude, is the Stanford Prison Experiment by Philip Zimbardo . Test subjects were supposed to spend two weeks in an improvised "prison" (in the institute basement) and were randomly assigned to either the guard or the prisoner role. Although the people before the experiment said that they would show little consideration for this distribution of roles and never use violence or other tough measures, both groups identified with their roles so strongly that the situation escalated and the experiment was discontinued.
  • Social comparison: After the social comparison theory of Leon Festinger judging his own abilities and characteristics, if no objective standards are present, by comparison with others. So one found z. B. found that students in whose class there were only a few good classmates rated their performance as better than students with many good others in their class. The social comparison affects the academic self-concept ( see also: Big Fish Little Pond Effect .)
  • Successes and failures: The consequences of people's behavior and their expressions also influence the formation of their self-image. If you experience a lot of failures, you rate your own abilities as low and less valuable.
  • Culture: Collectivist cultures (especially in the Asian area) place more value on group membership, on the opinion and views of others and the well-being of the community. A more interdependent self-concept arises here . This includes other people and groups in your own self-concept. Says z. For example, if a group to which a person feels they belong breaks away from it, an important part of the person's self-concept is also lost.
Individualistic cultures place more value on performance and personality traits of the individual. A more independent self-concept arises here . This hardly includes other people and is based more on one's own personality traits, attitudes and skills. Intercultural differences of this kind can be determined, for example, through the Twenty Statements Test .

Difference between identity and self-concept

First, identity denotes the sign of "complete correspondence with what it is or what it is called". The concept of self-concept differs from the concept of identity in that the former can differ from reality. Second, the concept of identity can be defined as "direct perception of one's own equality and continuity in time (...) and the associated perception that others also recognize this equality and continuity". Here, identity is socially situated: the focus is on both one's own and other people's perceptions of the respective subject. Since perceptions of self and others are also a constitutive part of the self-image, this work does not position itself with a strict separation of the two concepts, but with a merging process or an overlap of self-concept and identity.

Essential functions of the self-concept

Self-schemas , possible selves and the self-concept have important functions. Self-schemas influence and organize the processing of self-related information. They serve as the basis for decisions, assessments and conclusions with regard to oneself. Possible selves are essential to develop ideas and goals for the future and to generate motivation.

The basic function of the self-concept is to structure the perception and interpretation of self-related information. An appropriately developed self-concept provides a person with a contextualized evaluation and interpretation framework for the current perception of himself.

According to Epstein, self-concept organizes experiences a person has in social interactions into predictable sequences of possible behaviors and reactions. As a further fundamental function, he states that the self-concept tries to meet one's own needs in the sense of a pleasant balance of comfort and discomfort. At the same time, efforts are made to avoid disapproval from others and oppressive feelings of anxiety. If the self-concept is threatened or fails to implement one or more of these basic functions, this leads to stress, which may be. increases to such an extent that self-theory collapses. The person eventually experiences this condition as a complete disorganization. If, on the other hand, the self-theory works, the positive assessment of oneself can be maintained and stability with regard to one's own identity can be established.

Concept after William James

William James differentiated in the first basic work on self-between ( Engl. ) Me or empirical self and I , which is also called pure ego. (a) The Me, as the “objective” self, represents the object of self-definition; it is the present bodily existence felt with the senses, which can also be observed by others. The self-concept represents the dispositional , i.e. , temporally enduring part of the Me . (B) As a judging and evaluating authority that is only available to the individual, the I, on the other hand, defines the self. James defines it as "what is awareness in every moment"; so the subjective and fleeting thought that stores, judges and remembers self-feelings. Since the I stands for the existence of reflexive consciousness as such, only the Me can be a legitimate object of empirical science. I is the knower - the knowing, acting, active part of the self. Me is the known - the known, the foundation of the personality.

George Herbert Mead expanded the concept based on William James. Mead transfers James' categorization of the self in I and Me to the relationship between the individual and society: (a) The individual first opens up the perspective of others and ultimately the entire community by taking on roles. In addition, it develops a me or a self-perception that is primarily shaped by social norms of behavior. (b) The conceptual difference of the I lies in the fact that it embodies an active-creating response from the individual: it also reacts to a situation constituted by norms and expectations, but it can change it on its own. If this is applied to teachers with a migration background, for example, one component of their self is guided by the behavioral norms and expectations that society may have of them as fellow human beings with a migration background. However, through the second component of your self, the I , you can show competencies to create new things and bring about social change. It is conceivable, for example, that they assumed that they would not be able to become a teacher in Germany due to a lack of role models and the fact that their social environment gave them negative professional opportunities. Despite such conventions, your I provided the perspective and the courage to find a way there.

The self-concept from a social and cognitive psychological perspective

Scientists from the field of psychology usually approach the concept of self-concept with a cognitive psychological or a social psychological perspective. The former focuses on what can be called a self-concept and how this is present in humans. The social psychological perspective, on the other hand, focuses on sources of the self-concept, which v. a. in social interactions and perceptions or ascriptions of a person through their environment.

Cognitive representations as an illustration of the self-concept

In people's minds there are cognitive representations of themselves; self-related information is stored there. Filipp describes the entirety of all stored self-related data as an “internal self-model” (ibid.). The self-concept is accordingly a hypothetical construct that is composed of all self-related perceptions as well as information from a wide variety of individual experiences.

These areas of experience come from two dimensions of personality: (a) the cognitive component, which relates to factual information about the person, such as their hair color or size; (b) the affective component, which reflects a person's feelings about himself. An example of the latter is the thought "I am too small."

Mummendey continues this approach by adding an action component to the cognitive and affective component or mind and feeling. A person's behavior arises before or results from the first two components. It is in direct interaction with them and can therefore also be considered as part of the self-concept. A person's cognitive representations of himself or herself may correspond to reality or be very different from reality. For example, a person who has learned a foreign language (such as German) and speaks it fluently and without errors can still think of himself based on his own perceptions: “My German is very bad.” And thus have developed or consolidated an unrealistic self-schema.

The self-concept between stability and dynamism

With regard to the factor dynamics, two directions can be emphasized in self-concept research: While differential research regards the self-concept as a stable system, process-oriented research understands it as a dynamic construct. With regard to the stability of the self-concept, research shows two tendencies of people: (a) Self-verification describes the need for confirmation and thus for the maintenance of existing schemes, even if existing negative concepts remain the same. (b) In the context of self-enhancement, scientists assume a predominant tendency of people to maintain and develop positive self-schemas and to reduce negative aspects. Here the focus is on maintaining a positive image of yourself. Work in self-concept research mainly tends to deal with the protection of the self-concept. Many scientists are concerned with the question of how to maintain or consolidate a positive self-concept. With regard to research, it can be stated that people have a need for a certain stability of their self-concept and this represents the foundation for a stable awareness of their own identity.

The process-oriented discourse emphasizes the changeability as well as the context and situation dependence of the self-concept. This arises and changes in connection with conditions, experiences and observations of the person in their environment as well as the inner experience of the individual.

Scientists have shown that people need a fundamental stability and continuity in their self-image. In the course of life, however, new experiences and immense changes also lead to them perceiving certain self-schemata or themselves as a person differently or in a new way. If the self-concept is secured by a stable framework, change processes could be initiated and continued at individual points without the self-image of the individual collapsing.

Multidimensionality of the self-concept: Possible selves

In self-concept research, there is broad agreement on the multidimensionality of the self-image. People's knowledge of themselves is not available as a unit, but rather the self-related cognitions are available as knowledge about themselves in specific sub-areas and, overall, form an organized whole. However, there is disagreement about the structure and organization of these multiple situation and area-specific partial self-concepts.

Not all of the various self-representations that the complete or global self-concept contain are available at all times: The term working self describes the self-concept of the present moment. This represents a continuously active and shifting spectrum of the currently available or accessible self-knowledge. Possible selves are called different versions of the self that a person can imagine in the future:

  1. Present selves (also known as current / now selves ) represent how a person sees himself or herself at the moment and influence the extent to which he or she wishes for a corresponding or modified self in the future.
  2. To the extent that past selves may shape an individual again in the future, they too can be seen as possible selves: For example, teachers will never be students again, but their self-perceptions from this time can be activated again in everyday school life and their dealings with shape with learners.
  3. Ideal selves depict who and how a person would ideally be in the future. Like many other possible selves, they are u. a. direct results of comparing one's feelings, traits, thoughts and behaviors with those of significant other people in that person's life. P. 954.
  4. The versions of the self that a person definitely does not want to be in the future can be categorized as 'not-me' selves .
  5. Versions of the self that a person fears to become have negative connotations according to the 'not-me' selves.

In summary, possible selves represent the cognitive components of goals, fears and hopes and thus the conceptual connection between cognition and motivation. Some of these partial self-concepts are more relevant to a person than others. In the course of time they can shift from the periphery to the core of the overall self-concept and vice versa. Aspects of a previous self-concept that are no longer current can still be relevant if they are significant for how a person currently sees himself. In conclusion, it depends on the situation and context which versions of the self are active at a given point in time.

Social interactions as a source of self-concept

Scientists in social psychology largely agree that a person's self-concept is largely derived from their experiences of social interaction. In doing so, scientists contradict the popular view in society of introspectively preserved self-knowledge, according to which one has to look into oneself to know who or how one is. In particular, the reactions of interaction partners to personal content that a person reveals influence their self-concept.

The importance of social interactions as a source of self-concept can be combined with the symbolic interactionism according to Blumer. Blumer states that the meaning of social relationships, situations and objects is brought about in symbolically mediated processes of communication and interaction. Transferred to the self-concept, this means that an interaction partner can recognize himself as an object by adopting the attitude of other individuals towards himself (in each case within a social environment or an experience and behavioral context).

The concept of the Reflected Appraisal states that people represent a mirror for one another, from which one perceives who one is. Figuratively speaking, the mirror is the behavior of others towards the perceiving individual. The person concludes or interprets from this how other people see them and adopts this assumption in their self-concept. The theory of reflected appraisal as the source of the self-concept thus states that to a large extent one perceives oneself as one suspects to be perceived by others.

This can be illustrated by the following example: If a teacher perceives that other teachers in the staff are avoiding her, it is possible that she concludes, “I am unpopular.” Social interactions are a source of a person's self-concept of particular relevance, since the social recognition of the individual is an essential human basic need.

Social recognition usually arises when a person corresponds to the role models expected of them. In this context, Fremdling states that a person's self-concept is defined by the fulfillment or non-fulfillment “of the role that is brought to a person from outside, into which one slips [or is] pressed”. If the self fulfills the role expected of it and can expand it, positive feelings arise. However, when it is pushed into a role that it cannot or does not want to fulfill, the self feels bad. Since social recognition is a deep human need, health and identity-damaging consequences can arise if unattainable demands or roles in which a person feels uncomfortable predominate. If this is the case or if the person does not see any possibility of changing an unwanted or unattainable role that is continuously brought up to them, the negative feelings take on until they change e.g. B. discharged in burn-out syndrome or the breakdown of self-theory.

See also

literature

  • Annemarie Laskowski (2000): What drives people, development and influencing of self-concept , campus, ISBN 3-593-36478-6
  • Bettina Hannover (2002): The Dynamic Self. The context dependence of self- related knowledge , Bern: Huber, ISBN 3456827989
  • M. Ghin: What a Self Could Be. In: Psyche. (11) 5, 2005, pp. 1-10.
  • Helga Schachinger : The self, the self-knowledge and the feeling for one's own worth. 2005, ISBN 3-456-84188-4
  • Hans D. Mummendey : Chapter 4: Self, self-concept and self-concept research in psychology of self-expression , Göttingen: Hogrefe-Verlag, 1995, ISBN 3-8017-0709-1

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