Situation logic

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Situation logic is an explanatory approach represented by Karl Popper in action theory , which seeks to understand historical and social processes from the logic of the situation.

In microeconomics or in neoclassical theory there is a certain tradition of tracing the decisions of economic subjects back to a “logic of the situation”.

“If, for example, I find that - under certain conditions - the immediate profits of a company reach their maximum at an output at which the marginal costs are equal to the marginal revenue (the latter being equal to the price under perfect competition), then it can be said that I express the logic of the situation and a result that is just as valid as a rule of general logic, regardless of whether someone acts on it or not. "

Following this tradition of economic analysis and Max Weber's understanding sociology , Popper rejects a justification of the theory of action through psychological hypotheses.

“… This psychological part of the explanation is very often trivial compared to the detailed definition of his actions by what one might call the logic of the situation . ... The method of applying situation logic to the social sciences does not rely on any psychological assumption about the rationality (or other salient quality) of 'human nature'. On the contrary: when we speak of 'rational behavior' or 'irrational behavior', we mean behavior that or does not correspond to the logic of the situation. In fact, the psychological decomposition of an action into its motives - as Max Weber has shown - presupposes that we have already developed a standard by which we can judge what is to be considered rational in the situation in question. "

"The 'zero method' of constructing rational models is not a psychological, but a logical method."

Evaluation and criticism

For Lawrence A. Boland, Popper used situation logic to show neoclassical economists the method they themselves have used up to now. E. Matzner and A. Bhaduria come to the exact opposite view: the conventional equilibrium analysis completely disregards essential elements such as uncertainty, time and space, interaction, unintended consequences as well as culture and institutions.

For Peter Hedström , Richard Swedberg and Lars Udehn , Popper's approach adds little to the current debate about the rational choice theory , mainly because it is too vague and too general. While he does not consider interests and interaction, he does include social institutions. William A. Gorton believes Popper's approach can be integrated into analytical Marxism . Hristos Verikukis points to a possible inconsistency between Popper's falsificationism , which is based on the critical examination of nomological hypotheses, and the action-theoretical approach he proposed. Mario Bunge does not consider Popper's logic of situation to be a permanent contribution, because it is empirically empty , just like his principle of rationality .

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  1. ^ Joseph A. Schumpeter : History of economic analysis. Vol. 1, Göttingen 1965 (first: 1952). P. 48
  2. ↑ Karl R. Popper, The open society and their enemies, Vol. 2: Falsche Propheten - Hegel, Marx and the consequences. Tübingen 7th edition 1992 (first: 1944). P. 114f
  3. ^ Karl R. Popper: The misery of historicism. Tübingen 6th edition 1987 (first: 1957): p. 123
  4. ↑ Lawrence A. Boland: Situational Analysis beyond Neoclassical Economists (PDF; 21 kB)
  5. ^ E. Matzner, A. Bhaduri: The socioeconomic context: An alternative approach to Popper's situational analysis = Le contexte socio-économique: une approche alternative de l'analyse situationnelle de Popper. Philosophy of the social sciences , 1998, vol. 28, no 4, pp. 484-551 (1 p.1 / 4), pp. 484-497. ISSN  0048-3931
  6. ^ Peter Hedström, Richard Swedberg, Lars Udehn: Popper's situational analysis and contemporary sociology. Stockholm, Department of Sociology, Stockholm university, 1997, 35 p., 50 ref. (Working paper series / Work-Organization-Economy 56). ISSN  1400-4232
  7. ^ William A. Gorton: Karl Popper and the social sciences. 2006.
  8. ↑ Hristos Verikukis: Popper's Double Standard of Scientificity in Criticizing Marxism ( Memento of the original from July 16, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 341 kB) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / clogic.eserver.org
  9. ^ Mario Bunge: The seven pillars of Popper's social philosophy. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 26, 4, 1996. pp. 528-556

literature

  • Karl R. Popper: La rationalité et le statut du principe de rationalité. In: Jacques Rueff, (ed.): Les fondéments philosophiques des systèmes économiques. Paris 1967, pp. 142-150.
  • Spiro J. Latsis: Situational Determinism in Economics. British Journal of Philosophy of science, 1972, pp. 207-245.