South Canyon Fire

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View of the west flank of the hill where 12 of the firefighters lost their lives.

The South Canyon Fire was a forest fire triggered by lightning that burned from July 2 to 11, 1994 in the area of Storm King Mountain in the White River National Forest of Colorado , USA , and reached an area of ​​8.6 km². 14 firefighters died on July 6th from a blow-up , making the fire one of the most casualty fire department tragedies in US history.

Location and course of the fire

The fire was located about 11 km west of Glenwood Springs at the southern end of a ridge that ends in a northerly direction at Storm King Mountain. This ridge was bounded east and west by canyons , and south by Interstate 70 and the Colorado River . The vegetation on the ridge consisted mainly of Gambel oaks on the north and west slopes, and pinyon pines and grasses on the south, south-west and east. At the bottom of the western canyon there were grasses, bushes and isolated Douglas firs , some of which could also be found on the lower western slope. For the next three days, the fire burned with low intensity down the slopes covered with rubble, grass, bushes, and trees.

On the afternoon of July 6, a dry cold front with westerly winds reached the fire area. Due to the topography of the western canyon and the southern canyon of the Colorado River, part of the westerly wind was pushed north through the canyon. The warming of the upper slopes also induced a general upward flow of air and created a low pressure area at the entrance to the canyon, causing even more air to flow from the Colorado River canyon into the canyon. The increasingly strong westerly winds of the cold front carried the air away from the top of the canyon to the east, creating a pressure-induced wind flow from the Colorado River canyon through the canyon. Some photos and video recordings that were taken during the blow-up show smoke movements and, from 4:10 p.m. onwards, illustrated the complexity and turbulence of the surface winds , which passed through the canyon at top speeds of up to 72 km / h.

This wind caused the fire to spread from the western slope of the ridge into the western canyon. From there, the fire moved as a closed front from the western slope over the canyon and the opposite slope of the canyon towards the north, reaching an estimated speed of 60 meters per minute, favored by the combination of steep slopes, strong winds and combustible vegetation. Due to the higher westerly winds, the flames also hit eastwards towards the ridge, a phenomenon known as “hook and run”. During the blow-up , the flame front shot up the western slope and rolled over part of the retreating firefighters within a few minutes.

The fire burned on both sides of the western canyon to the main body of Storm King Mountain and further east before extinguishing on July 11th.

Fire fighting

First measures

The fire did not become known to the authorities until around 11 a.m. on July 3 and was located in a steep and inaccessible area. As there was a high risk of fire in the Grand Junction district at that time and 31 fires of varying intensity were already active on July 4th, no resources could be allocated for the South Canyon Fire for the time being.

It was not until July 5th that seven BLM firefighters under the commandant Butch Blanco advanced across the eastern canyon to the source of the fire. They set up a helicopter landing pad ( Helispot 1 ) at the highest point of the ridge north of the fire and started building a firebreak down the hill. At around 3 p.m., a fire-fighting aircraft was used for the first time to protect the interstate in the south. At 5:30 p.m., the firefighters withdrew from their location to renew their equipment.

At around 5:45 p.m., eight smoke jumpers landed under their commandant Don Mackey in the drop zone on the ridge further north. Mackey notified Blanco that the fire was actively burning and had skipped the BLM men's firebreak. The smoke jumpers then began to build a firebreak on the east side of the fire.

Action on July 6th

From 5:30 a.m. on July 6, eleven BLM and FS firefighters marched across the western canyon to the ridge and set up another helicopter landing pad ( Helispot 2 ) about 400 meters north of Helispot 1 . At around 8:45 am, Blanco and Mackey discussed the tactics for the day ahead. The firebreak between the helispots was to be expanded and another firebreak built on the western flank.

At 10:27 a.m. eight more smoke jumpers landed in the drop zone north of Helispot 2 and helped the other smoke jumpers to build the firebreak on the western flank, supported by a fire-fighting helicopter. By 1 p.m., ten elite firefighters from the Prineville HotShots under the direction of Tom Shepard were also flown to Helispot 2 , nine of whom were deployed with the Smokejumpers on the west flank. Shepard stayed on the ridge of the hill. The unit's ten other hotshots waited at Canyon Creek Estates for further orders.

Between 2 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. most of the hotshots and smoke jumpers stayed for lunch on a hill along a ridge that runs downhill at the southern end of the aisle and was later referred to as the Lunchspot Ridge . Smokejumper Dale Longanecker explored an area in the southwest from there. At 3:15 p.m., the ten remaining hotshots were flown in to Helispot 2 and used to expand the firebreak between Helispot 1 and the start of the western firebreak on the ridge, known as Zero Point .

From 3:30 p.m. Don Mackey noticed the increasing wind activity from the west and commissioned two of his men as observers, who were supposed to warn the forces on the west flank of any loose debris from above and of individual fires triggered by flying sparks. While the wind on the ridge was strong and gusty, it remained relatively calm on the west flank. At this point, most of the firefighters on the western firebreak were north and south of Lunch Spot Ridge , between 440 and 570 meters from Zero Point .

Within the next half hour, a single fire developed on the ridge and east of it, about 60 meters south of Zero Point . The fire southwest of Lunch Spot Ridge also intensified and burned up the hill. Due to the strong west wind, an attempt to extinguish the fire on the ridge with a helicopter failed. To support the BLM and FS firefighters who fought the fire on the ridge, the hotshots were withdrawn from their work at Helispot 2 and also reassigned to the fire further north on the ridge.

Smoke rose from the western canyon just after 4 p.m. and the fire southwest of Lunch Spot Ridge began to spread northeast. Smokejumper Anthony Petrilli briefed Don Mackey on the situation and then withdrew with the others to Lunch Spot Ridge . The fire on the slope already burned 235 meters to the ridge and moved further north, while smoke in the canyon also increased. At the ridge of the hill efforts had to be stopped to bring the fire under control. Shepard and Blanco then gave the order to withdraw to the safety zone at Helispot 1 . Some of the forces moved up the hill over Lunch Spot Ridge , while some climbed as a closed group along the firebreak through the western flank. The pilot of a fire-fighting helicopter, which was supposed to enable the forces on the ridge to reach the safety zone, estimated the westerly wind speed to be at least 80 km / h.

Blowup

Due to the increasing fire on the ridge and on the western flank, the attempt to reach Helispot 1 had to be abandoned. Helispot 2 in the north was agreed as the new safety zone . At around 4:05 p.m., 30 more smoke jumpers arrived at Canyon Creek Estates. At 4:11 p.m. Butch Blanco requested air support from Helispot 2 because the fire was out of control. On the ridge of the hill, the flames between Helispot 1 and Spure Ridge (a ridge south of Zero Point running down the ridge ) reached a length of more than 60 meters.

Within the next two minutes, a front of flames in a blowup rolled over the west flank and shot over the ridge. The hotshots Kathi Beck, Tamera Bickett, Scott Blecha, Levi Brinkley, Douglas Dunbar, Terri Hagen, Bonnie Holtby, Rob Johnson and Jon Kelso, as well as the smoke jumpers Don Mackey, Roger Roth and Jim Thrash were run over between 36 and 85 meters below the ridge and killed. The two smoke jumpers Kevin Erickson and Eric Hipke made it over the ridge to the east side, but suffered second and third degree burns. According to the investigation report by the Accident Investigation Team , the flames were up to 90 meters long and beat uphill at up to 30 km / h.

The ridge group, which was heading towards Helispot 2 , fled over the east side into the eastern canyon and from there reached the interstate in the south. The two Helitacks used in Helispot 2 , Robert Browning and Richard Tyler, fled for unknown reasons northwest of the drop zone into rocky terrain, where they were overtaken and killed by the fire at around 4:22 p.m. The two had tried to save themselves in their Fire Shelters . The eight smoke jumpers at Lunch Spot Ridge had withdrawn into their fire shelters and survived on an area devoid of vegetation that had burned down the days before. In addition, an aircraft had dropped fire-retardant extinguishing agents over their position. There they held out for about 45 minutes due to the heat of the fire about 150 meters away. Dale Longanecker had survived near the lunch spot without a fire shelter.

Effects

monument

The tragedy was investigated by a Fire Accident Investigation Team , which published its report in August 1994. Based on the results of this report, a plan to improve the safety of fire fighters was drawn up and was published as a follow-up report in October 1994. Further additions appeared in the final report from June 1995. The OSHA also investigated the incident and submitted its own report in February 1995.

Due to the South Canyon Fire, radio equipment was introduced across the board. It also scrutinized fire departments' decision-making and strategies, leading to changes in the National Weather Service's fire forecast division that doubled the number of fire forecasters and found ways to provide up-to-the-minute weather information, including key details about the wind, a fire and can trigger its direction. The Storm King Mountain Memorial Trail was created at the scene of the event as a memorial trail .

One of the survivors, Eric Hipke, later became an audiovisual specialist for the United States Forest Service, and in that capacity created a training video for fire departments about the South Canyon Fire. Dale Longanecker retired in 2011 with 896 jumps, 362 of them over fire areas, with a record among smoke jumpers.

The life of the late Smokejumpers Don Mackey was loosely filmed in 1996 with Adam Baldwin in the lead role ( Smoke Jumpers - Operation in Hell of Flames ).

literature

  • Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire by John N. Maclean

Web links