Strategic move
In game theory , a strategic move is an action with which an actor preempts others by announcing his decision. Your own answer rule is determined before the other side makes their move. The strategic move consists of the elements action plan and self-commitment.
Types of strategic moves
The aim of strategic moves is to change the opponent's expectations about future actions. You should influence the opponent in such a way that his actions develop to your own advantage. The decisive characteristic is that such a move deliberately restricts one's own freedom of action, because a lack of freedom of action has strategic value.
There are two types of strategic moves, the unconditional and conditional moves.
Unconditional moves
The essential feature of an unconditional move is that the actions of the players consciously take place one after the other for strategic reasons. This means that a player acts without restriction and independently of the actions of his opponents.
Conditional moves
Conditional strategic moves are essentially characterized by the fact that you can gain a strategic advantage in the game even if you do not make the first move. Before the other players turn, it is determined how you will react to their actions. The parties concerned must be made aware of this. However, this limits your ability to act on your own move, because the opponents have already been made known beforehand which action they can expect. But this very action can turn into a strategic advantage. With this so-called response rule , the response is determined in a way that would never take place without response rule. The action taken cannot be appropriate at all, since if it were, the response regime would be of no use.
Credibility of strategic moves
If a player has committed himself to a specific action plan, he must also make it credible to his opponent. This can be done through the following behaviors:
- threat
- The announcement of an unpleasant measure or effect for the opponent in the event of non-cooperation.
- promise
- A promise ties an opponent's action to a reward. There are compelling and deterrent promises.
- warning
- A warning is used in game theory to inform others of the consequences of their actions. With the warning, an actor cannot force his opponent to act, but only informs about the consequences.
- Affirmation
- Used in game theory when it is in the interests of the player to keep a promise.
example
The scorched earth war tactic is one of the strategic moves. The opponent is informed in advance that in the event of an attack on a region nothing will be left behind that could be of use to the attacker in any way. In order to make the opponent's actions plausible, the strategic move must contain an action plan and a credible link to this plan, the so-called self-commitment. The credibility of this threat can be ensured by the commander-in-chief issuing an order that the army should destroy anything with potential benefit to the enemy in the event of an attack.
literature
- Thomas Riechmann: Game Theory . 2nd Edition. Verlag Vahlen, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-8006-3505-4
- Avinash K.Dixit / Barry J. Nalebuff (eds.): Game theory for beginners - strategic know-how for winners . Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, Stuttgart 1997, ISBN 3-7910-1239-8 , 371 pages (basic literature on this article)
- Avinash K. Dixit / Susan Skeath (eds.): Games of Strategy . Second edition. WW Norton & Company, 2004, ISBN 0-393-92499-8 , 665 pages
- Christina E. Bannier: Contract Theory - An Introduction with Examples and Applications from Financial Economics . Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg 2005, ISBN 3-7908-1573-X