Promise (game theory)
The promise , in the game theory sense, is a conditional strategic move that ties an opponent's action to a reward.
Are the players z. B. in the prisoner's dilemma , a promise reinforces the opponent to maintain the status quo . The credibility of the promise is important and can be achieved through a commitment to the action plan. Self-commitment and an action plan are elements of the strategic move . The opponent must have knowledge of the promise before his move, i.e. he must know what reactions he can expect. The promise can also be assigned to non-cooperative game theory or non-cooperative games. Non-cooperative games are characterized by the fact that a cooperation has not been determined in advance and no player has to commit to it. However, cooperation is not ruled out.
Types of promises
Essentially, a distinction is made between two types of promises, the compulsory and the deterrent promise. Another expression is the empty promise, which, compared to the two previously mentioned, does not occupy such an important position.
Coercive promises
A compelling promise is supposed to actively trigger a certain action by the opponent. The following example is intended to illustrate a compelling promise.
During the year, parents regularly remind their child to be good. In order to achieve this, they promise the child many nice presents from Santa Claus, if they behave appropriately.
With the prospect of the many beautiful gifts for Christmas, which are a reward, the parents want to force good behavior on the child. The credibility of this statement must be conveyed by appropriate behavior on the part of the parents. So the year before, when giving presents, a Santa Claus with a rod should list his good and bad deeds to the child and explain their effects on the yield of gifts.
Chilling promises
A deterrent promise, in turn, serves to refrain from an ugly action. In other words, a promise should prevent undesirable behavior. The parents and their child should again be used as an example.
Before going to the doctor, parents promise their child that they will go to the cinema with him afterwards, if he does not cry when the doctor is vaccinated. The unpleasant act in this case is the child crying at the vaccination. It is precisely this behavior that the child should refrain from. This omission should be brought about with the prospect of the reward, the subsequent visit to the cinema. In order to make the promise credible, the parents and the child could reserve tickets for the performance before the doctor's visit.
Empty promises
Empty promises are characterized by the fact that the credibility of the occurrence of the reward is limited. The probability of the reward for the opponent occurring is very low or nonexistent. It is important that the opponent is aware of this fact. In the example of an empty promise, reference should be made to that of the enforcing promise. In the new situation, all seats for the film have already been sold and the child is aware of this fact. The promise to go to the cinema after the doctor's visit, provided the child doesn't cry, has lost credibility for the child. The probability that the reward will occur has decreased for the opponent, which in turn can result in a change in his strategy for action.
supporting documents
- ↑ cf. Professor Rieck's game theory page
- ↑ cf. Victory, p. 32
literature
- Siegfried K. Berninghaus; Karl-Martin Ehrhart; Werner Güth: Strategic games: An introduction to game theory , Springer textbook, 2005, ISBN 978-3540284147
- Avinash K.Dixit / Barry J. Nalebuff (eds.): Game theory for beginners - strategic know-how for winners , Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag Stuttgart, 1997, ISBN 3-7910-1239-8 , 371 pages (basic literature on this article)
- Gernot Sieg: Game Theory , Oldenbourg, 2nd edition, 2005, ISBN 3486275267