Incident CSX 8888

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Route from CSX 8888 (starting north near Toledo, Ohio)
A CSX-SD40-2 locomotive, the type that was involved in the incident

When CSX 8888 incident , also known as "Crazy Eights" (German Crazy Look ), rolled on 15 May 2001 an unmanned train with dangerous goods nearly two hours at a speed of up to km 82 / h 106 km far by the American State Ohio . The event served as the basis for the movie Unstoppable .

Course of events

On 15 May 2001 a few minutes before 12:35 scrapped the engine driver of the diesel locomotive of the type no. 8888 EMD SD40-2 the freight train of Y11615 CSX Transportation in the marshalling yard Stanley Yard in Walbridge at Toledo . The train should be parked in the exit group of the station . The 2,944.5 ton train consisted of a locomotive and 47 freight cars , 25 of which were empty. Toxic and corrosive phenol was in liquid form in two tank cars on the train .

It was intended during the Rangiermanövers in front of a still to be converted into end Soft stop, which due to damp track but failed and the mass of the train. The brakeman and the shunter were not on the train. The engine driver left the driver's cab at a speed of around 13 km / h at around 12:35 p.m. in order to run past the moving locomotive to the switch and switch it.

In order to slow down the journey, he activated the locomotive brake fully and also wanted to switch on the dynamic brake - which he did not, however. However, since he assumed he had activated the locomotive's dynamic brake, he had set the power regulator to the highest level. By reversing the motors to generators , this would have led to the highest possible braking effect, whereas the motor received full drive power with a fully acting mechanical brake at the same time. Since the locomotive brake was fully activated at the same time and a correspondingly low pressure was present in the brake line, the dead man's device (for switching off the engine) was deactivated. The train's compressed air braking system was not connected, as is usual with shunting trips.

The train driver succeeded in switching the points as intended, but he was no longer able to successfully jump onto the now faster train. During his attempt, he slipped on the damp steps and handrails so that he could not pull himself onto the rolling vehicle. After being dragged 24 meters, he let go. He suffered minor injuries.

Mobile track block

The train driver immediately informed the manager of the marshalling yard . The train was then directed to the south-leading "Toledo Branch". Since this route had a traffic control system , it was possible to continuously monitor the train. The shunter of the train and another railroad worker chased the train and tried unsuccessfully to jump up at a level crossing. Since they did not know that the train driver had jumped off in the marshalling yard, they suspected that he had suffered a heart attack. At 12:38 p.m., the local authorities and the police were informed of the passed train.

The attempt to stop the train at Galatea with a mobile derailment device failed. The attempts by the police to trigger the emergency fuel shut-off valve by shooting were equally unsuccessful. The oncoming train Q63615 was directed to a siding in Dunkirk . Its locomotive CSX 8392 (also an SD40-2) was uncoupled and waited for the CSX 8888 to pass. The train crew of this train (a driver with 31 years of experience in operation and a train attendant with one year of experience) were instructed to use their locomotive to follow the continuous train. They managed to couple at mile post 67. At that time the train was traveling 82 km / h. With the dynamic brake of their own locomotive, the two railroad workers managed to reduce the speed of the train to 18 km / h. This allowed a train master to jump up and turn off the locomotive at 2:30 p.m. south of Kenton .

To further slow down the train, it was planned to put another locomotive in front of the train south of Kenton. However, this much more dangerous maneuver was no longer necessary.

During the follow-up examination of the locomotive, it was found that the brake blocks of the locomotive were completely worn out.

Evaluation of the incident

The incident was investigated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Above all, attention was paid to whether the event had occurred as a result of the unfortunate concatenation of various circumstances, or whether such an incident could possibly occur more frequently. The FRA investigation came to the conclusion that the event had no systemic cause, but was due to the employee's individual misconduct. For example, the train driver had not sufficiently observed the speed during the shunting drive, he left the moving locomotive, he used the dynamic brake, although it is unsuitable at low speeds, and he believed that using the compressed air brake would improve the effectiveness of the locomotive brake. The coincidence of so many errors is relatively unlikely.

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