Wildlife suffering

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A red-tailed buzzard eats a California vole .

Wildlife suffering refers to the suffering of animals in nature, which is caused by diseases, injuries, hunger or natural disasters as well as killing by other animals. The starting point for this is the current state of scientific research, which assumes the consciousness and pain perception of animals . Wildlife suffering has historically been addressed in the context of religious philosophy in the discussion of the theodicy question ( CS Lewis , Michael Murray, Stephen Gould , Jeff McMahan , Charles Darwin ).

The focus of animal ethics , which has attracted attention since the 1980s, until recently was almost exclusively on the welfare and proper handling of captive animals. Recently, some animal ethicists have rejected this focus as too one-sided and placed it on animals living in the wild. It is discussed whether and to what extent humans are obliged to reduce the suffering of wild animals and to intervene in nature for this purpose. Main contributors to this discussion include Jeff McMahan, Yew-Kwang Ng , Daniel Dorado, Ole Martin Moen, Oscar Horta, Mikel Torres, Luciano Carlos Cunha, Brian Tomasik, David Pearce, Jacy Reese, Eze Paez, Beril Sözmen, and Catia Faria.

Empirical starting point: the extent of suffering in nature

Compatibility of suffering with evolution

In his autobiography, Charles Darwin admitted that the existence of grave suffering in nature is perfectly compatible with the functioning of natural selection. He argued, however, that pleasure is the main driver of fitness- increasing behavior of organisms. Evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins challenged Darwin's claim in his book River Out of Eden , in which he argues that wildlife suffering must be extensive through a combination of the following evolutionary mechanisms:

  • Selfish Gene (English selfish genes ) - As long as the DNA is passed, genes are completely indifferent to the well-being of individual organisms.
  • Struggle for Existence - The competition for limited resources leads to the death of the majority of organisms before they can pass on their genes.
  • Malthusian Trap - Resource-rich periods within an ecosystem ultimately lead to overpopulation and subsequently to the collapse of populations.

From this Dawkins concludes that nature, as an inevitable consequence of natural selection , must necessarily involve vast amounts of suffering for animals. By way of explanation he wrote:

A litter of mice with their mother. Reproduction in mice follows an r-selection strategy, with many offspring, short gestation, little parental care, and a short time to sexual maturity.

“The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive, many others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear, others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites, thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease. It must be so. If there ever is a time of plenty, this very fact will automatically lead to an increase in the population until the natural state of starvation and misery is restored. [...] The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference. "

“In nature, suffering has an extent every year that exceeds all tolerable expectations. The minute I write this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive; others run trembling with fear for their lives; still others are slowly ruined from within by voracious parasites or die of hunger, thirst or illness. It has to be like that. Whenever there are many resources it will automatically increase the population until the natural state of starvation and misery is restored. [...] The universe we perceive has exactly the properties that we should expect if it is not based on creation, purpose, or good, but nothing but merciless indifference. "

- Richard Dawkins

Suffering outweighs joy

Building on this, authors such as Oscar Horta, Mark Sagoff, and Yew-Kwang Ng argue that the predominance of r-strategists in the wild suggests that the average lifespan of wild animals is likely to be very short and that their lives will end in agonizing death. From this perspective, therefore, the average wild animal life involves more suffering than joy. An agonizing death outweighs any brief moments of joy.

Suffering from wild and domesticated animals

In Bambi or Bessie: Are Wild Animals Happier? Christie Wilcox argues that wild animals don't seem happier than domesticated animals. In doing so, it is based on findings of increased cortisol values ​​and stress levels in wild compared to domesticated animals. In contrast to life in the wild, some of the basic needs of domesticated animals would also be met by humans. The welfare economist Yew-Kwang Ng wrote about how evolutionary dynamics lead to poorer well-being of individual animals than is necessary for a certain population equilibrium.

Philosophical discussion

History of consideration of wild animals

In his essay On Nature , the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote about suffering in nature and the moral evaluation of the struggle against suffering:

“In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every day performances. [...] The phrases which ascribe perfection to the course of nature can only be considered as the exaggerations of poetic or devotional feeling, not intended to stand the test of a sober examination. No one, either religious or irreligious, believes that the hurtful agencies of nature, considered as a whole, promote good purposes, in any other way than by inciting human rational creatures to rise up and struggle against them. [...] Whatsoever, in nature, gives indication of beneficent design proves this benefit to be armed only with limited power; and the duty of man is to cooperate with the beneficent powers, not by imitating, but by perpetually striving to amend, the course of nature - and bringing that part of it over which we can exercise control more nearly into conformity with a high standard of justice and goodness. "

“In truth, almost all deeds for which men are hanged or imprisoned are part of everyday life in nature. [...] The sentences that attribute perfection to nature can only be seen as poetic exaggerations or expressions of pious feelings, but not as intended to withstand scrutiny. No one, religious or non-religious, believes that the painful activities of nature, taken as a whole, promote good ends except to fight against them by inciting rational human beings. […] Whatever gives the appearance of benevolent design in nature shows the limitation of the forces of this benevolence; and it is the duty of human beings to cooperate with these benevolent forces, not by imitation, but by constant endeavors to adapt the course of nature - and to bring the part over which we have control into conformity with the high standards of justice and good. "

- John Stuart Mill

In a book published in 1894, the English writer Henry Stephens Salt wrote an entire chapter on the misery of wild animals:

“It is of the utmost importance to emphasize the fact that, whatever the legal fiction may have been, or may still be, the rights of animals are not morally dependent on the so-called rights of property; it is not to owned animals merely that we must extend our sympathy and protection. [...] To take advantage of the sufferings of animals, whether wild or tame, for the gratification of sport, or gluttony, or fashion, is quite incompatible with any possible assertion of animals' rights. "

“It is of the utmost importance to stress that whatever legal fiction has been or still is, animal rights are not morally dependent on so-called property rights. It is not just the animals that are in possession that we should extend protection and sympathy to. [...] Taking advantage of the suffering of wild or tamed animals, be it through gratuities in sport, gluttony or fashion, is completely incompatible with the possible assertion of animal rights. "

- Henry Stephens Salt

Salt argues that it is justifiable for humans to kill wild animals for self-defense, but that "[...] we are not justified in killing harmless beings without necessity, much less torturing them." He applies this principle also on insects: "We are incapable of giving life, so we shouldn't take it from even the shabbiest of insects without sufficient reason."

In 1991 the environmental philosopher Arne Naess criticized what he called the “cult of nature”, which is characterized by current and historical attitudes of indifference to the suffering in nature. He argued that humans should encounter the reality of the wilderness and be ready to intervene in natural processes if this allowed for the alleviation of suffering.

Ecology as intrinsically valuable

Holmes Rolston III argued that only unnatural animal suffering is morally bad and that humans have no duty to intervene in natural cases. He emphasizes the special role in ecology that carnivores play as part of nature. Others argue that the human duty to protect other people from predators follows from the fact that people are part of the cultural world and not the natural world, which is why different rules apply in these situations.

Wildlife suffering as reductio ad absurdum

The supposed obligation of humans to intervene in nature was used as a reductio ad absurdum against animal rights positions . If, for example, prey animals were granted rights, it would follow that humans would have to intervene to protect them in nature, which has been viewed as absurd by some authors (David Benatar, Rainer Ebert, Wesley J. Smith). The objection raised was that an intervention in nature is not absurd if it protects other people from predators. Against this line of thought, Oscar Horta again raised the charge of unjustified unequal treatment of non-human animals ( speciesism ).

Relevance to the theological theodicy question

The existence of evil as a core element of the theodicy question has at times been extended to the suffering of animals in the course of evolution (CS Lewis, Michael Murray, Nicola Hoggard Creegan).

Practical Implications: Interventions to Reduce Suffering

Arguments for intervention

The moral basis for interventions aimed at reducing wildlife suffering can be rights-based, contract-based, or welfare-based.

If animals, following a rights-based approach, have moral rights to life and physical integrity, interventions in nature may be necessary in order to prevent these rights from being violated by other animals, for example. On the basis of contractualism , for example, it could be argued that in a decision-making situation behind a veil of ignorance, all sentient beings, i.e. all humans and non-human animals, would agree to prevent as much wildlife suffering as possible. This is because, when making the decision, they would not know what position they would be born into in a future society and would want to avoid the possibility of leading the short, excruciating life of a wild animal.

If all sentient beings, that is, all humans and animals, gathered behind a veil of ignorance and did not know in what position they would be born into a future society, they would agree to prevent as much wildlife suffering as possible in order to avoid the possibility to avoid living the short, torturous life of a wild animal. From a wellbeing perspective, interventions may be required if they can prevent suffering to wild animals without creating more suffering at the same time.

Proponents of intervention in nature argue that non-intervention is incompatible with the three moral approaches. Some suggested interventions include removing predators from the wild, failing to reintroduce predators (Mark Sagoff, Yew-Kwang Ng, Oscar Horta), providing medical care to injured animals (David Pearce, Tyler Cowen, Jacy Reese), and rescuing wild animals Animals from natural disasters.

The feasibility of interventions in nature

A common objection to interventions in nature is that such interventions are impractical. This is justified by either the effort required or the complexity of the ecosystem, which makes it difficult to know whether a particular intervention is beneficial overall. Aaron Simmons argues that humans should not intervene in nature to help animals, as doing so has unintended side effects, such as harming the ecosystem, disrupting human projects, or causing more animal suffering. The philosopher Peter Singer argues that interventions in nature are justified if they prevent a great deal of animal suffering with sufficient certainty in the long term. In practice, however, Singer speaks out against interventions because he fears that they cause more harm than prevent suffering.

Other authors contest Singer's empirical assertion about the likely consequences of interfering with nature, arguing that some types of intervention could be expected to produce positive consequences overall. Economist Tyler Cowen gives examples of animal species whose extinction was not considered bad for the world overall. In addition, Cowen argues that humanity is already intervening in nature in a variety of ways and the relevant practical question is therefore not whether people should intervene, but what kind of interventions they should prefer. The philosopher Oscar Horta also writes that humanity is already intervening in nature in many cases, for example because of human interests, the preservation of the environment or other goals that are considered valuable for their own sake.

The moral philosopher Jeff McMahan argues in a similar way . Interventions by humans are inevitable anyway. Although it is true that interventions at the expense of carnivores currently have incalculable ecological consequences, we should already think about possible options for action in a future in which we can better assess the consequences of our actions.

Peter Vallentyne suggested that even if humans were not to eliminate prey in nature, they could help prey on a smaller scale. In the same way that people are helped in emergency situations when it does not entail great expense, people could at least help some wild animals in certain circumstances.

Potential conflicts between animal rights and environmental protection

Arguments have been put forward that, in some cases, environmental objectives are incompatible with the welfare of sentient animals. The following were named as examples:

  • the hunt for invasive species for population control, advocated by environmentalists, but rejected by animal rights activists (Oscar Horta)
  • the consumption of beef, which is rejected by environmentalists because of its ecological consequences, while animal rights activists prefer it to the consumption of chicken for reasons of suffering reduction
  • the extinction or the change of carnivores or r-strategists , which animal rights activists advocate, whereas deep ecologists defend the right of animals to live without external interference
  • the preservation or expansion of wilderness, which is what environmentalists advocate, while some animal rights activists advocate the reduction or non-expansion of animal habitats in the wild. The reason for this is the concern that these rooms would cause a lot of animal suffering (Mark Sagoff, Yew-Kwang Ng, Ned Hettinger).

History of interventions

In 2016, 350 starving hippos and buffalo were killed by park rangers in Kruger National Park . One of the motives for the plot was to spare the animals suffering when they died.

literature

  • Yew-Kwang Ng : Towards Welfare Biology: Evolutionary Economics of Animal Consciousness and Suffering . in: Biology and Philosophy . Volume 10, No. 3, July 1995, pp. 255-285, doi: 10.1007 / BF00852469 .
  • Elisa Aaltola : Animal Ethics and the Argument from Absurdity . In: Environmental Values . tape 19 , no. 1 , February 1, 2010, p. 79-98 , doi : 10.3197 / 096327110X485392 ( ingentaconnect.com [accessed January 10, 2014]).
  • David Benatar : Why the Naive Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naive . In: Environmental Values . tape 10 , no. 1 , February 1, 2001, p. 103-112 , doi : 10.3197 / 096327101129340769 , JSTOR : 30301788 .
  • Tyler Cowen : Policing Nature . In: Environmental Ethics . tape 25 , no. 2 , May 1, 2003, p. 169-182 , doi : 10.5840 / enviroethics200325231 .
  • Luciano Carlos Cunha: If Natural Entities Have Intrinsic Value, Should We Then Abstain from Helping Animals Who Are Victims of Natural Processes? In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 1 , May 11, 2015, p. 51–63 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-001-cunh ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  • Rainer Ebert: Innocent Threats and the Moral Problem of Carnivorous Animals . In: Journal of Applied Philosophy . tape 29 , no. 2 , May 1, 2012, p. 146–159 , doi : 10.1111 / j.1468-5930.2012.00561.x .
  • Catia Faria: Animal Ethics Goes Wild: The Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature . Ed .: Universitat Pompeu Fabra. March 15, 2016, OCLC 987297552 ( tdx.cat - Dissertation).
  • Stephen Gould : Nonmoral Nature . In: Natural History . tape 91 , no. 2 , 1982, p. 19–26 ( pagefarm.net [PDF]).
  • Ned Hettinger: Valuing Predation in Rolston's Environmental Ethics . In: Environmental Ethics . tape 16 , no. 1 , February 1, 1994, p. 3-20 , doi : 10.5840 / enviroethics199416138 .
  • Oscar Horta: The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the Nonspeciesist Paradigm: A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature . In: Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals . tape 13 , no. 10 , 2010, p. 163–187 , doi : 10.15368 / bts.2010v13n10.10 ( digitalcommons.calpoly.edu [PDF]).
  • Oscar Horta: The Problem of Evil in Nature: Evolutionary Bases of the Prevalence of Disvalue . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 1 , May 11, 2015, p. 17–32 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-001-hort ( ledonline.it [accessed on May 8, 2016]).
  • Jeff McMahan , Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo, Matt Halteman: Philosophy comes to dinner: arguments on the ethics of eating . Routledge-Taylor & Francis, London / New York 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-80683-1 , The Moral Problem of Predation.
  • Ole Martin Moen: The ethics of wild animal suffering . In: Etiquk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics . tape 10 , no. 1 , May 9, 2016, p. 91-104 , doi : 10.5324 / eip.v10i1.1972 ( olemartinmoen.com [PDF; accessed May 8, 2016]).
  • Arne Naess : Should We Try to Relieve Clear Cases of Suffering in Nature? In: The Selected Works of Arne Naess (=  Pan Ecology . Volume 6 ). Springer Netherlands, 1991, p. 2391–2400 (PDF, pp. 129–137) , doi : 10.1007 / 978-1-4020-4519-6_99 ( abolitionist.com [PDF; accessed November 20, 2016]).
  • David Pearce: A Welfare State for Elephants? A Case Study of Compassionate Stewardship . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 2 , November 2, 2015, p. 153–164 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-002-pear ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  • Brian Tomasik: The Importance of Wild-Animal Suffering . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 2 , November 2, 2015, p. 133–152 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-002-toma ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  • Mikel Torres: The Case for Intervention in Nature on Behalf of Animals: a Critical Review of the Main Arguments against Intervention . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 1 , May 11, 2015, p. 33-49 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-001-torr ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Phillip Low et al .: The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness . Cambridge July 7, 2012 ( fcmconference.org [PDF]).
  2. ^ CS Lewis : The Problem of Pain . HarperOne, London 2015, ISBN 978-0-06-065296-8 (first edition: Macmillan, New York 1944).
  3. ↑ Michael Murray: Nature red in tooth and claw: theism and the problem of animal suffering . Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-959632-4 , doi : 10.1093 / acprof: oso / 9780199237272.001.0001 .
  4. ↑ Stephen Gould: Nonmoral Nature . In: Natural History . tape 91 , no. 2 , 1982, p. 19–26 ( pagefarm.net [PDF]).
  5. ↑ a b Jeff McMahan, Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo, Matt Halteman: Philosophy comes to dinner: arguments on the ethics of eating . Routledge-Taylor & Francis, London / New York 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-80683-1 , The Moral Problem of Predation.
  6. ^ Charles Darwin, Nora Barlow: The autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882: restored with original omissions . WW Norton & Company, New York 1993, ISBN 0-393-31069-8 , pp. 90 .
  7. ^ A b Ole Martin Moen: The ethics of wild animal suffering . In: Etiquk i praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics . tape 10 , no. 1 , May 9, 2016, p. 91-104 , doi : 10.5324 / eip.v10i1.1972 ( olemartinmoen.com [PDF; accessed May 8, 2016]).
  8. ↑ a b c d e Yew-Kwang Ng: Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering . In: Biology and Philosophy . tape 10 , no. 3 , July 1995, p. 255-285 , doi : 10.1007 / BF00852469 .
  9. ^ Daniel Dorado: Ethical Interventions in the Wild. An Annotated Bibliography . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 2 , 2015, p. 219–238 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-002-dora ( ledonline.it [accessed April 21, 2016]).
  10. ↑ Oscar Horta: The Problem of Evil in Nature: Evolutionary Bases of the Prevalence of Disvalue . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 1 , May 11, 2015, p. 17–32 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-001-hort ( ledonline.it [accessed on May 8, 2016]).
  11. ↑ Mikel Torres: The Case for Intervention in Nature on Behalf of Animals: a Critical Review of the Main Arguments against Intervention . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 1 , May 11, 2015, p. 33-49 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-001-torr ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  12. ↑ Luciano Carlos Cunha: If Natural Entities Have Intrinsic Value, Should We Then Abstain from Helping Animals Who Are Victims of Natural Processes? In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 1 , May 11, 2015, p. 51–63 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-001-cunh ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  13. ^ Brian Tomasik: The Importance of Wild-Animal Suffering . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 2 , November 2, 2015, p. 133–152 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-002-toma ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  14. ↑ a b David Pearce: A Welfare State for Elephants? A Case Study of Compassionate Stewardship . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 2 , November 2, 2015, p. 153–164 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-002-pear ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  15. ↑ a b Jacy Reese: Wild animals endure illness, injury, and starvation. We should help. (No longer available online.) Vox, December 14, 2015, archived from the original ; accessed on July 28, 2018 (English).
  16. ↑ Eze Paez: Refusing Help and inflicting harm. A Critique of the Environmentalist View . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 2 , November 2, 2015, p. 165–178 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-002-paez ( ledonline.it [accessed May 8, 2016]).
  17. ↑ Beril Sözmen: Relations and Moral Obligations towards Other Animals . In: Relations. Beyond Anthropocentrism . tape 3 , no. 2 , November 2, 2015, p. 179–193 , doi : 10.7358 / rela-2015-002-sozm ( ledonline.it [accessed on May 8, 2016]).
  18. ↑ Catia Faria: Animal Ethics Goes Wild: The Problem of Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature . Ed .: Universitat Pompeu Fabra. March 15, 2016, OCLC 987297552 ( tdx.cat - Dissertation).
  19. ^ Charles Darwin , Nora Barlow: The autobiography of Charles Darwin, 1809-1882: restored with original omissions . WW Norton & Company, New York 1993, ISBN 0-393-31069-8 , pp. 90 .
  20. ^ Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: a Darwinian view of life . Basic Books, New York 1995, ISBN 0-465-01606-5 , Chapter 4: God's Utility Function.
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  28. ↑ Arne Naess: Should We Try to Relieve Clear Cases of Suffering in Nature? In: The Selected Works of Arne Naess (=  Pan Ecology . Volume 6 ). Springer Netherlands, 1991, p. 2391–2400 (PDF, pp. 129–137) , doi : 10.1007 / 978-1-4020-4519-6_99 ( abolitionist.com [PDF; accessed November 20, 2016]).
  29. ↑ HolmesRolston III: Environmental ethics: duties to and values ​​in the natural world . Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1988, ISBN 0-87722-501-X .
  30. ^ A b Ned Hettinger: Valuing Predation in Rolston's Environmental Ethics . In: Environmental Ethics . tape 16 , no. 1 , February 1, 1994, p. 3-20 , doi : 10.5840 / enviroethics199416138 .
  31. ↑ Paul Moriarty, Mark Woods: Hunting ≠ Predation . In: Environmental Ethics . tape 19 , no. 4 , November 1997, pp. 391-404 , doi : 10.5840 / enviroethics19971945 .
  32. ^ Aaron Simmons: Animals, Predators, The Right to Life and The Duty to Save Lives . In: Ethics & The Environment . 14, No. 1, 2009, pp. 15-27. doi : 10.1353 / een.0.0018 .
  33. ^ David Benatar: Why the Naive Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naive . In: Environmental Values . tape 10 , no. 1 , February 1, 2001, p. 103-112 , doi : 10.3197 / 096327101129340769 , JSTOR : 30301788 .
  34. ^ Rainer Ebert: Innocent Threats and the Moral Problem of Carnivorous Animals . In: Journal of Applied Philosophy . tape 29 , no. 2 , May 1, 2012, p. 146–159 , doi : 10.1111 / j.1468-5930.2012.00561.x .
  35. ↑ Wesley J. Smith: Elimate [sic] Predators to Eliminate All Suffering! In: National Review . July 31, 2014 ( nationalreview.com [accessed August 1, 2014]).
  36. ↑ Oscar Horta: Disvalue in nature and intervention . In: Pensata Animal . 34, May 15, 2015.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.pensataanimal.net  
  37. ^ CS Lewis : The Problem of Pain . HarperOne, London 2015, ISBN 978-0-06-065296-8 (first edition: Macmillan, New York 1944).
  38. ↑ Michael Murray: Nature red in tooth and claw: theism and the problem of animal suffering . Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-959632-4 , doi : 10.1093 / acprof: oso / 9780199237272.001.0001 .
  39. ↑ Nicola Hoggard Creegan: Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil . Oxford University Press, 2013, ISBN 978-0-19-993185-9 , pp. 44-55 ( books.google.com ).
  40. ↑ Elisa Aaltola: Animal Ethics and the Argument from Absurdity . In: Environmental Values . tape 19 , no. 1 , February 1, 2010, p. 79-98 , doi : 10.3197 / 096327110X485392 ( ingentaconnect.com [accessed January 10, 2014]).
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