Welfare chauvinism

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As welfare chauvinism ( english welfare chauvinism , rare good driving state chauvinism or welfare chauvinism called political scientists) the approval of a developed welfare state , whose facilities but typically the original inhabitants of a country should be available only to a specific group, while others - especially immigrants - should be excluded who are accused of unjustified use and thus endangering their own prosperity . In this way he differs from neoliberal demands for a “ lean state ”, in which welfare state expenditures are to be cut back in principle. In addition to the access of immigrants to welfare state institutions and services, expenditure on development aid is also rejected, since state services should only go to “ our own ”. But welfare chauvinism can also be directed against redistribution from a richer to a poorer part of the same country, for example in the case of Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium or northern and southern Italy.

This attitude is typically observed in right-wing populist parties and movements, especially in northern and western European countries: right-wing populist parties in the Scandinavian countries, the French Front National , the Belgian Vlaams Belang , the Freedom Party of Austria and the Italian Lega Nord are considered to be welfare chauvinist described.

The term appeared in literature from around 1990 and was mainly described by Herbert Kitschelt as a variant of the Western European "new radical right", which should be distinguished from (neo) fascism, racist authoritarianism and anti-statist populism. Kitschelt cited the German republicans and the DVU as examples of this variety in 1995 , but assumed at the time that this direction would not achieve lasting electoral success in “developed capitalist democracies”.

The use of the term also meets with criticism in professional circles, for example Frank Decker criticizes that “welfare chauvinism” suggests that defending one's own prosperity against outsiders is always something reprehensible.

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d Frank Decker : The new right-wing populism. 2nd edition, Leske + Budrich, Opladen 2004, p. 202.
  2. a b Jørgen Goul Andersen, Tor Bjørklund: Structural change, new lines of conflict and the progressive parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In: Parties, Parliaments and Elections in Scandinavia. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1994, pp. 57-89, at pp. 81-83.
  3. ^ Gerd Reuter: Right-wing populism in Belgium and the Netherlands. Differences in the Dutch-speaking area. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2009, p. 130.
  4. Jens Rydgren: From welfare chauvinism to ideologically based xenophobia. Right-wing populism in Sweden and Denmark. In: Populism. Danger to Democracy or Useful Corrective? VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2006, pp. 165-190.
  5. Gilles Ivaldi, AMRC Swyngedouw: right-wing populist figure. Front National and Vlaams Blok. In: Populism. Danger to Democracy or Useful Corrective? Pp. 121–143, at p. 128.
  6. Steffen Kailitz : The ideological profile of the right (and left) wing parties - a discussion of Herbert Kitschelt's theses. In: Threats to Freedom. Extremist ideologies in comparison. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2006, pp. 283-320, on pp. 295-296.
  7. ^ Kurt Richard Luther: Electoral Strategies and Performance of Austrian Right-Wing Populism, 1986-2006. In: The Changing Austrian Voter. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (NJ) / London 2008, pp. 104–122, at p. 111.
  8. ^ Herbert Kitschelt: The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1995, pp. 22-25.
  9. Michael Minkenberg : The new radical right in comparison. USA, France, Germany. Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden / Opladen 1998, pp. 27–28.
  10. Steffen Kailitz: The ideological profile of the right (and left) wing parties - a discussion of Herbert Kitschelt's theses. In: Threats to Freedom. Extremist ideologies in comparison. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2006, pp. 283-320, on p. 291.