Zapper (software)

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Zapper is a term for software that subsequently changes transaction and sales data stored in accounting systems , merchandise management systems and, above all, cash registers , taximeters and slot machines . Zapper generally undermine the principles of proper data security according to the state of the art. Every system of hardware and software that can be manipulated by Zapper is an insecure system. This applies in particular to threats contrary to the requirements of ISO / IEC 27001 (Information technology - Security techniques - Information security management systems - Requirements).

The manipulation is carried out to reduce sales and thus to evade tax and evade social security contributions. The term zapper was first used by Richard Ainsworth .

Background and story

In industries with a high share of cash sales, sales figures are often manipulated. This happens z. B. by changing data in cash registers. The Federal Audit Office already pointed out in its 2003 remarks on the budget and economic management of the federal government that the (then) new generation of cash registers did not meet the requirements for proper bookkeeping. If the reports from the cash registers only contain total values ​​(e.g. total sales per day), these manipulations can be carried out relatively easily (e.g. through cancellations). For this reason, the tax authorities require the submission of individual transactions in electronic form (in Germany by applying the principles for data access and the verifiability of digital documents (GDPdU) also on cash registers).

Since manual manipulations are time-consuming and can be detected relatively easily using analytical methods (e.g. digit analyzes such as the Benford or Chi-square test and deviations from statistically expected distributions), software for the automated manipulation of data was developed.

Various cases of zapper software have become known . Some of the software came from the manufacturer of the cash registers or their software, and some was developed by third parties. The largest case in Germany concerns pharmacy software. A press report says that in the Canadian province of Quebec alone 31 zapper programs were found on 13 different types of cash registers. The problems, possible solutions and above all the high tax losses - but only for sales tax - are comprehensively presented in the OECD report, which is also available in German.

Zapper software is only used when complex manipulations of a database are carried out largely automatically and the software is temporarily loaded into the system (e.g. from a USB stick ). Systems where z. B. a counter of the cancellations in the printout is omitted due to parameter changes or a training mode is used for regular work or built-in manipulation functions do not belong in the zapper software category.

In case law and literature, the term manipulation software is mainly used. In press articles there was also belittling talk of cheat software .

technology

In the case of PC-based cash registers, the database used is usually changed directly; for non-PC-based systems, e.g. B. manipulated the database of a PC evaluation software. The zapper software can be integrated into the product or separated from it for camouflage. It has partly been disguised as a game in which the manipulation functions can suddenly be used at the highest level.

Two examples documented in the specialist literature:

  • Zapper at a POS terminal ( open system ): In this system is SQL - database used. This database can be changed with a separate program. At first glance, the program is software for analyzing sales data. By clicking on a displayed quantity value, the number of sales of the corresponding product can be reduced to a freely determinable value. To do this, the changes in sales volumes are distributed over several transactions that contain the corresponding product. During the manipulation, an overview of the original and changed sales is displayed. From the modified database, the cash register software then later creates the reports and the data to be presented during an external audit.
  • Zapper in a proprietary ( closed ) system: In this system, the data from the cash register is transferred to a back office software on a daily basis. The zapper is part of this software and is activated by a USB stick with a specific file. The zapper function is called up by clicking in a certain, invisible area. After specifying an amount to be reduced, the stored transactions are automatically adjusted in order to achieve the target value.

Measures to prevent and detect tampering

Technical safeguards

The use of zapper software can be made more difficult or even practically impossible through technical measures. These are primarily fiscal storage systems or newer processes such as INSIKA . The city of Hamburg is even promoting the acquisition and installation of devices that are suitable for securing data generated in the taximeter in an unchangeable manner and transferring it to external storage media.

Monitoring measures

If no technical countermeasures are in place, the only approach remaining is to discover zappers by analyzing sales data as part of field audits . The usual electronic tax audit must be supplemented by other controls in order to recognize the use of a zapper. On the one hand, this can be the random check of the documents. Another approach is the request to submit various data (sales file consisting of the checkout line, the individual data and the movement file from the merchandise management system).

Use of experts

A forensic investigation will be carried out in specific suspected cases . If necessary, the tax investigation department calls in experts.

Legal situation in Germany

Criminal Law Norms Affected

Professional law

  • Business prohibition due to unreliability according to § 35 GewO
  • Revocation of the taxi license according to PBefG
  • Revocation of license to practice medicine from pharmacists and doctors

user

Since the use of a zapper software suggests tax evasion, every user must expect corresponding audit measures. By using a zapper, the correctness of the accounting according to § 158 AO refuted and thus there is the possibility of an addition acc. § 162 AO. It is also possible to withdraw a business license or license due to tax unreliability.

Developers, distributors and operators

The development, sale and installation of Zapper software qualifies as aiding and abetting tax evasion. Even the technician who installs a zapper on site makes himself a criminal offense for assisting in tax evasion. It should be noted that this aid is not only punishable, but also leads to joint liability for the evaded taxes and the resulting interest according to Section 71 AO. In a ruling by the Rhineland-Palatinate Finance Court on January 7, 2015, Az. 5 V 2068/14, a corresponding decision against the author of a Zapper software was confirmed. The liability sum of 1.6 million euros arose from only one customer - an ice cream parlor. Liability for further cases and criminal prosecution are not excluded.

tax consultant

If a tax advisor or the clerk in the tax office who is processing the specific client knows that the client is using a zapper, he may not assign his authority to the tax bases processed in this way and submit it as a tax return. This solves your own criminal liability according to § 370 AO of the tax advisor and / or the specialist assistant, since a tax evader does not have to be the tax debtor. In addition, the tax liability according to Section 71 AO if the client cannot or does not want to pay the tax debts and enforcement by the tax office z. B. remains unsuccessful due to bankruptcy.

consequences

Tax loss

There are no estimates for Germany of the extent to which tax losses occur due to manipulation software. An estimate by the tax authorities of Québec assumes tax evasion in the amount of 425 million dollars only in restaurants and only for the province of Québec (approx. 8 million inhabitants) and again in a comparable amount for the taxes to be paid to the state of Canada - based on the If the number of inhabitants were transferred to Germany, that would be more than 6 billion euros.

Since individual transactions are to be archived due to the BMF letter of November 26, 2010, an increasing proportion of tax reductions made using manipulation software can be assumed. The effort to uncover the evasion by means of a tax audit and tax investigation, to estimate the correct taxes and to prosecute those involved will therefore also increase. From the point of view of legal policy, systematic protection against manipulation through procedures like INSIKA appears to be the only practicable solution from the perspective of reducing bureaucracy and ensuring fair taxation .

General suspicion

After the discovery of Zapper software, the tax authorities regularly focus their tax audits on all users of the cash registers or software solutions concerned, or even on entire industries (such as pharmacies since 2010).

Cases uncovered

Selection of cases that have been verifiably publicly reported. The year of discovery is given as the year. Due to the sometimes superficial information, it is not always clear whether it is a zapper in the narrower sense or another type of data manipulation.

  • 1993: Retail, USA - first documented zapper
  • 1998: Slot machines, Germany - apparently a sophisticated solution in terms of function
  • 2001: Taxi industry, Germany (Hamburg) - software with manipulation functions in use since 1993
  • 2001: Discotheques, Germany - technically less complex manipulation of total sales (therefore actually not a real zapper ), several hundred users
  • 2005: Gastronomy, Sweden - manipulation in the evaluation software that is connected to the cash register
  • 2006: Gastronomy, USA - complex manipulation software
  • 2008: Gastronomy, Canada - Zapper from the manufacturer of the cash register software, this was also convicted
  • 2009: Gastronomy, Belgium - apparently sophisticated automatic manipulation
  • 2010: Gastronomy, Netherlands - manipulation of data from a PC-based cash register
  • 2011: Gastronomy, Germany - details not known
  • 2011: Pharmacies, Germany - very complex solution that also manipulates warehouse data, potentially thousands of users
  • 2012: Gastronomy, France - details not known, potentially thousands of users
  • 2012: Gastronomy, Austria - manipulation of data from a common PC-based cash register, further details not known
  • 2012: Gastronomy, Germany - Zapper disguised as a computer game, the supplier of the Zapper software was held liable for evaded taxes
  • 2013: Gastronomy, Belgium - manipulation technique not yet precisely described
  • 2013: Gastronomy, France - manipulation software on USB sticks
  • 2014: Eisdiele, Germany - Zapper disguised as a game on PC
  • 2017: Gastronomy, Germany - larger number of users
  • 2019: Gastronomy, Germany - around 1,000 users

Tax policy

NRW finance minister Walter-Borjans has declared war on the manipulation by zapper software and is calling for legal changes. This was announced publicly at a press conference on April 3, 2014.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. Richard T. Ainsworth: Zappers Tax Fraud, Technology and Terrorist Funding. Boston University School of Law, February 20, 2008, accessed November 19, 2012 .
  2. Comments 2003 (PDF; 2.1 MB) Bundesrechnungshof, pp. 197-198 , accessed on May 1, 2019 .
  3. ^ BMF letter of November 26, 2010. (No longer available online.) Federal Ministry of Finance, November 26, 2010, archived from the original on August 25, 2012 ; Retrieved November 19, 2012 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bundesfinanzministerium.de
  4. a b Financial auditors looking for manipulation in pharmacy EDP. (No longer available online.) In: apotheke adhoc. September 9, 2011, archived from the original on November 19, 2012 ; Retrieved November 19, 2012 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.apotheke-adhoc.de
  5. With Software, Till Tampering Is Hard to Find. In: The New York Times . August 29, 2008, accessed March 3, 2013 .
  6. ^ Electronic Sales Suppression: A threat to tax revenues . OECD
  7. ^ FG Düsseldorf of March 20, 2008, 16 K 4689/06 E, U, F, EFG 2008, 2012
  8. Andreas Wähnert, manipulation software - can remain permanently invisible manipulation ?, STBP 2013, 102
  9. ^ Hermann Pump, Legal Consequences when Using Manipulation Software (Zappersoftware), DStZ 2013, 299.
  10. a b Erich Huber: Tax supervision and auditing in the time of the cash android and without INSIKA - basic ideas, goals, risks and second-best solutions - Part III and IV . In: The tax audit . 01 to 02, 2013, p. 10-12, 35-36 .
  11. Erich Huber: About cash registers, phantom goods, zapping and fiscal solutions from Germany and Austria - Part II . In: The tax audit . No. 07 , 2009, p. 191-195 .
  12. Funding for taximeters in Hamburg. (No longer available online.) City of Hamburg, traffic trade supervisory authority, archived from the original on February 22, 2013 ; accessed on January 31, 2013 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.hamburg.de
  13. Arno Becker: Suppression of evidence according to § 274 Paragraph 1 Numbers 1 and 2 StGB - Part I to III . In: The tax audit . 02-04, 2008.
  14. Judgment VG Berlin, 11 L 352.11. August 10, 2011, accessed March 1, 2013 .
  15. a b Tax evasion in the case of the sale and use of cash register manipulation software. (No longer available online.) FG RP, Jan 7, 2015, archived from the original on March 6, 2016 ; accessed on January 28, 2015 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www3.mjv.rlp.de
  16. ^ Quebec's Sales Recording Module (SRM): Fighting the Zapper, Phantomware, and Tax Fraud with Technology. (PDF; 522 kB) In: Canadian Tax Journal. 2009, p. 718, footnote 4 , accessed on February 3, 2013 .
  17. Pharmacists as a high-risk class. (No longer available online.) In: apotheke adhoc. January 27, 2011, archived from the original on March 9, 2014 ; Retrieved February 20, 2013 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.apotheke-adhoc.de
  18. ^ Connecticut Store Owner Sentenced in Tax Fraud. In: The New York Times . October 21, 1993. Retrieved November 19, 2012 .
  19. Innocent receipt . In: Der Spiegel . No. 17 , 1998 ( online ).
  20. ^ Judgment FG Hamburg 6th Senate, 6 K 90/08. November 18, 2009, accessed January 10, 2013 .
  21. DISCOS: Dance with the Treasury. In: Focus . December 3, 2001, accessed November 19, 2012 .
  22. Richard T. Ainsworth: Zappers: Technology-assisted Tax Fraud. (PDF; 311 kB) (No longer available online.) June 9, 2008, archived from the original on November 19, 2012 ; Retrieved November 19, 2012 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.taxadmin.org
  23. ^ Superseding indictment returned against La Shish owner. (PDF; 76 kB) (No longer available online.) US Department of Justice, May 30, 2007, archived from the original on May 30, 2010 ; Retrieved November 21, 2012 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.justice.gov
  24. Sushi restaurants accused of tax fraud. (No longer available online.) In: canada.com. December 11, 2008, archived from the original on March 14, 2009 ; Retrieved February 19, 2013 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.canada.com
  25. ^ Richmond software firm fined $ 100,000 for tax evasion software. (No longer available online.) In: richmondREVIEW.com. July 23, 2012, archived from the original on August 19, 2013 ; Retrieved February 19, 2013 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.richmondreview.com
  26. Double comptabilité dans des restaurants. In: La Libre Belgique. Retrieved November 20, 2012 .
  27. Aanhoudingen vanwege large-shell burdensome woman with kassa's. (No longer available online.) Government of the Netherlands (Rijksoverheid), April 13, 2010, formerly in the original ; Retrieved November 19, 2012 .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.rijksoverheid.nl  
  28. Manipulated cash registers in Hanover's gastronomy. In: Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung. November 20, 2011. Retrieved November 19, 2012 .
  29. Arnaque juteuse grâce aux caisses miraculeuses. In: Le Parisien. October 6, 2012, accessed November 19, 2012 .
  30. a b Press conference “When the cash register is ringing”. (PDF) (No longer available online.) Ministry of Finance NRW, April 3, 2014, archived from the original on April 8, 2014 ; accessed on May 15, 2014 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.fm.nrw.de
  31. Marktleider voor kassasystemen helps horecazaken om te frauderen. In: Het Laatste Nieuws. March 27, 2013, accessed March 27, 2013 .
  32. ^ Esprit, Kili et 64: le procès met leurs comptes à jour. In: La République des Pyrénées. September 23, 2014, accessed October 8, 2014 .
  33. cf. Order of the Rhineland-Palatinate Finance Court on January 7, 2015, Az. 5 V 2068/14.
  34. Arrest warrants for cash manipulation. In: Saarbrücker Zeitung. June 12, 2017. Retrieved June 20, 2017 .
  35. Asian restaurants are apparently cheating the state for hundreds of millions of euros. In: SPIEGEL Online. March 16, 2019, accessed May 1, 2010 .