My Lai massacre

Photographs of the My Lai massacre provoked world outrage and became an international scandal.

The Mỹ Lai massacre was a massacre and an atrocity by U.S. soldiers of hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese civilians, mostly women and children, on March 16, 1968, during the Vietnam War. Becoming a symbol of US-American war crimes in Vietnam, it prompted widespread outrage around the world and reduced public support for the war in the United States.

Background

During the Vietnam War, the Quang Ngai Province of South Vietnam was suspected of being a haven for guerrillas of the People's Liberation Armed Forces and other cadres of the National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NLF), also called the "Viet Cong" or "VC" by the U.S. forces and their sympathizers. Informally renamed Pinkville (due to the color printed on maps) by the U.S. military, the province was frequently bombed and shelled. By 1968 almost all homes in the province had been destroyed or damaged.

It was seen by the military to be of primary importance that NLF operatives be eliminated. Accordingly, rather than measuring success by the acquisition of territory or strategic locations (for example), missions were evaluated based on their "body count" - the number of presumed NLF operatives killed. Soldiers were encouraged by higher command to exaggerate body counts in order to give the impression of military success. Owing to that pressure, and to the fact that it was often very difficult for a NLF operative to be distinguished from a non-combatant, there was often a very broad discrepancy between the declared body count for a particular mission, and the number of enemy weapons recovered. According to University of Missouri-Kansas City law professor Doug Linder, GIs joked that "anything that's dead and isn't white is a VC" for body count purposes. There is no doubt that many civilians had been killed in the province, fueling existing Anti-American sentiment in the region.

Insurgents were sometimes housed and sheltered by civilians in the area. However, American soldiers were frustrated with the complicity of the local people. Together with their inability to close with an elusive enemy and pervasive fear of ambush, this resentment made violent reprisals against civilians more likely.

The Massacre

Charlie Company, 11^th Brigade, Americal Division arrived in Vietnam in December of 1967. Their first month in Vietnam passed without any direct enemy contact.

During the Tet Offensive of January 1968, attacks were carried out in Quang Ngai by the 48th Battalion of the NLF. US military intelligence formed the view that the 48th Battalion, having retreated, was taking refuge in the Son My village. A number of specific hamlets within that village - labelled as My Lai 1, 2, 3 and 4 (nicknamed "Pinkville" ) - were suspected of harbouring the 48th. A major offensive on those hamlets was planned by US forces.

On the eve of the attack, Charlie Company was advised by US military command that any genuine civilians at My Lai would have left their homes to go to market by 7 a.m. the following day. They were told that they could assume that all who remained behind were either VC or active VC sympathisers. They were instructed to destroy the village. At the briefing, Captain Ernest Medina was asked whether the order included the killing of women and children; those present at the briefing later gave different accounts of Medina's response.

The soldiers found no insurgents in the village on the morning of March 16, 1968. The soldiers, one platoon of which was led by Lt. William Calley, killed hundreds of civilians – primarily old men, women, children, and babies. Some were tortured or raped. Dozens were herded into a ditch and executed with automatic weapons. At one stage, Calley expresed his intent to throw grenades into a trench, filled with villagers.[1]

The precise number reported killed varies from source to source, with 347 and 504 being the most commonly cited figures. A memorial at the site of the massacre lists 504 names, with ages ranging from as high as 82 years to as low as 1 year. According to the report of a South Vietnamese army lieutenant to his superiors, it was an "atrocious" incident of bloodletting by an armed force seeking to vent its fury.

A US Army helicopter crew famously saved some civilians by landing between the American troops and the remaining Vietnamese hiding in a bunker. The 24-year-old pilot, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, Jr., confronted the leaders of the troops and told them his gunship would open fire on them if they continued their attack on civilians. [2]

With the support of the other two members of the helicopter crew — Spc. Lawrence Colburn and Spc. Glenn Andreotta — Thompson directed an evacuation of the village. The crew members have been credited with saving at least 11 lives but were long thereafter reviled as traitors. On April 8, 1968, Glenn Andreotta and Charles Dutton, crewmen on an OH-13 (62-03813) "Warlord" scout, were killed when their aircraft was shot down, crashed and burned. It was not until exactly thirty years later, following a television report concerning the incident, that the three were awarded the Soldier's Medal, the army's highest award for bravery not involving direct contact with the enemy.

In the spring of 1972 the camp (at My Lai 2) where the survivors of the My Lai massacre had been relocated was largely destroyed by ARVN (South Vietnamese) air and artillery bombardment. The destruction was attributed to Viet Cong terror. However, the truth was revealed by Quaker service workers in the area, in testimony by Martin Teitel at the hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees in May 1972. In June of the same year Teitel's account of the event appeared in the New York Times.

Cover-up

Initial investigations of the My Lai incident were undertaken by the 11^th Light Infantry Brigade's Commanding Officer, Colonel Oran Henderson, under orders from Americal's Assistant Commanding Officer, Brigadier General Young. Henderson interviewed several of the soldiers involved in the incident, then issued a written report in late April claiming that approximately 20 civilians were inadvertently killed during the military operation in My Lai. The army at this time was still describing the event as a military victory resulting in the death of 128 of the enemy.

Six months later, a young soldier of the 11^th Light Infantry (The Butcher's Brigade) named Tom Glen wrote a letter accusing the Americal Division (and other entire units of the U.S. military, not just individuals) of routine brutality against Vietnamese civilians; the letter was detailed, its allegations horrifying, and its contents echoed complaints received from other soldiers. Colin Powell, then a young US Army Major, was charged with investigating the letter, which did not specifically reference My Lai (Glen had no knowledge of the events there). Powell wrote: "In direct refutation of this portrayal is the fact that relations between American soldiers and the Vietnamese people are excellent." Later, Powell's refutation would be called an act of "white-washing" the news of My Lai, and questions would continue to remain undisclosed to the public. On May 4, 2004, Powell, then United States Secretary of State, said to Larry King, "I mean, I was in a unit that was responsible for My Lai. I got there after My Lai happened. So, in war, these sorts of horrible things happen every now and again, but they are still to be deplored." [3]

The carnage at My Lai might have gone unknown to history if not for another soldier, Ron Ridenhour, who, independent of Glen, sent a letter to President Nixon, the Pentagon, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and numerous members of Congress. The copies of this letter were sent in March, 1969, a full year after the event. Most recipients of Ridenhour's letter ignored it, with the notable exception of Representative Morris Udall. Ridenhour learned about the events at My Lai secondhand, by talking to members of Charlie Company while he was still enlisted. Eventually, Calley was charged with several counts of premeditated murder in September 1969, and 25 other officers and enlisted men were later charged with related crimes. It was another two months before the American public learned about the massacre and trials.

Independent investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, after extensive conversations with Ridenhour, broke the My Lai story on November 12, 1969, and on November 20 Time, Life and Newsweek magazines all covered the story, and CBS televised an interview with Paul Meadlo. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) published explicit photographs of dead villagers killed at My Lai. As is evident from comments made in a 1969 telephone conversation between United States National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, revealed recently by the National Security Archive, the photos of the war crime were too shocking for senior officials to stage an effective cover-up. Secretary of Defense Laird is heard to say, "There are so many kids just lying there; these pictures are authentic."

Courts Martial

On March 17, 1970, the United States Army charged 14 officers with suppressing information related to the incident. Most of these charges were dropped.

U.S. Army Lt. William Calley was convicted in 1971 of premeditated murder in ordering the shootings and initially sentenced to life in prison; two days later, however, President Richard Nixon ordered him released from prison. Calley served 3½ years of house arrest in his quarters at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was then ordered freed by a federal judge. Calley claimed that he was following orders from his captain, Ernest Medina; Medina denied giving the orders and was acquitted at a separate trial. Most of the soldiers involved in the My Lai incident were no longer enlisted. Of the 26 men initially charged, Lt. Calley's was the only conviction.

Aftermath

The explosive news of the massacre fueled the outrage of the American peace movement, which demanded the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. It also led more potential draftees to file for conscientious objector status. Those who had always argued against the war felt vindicated; those on the fringes of the movement became more vocal.

The more pivotal shift, however, was in the attitude of the general public towards the war. People who had not previously been interested in the peace/war debates began to analyze the issue more closely. The horrific stories of other soldiers began to be taken more seriously, and other abuses came to light.

Some of the public's anger was turned towards the soldiers themselves. The troubled image of Vietnam veterans greatly increased the difficulties of soldiers struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse and homelessness.

Some military observers concluded that My Lai showed the need for more and better volunteers to provide stronger leadership among the troops. As the Vietnam combat dragged on, the number of well-educated and experienced career soldiers on the front lines dropped sharply as casualties and combat rotation took their toll. These observers claimed that the absence of the many bright young men who did not participate in the draft due to college attendance or homeland service caused the talent pool for new officers to become very shallow. Many new officers were barely into their twenties, often unintelligent and irresponsible. They pointed to Calley, a young, unemployed college dropout, as an example of the raw and inexperienced being rushed through officer training.

Those involved

1st Platoon

• William Calley - Lt who led C-Company, the only person convicted
• David Mitchell - Sgt
• Ronald L. Haeberle - Company Photographer
• Charles Sledge - Radio Operator - testified he saw Calley purposely kill a young child
• Paul Meadlo - Private First Class - testified that he was afraid of being shot if he didn't participate
• Dennis Conti - Private First Class - claimed he was originally lost, and had to find his company
• James Dursi - Private First Class
• Allen Boyce - Private First Class
• Ronald Grzesik - Private First Class
• Robert Maples - Private First Class, claimed to have refused to participate
• Varnado Simpson - Private First Class, committed suicide citing guilt over My Lai
• Harry Stanley - claimed to have refused to participate
• Gary David Roschevitz - unknown
• Elmer Haywood - unknown
• William Lloyd - unknown
• Lenny Lagunuy - unknown
• Sidney Kye - unknown
• Robert Bergthold - unknown
• Robert Mauro - unknown
• Robert Lee - unknown
• Isaiah Cowan - unknown
• Bruce Cox - unknown
• Harry Stanley - unknown
• Charles Hall - unknown
• Roy Wood - unknown
• Herbert Carter - unknown
• David Mitchell - unknown
• Gregory Olsen - unknown
• Daniel Simone - unknown

Intervention

• Hugh Thompson, Jr. - Warrant Officer
• Lawrence Colburn - Helicopter Gunner
• Glenn Andreotta - Helicopter Crew Chief
• Dan Millians - Medevac Pilot
• Brian Livingstone - Medevac Pilot
• Reginald Forsythe - Combat Photographer

References

• Anderson, David L. (1998) Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas — extensive interviews with trial participants and soldiers.
• Becker, Elizabeth. Kissinger Tapes Describe Crises, War and Stark Photos of Abuse., The New York Times, May 27 2004 (mirrored)
• Belknap, Michal R. (2002) The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and the Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700612114.
• Bilton, Michael and Sim, Kevin. (1992) Four Hours in My Lai New York: Viking, 1992. — a recent re-examination, draws extensively on interviews with participants and contains detailed bibliographic references.
• Chomsky, Noam. After Pinkville, Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal on Vietnam, 1971
• Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Herman. Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact & Propaganda, 1973 and 2004
• Colburn, Lawrence and Paula Brock. The Choices Made — Lessons from My Lai on Drawing the Line, Seattle Times, March 10 2002
• Department of the Army. Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident (The Peers Report), Volumes I-III (1970).
• Gershen, Martin. (1971) Destroy or Die: The True Story of My Lai New York: Arlington House.
• Goldstein, Joseph. (1976) The My Lai Massacre and its Cover-Up New York: Free Press.
• Hammer, Richard. (1971) The Court-Martial of Lt. Calley New York: Coward.
• Hersh, Seymour M. (1972). Cover-up: the Army's secret investigation of the massacre at My Lai 4. Random House. ISBN 0394474600.
• Hersh, Seymour M. (1970). My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. Random House. ISBN 0394437373.
• My Lai and Why It Matters: Review of Ron Ridenhour's Videotaped Lecture
• O'Brien, Tim. (1994) In the Lake of the Woods, McClelland & Stewart. ISBN 1895246318 — a haunting work of historical fiction about a Vietnam Vet who can't escape his own experience of My Lai.
• Olson, James S. and Roberts, Randy (eds.) (1998) My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 0312177674
• 161st Assault Helicopter Company. Unit History of the 161st Assault Helicopter Company (who intervened in the massacre)
• PBS/The American Experience. The My Lai Massacre
• Peers, William. (1979) The My Lai Inquiry New York: Norton.
• Raimondo, Maj. Tony, JA. The My Lai Massacre: A Case Study, Human Rights Program, School of the Americas, Fort Benning, Georgia
• Sack, John. (1971) Lieutenant Calley: His Own Story New York: Viking.
• University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School. The My Lai Courts-Martial, 1970
• Teitel, Martin. Again, the Suffering of Mylai, article preview, New York Times, 7 June 1972, pg. 45.
• Texas Tech University. The Vietnam Oral History Project

See also

• Ron Ridenhour
• Seymour Hersh

• Human Rights Record of the United States

• Actions by American forces:
  • Tiger Force
  • Phoenix Program
• Actions by North Vietnamese forces:
  • Massacre at Hue