Tiger Force

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Tiger Force unit badge

The Tiger Force was a special unit of the American armed forces in the Vietnam War . The unit of the 1st Battalion, 327th Regiment, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division , on average around 45 men in action , existed from 1965 to 1970 as a long-distance reconnaissance platoon . From May to November 1967 she committed a number of war crimes in the South Vietnamese provinces of Quảng Ngãi and Quảng Tin near the demarcation line at the 17th parallel . The number of their victims was in the three-digit, possibly four-digit range. Evidence of these atrocities led to an in-house investigation from February 1971 to June 1975 - the longest investigation during the Vietnam War. None of the suspected crews and officers were charged. In the fall of 2003, a team of reporters from the local newspaper Toledo Blade ( Ohio ) published a four-part series of articles about these war crimes and the course of the investigation. In June 2004, the editors won the Pulitzer Prize in the "Investigative Journalism" category .

background

War situation

American combat troops were officially in South Vietnam since 1965. Before that, the American military acted there in advisory status ; in 1963 there were 16,300 men. The promises of military and political success that were repeatedly made public, associated with the constant increase in the number of troops and firepower, remained unfulfilled. In the second half of the 1960s, the American government under President Lyndon B. Johnson found itself in a “ credibility gap” that had already opened up during Kennedy's tenure. Supported by troops from North Vietnam , the Viet Cong continued to advance. The population remained largely unaffected by the actions of the corrupt South Vietnamese regime and the promises of the American freedom and prosperity discourse. The worries of the leading American politicians and military could not be banished: for the first time in its history the United States faced a war defeat; Vietnam - so the assumption - would then fall behind the communism imagined as a monolithic block and, according to the " domino theory ", sweep away all of Southeast Asia . Political credibility, military prestige and geopolitical spheres of influence were threatened .

In particular, the middle management level of the American military recorded the war success - in the absence of victories in major field battles and permanent territorial gains - by body count and reported it regularly to the high command, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam . The information provided was regarded as a key figure that was incorporated into the relevant statistics. It was known from the American Defense Secretary Robert McNamara that he, together with his closest advisers in the Department of Defense, had these and other figures processed into tables, statistics and diagrams in order to formulate targets on this basis. The quality of such information was neglected: whether people were actually killed or soldiers and officers merely made corresponding claims, whether more or fewer people were killed than reported, whether they were civilians killed or armed enemies - all of that was possible hardly read from the digits. It seems that body count statistics were at the heart of a manipulated world of numbers.

An asymmetrical war was waged in Vietnam . Completely differently equipped and trained fighters met, each understanding of warfare was different. This disparity was evident in anchored off the coast of US aircraft carriers , large bomb loads abwerfenden B-52 bombers ( "Stratofortress") and ubiquitous military helicopters on the one hand and transported by bicycle supplies , snipers , in the jungle thicket yielded booby traps and sudden hit and run -Stops on the other side. The asymmetrical war threatened always to hit "soft" targets - especially non-combatants or civilians - and the ius in bello (law in war) to set de facto obsolete: the Vietcong tried with terrorist civilians to tolerate and support for the guerrillas to move , the Americans used terror to stop them or to “dry out” the environment of the Viet Cong. For the Viet Cong there was a further effect when attacking from a civilian environment and seeking cover there: counter-attacks by US troops severely affected the civilian population and thus undermined the Americans' claim to represent a morally superior cause.

Classification and characteristics of the unit

In 1965 David Haskell Hackworth , the most highly decorated infantryman in the US Army, founded the Tiger Force with the aim of defeating the guerrillas of the Viet Cong with their own means ("to outguerilla the guerilla"). He preferred fighting in small and very small groups. Here was a clear difference to the conventional strategy, which relied on superior firepower and large troop contingents.

Basically, the Tiger Force combined reconnaissance and command functions as a Recondo unit . Their more specific task consisted of tracking down enemy positions, marking targets for American air strikes or landing operations, carrying out sabotage actions, interrupting supply lines of the Viet Cong and kidnapping and possibly murdering cadres of these guerrillas.

Even when the Tiger Force was founded, it was only intended to be loosely linked to higher-level troops. Some officers saw the danger of becoming independent, but William Westmoreland , the commander in chief of the American troops in Vietnam, insisted that such autonomous units were necessary in guerrilla warfare. Such combat troops "should be kept on the longest possible leash".

The Tiger Force was usually faced with difficult tasks. So it should cut off the withdrawal of guerrilla units or relieve significantly larger units of the US Army if they were involved in heavy firefights. For example, on February 7, 1966, the Tiger Force encountered very well entrenched enemy units. She was only able to get out of the firefight after her commander James A. Gardner, who was also one of the unit's trainers, single-handedly attacked three enemy bunkers. Gardner was killed and was posthumously honored with the Medal of Honor for his courage . On June 11, 1966, the Tiger Force chased a North Vietnamese regiment near Dak To near the Laos border . Eleven Tiger Force members were killed in the corresponding firefights.

Shortly before their use in the Song Ve Valley and then in the jungle of Quang Tin Tiger Force came west on 15 May 1967 by Duc Pho in an ambush North Vietnamese soldiers. In the battle, which lasted several hours, 25 GIs suffered injuries and two died. The Tiger Force then referred to this dispute as the "Mother's Day Massacre" ("Mother's Day Massacre").

Around 120 paratroopers - all of them seasoned volunteers - served in the Tiger Force between May 1967 and November 1967 when members of this unit committed war crimes. At the same time, however, only around 45 men were deployed, often for weeks in small groups and far away from their base camp. After November 1967 the Tiger Force was relocated. Your task was now to defend an American camp near the border with Cambodia . In October 1968 Lyndon B. Johnson awarded the unit for its combat behavior with a Presidential Unit Citation . At the end of 1970 the Tiger Force appears to have been disbanded.

The members of the Tiger Force did not wear regular uniforms, but camouflage suits without troop or rank insignia . Instead of the steel helmet , they use wide-brimmed all-weather hats. Men were allowed to grow beards. As a sign of their special position, they were allowed to carry handguns openly . The Tiger Force members saw themselves as the “elite of the elite”; they were admired and feared by other American soldiers on duty in Vietnam.

One of the anomalies of this unit was that it was not recorded in any US Army registry . In this regard, it was a kind of "ghost platoon " (ghost unit). However, the Tiger Force was formally part of the 1st Battalion, 327th Regiment, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which Westmoreland enjoyed greatly. The general spoke several times of "my fire department" and viewed the battalion as the hard core of the 101st Airborne Division. This characterization was reflected in self-designations. Colonel Gerald E. Morse, who took command of the 1st Battalion on August 9, 1967, used the alias Ghost Rider in radio communications . During Operation Wheeler (September 11, 1967 to November 27, 1967) he gave the three companies of his association new names: The A-Company was henceforth called Assassins (assassins), the B-Company received the title Barbarians (barbarians) and the C -Company he addressed as Cutthroats (cutthroats). A playing card manufacturer in the United States had 10,000 ace of spades cards sent to them to be left in the contested areas or on the corpses of killed Vietnamese. The ace of spades is considered a death card and particularly symbolizes aggressiveness, impending misfortune and death.

Location in the operational area of ​​the Tiger Force

The Tiger Force was deployed from May to November 1967

The provinces of Quảng Ngãi and Quảng Tin were part of the I Corps Tactical Zone . War events were concentrated in this northernmost of the four Corps Tactical Zones . For both parties it was the zone "with the highest concentration of troops, the most intense fighting and consequently also the greatest loss rates". 54 percent of all GIs killed in Vietnam died here.

The Song Ve Valley is located in Quảng Ngãi Province. It is around seven kilometers long and ten kilometers wide and at that time was one of the most fertile areas of Vietnam. The Buddhist farmers of the river valley did not actively support the Viet Cong, but tried to stay out of the war. However, the rice produced in the valley was considered a potential prey for the Viet Cong. For this reason, the area moved into the focus of the American troops: the population was to be placed in relocation camps (fenced and guarded camps) and the fields made unusable. The corresponding Operation Rawhide was unsatisfactory in the eyes of the American military leadership: around 2,000 farmers continued to live in the Song Ve valley, they had hidden or came back secretly. Then decided the commanders to burn down the villages in the valley, and declared the Vietnamese outside the relocation camps for outlaws . Two thirds of the area was declared a Free Fire Zone - practically a license for large-scale destruction and extermination without further coordination with higher military authorities. The Tiger Force was assigned the role of a fearsome raid party during their two-month stay in this valley.

The conditions in Qu Tinng Tin were different. From August 10, 1967, the Tiger Force had to wage a jungle war against parts of the dreaded 2nd Infantry Division of the North Vietnamese Army . The US High Command estimated that 7,500 North Vietnamese soldiers reached Quảng Tin via the foothills of the Ho Chi Minh Trail , where they supplied supplies and set up new base camps. The natural environment of the envisaged fighting between Chu Lai and Tam Ky consisted of inaccessible mountainous jungle . Five members of the Tiger Force were killed here, and twelve others were wounded in the fighting.

War crimes

The Tiger Force acted like a death squad in the Quảng Ngãi and Quảng Tin area between May and November 1967 . They sat in the Vietnam War standards of its own kind: "Anyway, is not aware of any other entity would have and murdered so long in fact on its own account." Their crimes included theft , arson , rape , the torture prisoners, massive machine gun -Fire on inhabited Villages, target shooting at civilians, the indiscriminate shooting of peasants, the murder of accidentally encountered people, beatings of the defenseless to death, individual and group executions , the deliberate killing of the elderly, the sick, the disabled and women, the stabbing , scalping , Bayonetting and strangling , beheading a baby, mutilating corpses, and decorating with body parts.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of Vietnamese fell victim to the special unit. The number of deaths can hardly be determined more precisely because Tiger Force soldiers killed many people seeking protection by throwing hand grenades into earth bunkers without prior warning and then failing to count the bodies.

The Tiger Force contributed to the U.S. Army's body count practice. Colonel Gerald E. Morse instructed her to care for 327 dead - according to the regiment number. On November 19, 1967, the unit reported that the number of dead had been reached.

Overview of perpetrators and acts

According to internal investigations and research by the Toledo Blade, the following individuals have been implicated in abuse and crimes:

  • Sergeant James Robert Barnett
    • participated in the shooting of four unarmed female and male rice farmers in the Song Ve valley on July 28, 1967. One of the fatally wounded farmers was the 60-year-old Kieu Cong, Le Muc and Phung Giang and an elderly woman from the also died Trang family, six more farmers were injured in the action
    • In the jungle of Quảng Tin province, together with other Tiger Force soldiers with assault rifles or machine guns, several huts in which there were villagers were under massive fire - in these attacks the residents were injured or killed
    • shot and killed seven unarmed captured villagers of various ages, all male, in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province
    • In the jungles of Quảng Tin Province, on the orders of Harold Trout, shot and killed a captured, unarmed young villager who had previously raped Trout
    • shot dead an unarmed Vietnamese man in the jungle of Quảng Tin province west of Than Moi
  • Specialist Barry Bowman, medic
    • killed an injured, unarmed elderly villager at close range with a head shot in a village near the Son Ly River in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province
  • Specialist William Carpenter
    • killed an unarmed, wounded old villager west of Chu Lai in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province with a close-range shot in the neck
  • Private James Cogan
    • shot a defenseless old villager in the mouth with his pistol, west of Chu Lai in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province
  • Sergeant William Doyle, one of the Tiger Force squad leaders
    • shot an unarmed youth from behind after he had asked him to leave the place
    • gave the order to execute a defenseless Vietnamese farmer in the Song Ve Valley after beating him with his rifle
    • participated in the shooting of four unarmed female and male rice farmers in the Song Ve valley on July 28, 1967 (for details see James Robert Barnett)
    • gave the order to shoot an unarmed, captured villager in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province, who had already been shot by himself
  • Sergeant Charles Fulton
    • Together with other Tiger Force members, he and other Tiger Force members threw hand grenades into an earth bunker in the jungles of Quảng Tin Province, where unarmed Vietnamese had sought refuge, after which he and other members of the Tiger Force did not respond to cries from the injured
  • Specialist Kenneth "Boots" Green
    • participated in the shooting of four unarmed female and male rice farmers in the Song Ve valley on July 28, 1967 (for details see James Robert Barnett)
    • beat a captured North Vietnamese soldier in the Song Ve valley together with Sam Ybarra until he lay motionless on the ground (for more details see Sam Ybarra)
    • tortured and killed a prisoner by stabbing him in the back and neck
    • Fired together with others at a hamlet and its residents in the jungle of Quảng Tin province without warning . The attack resulted in many civilian deaths and injuries
  • Sergeant James Haugh
    • ordered members of the Tiger Force in the jungle of Qu inng Tin Province to throw hand grenades into an earth bunker in which unarmed Vietnamese had sought protection (for details see Charles Fulton)
    • Fired with rifles without warning in the jungle of the province of Quảng Tin near the Son Ly river together with other Tiger Force soldiers at a village. Many civilians were injured or killed in these attacks
  • Lieutenant James Hawkins, since the beginning of July 1967 commander of the Tiger Force
    • ordered the execution of two Vietnamese prisoners in the Song Ve Valley on the morning of July 27, 1967
    • ordered the shooting of four unarmed female and male rice farmers in the Song Ve valley on July 28, 1967 (for details see James Robert Barnett)
    • killed defenseless, abused and injured 68-year-old carpenter Dao Hue from Hanh Tin Village in the Song Ve Valley with two shots, one of which was shot in the head
    • opened fire on two unarmed Vietnamese women near the village of Hanh Tin in the Song Ve Valley without warning, other Tiger Force members joined the shelling and one of the two women was injured
    • organized a target shooting at a rice farmer in the jungle of the province of Quảng Tin together with Edward Sanders
    • allowed Tiger Force members to mutilate corpses
  • Private Terrance Kerrigan
    • shot and killed a captured Vietnamese civilian on the orders of Harold Trout
    • Participated in the jungle of the province of Qu Provinzng Tin together with other Tiger Force soldiers in the bombardment of huts in which villagers were - residents were injured or killed in these attacks (for more details see James Robert Barnett)
    • mutilated the corpses of Vietnamese in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province by cutting off their ears and wearing these body parts on a necklace
  • Captain Harold McGaha, replacing James Hawkins, in command of the Tiger Force from November 1, 1967
    • tolerated the wearing of necklaces with human ears
    • tolerated rifles being adorned with scalps
    • ordered fires to be opened on huts held by villagers in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province - many residents were injured or killed in the attack
  • Sergeant Ernest Moreland
    • bayoneted a previously abused prisoner in the Song Ve Valley together with Robin Varney
  • Lieutenant Edward Sanders, one of the commanders of the Tiger Force in the area
    • organized a target shooting at a rice farmer in the jungle of the province of Quảng Tin together with James Hawkins (for details see James Hawkins)
  • Private Floyd Sawyer
    • participated in the torture of two prisoners in the jungles of Quảng Tin Province, and then killed one of them
  • Sergeant Harold Trout, one of the Tiger Force squad leaders
    • shot and killed an injured unarmed civilian in the Song Ve Valley
    • abused 68-year-old Dao Hue in the Song Ve valley (for details see James Hawkins)
    • ordered James Cogan to kill an unarmed old man in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province (see James Cogan for details)
    • ordered James Robert Barnett in the jungles of Quảng Tin Province to shoot a captured, unarmed young villager whom he had raped himself (for details see James Robert Barnett)
    • tolerated the torture and killing of two prisoners in the jungle of Quảng Tin Province (for details see Floyd Sawyer)
  • Sergeant Robin Varney
    • bayoneted a previously abused prisoner in the Song Ve valley together with Ernest Moreland
  • Private Sam Ybarra
    • hit a captured North Vietnamese soldier in the Song Ve valley together with Kenneth "Boots" Green until he lay motionless on the ground, and then cut his throat
    • shot an unarmed youth and then stole his shoes
    • beheaded a baby in the jungles of Quảng Tin Province and stole its necklace
    • regularly mutilated the corpses of Vietnamese, often cutting off their ears, collecting them and putting them on necklaces
    • knocked gold crowns and teeth out of the teeth of dead Vietnamese and stole them
    • scalped a prisoner in the Song Ve valley in June 1967
    • decorated his rifle barrel with scalps of Vietnamese

refusal

About a dozen of the 45 men deployed in each case refused to participate in the war crimes. They secluded themselves, laid down their rifles or refused to give orders to mistreat or kill defenseless Vietnamese. For example, corporal and medic Rion Causey ignored orders to shoot seven unarmed, captured male villagers of various ages in the jungles of Quảng Tin Province. Private Kenneth Kerney also refused to shoot at unarmed villagers - men, women and children - in the jungles of Quảng Tin Province, despite an order. In particular, many new team members appear to have initially refused to shoot at people who were identified as noncombatants.

resistance

During the Vietnam War, individual American soldiers actively resisted by preventing the killing of defenseless civilians or preventing the continuation of such acts. The most famous example of this is the helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson during the Mỹ Lai massacre .

Of the Tiger Force members, Sergeant Gerald Bruner sided with an unarmed Vietnamese teenager when another Tiger Force soldier threatened his death in the jungles of Quảng Tin. Bruner forced his comrade at gunpoint to give up his plan. Bruner ignored Sergeant William Doyle's order not to threaten his comrade with a weapon.

William Carpenter tried to prevent the mistreatment and murder of the 68-year-old carpenter Dao Hue (for details, see James Hawkins and Harold Trout above), but failed, as did Lieutenant Donald Wood, who reached the scene too late and was also knocked down by Trout.

Information from superiors

Two members of the Tiger Force - Lieutenant Donald Wood and Sergeant Gerald Bruner - repeatedly briefed superiors in August 1967 about war crimes committed by the combat unit. They wanted to initiate internal investigations in the poor, but they did not take place. Bruner was reported to have mental health problems and was immediately transferred to another unit. Wood's military superiors said they could do little and signaled their unwillingness to investigate just because a few American soldiers killed gooks . In the investigation that finally began in 1971, four other Tiger Force members said that their superiors had known what was happening in the area. At the same time it turned out that the Tiger Force superiors had committed their soldiers to strict secrecy.

Investigations

Trigger and scope

The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) investigated allegations against the Tiger Force from February 1971 to June 1975. The investigation began after Gary D. Coy, a C Company (Cutthroats) soldier , reported atrocities during Operation Wheeler in early 1971 . In light of the upcoming trial of the Mỹ Lai massacre, his advice was taken seriously. Army lawyer Gustav Apsey took over the case and pushed it forward tenaciously. He tracked down the Tiger Force, which was not on the military registers, by systematically comparing Coy's allegations with those made by journalist Dennis Lee Stout in late 1969. In the Phoenix Arizona Gazette and at a press conference in Phoenix , Stout had accused members of the B-Company (Barbarians) of serious crimes. Army investigators were not convinced of Stout's allegations in 1969 and closed the case because of lack of evidence.

Around 100 CID employees dealt with the Tiger Force between 1971 and 1975. They interviewed 137 witnesses, speaking to Tiger Force members in 63 cities - in the United States, South Korea , Germany and the Philippines . A number of witnesses provided extensive information. However, two thirds of the respondents refused to give a statement, and some were asked to do so by CID employees. In the end, there was a " dossier with overwhelming evidence": According to the investigation, 18 soldiers committed war crimes. However, no charges were ever brought. During the investigation, six suspects - including an officer - were allowed to retire from military service. Prosecution was no longer possible in these cases.

Information from authorities

The results of the investigation were sent to the US Department of Defense and the United States Secretary of the Army without leading to any concrete action there. Senior officials in the White House have also been briefed several times on the progress of the investigation. This is the case, for example, with John Dean , President Richard Nixon's legal advisor . “What role President Nixon played in covering up the Tiger Force crimes is unclear. For two years - from 1971 to 1973 - the White House received weekly summaries of the status of all war crimes investigations, including ten dossiers on the Tiger Force death squad ”. The Vietnam War Crimes Working Group has existed in the American administration since the press coverage of the Mỹ Lai massacre . After Westmoreland was relieved of the position of Commanding General of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the Army , members of his circle in the Pentagon formed this working group to keep up to date with internal army investigations into war crimes and as a political one Early warning system to work. The logs and records of the investigation into the acts of the Tiger Force were eventually turned over to the National Archives and Records Administration .

Media and scientific perception

Report in the Toledo Blade and Pulitzer Prize

After the death of Henry H. Tufts, head of the CID from 1971 to 1975, his files went to the Harlan Hatcher Graduate Library at the University of Michigan at the end of 2002 . In February 2003, before the files were archived, Mitch Weiss and Michael Sallah, two reporters from the Toledo Blade, were able to inspect the files. They contained, among other things, a 22-page document entitled Coy Allegation , the contents of which were previously unknown to the public. The same applied to the fighting unit accused in the Coy Allegation : the Tiger Force. The two journalists, who were later joined by investigative journalist Joe Mahr, convinced their superiors of the explosiveness of the material and were able to research the case for more than eight months. They interviewed Gustav Apsey, the chief investigator who had remained silent out of loyalty to the army. They also identified 65 former Tiger Force members and interviewed 43 of them. In addition, they evaluated the archived radio protocols of the unit in order to get an idea of ​​the respective whereabouts of the unit. The journalists also traveled to Vietnam and spoke to survivors there. From October 19-22, 2003, the Toledo Blade published a four-part series of articles entitled “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths” about the war crimes of the Tiger Force.

Following the publication of the Toledo Blade, the American Army announced an investigation into whether the suspected members of the Tiger Force could be charged retrospectively.

On June 3, 2004, the three employees of the Toledo Blade received for her report the Pulitzer Prize in the category "Investigative Journalism", endowed at 10,000 dollars . This was the first and so far only award of this kind for the newspaper.

Reports from other media

After the publication in October 2003, other media picked up the story and reported, based on the findings of Weiss, Sallah and Mahr. These media included the Associated Press and Reuters , newspapers such as the International Herald Tribune , The Washington Post , The Miami Herald , The Boston Globe, and the Chicago Tribune . The main news program ABC World News Tonight and Nightline magazine also gave full coverage of what went on. The New York Times found the announcement of war crimes by American soldiers in Vietnam to be unsurprising after decades. In April 2004 Spiegel Online published a German translation of the articles in the Toledo Blade.

Nevertheless, important American media did not make the atrocities of the Tiger Force the lead story , as Seymour Hersh criticized, who exposed the 1969 Mỹ Lai massacre. Scott Sherman also criticized The Nation for the lack of a comprehensive account of the Tiger Force crimes. He suspected that in 2003 and 2004, many journalists did not seem opportune to focus on such crimes - American troops ended up waging war in Iraq .

Book publications

In 2006 Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss published a book about the Tiger Force. The roughly four hundred page work was published by Little, Brown and Company . The paperback edition came out a year later. The book received positive reviews in many American media. A number of reviewers highlighted the journalistic achievements of the Toledo Blade reporters.

In his study “War Without Fronts”, published in 2007, the historian and political scientist Bernd Greiner dealt with American warfare in Vietnam, paying particular attention to the violent practices of ground troops and helicopter crews. Using several case studies, he shows that the Mỹ Lai massacre was no exception, but that such acts of violence were much more widespread than previously known. He also makes it clear that the legal prosecution of such violations of the international martial law in the American army was very negligent, one was dealing with "an erosion of the military legal culture in a legal way".

In this study, Greiner also goes into the acts of the Tiger Force. As one of the "small units" widespread among the American ground forces, it tended to use excessive force, because it practically gave itself the rules of engagement in the unknown and confusing combat area and because the exercise of violence within the unit opened up the chance to gain distinction and reputation . The fun of killing, which some of the perpetrators had, also becomes clear from their actions. According to Greiner, these factors are important for explaining the rampant violence of the war, in addition to approaches that refer to group pressure and internal coherence of small groups that are largely left to their own devices.

In the area of ​​operations in Vietnam, especially in the jungle, many factors favored massive violence and war crimes: Greiner names macho behavior and its counterpart (fear of being taken for a coward), combat stress up to physical exhaustion, and rapid indifference to suffering, the Obsession with an omnipresence of the Viet Cong, the constant distrust of a strange nature, frequent experiences of powerlessness, pronounced hatred of Vietnamese women as well as the linguistic humiliation and dehumanization of the Vietnamese - they were called gook , dink , dope or slope , for example . From the perspective of the perpetrators, acting out violence against Vietnamese was an act of self-assurance through acts of violence, of conquering one's own fear and of taking revenge for what they had experienced.

attachment

literature

Web links

Notes and individual references

  1. ↑ After the reunification of Vietnam it was again part of the Quảng Nam province .
  2. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 28 and 239.
  3. ↑ a b c d e f DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003.
  4. ↑ a b Joe Mahr: Unit's founder says he didn't know of atrocities. In: Toledo Blade . March 28, 2004.
  5. ↑ a b Blade wins Pulitzer. Series exposing Vietnam atrocities earns top honor. In: Toledo Blade. June 4, 2004.
  6. ↑ Udo Sautter : Lexicon of American History , Beck, Munich 1997, p. 384, ISBN 3-406-39294-6 .
  7. ↑ See the entry Credibility Gap in James Stuart Olson: Historical dictionary of the 1960s , Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn. 1999, p. 118, ISBN 0-313-29271-X .
  8. ↑ Greiner: War without Fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, pp. 421-430. For the meaning of body count, see also Lewis Sorley, Body Count. In: Spencer C. Tucker (Ed.): Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. A political, social, and military history. Vol. 1, Abc-Clio, Santa Barbara / Denver / Oxford 1998, ISBN 0-87436-983-5 , p. 70.
  9. ↑ On the dynamics of asymmetrical warfare in Vietnam see Greiner: War without Fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, pp. 44-56.
  10. ↑ Hackworth's formulation. See Richard Hanner: Hackworth: Warrior, advocate, writer . In: Lodi News-Sentinel , May 14, 2005.
  11. ↑ See in retrospect Interview with Col. David Hackworth, US Army, South Vietnam , printed on the PBS website .
  12. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 13.
  13. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 231.
  14. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War , 2007, p. 52.
  15. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 254.
  16. ^ Family of Dyersburg Medal of Honor recipient donates medal to 101st Airborne . in: Dyersburg State Gazette , September 1, 2009; Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 13 f.
  17. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 15 and p. 22.
  18. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 231; Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 317; DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003.
  19. ↑ The website of the veterans does not present a recent group picture of soldiers of this unit in the Vietnam operation. See the Tiger Force website .
  20. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 232; Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War , 2007, p. 277.
  21. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 232.
  22. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 231.
  23. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War , 2007, p. 226.
  24. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 228, there also the quote.
  25. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 143.
  26. ↑ See John D. Root: Wheeler / Wallowa, Operation. In: Spencer C. Tucker (Ed.): Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. A political, social, and military history. Vol. 2, Abc-Clio, Santa Barbara / Denver / Oxford 1998, ISBN 0-87436-983-5 , pp. 818-820; also: English-language information about this operation on the website http://www.lzcenter.com ./
  27. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 228; Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War , 2007, p. 179.
  28. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 228 f. and p. 328.
  29. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 202, there also the quotation from Greiner.
  30. ↑ See also Cecil B. Currey: Free Fire Zones. In: Spencer C. Tucker (Ed.): Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. A political, social, and military history. Vol. 1, Abc-Clio, Santa Barbara / Denver / Oxford 1998, ISBN 0-87436-983-5 , p. 230; also Lewis M. Simons: Free Fire Zones. ( Memento of October 8, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) at: www.crimesofwar.org .
  31. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, pp. 235-237. See also Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, pp. 36-38. Duration of the Tiger Force's stay in the valley after DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003. For the valley itself, see also DAY 3: Pain lingers 36 years after deadly rampage. In: Toledo Blade. October 21, 2003.
  32. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 237. See also Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 134 f.
  33. ^ So Greiner. See war without fronts. The USA in Vietnam , 2009, p. 37, p. 233 and more often. Sallah and Weiss call them a "kill squad", see Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War , 2007, p. 277.
  34. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 37.
  35. ↑ See the summary information in Greiner: War without Fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 238, p. 240 and p. 243 f.
  36. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 239.
  37. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 209 and p. 212; DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003.
  38. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 123; DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003.
  39. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 161, p. 197, p. 208.
  40. ↑ a b c Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 199.
  41. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 202, p. 361 f, p. 377 f.
  42. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 209 f.
  43. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 153, p. 251.
  44. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 156 f., P. 350.
  45. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 156, p. 350 f., P. 383.
  46. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 256.
  47. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 256.
  48. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, pp. 165-167, p. 260, p. 382.
  49. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 151, p. 275, p. 352, p. 375.
  50. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 63 f., P. 336.
  51. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 265 f., P. 344.
  52. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 161.
  53. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 150 f, p. 352, p. 375.
  54. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 152 f.
  55. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 84.
  56. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 302, p. 382.
  57. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 123, p. 238, p. 255, p. 300 f .; DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003.
  58. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, pp. 94-96, p. 239, p. 314, p. 341; DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003.
  59. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 99 f., P. 258, p. 342.
  60. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 184, p. 359, p. 382.
  61. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 370.
  62. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 144 f., P. 343 f, p. 351.
  63. ↑ a b Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 208.
  64. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 197 f., P. 200, p. 202, p. 208.
  65. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 206.
  66. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 207.
  67. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 113, p. 264.
  68. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 162 f, p. 251, p. 353 f.
  69. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 101.
  70. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 113, p. 264, p. 302, p. 344, p. 372.
  71. ↑ For him see 7 allegations focused on GI from Arizona. In: Toledo Blade . October 19, 2003.
  72. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 63 f, p. 337.
  73. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 239.
  74. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 213 f., P. 265, p. 360, 364, p. 372.
  75. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 62, p. 128, p. 198, p. 200, p. 202 f., P. 208, p. 302 f., P. 335, p. 371-373, p. 383.
  76. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 209, p. 211, p. 303, p. 373, p. 383.
  77. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. P. 336, p. 374.
  78. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 245 f.
  79. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 127.
  80. ↑ For him and his helicopter crew during the Mỹ Lai massacre, see Greiner: War without Fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, pp. 342-345.
  81. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 167.
  82. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 96 f.
  83. ↑ DAY 2: Inquiry ended without justice. In: Toledo Blade. October 20, 2003. On Bruner's experiment, see also Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. , 2007, p. 356 f and p. 193. For Wood's report, see Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. , 2007, pp. 126-129.
  84. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 287.
  85. ↑ For his biography see Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. , 2007, p. 217 f., P. 220 and p. 304.
  86. ↑ Biographical information on Stout in Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 81 f.
  87. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. , 2009, p. 233; Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, p. 223 f.
  88. ↑ a b c Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 234.
  89. ↑ DAY 2: Inquiry ended without justice . In: Toledo Blade. October 20, 2003; DAY 1: Rogue GIs unleashed wave of terror in Central Highlands. In: Toledo Blade. October 19, 2003.
  90. ↑ DAY 2: Inquiry ended without justice . In: Toledo Blade. October 20, 2003.
  91. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 496.
  92. ↑ Nick Turse, Deborah Nelson: Civilian Killings Went Unpunished. Declassified papers show US atrocities went far beyond My Lai. In: Los Angeles Times . August 6, 2006. See also Marcel Berni: Review of: Turse, Nick: Kill Anything That Moves. The Real American War in Vietnam. New York 2013 , in: H-Soz-u-Kult , September 20, 2013.
  93. ^ Institution website .
  94. ↑ Sallah, Weiss: Tiger Force. A True Story of Men and War. 2007, pp. 309-320; Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 234 f.
  95. ↑ a b How The Blade came to win a Pulitzer for a story that was 37 years old , Interview by Barry Sussman with Ron Royhab, Executive Editor of the Toledo Blade, Nieman Watchdog Project, May 8, 2004.
  96. ↑ Bernd Greiner: What an American death squad did in the Vietnam War. In: The time . 34-2006.
  97. ↑ War Crimes in Vietnam: Apocalypse Now. In: Spiegel Online. April 16, 2004.
  98. ↑ Contribution by Scott Sherman in The Nation , March 1, 2004. References to this criticism by Hersh and Sherman in Edwin A. Martini: Invisible enemies. The American war on Vietnam, 1975-2000 , Univ. of Massachusetts Press, Amherst 2007, ISBN 978-1-55849-609-5 , pp. 239 f.
  99. ↑ See the review excerpts in the paperback 2007 edition. Also, reviews of the book on the Barnes & Noble website . See also discussion by Nathaniel R. Helms in Michigan War Studies Review , Aug. 1, 2007.
  100. ↑ See the votes on the corresponding page at www.bookmarksmagazine.com .
  101. ↑ See the review by Volker Ullrich : The American Nightmare. In: The time. September 27, 2007 and the review of Ulrich Bröckling on See points , Issue 8 (2008), no. 1 of 15 January 2008.
  102. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 38.
  103. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 37.
  104. ^ These derogatory terms in Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, p. 179.
  105. ↑ On the factors promoting violence see Greiner: War without Fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, pp. 175-181.
  106. ^ Greiner: War without fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, pp. 193-200. For the concrete case of the Tiger Force see Greiner: War without Fronts. The USA in Vietnam. 2009, pp. 240-249.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on October 26, 2014 .