Special unit

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KSK troop at Bundeswehr Day in Faßberg (2017)

A special unit or special unit is a closed unit of special forces of a military , police or intelligence institution, the tactical use of which is intended to develop an operational effect that cannot normally be expected through the use of diplomatic, intelligence or conventional military means. The use of special units is therefore characterized by the pursuit of high precision while at the same time minimizing costs and risks. Therefore, they are usually able to carry out assignments with an extremely hazardous situation and a high degree of difficulty. They are able to do this due to special training and high-quality, modern equipment. With their special combination of skills, they cover a range of missions that the conventional military, for example, cannot perform due to logistical, financial or other organizational considerations.

Specialized forces are, their use types and orders are in contrast to forces aligned to a specific order, such as the boarding company of the German Navy , special pioneers , the personal protection commands or access forces the military police force .

The forerunners of today's military special forces were the German shock troops in World War I , the Soviet and German paratroopers between the wars, and the commandos of World War II .

Some military special forces, who are involved in setting up, training and leading local resistance groups in hostile territory, are viewed by military planners and politicians as so-called force multiplier , because their effectiveness is many times higher than that of conventional units.

In the course of time, special forces came more and more into the focus of military and police planning because the threat scenarios have changed due to the emergence of terrorism , the end of the Cold War and the increase in asymmetrical conflicts and crises worldwide. Today they are often seen as a more effective instrument for coping with and solving difficult situations than traditional conventional formations.

Military special forces

term

According to the military historian Simon Anglim, the concept of the special unit has not been adequately researched or even justified theoretically. Unlike the war in general or the insurrection in particular, which are based on the writings of Carl von Clausewitz or Mao Zedong , special forces have not been preceded by any relevant theoretician. Furthermore, the delimitation is made more difficult by three factors: First, official doctrines are inaccessible due to confidentiality measures. Second, the demarcation is blurred by “sensational” media, especially in film, television and video games. In the end, commanding officers would be exposed to the tension between politics and operations management; While political elites oppose special units with enthusiasm or even unreasonable expectations due to their suspected or demonstrated effectiveness, from time to time it is precisely this patronage, the comparatively high expenditure of resources and the prestige of such units that burden the relationship to the commanders of conventional units with a traditional understanding of their tasks.

In the United States , the entirety of the American special forces is referred to as Special Operations Forces , since the term Special Forces is already used as a proper name for the corresponding unit of the US Army . Internationally and in non-Anglo-American literature, Special Forces is generally used for special forces.

"Elite units"

French Foreign Legion at a parade in Rome , 2007

The term special unit is often used misleadingly. Not every outstanding unit is originally a special unit, because members of special units usually belong to the professional performance elite , but not all elite associations are special units.

Therefore, a distinction must be made in particular between military "elite associations", which have a higher level of training, special recruiting and selection procedures and thus also an above-average combat strength , and conceptual special forces who have a task that differs significantly from the regular military, for which they are specially trained and are equipped and which cannot or only unsatisfactorily be carried out by "normal" formations.

Examples of such "elite associations" (the term elite is now uncommon even frowned upon in most armed forces and partially and is now actually used only in the press or in popular science literature) are the French Foreign Legion , the Spanish Legion , the Light Infantry of the US Army (for example the 10th US Mountain Division ) as well as various airborne units of individual nations. The latter are basically only airborne light infantry and, due to their operational profile, which regularly assumes a self-reliant fight against superior enemy forces until relief is possible, they are equipped with particularly efficient and motivated personnel.

However, all of these units mostly carry out classic military missions on a broad basis, even if they are partly through additional training for combat under special climatic conditions ( jungle , desert and alpine warfare ) and partly through command skills (this is limited to as a rule, however, to one or more companies or to a battalion and is not available in width).

The hunting fight is to be distinguished from the commando operation , which is carried out by the infantry as a type of combat , formerly a special combat action, in addition to their normal range of tasks with attack and defense. The main difference is that command units are only intended for operational command missions, infantry, especially paratroopers and mountain fighters, also perceive this in a tactical sense.

Conventional special forces

US Army Rangers on patrol

The order of conventional special forces moves as a rule on the lower tactical level and in the context of general military operations. Certain missions can be of strategic importance, for example if an enemy command center or a radar station could be destroyed by a commando operation and as a result an unsecured approach path is created through which the own air force can then attack strategic targets.

Special units are consistently suitable for jumping, trained in the advanced HAHO jumping technique and in special infiltration techniques. Classic deployment profiles are command operations, i.e. the targeted capture, rendering useless or destruction of key enemy positions such as airfields, communication and command centers, artillery and missile positions, bridges, ports, supply bases, bunkers or other particularly valuable positions of the enemy. Attacks as a coup d'état (English direct action ) are carried out either at the front or, after successful infiltration, in the enemy hinterland.

Another area of ​​responsibility is tactical reconnaissance and the recovery of personnel and equipment from behind enemy lines with shallow penetration depths (usually up to 30 kilometers). Many of these units are also trained for sabotage and search and rescue missions in combat situations (CSAR). They can also be used as an advanced observer and as a forward air controller to direct the indirect fire of the artillery or to conduct close air support .

In order to express their own self-image and their demarcation from unconventional special forces such as the Green Berets , a commander of the US Army Rangers formulated his mission in an interview with author Hartmut Schauer as follows:

“Our job is to kill people and destroy things. [...] We are killers, not helpers and trainers [...]. "

Typical representatives of this classic commandos ( shock troops , Eng. And Shock Troops ), the US Army Rangers and USMC Reconnaissance Battalion .

Unconventional special forces

Members of the SAS after a patrol ( North Africa , 1943)
Navy SEAL with CAR15 assault rifle and attached M203 grenade launcher
Members of the US Special Forces pay their last respects to fallen comrades at Ramstein Air Base

In contrast to the classic commando units, the unconventional special units operate more covertly and underground. This means that although they also have the capabilities of these units (classic command warfare), they usually do not operate according to the tactical principles of regular infantry. Their deployment patterns are more like those of intelligence services . This means that they can also be used “undercover” and without a uniform. Their training goes far beyond that of a classic commando unit, because these units not only serve significantly more operational profiles, but are also linguistically and culturally trained in order to be able to work in the operational area and to adapt to the circumstances there.

In contrast to the conventional special units, this also means that many of these units are deployed in civilian and undercover operations, with considerable legal consequences for the soldiers involved and possibly also for the nations that deploy them. For example, verifiable disclosure or even imprisonment would mean that members of such units do not fall under the protection of the Hague Land Warfare Regulations and the Geneva Conventions and are thus considered formal non-combatants and spies who face execution.

The typical order patterns are long-range reconnaissance with great penetration depth (up to 800 kilometers), asymmetrical warfare ( Unconventional or Revolutionary Warfare ), anti-guerrilla warfare , sabotage and the broad field of security and military advice . This is gaining in importance today because it gives governments the opportunity to discretely and without large military contingents exert political influence on the friendly host nations and their regions, which would otherwise not be possible by means of the usual power projection by naval associations or conventional military.

In addition to military and security-related aspects, civilian goals are also pursued as part of these military advisory missions. The host countries should be politically stabilized through training, infrastructural, social and health measures and any conflicts should be nipped in the bud (crisis prevention). Often such units are also trained in psychological warfare and military civil administration.

A distinction is made between three levels of deployment, military advice in peacetime, crisis intervention and war deployment.

In the latter, these unconventional formations usually work completely on their own for months behind enemy lines in small groups that usually only consist of six to twelve men. They are eager to recruit local resistance groups to train and in a guerrilla war ( Guerra , "war" and guerrilla "small war", which is now a synonym for the partisan war ) to lead against the enemy they also logistically support.

Another job profile of such units is hostage rescue and counter-terrorism . This often means that members of such units also act as bodyguards for commanders in chief or civilian dignitaries.

Because of the close links with the (military) intelligence services, these units also perform special operations (Special Activities) as targeted killings or kidnappings of individuals, for example, a dictator or war criminal or covert reconnaissance through in a hostile land. Naturally, these operations are carried out under particularly strict secrecy due to their political explosiveness. It is often the case that the perpetrators, should they be exposed and captured, are on their own, that is, the responsible government denies that the soldiers are members of their own military.

Police special forces

A report on various US special forces taking part in a counter-terrorism course in New Mexico .

Police special units sometimes have similar orientations as military ones, but they are legally and practically adapted to the specific requirements of police tasks. A distinction is made between three classic groups of police special forces, as well as various specialist or special departments for certain special uses, which do not operate independently, but are regularly used either as a command or support department for special situations or types of crime. The European special police units have been organized in the Atlas network since 2002 .

Special task forces

United States

In 1965, the race rioting of the Watts riot in Los Angeles , which lasted six days, claimed 34 lives and over a thousand injured, and resulted in 4,000 arrests and which could ultimately only be ended with the help of the National Guard , led to a review of the police tactics. These experiences and the significant increase in crime in which firearms were used, as well as the increase in gang crime, led the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to develop the SWAT deployment concept and in 1967 to set up the first SWAT unit in the USA, the LAPD SWAT . Many other US police administrations followed suit and also set up their own SWAT teams, even before another important field of activity, counter-terrorism, was added in the early 1970s.

Germany

After the Munich Olympic attack in 1972, the GSG 9 was set up as a special federal unit in the same year in order to be able to adequately counter such threat scenarios. Two years later, the Conference of the Interior Ministers decided in 1974 to set up sniper commandos , subsequently the special operations commandos for the individual federal states, through the establishment of special units (officially the concept for the establishment and deployment of special units of the federal states and the federal government for combating terrorists ) .

Other countries

Similar procedures were followed in other countries, where tactical special units were set up that were specially trained and equipped for the fight against terrorism, the final solution to hostage-taking , the arrest of particularly dangerous criminals, and the ending of rampages and kidnappings .

organization

These units are usually composed of two groups, a precision rifle group (in Germany precision rifle command ) and an access group. The first group secures the crime scene, the second group is responsible for the liberation of hostages and arrests. In many nations, the so-called final rescue shot is allowed, the targeted killing of a hostage-taker or threatening explosives bomber. In Germany there are high demands on the proportionality of the measure. The application is not regulated in all police laws.

Typical representatives of such units are the SEKs of the federal states, the hostage rescue team of the FBI , the SWAT units of the US police authorities and the Austrian task force Cobra .

Other task forces

Russian OMON police officers in Moscow's Red Square

There are also special police units that do not primarily deal with the fight against terrorism and hostage liberation, but with the fight against other forms of crime, which nevertheless require a specially trained search, observation and access unit, as these situations overstrain the training level of normal police officers.

In Germany these are the mobile task forces (MEK) of the federal states. You have two main areas of activity. The covert observation of potential or identified criminals can be carried out both with personnel and with the appropriate technology. Further tasks are direction finding and location, the technical observation of people, vehicles and mobile phones as well as the protection of undercover investigators in case of possibly problematic contact with the perpetrator.

Both MEKs and SEKs are qualified to arrest people, both from a mobile position and from a static position . MEK are preferably used in the mobile position, that is, the access should surprisingly take place from the movement of the person to be arrested (driving / walking perpetrator). If, on the other hand, strong armaments, high resistance or locked doors in a static location (such as an apartment) are to be expected from the police counterpart in advance, support from a special task force equipped with better self-protection is usually requested.

In other countries there are similar units that are trained for special situations and operations, but do not deal with terrorist or serious criminal threats. Nevertheless, they are specially equipped and trained and are not integrated as a unit into the normal police service, but are only used depending on the situation and selectively.

Examples of such units are the WEGA of the Vienna Police, the Russian OMON and the Swiss special unit Enzian .

The special units of the customs were, in structure and subordination, to those of the police according to Police regulation 100 adjusted.

Thus, the Central Customs Support Group (ZUZ) is comparable to a special task force ( SEK) and the customs observation unit (OEZ) with a mobile task force (MEK).

Observation and reconnaissance groups

These special units or also operational departments deal mainly with the observation of persons of interest to the security organs in order to monitor them and to determine their movement profiles and habits. These can be potential or identified criminals, informants , undercover investigators, terror suspects, persons relevant to the intelligence service and foreign citizens or diplomats . Observations are usually carried out by four-man teams, but can also be carried out with several teams. This depends on the importance of the target person and the fact whether they themselves are trained in observation techniques and their recognition. Technical aids such as transmitters, transponders , UV color markings or reflectors (on vehicles) and, in cases of the utmost importance, military satellites are also used.

The second typical task of such units is the tactical reconnaissance of city districts, buildings or rural areas in which relevant people, captured hostages, assassins, gunmen, kidnappers or objects are or are located. This is usually done in preparation for a later access (use) or to determine criminally relevant material or circumstances.

Often parts of the deployment profile of such observation and reconnaissance groups are taken over by the special task forces themselves or already belong to the deployment profile of other task forces, such as the MEKs.

An example of such a special unit is the British Special Reconnaissance Regiment , which is part of the British Army but, like the Special Air Service, also performs police duties.

Specialized departments

Specialized departments are not special units in the actual sense, as they do not operate independently and do not have an association structure. In special situations, you are called in as a specialized support group (department) or command post and work as part of a crisis intervention group in the event of hostage-taking, situations with a terrorist or serious criminal background and in the event of natural disasters, or as part of a specially set up special commission (SOKO) with individually defined objectives. An example of such a specialized specialist or crisis intervention management body is the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group .

These can be psychologically trained negotiation groups (in the case of hostage-taking), so-called profiler groups for investigations against serial perpetrators or special IT investigation groups that conduct both Internet searches and legally legitimized hacking , targeted intrusion into third-party protected IT systems . An example of such a profiling department is the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit .

Certain departments of the Federal Criminal Police Office that have similar branches in the structures of the state criminal police offices , such as state security, the SO department - Serious and Organized Crime (responsible for organized crime , drug crime and covert investigations and the management of confidants ) and the SG– department - Security group ( personal protection ) are also specialized departments. However, the boundaries are blurring here and it becomes clear how difficult it is to differentiate from special units in the classic sense, since there is no binding system of differentiation. The different national classification and classification of different units with the same operational profile also makes things more difficult.

Intelligence special forces

Spetsnaz -Trupp at a briefing ( Afghanistan , 1988)

Intelligence services also maintain special units, mostly of a paramilitary character. In contrast to the administrative departments of the services, these often have a closed association structure and are primarily recruited from particularly qualified and experienced soldiers of the armed forces who have already served in special military units.

When these soldiers change employers, they receive additional training in operational intelligence work. Intelligence instructors teach the entire range of skills that an agent must master in action. These include, among other things, observation, counter-observation, direct conspiratorial contact with informants, but also indirect non-technical exchange of messages (e.g. the use of dead mailboxes ) and covert infiltration into hostile operational areas. The focus is not so much on obtaining information from the intelligence service, but rather on forwarding information from informants and agents and exploring the situation. The members of such units are to be put in a position to operate undetected undercover in enemy territory. Often the former soldiers have already mastered many of these skills because they were already deployed in the military at the interfaces to intelligence services or were already deployed in joint operations.

The main focus of such units encompasses the entire range of mission profiles of unconventional special forces. Since intelligence services usually follow different legal principles than the armed forces of the respective country, the integration of such military potential under the umbrella of an intelligence service has the advantage that operations can take place with their own resources without other authorities or ministries having to be involved, and thus secrecy can often be better preserved. Another advantage is the elimination of possible frictional losses in joint operations with other agencies if the personnel involved are familiar with the special aspects of an intelligence operation and thus possible sources of error can be excluded from the outset.

In many countries, the integration of paramilitary special units into intelligence agencies leads to expanded operational powers that go beyond military or police forces and then merge them. This not infrequently leads to the fact that these are abused by the respective governments and used to repression political opponents and to keep dictatorial regimes in power . This often leads to a generally rather critical assessment of paramilitary formations under the umbrella of intelligence services among political observers, specialist authors and the press.

Typical examples of such formations are the US-American Special Activities Division of the CIA , the Israeli Sajeret Matkal des Aman , the Russian Speznas of the GRU , the Alfa and Wympel of the FSB and members of the armed forces in the Office for Military Studies who work for the Federal Intelligence Service .

Benefits and Risks

Due to their structure, training and equipment, special units are able to process certain deployment profiles better than conventional units or departments. In addition, they open up completely new operational patterns that conventional units cannot provide. Like other elites in society and the economy, they also have to struggle with the same problems in terms of acceptance and legitimacy with regard to tasks and budgets. As an antithesis to the large conventional military, they are often seen within the armed forces as a foreign body and competitor, since their presence alone often has a negative influence on the morale of conventional units, because these often feel neglected in their ratings and the maintenance of special units in the Is very expensive in relation to their manpower. Many commanders are still skeptical about their military benefits in relation to their costs and are bothered by the elitist habitus of such units, which often violates military etiquette.

Nevertheless, since the 1960s, the age of proxy wars in the era of the Cold War , the importance of special forces experienced a steady increase, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a massive increase. Due to the dissolution of the East-West antagonism and the bloc politics as well as the emergence of new sovereign individual states from former Soviet republics (e.g. Belarus , Ukraine and Georgia ), the international situation regarding the feasibility of wars became more complicated and dangerous. In the past, everything was subordinated to the East-West confrontation and the impending nuclear apocalypse ( nuclear war ), but today this sword of Damocles is less threatening , which leads many states to believe that wars are feasible again and can be a useful means of achieving political goals. While around 600 wars were documented in the 20th century up to 1990, there are already over 50 military conflicts worldwide today, and the trend is rising.

This development led many governments to the realization that military instruments are needed that are capable of enforcing national security interests directly, but also within the framework of international organizations such as the UN. This is done by means of mediating, peacemaking and conflict-de-escalating operations in the event of disputes that are already smoldering. This is only possible to a limited extent, both technically and politically, with the conventional military, as was necessary for deterrence during the Cold War. This has led to enormous disarmament in many countries since the 1990s, while at the same time maintaining and increasing the number of special forces. Powerful, flexible and air-deployable units began not to replace the role of the conventional military within national operational planning, but to postpone it. The expensive, heavy and immobile mass army, mostly with a large number of conscripts , was ousted by light, well trained and highly motivated special units made up of professional and contract soldiers in a number of planning and deployments . The quantitative change (increase) of the conflicts, but above all their qualitative, the increase in asymmetrical threats and disputes led to the fact that the role and importance of special forces was further upgraded, as they were not only in war, but also in crises or in Peace can be used as a military advisory body and thus have a political effect that goes far beyond purely military effectiveness.

Competitions

Every year tournaments and competitions take place among special forces. In addition to the competition, the meetings focus primarily on the exchange of information and tactics. In Yemen every year 30 to 40 special forces from up to 19 countries are meeting since 2009 Warrior Competition . Another competition is the Combat Team Conference , which has been held in Germany every four years since 1983 , in which, in addition to physical exercises, particular attention is paid to care, precision and the optimal use of human and material resources as well as adherence to tactical principles.

Warrior Competition

year Number of participating teams winner
2015 37 from 18 countries (excluding ) GermanyGermany AustriaAustria SwitzerlandSwitzerland RussiaRussia Counter Terrorism - Team (1)
2014 33 from 19 countries (excluding ) GermanyGermany AustriaAustria SwitzerlandSwitzerland China People's RepublicPeople's Republic of China Snow Leopard Commando Unit
2013 30 from 17 countries (excluding ) GermanyGermany AustriaAustria China People's RepublicPeople's Republic of China Snow Leopard Commando Unit
2012 35 from 18 countries (excluding ) SwitzerlandSwitzerland GermanyGermany GSG 9 of the Federal Police
2011 ? AustriaAustria Task Force Cobra
2010 ? United StatesUnited States FORECON
2009 ? JordanJordan Da'irat al-Muchabarat al-Amma
Combat Team Conference
2015 43 from 27 countries AustriaAustria Task Force Cobra
2011 41 from 25 countries GermanyGermany SEK

criticism

Military

Since isolation and special secrecy are often required for the fulfillment of orders for certain special units, resentments that are latent in any case are intensified in conventional units. The elitist and often mysterious nimbus often has a negative effect on military cooperation. The competition for equipment and budget allocations persists in many armed forces. And although “ soldiers of fortune” and “daredevils” are usually singled out through appropriate psychological selection processes, certain soldiers who do not really fit into such units in terms of character are always successful. Such individuals are also mostly responsible for brawls with conventional soldiers or mocking of them by special forces.

Despite the changed global conflict situation and the general upgrading of special units, there are still conservative military who see the role of special units as overrated and sometimes question their military benefits, given their costs. The general disarmament of the conventional armies with the simultaneous upgrading of the special units has tended to intensify the distribution competition.

The special operations forces of the US armed forces have put a stop to this negative development after a number of bad experiences on the administrative side. Through the enactment of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment of 1987, the military was legally forced to set up a cross-armed forces command , the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which jointly leads, trains and equips all special operations forces and has its own budget and how to use it it can decide for itself. There were similar developments in the same year in the United Kingdom with the establishment of the United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) of the Department of Defense and in France, which in 1992 set up the Commandement des opérations spéciales (COS).

The often quite lax military discipline within the special forces is also a constant source of criticism, although, for example, the greeting rituals between officer and non-commissioned officers (there are no crews in most military special units) should not be for operational reasons, for example to prevent enemy snipers recognize who is in command, or passers-by during covert operations do not recognize that the supposed civilians are actually none. Since members of such units have generally gone through a very difficult selection process and operate in small groups when deployed, they need intelligence and a creative, team-oriented and independent problem-solving strategy. An unnecessary and exaggerated hierarchical discipline would be a hindrance. Officers and NCOs work as a team and differences in rank take a back seat to personal qualifications. The actual command structure, however, remains unaffected.

Another point of criticism is the often confidentiality-related lack of coordination with the leadership of the conventional military in the area of ​​operations. For example, in addition to the regular military, numerous special operations forces of the US armed forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, which are not subordinate to the actually responsible high command of the theater of war, the US Central Command (CENTCOM), but rather to the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) operating in the same area. . In the past, this has in part led to inefficiency and increased risk to the conventional military, as it was not included in SOCOM's planning. The situation is similar in Germany, for example operations by the German KSK were later criticized by the Bundeswehr operations command (EinsFüKdoBw) because they were not coordinated.

Administrative

Due to their often wide range of activities, special units sometimes arouse official desires, delimitation reflexes and the diffusion of responsibility . In many cases, the units, which are mostly controlled by the military, are also deployed in traditional areas of responsibility of other ministries or offices. This is the case with some military advisory missions, for example, when these units work under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or also cooperate with domestic law enforcement agencies in the fight against drugs. The same applies to special police units, which also work on missions abroad under the political responsibility of the Foreign Ministry, even if these forces are assigned to the relevant specialist ministry of the host country.

An example of what behördliches turf wars can result was the disaster in Waco in the US state of Texas on 28 February 1993. This was, on which members of a farm Davidians - sect had barricaded with women and children, by officials of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) besieged, although the FBI operations management knew that the sect knew of the planned action. After a violent exchange of fire and a fire, the result of the unsuccessful operation was the death of four officers and 68 sect members, including 25 children.

Politically and socially

In addition to internal military criticism, there is also political criticism in some countries.

In particular, some special forces in Latin America and Africa are repeatedly abused by dictatorships to maintain power and to repression the population. Even organizations and press organs that are legally critical of the regime under national law are often persecuted, abducted and killed by means of such special units, whether they are military, police or intelligence services. Quite a few of these units even operate completely covertly (unofficially), like so-called death squads . However, such groupings are not necessarily restricted to authoritarian systems. A more recent example of such a formation were the Spanish Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) (Eng. "Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups"). These undercover Interior Ministry commands were involved in the fight against the Basque ETA from 1983 to 1986 and often operated outside the law.

But also in the democracies of western character, the special units are in the critical focus of society. The elitist character that surrounds them, their often less transparent powers and mission profiles, the special secrecy provisions that often apply to them, form a constant refuge for fears that such groups could stand outside the law, or deployed beyond it and possibly by political and military decision-makers could be misused. This means that special units and their members are regularly caught in the field of tension between the necessary secrecy, operational authority and order situation on the one hand, and necessary parliamentary control and political transparency, the public's right to information, on the other.

Nevertheless, the increasing use of special forces in the context of international humanitarian and infrastructural measures has led to the fact that the "killer" and " rambo " image of such units , which was often widespread in the past , has undergone a change and the soldiers are now seen more as professional specialists (assessment by author Hartmut Schauer, see bibliography).

See also

Commons : Special forces  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

literature

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  • Sören Sünkler: The special units of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2007, ISBN 978-3-613-02592-9 .
  • Sören Sünkler: Europe's elite and special units. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2008, ISBN 978-3-613-02853-1 .
  • Susan L. Marquis: Unconventional Warfare. Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces. Brookings, Washington DC 1997, ISBN 0-8157-5476-0 . (English)
  • Tom Clancy / John Gresham: Special Forces. The special forces of the US Army. Heyne, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-453-86912-5 .
  • Terry White: Elite Associations of the World. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 1995, ISBN 3-613-01688-5 .
  • Wilhelm Probst: Combat swimmers of the Federal Navy. Inside views of an elite troop. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-613-02148-X .
  • Wolfdieter Hufnagl: Special units of the Austrian police and gendarmerie. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 1999, ISBN 3-613-01941-8 .
  • Wolfdieter Hufnagl: Jagdkommando, special unit of the Austrian Armed Forces. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-613-02079-3 .
  • Wolfdieter Hufnagl: COBRA, the Gendarmerie Task Force. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-613-02248-6 .
  • Yers Keller / Frank Fosset: France's elite. Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 3-613-02103-X .
  • Gary L. Bounds ( LTC , US Army ): CSI Report No. 4, Notes On Military Elite Units , TRADOC 1984, PDF document ( Memento of January 27, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) (memorandum on military elite units)

Web links

Wiktionary: special unit  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. a b c Simon Anglim: Special Forces - Strategic Asset. from: Infinity Journal , Issue 2, Spring 2011, p. 16.
  2. ^ Colin S. Gray : War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History , London: Routledge 2007, p. 284.
  3. Chapter 4: Special Operation Forces in Annual Report to the President and the Congress (1998) . US Government. Archived from the original on June 29, 2011. Retrieved July 6, 2008.
  4. a b c d Hartmut Schauer: US Navy SEALs. Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2000, page 14, ISBN 3-613-01864-0 .
  5. a b Hartmut Schauer: US Navy SEALs. Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2000, page 15, ISBN 3-613-01864-0 .
  6. Special Forces. (No longer available online.) In: goarmy.com. Archived from the original on August 3, 2004 ; Retrieved on June 17, 2008 (English): "Direct Action missions are short duration strikes that are used when Special Forces want to seize, capture, recover or destroy enemy weapons and information or recover designated personnel or material."
  7. Hartmut Schauer: US Ranger. The story of an elite force. Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 1993, pages 13 and 15, ISBN 3-613-01581-1 .
  8. If caught operating in civilian clothes, a soldier was no longer protected by the Geneva Convention and would more than likely be shot on sight if captured. at specialoperations.com ( Memento November 6, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), accessed June 22, 2008
  9. Special Forces teams are infiltrated behind enemy lines to provide the theater commander with intelligence on the enemy or to gather information on the terrain, local populace, etc. of an area. Verify, through observation or other collection methods, information concerning enemy capabilities, intentions, and activities in support of strategic / operational objectives or conventional forces. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted at strategic or operational levels to complement national and theater-level collection efforts. Collect meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, and demographic data; provide target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance data. groups.sfahq.com ( July 16, 2011 memento in the Internet Archive ), accessed June 17, 2008
  10. US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne). In: globalsecurity.org. Retrieved June 17, 2008 : “Unconventional Warfare (UW) includes a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive area. UW includes, but is not limited to, guerilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. "
  11. US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne). In: globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on June 17, 2008 : "Foreign Internal Defense operations, SF's main peacetime mission, are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with their military and police forces to improve their technical skills, understanding of human rights issues, and to help with humanitarian and civic action projects. "
  12. Induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to US objectives. Influence emotions, motives, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. groups.sfahq.com ( July 16, 2011 memento in the Internet Archive ), accessed June 30, 2008.
  13. Establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, civil authorities, and civilian populations to facilitate military operations. May be conducted as stand-alone operations or in support of a larger force. May include military forces assuming functions normally the responsibility of the local government. groups.sfahq.com ( July 16, 2011 memento in the Internet Archive ), accessed June 17, 2008.
  14. US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne). In: globalsecurity.org. Retrieved June 17, 2008 : “Special Forces units perform five doctrinal missions: Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action and Counter-Terrorism. These missions make Special Forces unique in the US military, because it is employed throughout the three stages of the operational continuum: peacetime, conflict and war. "
  15. ^ Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Preempt or resolve terrorist incidents. Interagency activity using highly specialized capabilities at groups.sfahq.com ( July 16, 2011 memento on the Internet Archive ), accessed June 17, 2008
  16. That's why they usually also need the express approval of the President (what is known as a "finding", resolution) and a mandate from the Congress determined supervision p. 36 at Tom Clancy, John Gresham: Special Forces - Die Spezialformen der US Army . Heyne, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-453-86912-5 .
  17. ^ SWAT special weapons and tactics. In: lapdonline.org. Retrieved July 20, 2008 : "Since 1967, the Los Angeles Police Department's Special Weapons And Tactics Team (SWAT) has provided a ready response to situations that were beyond the capabilities of normally equipped and trained Department personnel. Since its inception, LAPD SWAT Team members have affected the safe rescue of numerous hostages, arrested scores of violent suspects and earned hundreds of commendations and citations, including several Medals of Valor, the Department's highest award for heroism in the line of duty. "
  18. Andreas Förster, Damir Fras: Uniform under the agent's void: BND officials in Iraq were also members of the Bundeswehr - the committee of inquiry is getting closer. In: berliner-zeitung.de. January 14, 2006, accessed September 18, 2018 .
  19. a b Hartmut Schauer: US Navy SEALs , Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2000, page 13, ISBN 3-613-01864-0 .
  20. Warrior Competition - World Championship of Special Forces. Every year the best anti-terrorist units in the world meet in Yemen to find out which force is the best. In addition to the competition, however, the exchange of information and tactics is the main focus. Retrieved April 20, 2018 .
  21. a b "Olympic Champion" of the special forces. (PDF) A team from the Task Force Cobra won first place at the Combat Team Conference in Germany. The “Olympic Games of Special Forces” at the headquarters of GSG 9 are considered to be the most important competition for police anti-terrorist teams in the world. In: Public Safety. Retrieved April 20, 2018 .
  22. Reason to celebrate at the SEK Sachsen - Cobra wins. July 13, 2015, accessed April 20, 2018 .
  23. online ( memento from March 25, 2016 in the Internet Archive )
  24. online ( Memento from August 28, 2016 in the Internet Archive )
  25. Eberhard Wein: Fit unit hits the mark again. Running, climbing, shooting: A special unit of the Göppingen riot police won the world championship title for the second time. June 17, 2011, accessed April 20, 2018 .
  26. a b Hartmut Schauer: US Navy SEALs . Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2000, ISBN 3-613-01864-0 , p. 21.
  27. Afghanistan mission consistently inadequate. In: tagesspiegel.de. January 16, 2008, accessed on April 30, 2015 : “[…] In addition, the elite unit Command Special Forces (KSK) operates largely past the operations center in Potsdam, it was said in the 'Zeit'. This life of its own for the KSK harbors 'great risks for the security in the entire operational area and for the life and limb of the soldiers deployed there' [...] "
  28. Hartmut Schauer: US Navy SEALs . Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2000, ISBN 3-613-01864-0 , pp. 19-20.
  29. Julio M. Lázaro: El final de los GAL , About the GAL of El País (edition of May 25, 1998) at udel.edu , accessed on July 24, 2008.
  30. Juicios sobre el paramilitarismo en España: Caso GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación). - Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo español sobre el Caso Marey .: Court ruling on the Marey case at derechos.org , accessed on July 24, 2008.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on July 26, 2008 .