Special Forces Command

This article deals with the German Army Association. For the association of the German Navy see Command Special Forces of the Navy , for the association of the Swiss Army see Command Special Forces (Switzerland) .

Special Forces Command - KSK - X
Association badge
Lineup	September 20, 1996
Country	Germany
Armed forces	armed forces
Branch of service	Special forces
strength	1400 soldiers
Insinuation	Fast forces division
Location	Calw (Baden-Wuerttemberg)
motto	unofficial: facit omnia voluntas ( Latin , 'the will decides')
Awards	US Navy Presidential Unit Citation for KSK units of Task Force K-Bar
Web presence	KSK
commander
commander	Brigadier General Ansgar Meyer
insignia
Beret badge

The Special Forces Command ( KSK ) is a special military unit and large unit at the brigade level of the Bundeswehr with the focus on special operations and command warfare , reconnaissance , counter-terrorism , rescue, evacuation and recovery as well as military advice . The KSK is subordinate to the Rapid Forces Division (DSK) and is stationed in the Graf Zeppelin barracks in Calw , Württemberg .

The British Special Air Service (SAS), the US Special Operations Forces and the GSG 9 of the Federal Police served as models for setting up and aligning the KSK .

The association has since its formation, among others, for the prosecution of war criminals in the former Yugoslavia and the war in Afghanistan since 2001 used. A military hostage rescue by the KSK never took place (as of June 2020).

The association and its operations are subject to special military secrecy . Even after the missions were completed, no information about successes or losses was published for a long time. This has already led to criticism from members of the Bundestag as well as in the press on several occasions .

The KSK repeatedly made headlines due to right-wing extremism incidents, particularly towards the end of the 2010s , so that it was reformed in 2020.

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background

During the Cold War , the Bundeswehr served the purpose of territorial defense in accordance with its self-image and its primary focus . It also had a considerable number of paratroopers , but they were planned as a quick deployment reserve and not as an "offensive element" on foreign soil. Their training and orientation were based on classic war scenarios that were based on long front lines. The jump operation into the enemy hinterland was part of the operational conception, but was more of an exception option. The paratrooper troops were not primarily intended for commando companies with a coup d'état or ambush in a hunt . This resulted in what the versatility of this branch of service was concerned, a reverse trend compared to their use in WWII . Special units were already the frogmen of the Navy and the Fernspäher the army . However, these were numerically very small units with specific tasks such as underwater combat and long-range reconnaissance.

Sleeve badge of a paratrooper company B1 (command)

With German reunification in 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the security policy framework in the Federal Republic also changed; large standing armies and armored forces were no longer needed and, accordingly, were massively disarmed in Europe. A first reaction to the new political situation was the Army Structure V (1990-1992) , a comprehensive structural reform to reduce the size of the armed forces, which became necessary after the unification of the Bundeswehr and National People's Army (NVA) (including the use of synergies and the settlement of the NVA). Among other things, it stipulated that the paratrooper companies B1 (command) were to be set up, one each in airborne brigades 25, 26 and 27. For the first time, they were specially trained for command combat, the attack and coup-like combat of operationally valuable targets in the enemy hinterland. At the same time, these command companies were also trained in "rescue and liberation", ie the ability to solve hostage situations, which made a fundamentally offensive operational component of the paratroopers available for the first time.

This restructuring was finally defined in the White Paper of 1994, which describes the necessary adaptation of the Bundeswehr to the new tasks, including the development of crisis reaction forces .

The specific reason for the establishment of the KSK was the fact that in 1994, during the genocide in Rwanda, German citizens had to be evacuated by Belgian para-commandos . The decision that this task should be carried out by special forces of the former colonial power Belgium was made in advance by mutual agreement between the NATO partners. The federal government also refused to intervene because, in its view, neither the GSG 9 nor the command companies of the paratroopers were trained to operate in a guerrilla war situation and there was also a lack of the necessary technical means for delivery and execution.

As a result of this crisis, NATO evacuation plans and regional assignments of responsibility defined which country should be the lead nation in which region in the event of future comparable crises . At the same time, secret deployment plans were drawn up between the NATO partners. In accordance with these additions to the valid NATO doctrine, special forces were to be kept available for military operations, due to the special nature and political significance of the order, due to the special features of the task fulfillment - possibly also concealed and associated with high risk - as well as the importance of the objectives of the operations policies and procedures other than traditional force deployments should be followed. This involvement in planning and NATO doctrine increased the pressure of the allies on Germany to build up its own capacities for this area of ​​responsibility. The allies apparently expected Germany to be willing and able to find an independent solution in a situation similar to that in Rwanda, in which twelve Belgian soldiers died. In an interview with author Sören Sünkler (see literature list), the commander of the Belgian task force confirmed the lack of understanding for the German attitude at the time.

The decisive factor was the Federal Constitutional Court ruling of July 12, 1994, the so-called out-of-area ruling , which bindingly stated that humanitarian and military operations by the Bundeswehr were also permitted outside of NATO territory. A prior constitutional approval of the German Bundestag was stipulated as a prerequisite for such an operation, for which a simple majority is sufficient. This new legal room for maneuver paved the way for planning in the Federal Ministry of Defense at a time when Germany was still looking for its new role in world politics, together with the increasingly asked question abroad why Germany had not carried out a rescue itself. and provision of immediately operational staff.

Volker Rühe , 2001

The then Federal Minister of Defense Volker Rühe said:

"The ability to save one's own citizens abroad from danger to life and limb in an emergency is a fundamental responsibility of every state."

At the end of 1994, the events led to a realignment of security policy. German reaction forces should be designed and equipped to joint forces across and in cooperation with the alliance partners are able to carry out rescue and relief operations in a hostile environment. In the summer of 1994, the army command staff worked out the conceptual basis for German special forces and a year later, on September 28, 1995, the Army inspector, Lieutenant General Hartmut Bagger, issued the “Target and Planning Concepts Special Forces” .

Another cornerstone that summarized the change in foreign and security policy was the address given by the then Federal President Roman Herzog to the German Society for Foreign Policy on March 13, 1995, in which he stated that "the end of free-riding [...] achieved ”and now it must apply that Germany take over the political and military responsibility in the world that corresponds to its increased weight.

In the spring of the same year, the planning was so advanced that the Federal Minister of Defense officially presented the establishment of a “Special Forces Command (KSK)” to the Defense Committee of the German Bundestag in his departmental concept. In it, the original plans, only one force for the "rescue and evacuation of German citizens and / or other people in special situations abroad" were considerably expanded. The tasks of “obtaining key information in crisis and conflict areas”, “protecting people in special situations” and “combat missions in opposing areas” were added.

In June the federal government ( Kohl V cabinet ) decided to set up the KSK.

Lineup

Rühe provided 41 million DM from his budget and initiated the establishment of a corresponding special unit, the Special Forces Command. Major General Volker Löw , Commander of the Air Mobile Forces (KLK) and 4th Division, officially put the KSK into service on September 20, 1996 in the Graf Zeppelin barracks in Calw. The training company started immediately. The tradition of the Airborne Brigade 25 "Black Forest", which was decommissioned on April 1, 1996 , was continued in the Special Forces Command and the KSK was part of the Air Mobile Forces Command / 4. Division (KLK) subordinated.

The soldiers were primarily recruited from the former B1 paratrooper companies (command) of the individual airborne brigades, which had already been trained to rescue hostages and command operations and were now absorbed by the KSK in the course of this restructuring. In addition, many soldiers from Fernspähkompanien 100 and 300, which were also dissolved in 1996, came to the KSK and are still considered to be the most experienced members of this unit, the so-called veterans . Other soldiers came to the KSK from areas designated as “green uses” of the army, such as paratroopers , mountain fighters and hunters . Occasionally, specialists were also recruited from other parts of the Bundeswehr. The integration was rounded off with new equipment, which was also adapted to the largely new deployment profile of "Crisis preparedness and crisis management" and was supplemented by equipping the KSK with its own management, telecommunications and support staff.

Structure (as of September 20, 1996):

• Rod
• Headquarters and telecommunications company
• Support company
• Telecommunication command company
• Command companies 1 and 2
• Training and testing center

At this point in time, the first operational structures within the KSK were already in place, especially in the area of ​​“Rescue and Liberation”.

Shortly after the installation, 25 KSK soldiers, who were to form the future basic training staff, were sent to GSG 9 in Sankt Augustin in order to familiarize themselves with the precision rifle system of the anti-terrorist unit of the Federal Border Guard (BGS) in several courses , as this is clearly different from the military sniper deployment differs. This training lasted until 1998, when the KSK had set up its own training base.

The KSK soldiers also learned how to free hostages from planes, buses and trains. They were then sent to the British Special Air Service in Hereford , where the Calwers deepened the battle of command, and then to Israel , where they were trained in counter-terrorism by the Sajeret Matkal . Finally, in the United States , the Special Forces at Fort Bragg deepened shooting at great distances with the Barrett M82 , which was not yet introduced into the German Armed Forces at the time .

Initial criticism

A rather casual statement made during the official press presentation of the KSK in Calw by the then Inspector of the Army Lieutenant General Helmut Willmann that the German Bundestag might no longer be involved in the decision in the event of an evacuation operation caused irritation in Parliament as a member of the parliamentary group Alliance 90 / The Greens addressed this.

As early as 1996 there were demonstrations of the peace movement in Calw and later also during the Easter marches regular criticism of the KSK and its orientation. The " Tübinger Informationsstelle Militarisierung eV " (IMI), which was founded as a reaction to the establishment of the KSK on the same day, classified the KSK as "undemocratic" and saw it as an instrument for "worldwide German power politics" was in charge of these campaigns .

Tobias Pflüger , the founder of IMI, fundamentally questioned the constitutionality of certain KSK deployment scenarios. He explains that the Federal Constitutional Court set two requirements for the Bundeswehr to be deployed outside of NATO territory:

"1. The Bundestag must approve this by a majority before an operation (parliamentary reservation). 2. A military action may only be carried out within the framework of a 'collective security system'. The special troops Command Special Forces should also be 'used' in purely German military operations. Military intervention should also be possible if there is no Bundestag resolution yet, as some operations would have to be planned in secret and some military actions would have to be carried out very quickly. These are two planned breaches of the constitution! "

From the ranks of the peace movement, the accusation was repeatedly raised that the KSK was "withdrawn from any democratic control and public criticism" due to its conception and the prevailing secrecy.

The defense policy spokeswoman for the Bundestag faction of Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen, Angelika Beer , stated in parliament that suitable police forces already existed for rescue operations like in Rwanda and that a corresponding military component was therefore not necessary. However, this assessment was contradicted by police and military experts, who considered the statement to be correct for an orderly rule of law as an operational area, but not for crisis and war areas in which state organizational forms have ceased to exist and warlords , mercenaries and militias are operating. Because a police operation is not possible there, as this requires a “safe environment” and the police are generally not trained for war operations. Even the GSG 9 is primarily trained to rescue hostages, but not to operate in a hostile environment.

Both in the media and in politics, criticism was expressed that the future tasks of the KSK were not adequately communicated in the official presentation. The federal government has regularly put the subtask of rescuing “German citizens abroad from the clutches of terrorists” in the foreground, but the actual scope of the KSK mandate, the “switching off command centers and important telecommunications facilities in the depths of the enemy Space as well as the acquisition of strategically and operationally important news ”, the“ defense against terrorist threat ”, the“ fight against subversive forces ”and“ covert operations ”were not fully publicly discussed.

The debate about the meaning and benefits of the KSK reached its first climax when, on December 18, 1996, the Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen parliamentary group put a small question with a total of 53 individual questions to the federal government Tasks of the KSK, its relationship to GSG 9 and the help of the NATO partners with the setup and training was discussed.

A dilemma for the Bundeswehr was already evident in this phase. On the one hand, for tactical reasons, efforts were made to maintain secrecy in order not to endanger the operational safety of the KSK. On the other hand, the leadership of the Bundeswehr tried to create a counterpoint to the criticism of the peace movement and Alliance 90 / The Greens. In addition, they wanted to increase awareness of the KSK in order to interest as many applicants as possible.

The debate about the meaning of the KSK flared up again when in mid-March 1997 paratroopers practiced flying out threatened citizens, but almost at the same time "the normal Bundeswehr" (quote from the Federal Minister of Defense Rühe ) carried out such a mission in Operation Libelle successfully performed.

Production of full operational readiness, "Schneller Adler 97" and press coverage

In April 1997, the KSK was ready and demonstrated in terms of positive press for the first time during the military exercise Fast Eagle 97 from 1 to 10 September 1997 on the military training area of Baumholder and the airbase Mendig its operational capability in public. A total of 1,600 soldiers with 20 helicopters, 11 transport aircraft and almost 500 vehicles took part in the maneuver , which was led by Volker Löw, the then commander of the Luftmobile Forces Command (KLK). The large-scale exercise simulated the liberation of hostages from terrorist control abroad (assumption 1,200 km away, Baumholder country of operations ) and the evacuation of German citizens. Federal Minister of Defense Volker Rühe was on site to personally inspect the maneuver in Mendig.

The public demonstration of the capabilities did not fail to have the intended effect, and the media reported the event and the troops largely positively. The question of financing such a special unit in the age of disarmament and in the area of ​​tension between high-risk operations and insufficient financial compensation for the soldiers was only asked marginally. Likewise, the point of view of whether the Bundeswehr actually “only” affords this troop of over 1,000 men to rescue hostages abroad and, if so, why, was hardly discussed.

First restructuring, Balkan deployment and first public deployment confirmation

Increase

In 1998 the number of forces was doubled with the establishment of Command Companies 3 and 4, and the force began to carry out missions around the world. Almost all missions were carried out in secret.

Balkan use

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague

The KSK had its first known operation on June 15, 1998 when it, together with French SFOR units, arrested the Bosnian Serb and war criminal Milorad Krnojelac in Foča ( Bosnia and Herzegovina ). On the same day, Krnojelac was transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague using SFOR air capacities .

KSK soldiers also succeeded in arresting the Serbian paramilitary Radomir Kovac on the night of August 1st, 1999 in Foča . In the same month, German and Dutch (CLAS Korps Commandotroepen) special forces arrested three further war criminals in Orahovac, Kosovo .

Another access took place in October 2000 again in Foča. The aim was the arrest of Janko Janjic and his transfer to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. During the access (operation "Kilo 2"), however, according to reports by "Spiegel" on September 24, 2001, an incident occurred in the course of which 43-year-old Janjic killed himself with a hand grenade. Three KSK soldiers were injured in the process.

In the autumn of 2000, KSK members carried out a so-called cold hit together with Dutch soldiers , an urgent mission without a thorough risk analysis. Several Serbs were captured and then transferred to the UN. A day later, however, it was reported that the prisoners were all able to flee.

Confirmation of employment

In 2000 it was officially confirmed for the first time in a television report by ARD that the KSK had already carried out several missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo at this point in time . The then acting inspector of the army , Helmut Willmann , disclosed this information himself, but without going into detail.

OEF and ISAF - Two independent mandates and separate command structures

The ISAF area of responsibility under NATO leadership with territorial allocation of the participating nations (without taking into account the Operation Enduring Freedom forces)

On November 16, 2001, the German Bundestag decided to allow German forces to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the war on terrorism and, on December 22, 2001, to support the International Security Assistance Force ( ISAF ) by the German Armed Forces.

The ISAF mission is to 1386 including on the basis of the resolution of the UN Security grant of a secure and stable environment for civilian reconstruction support the Afghan government in creating. ISAF is militarily led by the NATO headquarters Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum . The area of ​​deployment of the German armed forces under ISAF mandate was initially limited to Kabul and the surrounding area, only since September 21, 2005 has it basically included the regions “North” and “Kabul” defined by the NATO Council.

The aim of Operation Enduring Freedom, on the other hand, is to fight international terrorism. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) is in charge of all OEF forces . Under the mandate of the German Bundestag, German special forces (upper limit 100) were made available from 2001 to 2008, which could be deployed throughout Afghanistan. This mandate was canceled by the Bundestag on November 13, 2008.

Already two months before the first OEF mandate was granted, in September 2001, the former commander of the KFOR peacekeeping force in Pristina and Kosovo as well as the Bundeswehr contingent in Somalia , General Klaus Reinhardt , warned that the KSK was intended for them Task too small, he lacks the necessary equipment and the Bundeswehr does not have the necessary air transport capacities.

After an advance command had first inspected the Camp Rhino site south of Kandahar , forty commandos and sixty supporters of the KSK, led by a colonel of the US Army Special Forces from Oman , arrived in mid-December 2001 . According to the requirements of the ISAF mandate, units of the Bundeswehr were initially deployed in a multinational coalition led by the United States.

The elite unit Command Special Forces (KSK) was added to the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. It arrested Taliban leaders and cracked down on the Islamists. Allegedly the KSK killed more enemies in Afghanistan than the rest of the Bundeswehr put together. So far, neither the KSK nor military experts have questioned this claim. How many Taliban killed the German armed forces is not known. In the case of the Bundeswehr, when asked, they only say, "As a matter of principle, one does not count dead enemies".

Well-known missions in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom

Participation in the K-Bar Task Force

Task Force K-Bar was the first multinational Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - South to operate first from Oman , then from forward field bases in southeast Afghanistan under the command of Captain Robert Harward ( US Navy ) from October 2001 Operated against the Taliban and suspected Al Qaeda activists until April 2002 . A total of 42 reconnaissance and surveillance missions and an unknown number of combat missions led to the capture (107 men) and death (115 men) of numerous Taliban and Al-Qaida fighters. The KSK was involved and initially had the task of identifying Taliban networks, breaking identified personal connections through arrests and digging weapons caches. These were, however, not very explosive orders. This was due to an initial distrust of the Americans, British and French, who wanted the difficult missions to be carried out by established special forces.

Battle for Tora Bora

Nevertheless, the KSK was immediately used in the context of the Battle of Tora Bora and the OEF mandate for reconnaissance and secured the military deployment of the Americans and British on the flanks of the mountain range. The KSK was also involved in three access operations that were successfully carried out against suspected camps and cave systems by Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters. Various US media praised the good cooperation with the KSK and the professionalism of its soldiers at the beginning of January 2002, but Federal Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping only confirmed the operations at the beginning of March.

Operation Anaconda

Operation Anaconda mission map

KSK soldiers were also actively involved in the controversial Operation Anaconda in March 2002. During this undertaking within the OEF framework, a civilian (goatherd) probably unmasked a secret observation post of the KSK by chance. This then led to the abandonment of these observation positions and retreat. The German approach was heavily criticized by the Americans, who allegedly used to solve such threats by shooting ("neutralizing") such civilians in order not to have to break off their mission.

Award for the Task Force K-Bar service

Navy and Marine Corps Presidental Unit Citation

On December 7, 2004, the then US President George W. Bush awarded various special forces that were part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-SOUTH / Task Force K-Bar operating in Afghanistan between October 2001 and March 2002 , including the KSK , the Navy Presidential Unit Citation for "extraordinary courage, ingenuity and aggressive fighting spirit in combat against a well-equipped, well-trained and insidious terrorist enemy".

As part of Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF from December 2001 to October 2003, up to 100 KSK soldiers were continuously deployed in Afghanistan. The troops were mainly involved in reconnaissance operations in the Afghan- Pakistani border area and were later also assigned to the Kabul area. Their task was to obtain key information.

The Murat Kurnaz case

After his capture by US forces as a suspected Taliban fighter in 2002 and after more than four years in prison in Guantanamo , Murat Kurnaz accused two KSK soldiers of ill-treating him in Kandahar , Afghanistan . After an initial denial, the federal government admitted contact with KSK troops, but denied mistreatment. In October 2006, the Bundestag decided that a committee of inquiry should investigate the allegations and investigate the operations of the KSK in Afghanistan in general. He set up the Defense Committee, which did not meet in public. After about a year, the Tübingen public prosecutor closed the investigation against the two accused KSK soldiers for lack of evidence. It is still testimony against testimony. The allegation was derived from the testimony that the soldiers had colluded. The Defense Committee's final report, which appeared after 22 months, could neither refute nor confirm the allegations of ill-treatment, but did not deny Kurnaz its credibility. He stated that the federal government had now better fulfilled its duty to inform the Bundestag about the operations of the KSK. A regulation for this is still pending.

In addition, further problems of the KSK mission in Afghanistan were mentioned. These ranged from the general questionability of the military value of the mission to the soldiers' excessive consumption of alcohol and legal problems in connection with arrests and cooperation with foreign armed forces.

Internal criticism and public relations work by the Bundeswehr

After the conclusion of Operation Anaconda, by March 2002 at the latest, according to a KSK officer in the Kurnaz investigation committee, there would actually have been “no more meaningful assignments”. The then commander Reinhard Günzel commented on this as follows:

“The men sat for ten days at an altitude of 4,000 or 3,500 meters on a mountain peak in the snow and observed and reported the surrounding area. That's one thing for which you don't need special forces. "

As of June 2002, thirty-seven US soldiers had been killed in the course of Operation Enduring Freedom. The increasing number of casualties caused the United States to intensify its air strikes. For example, Boeing B-52 bombers flew heavy attacks on the Scha-i-Kot Valley between the towns of Shkin and Khost, which led to an increase in the number of victims among the Afghan civilian population. High-ranking German officers criticized this approach in part also publicly. The Federal Ministry of Defense responded with changing press work. More and more journalists were invited to press meetings either in Calw or in the Hindu Kush.

In autumn 2002 there was reports of "frustration" among the KSK soldiers, who felt they were underutilized and that KSK commanders had asked their chief employer to consider withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) began withdrawing American and British soldiers from Afghanistan in preparation for the planned Iraq war. This made the KSK missions less effective because of the lower means of transport and air support, but the federal government ( Schröder cabinet ) nevertheless decided against a withdrawal so as not to further deepen the diplomatic turmoil between Germany and the USA due to the lack of support for the Iraq war . The FAZ headline on November 3, 2002: "Germans on the front line". The new Federal Minister of Defense Peter Struck , who had meanwhile replaced Scharping, informed the FAZ that the KSK soldiers “had earned the recognition and respect of our allies with their commitment and high level of professionalism”. “With this commitment” Germany shows “its willingness to take on extensive military responsibility”.

Even after the end of the Iraq war, the KSK remained in Afghanistan, contrary to the official KSK mission statement “In, do the job, out again”, as the Army Inspector Gert Gudera described it as the “ideal case”. In an interview with Die Welt am Sonntag on August 24, 2003, Struck drew a first interim assessment of the KSK's deployment in the Hindu Kush. He emphasized that the Bundeswehr had to be strengthened in the areas of NBC defense forces, communication and special forces.

The KSK should therefore be expanded consistently, but with care. Because "we don't need rambos for this, but responsible soldiers for difficult tasks, such as the liberation of German citizens". In the same interview, the then Federal Minister of Defense also indicated that the KSK had played a not inconsiderable role in the liberation of the “Sahara hostages” who had been held in Mali since Easter 2003 (see Sahara hostage-taking 2003 ).

Second restructuring in 2005

In 2005, the structure of the KSK was changed for the second time in its young history, when an independent medical center was set up as a result of restructuring measures from the medical area , which belonged to the staff and supply company. In addition, the emergency services were supplemented by the so-called special command company, which corresponded to a reinforcement of 20 percent.

Well-known assignments within the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

According to Sören Sünkler, KSK soldiers were relocated to Afghanistan again in May 2005. They performed different tasks there and helped to create a “safe environment” in different places. According to this source, the KSK was used both as part of the ISAF mandate in the north and in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the highly competitive south. The Bundeswehr mainly reported on the peace-stabilizing aspect of the ISAF mission; it did not comment on the KSK's contribution to both operations.

In July 2005 there was a scandal when the magazine Stern published an article about such missions and grievances within the KSK. The author Sören Sünkler interprets the statements of KSK soldiers quoted there as follows:

“In its July 2005 edition, the Stern published the criticism of some KSK insiders who wanted to use it to expose grievances. The political mendacity under which the commandos in Afghanistan are burned, the inadequate military preparation of the operations and the inadequacy of the leadership to plan and conduct special operations were particularly denounced. "

Location of the Paktika Province in Afghanistan

In addition, the Stern published a number of images that showed KSK soldiers in action and described the Paktika province in the southeast on the border with Pakistan as a possible location for the troops. The Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg) declined, as usual, to comment on the allegations made there, stating that no information was given on operations and internal processes in special forces of the Bundeswehr. In mid-July 2005, the defense policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group, Rainer Arnold , replied to the newspaper Die Welt when asked whether the KSK also took action against drug lords: “There are overlaps. A terrorist can finance his terrorist business with drugs. "

Since August 2006, soldiers of the KSK have been deployed again in northern Afghanistan to track down and fight terror suspects and irregulars in order to protect the German contingent from the threat of local warlords .

On September 12, 2006, General Inspector Wolfgang Schneiderhan Army - Staff Sergeant Jonathan Zapien from the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) personally awarded the Bundeswehr Medal of Honor . Zapien had saved the life of a KSK soldier during the deployment period in eastern Afghanistan from June to October 2005.

In October 2006 the KSK arrested a group of bombers in Kabul . Allegedly they are the masterminds behind the attack on a Bundeswehr bus that was attacked in 2003. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung saw this as an “important political signal” to the effect that German forces were also successfully deployed in Afghanistan. In May 2013, Federal Minister of Defense Thomas de Maiziere confirmed the death of a KSK soldier in Afghanistan.

Lack of coordination with the conventional military in the operational area

Area of ​​responsibility of the CENTCOM

According to an internal report by the Federal Minister of Defense ( "Van Heyst" report ), the Bundeswehr missions abroad are dramatically poorly organized. The German ISAF operations in Afghanistan suffered from the base to the leadership under improper management, reported the weekly newspaper Die Zeit in advance, citing this report. In addition, KSK forces largely bypass the Bundeswehr Operations Command (EinsFüKdoBw) in Potsdam, as they are largely not under the NATO High Command of ISAF ( Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum ), but rather under the US Central Command as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (CENTCOM) are subordinated. This endangers the security of the German soldiers stationed in Afghanistan.

Unsuccessful access to Kunduz

Location of Kunduz Province in Afghanistan

At the end of April 2008, a joint operation by forces of the German Armed Forces and the Afghan armed forces was carried out near the Afghan city of Kunduz . 13 people were arrested, two of whom were suspected of having been involved in attacks against the Bundeswehr. The actual target, the mastermind behind the attack on German soldiers in Kunduz in May 2007, who was monitored by KSK soldiers, escaped.

Weapons found in Jowzjan

In July 2008, members of the KSK, working with Afghan security forces, discovered a large arsenal in Jowzjan province , 120 kilometers west of Mazar-e Sharif . 1,100 mortar shells, propellants and detonators were hidden in it.

Establishment of Task Force 47

When the Afghanistan mandate was extended on November 13, 2008, the Bundestag had expressly agreed that KSK would no longer be deployed. In 2009, however, internal documents of the Bundeswehr became known, according to which the KSK had provided soldiers for a Task Force 47 (TF 47) in Kunduz, who had played an important role in the air attack near Kunduz on September 4, 2009 , for example .

Arrest of Abdul Razeq

On May 7, 2009, the KSK succeeded in arresting the Taliban leader Abdul Razeq , who had been wanted since 2008, near Faisabad in northern Afghanistan. After an unsuccessful access to Razeq's house, Razeq fled into impassable terrain, where the German forces managed to track him down after several hours of pursuit. The arrest itself was then carried out by Afghan security forces. Abdul Razeq is accused of planning and carrying out at least three attacks on ISAF and NATO troops in Afghanistan in 2008. A KSK member was slightly wounded during the operation.

Operations in 2010

Also in the Afghanistan mandate of the Bundestag of February 26, 2010, the deployment of the KSK in Afghanistan was not decided. In the press, however, questions were cited by MPs as to whether the TF 47 in Afghanistan had taken on tasks of the KSK and thus the OEF, contrary to mandate. In fact, the commander of the KSK, Brigadier General Hans-Christoph Ammon , declared on a Bundeswehr website in May 2010 that the KSK was also deployed in Afghanistan, “we make no secret of it”.

With regard to targeted killing operations, Brigadier General Josef Dieter Blotz told Tagesspiegel that one of the tasks of the Special Forces Command (KSK) was to hunt down the Taliban and “eliminate” it: “The Defense Ministry has definitely ruled out targeted killings by special forces of the Bundeswehr. However, the Bundeswehr's Special Forces Command (KSK) was also used to eliminate networks of extremists. "

In September 2010, a KSK commando arrested the high-ranking Taliban leader Maulawi Roshan . He was arrested in a night operation in a homestead in Chahar Darreh near Kunduz .

Mullah Abdul Rahman arrested

On the evening of October 19, 2012, the KSK and Afghan Special Forces succeeded in arresting Mullah Abdul Rahman, the “shadow governor” of northern Afghanistan, near the village of Ghunday Kalay and handing it over to the Afghan authorities.

losses

The command's losses are usually kept secret. On May 5, 2013, Federal Minister of Defense Thomas de Maizière informed the public for the first time that a KSK soldier had fallen in action. This happened during a mission in northern Afghanistan, and the casualty was the first KSK soldier to be killed in action in Afghanistan. Until then, according to various reports , soldiers had only died in traffic accidents and accidents during training, for example during diving exercises, parachute jumps or practice shooting.

Further deployments or training missions

Deployment in Libya 2011

According to information provided by the Frankfurter Rundschau KSK soldiers were also involved in the evacuation operation "Pegasus" involved in during the riots in Libya 132 people with the help of two on 26 February 2011, a total Transall transport aircraft from the eastern Libyan desert town Nafurah to Crete were brought. According to the Frankfurter Rundschau, the Federal Ministry of Defense did not want to comment on any involvement of the KSK.

Training mission in Afghanistan (since 2018)

As part of the NATO mission Resolute Support , the KSK has been in Afghanistan as a training contingent in cooperation with the Maritime Special Forces of the Netherlands (MARSOF) since 2018.

Training mission in Jordan

Training of Jordanian special forces as part of the Military Assistance mission "Arabian Leopard" in 2019.

Evacuation mission in Afghanistan in August 2021

KSK soldiers were summoned to Kabul airport in August 2021 during the Taliban's takeover to assist in the evacuation of those authorized to leave the country . During one operation, KSK soldiers, in cooperation with the US military, evacuated people by air from the city of Kabul to Kabul Airport. Reports on whether KSK soldiers actually operated outside of Kabul airport were contradicting another mission in the context of the same mission.

Mission-related problems

Criticism for lack of aircraft for special missions

The KSK needs helicopter support for the transport to the place of deployment or to an operational area. In order to be able to operate independently and flexibly with the greatest possible self-protection, these must meet special requirements. These include, for example, large ranges (through additional tanks or air refueling capability ), connectivity (through radio data transmission), all-weather / night-time suitability (through appropriate avionics ) and high self-protection (through EloKa equipment and a chaff / flare dispenser (decoy system)).

In 2008 the Bundeswehr did not have such aircraft. Among other things, Germany came under fire from the US military leadership, as it relies on appropriate support from the USA or Great Britain for its special forces operating in Afghanistan.

Only in the medium to long term will the KSK with the upgraded CH-53 , the multi-purpose helicopter for special forces Airbus H145M , which will be available from 2017, and the air force helicopter for armed search and rescue (CSAR: Combat Search and Rescue ) that will be available within the Bundeswehr fall back and become more independent of NATO partners.

Since the training and development of procedures for airborne special operations means a lot of effort for both the soldiers of the KSK and the aircrews, this was started in 1995 with the establishment of the "CSAR core group" well before the introduction of corresponding aircraft. Since a small part of the required capabilities can also be covered with currently available helicopters, an "SOF (Special Operations Forces) Air" element (Flying Department 251) was set up in Laupheim for the then Middle Transport Helicopter Regiment 25 "Oberschwaben" of the Army Aviation is tailored to the range of operations of special forces. The CH-53 of the helicopter squadron 64 is currently used for this . The further use of the liaison helicopter BO-105P1M with the "Swooper" kit, with which commandos soldiers can be moved to the two outer sides of the helicopter and can be used directly from the flying aircraft, was discarded because the BO-105 is being decommissioned. At the same time, another approach to support is being pursued in the Air Force by the CSAR core group.

Capture-or-kill missions are prohibited

In connection with the failed access operation in Kunduz in 2008, the international discussion on the question of whether terror suspects should be specifically killed was rekindled.

The German position on this is clear. It expressly permits the use of lethal force only in the event of an actual or imminent attack. For reasons of principle of proportionality, the Federal Government rejects the “targeted killing of suspects” in the sense of “liquidation” ”and refers to the rules of engagement (RoE: Rules of Engagement ) established with NATO . Further restrictions (so-called caveats ) with an impact on the ISAF operation plan do not exist on the part of Germany.

The incident raised the question of the compatibility of the KSK with other special forces of the Allies, which would have “fewer problems with it”. For example, British and American forces identified, tracked down and often “switched off” the “target persons” [...] using laser-guided weapon systems ”. Der Spiegel further explains:

“The Federal Government regards the Allies' approach as' not in accordance with international law '. So it is hardly surprising that NATO's Afghanistan mission crunches and cracks.
The critics accuse the Germans of achieving the opposite of what they are supposedly striving to achieve: 'The Krauts let the most dangerous people go and thus increase the threat to the Afghans and all foreign forces here,' said a British officer in the Kabul ISAF- Headquarters on Great Massoud Road uncomprehending. "

Failure of the KSK to intervene in the case of hostage liberation by the foreign military

On September 29, 2008, a tour group abducted in Egypt was released after being detained for ten days. According to the Egyptian Defense Minister and Commander of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Hussein Tantawi , the liberation was carried out by Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers. According to the former hostages, however, no rescue operation should have taken place; instead, the kidnappers released the prisoners and even provided them with a vehicle to escape to the Egyptian border. One of the former hostages, Ibrahim Abdel Rahim, reported that he had repeatedly managed to secretly pass on the GPS data of their location, but the military 300 km away did not intervene. According to the Federal Ministries of the Interior and Defense, German special forces (KSK and GSG 9 of the Federal Police ) were also indirectly involved in the liberation by being involved as support forces on site. In fact, the KSK was not involved in combat operations there.

Refusal to authorize a military release of hostages - the hostage escapes

From mid-April to May 2015, a German development worker from GIZ was held hostage in the Afghan province of Kunduz . A military intervention, which the KSK had prepared by sending 178 soldiers, did not take place. The hostage managed to escape without any help.

Refusal to approve a military hostage rescue - release by handing over a ransom

A German development worker from GIZ was held hostage in Kabul from mid-August to October 2015 . The Foreign Office asked the KSK for help, which then sent its own soldiers to Afghanistan to rescue hostages. Instead of a military hostage liberation , which was ultimately not approved, only the handover of the ransom was secured by KSK soldiers.

Corruption suspected

During several training missions of the KSK in Namibia between 2014 and 2019, the company of a former KSK soldier there was commissioned with the implementation of official training missions on "land relocation under extreme conditions". The BMVg is said to have rejected his new application after receiving information about his possible right-wing extremist attitude. According to media reports, the BMVg is examining the case and the related awarding practice.

Grievances within the KSK

Any ideological proximity of a commander to Nazi folklore

Reinhard Günzel , commander of the KSK end of 2003, in his book Secret Warriors , which he in 2005 together with the GSG-9 founder Ulrich Wegener and the former Wehrmacht officer Wilhelm Walther in which the publishing complex of the extreme right-wing publisher Dietmar Munier belonging Pour le Merite Verlag published, the KSK in the tradition of the Wehrmacht special unit Division Brandenburg .

Then put the Left faction in the Bundestag a written question whether the KSK see the Brandenburg Division as tradition stiftend. In doing so, she expressed that, in her opinion, the commander's relationship to the crimes of the Wehrmacht in World War II was not sufficiently clarified because the Brandenburg Division was accused of violating the Hague Land Warfare Regulations . The federal government replied to the left-wing parliamentary group that the traditional relationship of the KSK was based on “special qualifications and pride in having successfully completed a tough and demanding training” and that assumptions about “right-wing extremist views were based on Brigadier General a. D. Günzels during his active service as commander of the KSK “have no basis whatsoever. In doing so, the government made it clear that there had never been an official traditional reference to the Brandenburg Division and that Günzel's journalistic statement was his private opinion.

Reinhard Günzel was dismissed on November 4, 2003 by Federal Minister of Defense Peter Struck because of a letter of support to the former member of the Bundestag Martin Hohmann , which he wrote on official paper and thus in his position as commander of the KSK. (Hohmann was expelled from the CDU / CSU parliamentary group because, in a speech about collective guilt with reference to the crimes of the October Revolution , he had said "Therefore, Jews could be called 'perpetrators'' with some justification.")

Right-wing extremist soldier Daniel K.

In early April 2008, the magazine published Der Spiegel in its issue 13/2008 that the KSK Captain Daniel K. member of the Bundeswehr critical Soldiers Association Darmstadt signal , Lt. Col. Jürgen Rose had threatened, via a solicitation to him e-mail: "You will be observed , no, not from impotent, instrumentalized services, but from officers of a new generation who will act when the time makes it necessary. ”In addition, Rose was described as an“ enemy within ”who had to be“ smashed ”. His disciplinary officer responded with a disciplinary action, but left it with a simple reprimand. The initiation of judicial disciplinary proceedings did not take place. This simple disciplinary measure does not prevent the promotion of an otherwise proven soldier, according to the federal government at the press conference on May 2, 2008. In mid-June 2008, Der Spiegel reported in the 25/2008 issue that the Bundeswehr had imposed a disciplinary fine of 3000 euros on Jürgen Rose was imposed because he called the Special Forces Command a “sewer” and accused the unit of right-wing tendencies . Lieutenant Colonel Jürgen Rose was retired early and, as a civilian, continues to work in the vicinity of the Darmstadt Signal and the peace movement.

Daniel K., now in the rank of lieutenant colonel , was banned from wearing uniforms and duties in February 2019 due to right-wing extremist posts in a Facebook group. In his remarks he shared the ideas of the Reich citizens , among other things he called for the abolition of the office of Federal President . In the same year he was discharged from the German Armed Forces due to his connections to the Identitarian Movement , which was uncovered by the Military Counter-Intelligence Service , and was subsequently on sick leave with depression and a post-traumatic stress disorder. He was also accused of fraudulent misrepresentation because, during a job interview in 1991, he was said to have concealed the fact that he had worked for the Young Nationalists for two years in the late 1980s . The dismissal was lifted by the Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg in December 2020 at the latest. The reason given was that K. had withheld his political history, but disclosed it before he was appointed as a professional soldier.

In a letter to his comrades, K. described himself as a “deeply national-conservative patriot ” who was “definitely not a so-called Nazi ”. He was the victim of a campaign because he was "in the way of certain media-political, but also cowardly opportunistic forces in uniform".

Right-wing soldier Andre S.

As a KSK soldier, Andre S. was the leader and namesake of the Hannibal network . In the course of terror investigations against Bundeswehr soldiers from 2017 onwards, he was a contact for the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) at the KSK. He was interrogated as a result of criminal proceedings against his liaison at the MAD. In doing so, his role as network administrator and co-founder of the Uniter association emerged. In 2017, the BKA investigators found two handfuls of cartridges, smoke and signal grenades and a box with detonators for hand grenades in his home and parents' house. In September 2019 , the Böblingen District Court imposed a fine of 120 daily rates on him for violating the Weapons Act and the Explosives Act . He appealed against this. He was transferred from the KSK, but not released from the Bundeswehr. After leaving the KSK, Andre S. was the “information person” for right-wing extremist tendencies in the Bundeswehr for the MAD. In September 2019, André S. stated that his military service as a temporary soldier would expire at the end of the month. He thus escaped disciplinary proceedings . The Frankfurt Higher Regional Court had not found sufficient suspicion of terrorism against him, but the Federal Prosecutor continued to accuse him of planning right-wing extremist attacks and examined a lawsuit for them.

Observation by the military secret service as a result of widespread right-wing extremism

The Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) reported at the beginning of 2020 that around 550 suspected right-wing extremism cases were being investigated throughout the Bundeswehr . According to the President of the MAD, the KSK is particularly affected, because here the number of suspected cases is around five times as high as the average. The reason for this is the elitist self-confidence of the isolated unit, whose intensive network of relationships also led to risks. In a confidential briefing, the President of the MAD admitted to members of the Bundestag that at least nine of around 20 so-called suspected cases had been confirmed and corresponding sanctions had been ordered against the soldiers. Sanctions were imposed on nine soldiers from the command because of their convictions, and three KSK soldiers were banned from wearing their uniforms. In March 2020, one soldier classified as a right-wing extremist was released, and another was about to be released. Two soldiers were transferred. Disciplinary proceedings are ongoing in two other suspected cases. Only in one of the total of 20 suspected cases did the suspicion turn out to be unfounded by March 2020.

In mid-September 2021, it was announced that the MAD was investigating two more cases. In one case, the charge is made that in 2015 a sergeant major raised a black-white-red flag himself or at least tolerated it. The second allegation concerns a lieutenant who in 2014 shared “a small” number of pictures in a WhatsApp group that were in a right-wing extremist context.

Islamist soldier Ömer S.

On June 17, 2020 it was reported that the Islamist staff sergeant Ömer S. was reported to the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) in 2019 and, after being classified by the MAD as an extremist, was dismissed from the Bundeswehr at the beginning of 2020.

Right National Staff Sergeant Philipp Sch.

In the summer of 2018, the commander of the KSK said of him that he was a "model commando soldier" and an "essential service provider" with pronounced social skills. Philipp Sch. was trained as a lifeguard, mountain guide and parachutist, among other things.

The Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) observed, among others, Philipp Sch. since incidents in 2017. On April 27, 2017, a farewell party for Lieutenant Colonel Pascal D., company commander of the 2nd KSK Company, took place at the Bundeswehr location shooting range Im Bernet near Stuttgart . He wore among other things. a tattoo with a Chetnik flag. He completed a course and threw pig heads. The winning prize was supposed to be a prostitute booked for this purpose. She turned her observations to the public. To right-wing rock music, such as B. the Sturmwehr group , parts of those present showed each other the Hitler salute , including Philipp Sch. Pascal D. was then sentenced to a fine . Few others have been disciplined.

At the beginning of 2020, the MAD received information from Philipp Sch.'s son that his father had set up a weapons and ammunition hiding place. The MAD switched on the investigative authorities in Saxony on February 11, 2020. On March 23, 2020, the investigators received a search warrant, which resulted in a raid on the property of KSK soldier Philipp Sch. was carried out in Collm in northern Saxony . During the search, an extensive hiding place for weapons and ammunition was excavated in the garden. Several firearms (including an AK-47 ), several thousand pieces of rifle and pistol ammunition and highly explosive explosives (including two kilograms of PETN ), most of which came from the armed forces' stocks , were seized. In addition, right-wing extremist writings (including an SS songbook) were seized. An arrest warrant was issued against the 45-year-old sergeant , disciplinary proceedings were initiated , and investigations into violations of the War Weapons Control Act , the Weapons Act and the Explosives Act were initiated. At the beginning of December 2020, Philipp Sch. Released from custody against conditions, including a security deposit of € 15,000.

A lieutenant colonel from the anti-extremism department of the MAD who was involved in the investigation was suspended because he had investigative information against Philipp Sch. passed it on to a friend of the KSK soldier.

Many politicians expressed concern about the incident. The commander of the KSK, Markus Kreitmayr, sent a fire letter to the association in which he described the case as a “shocking climax” that “reached a new dimension for all of us”. He appealed to the soldiers to take action against right-wing extremists within their own ranks. He also called on these soldiers to leave the KSK and the Bundeswehr, otherwise they would be found and removed. The Federal Ministry of Defense put together a working group that was supposed to work out a package of measures by the parliamentary summer break that would “prevent right-wing extremist tendencies from the outset”.

On March 12, 2021, the Leipzig Regional Court sentenced him to two years' probation. The judge attested that he had a right-wing national mindset. Philipp Sch. was responsible in the 2nd company of the KSK for the planning and execution of target exercises and the ammunition handover to the soldiers. He explained his ammunition hoarding by saying that it was for official use to bridge existing bottlenecks in shooting training. In the trial, the defense stated that it was Philipp Sch. It seemed too risky to hand over stolen ammunition to the barracks as part of the amnesty . The lawyer said, among other things: "If he had done it, he would still be a highly respected commando soldier today." Would have connected threats of punishment? He would have achieved nothing because hardly anyone would have given anything. " Both the General Public Prosecutor in Dresden and the defense of Philipp Sch. did not appeal an appeal, whereby the judgment became final on March 19, 2021.

Fire letter from a whistleblower

In June 2020, a KSK captain sent a fire letter to Federal Minister of Defense Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer , in which he described right-wing extremist grievances within the association as profound and structural. Right-wing extremist tendencies are "recognized internally, but [...] are collectively ignored or even tolerated" and any reports are prevented during training, in some cases knowingly covered up, and members are told not to report any incidents. The prospective KSK soldiers are trained in a rigorous obedience, which internally by trainees “was compared with that of the Waffen SS ”. You would a bondage instilled that "with the boundaries of order and obedience is by the standards of the Bundeswehr as incompatible to evaluate." Disciplinary punishments are used "to make soldiers and, above all, critical officers compliant". As a result, there would be “a kind of cadaver obedience ”, a “culture of accepting illegal behavior” and a “toxic association culture”. The whistleblower attests to an instructor who uses the callsign “Y-88” ( 88 stands for Heil Hitler ) an “aggressive national-conservative attitude”. It is "naive" to believe that soldiers like Daniel K. are isolated cases. To remedy the grievances, the author suggested an external investigation and subsequent reform of the KSK.

In addition to the grievances in the Special Forces Command, his threatened transfer to another unit was also a reason for the whistleblower for his letter. The reason for the transfer was an “extramarital affair” which, according to the instructors, would show “unsuitable character”. The whistleblower saw this as an "arbitrary punitive measure" against him. According to the whistleblower, the transfer was stopped by KSK commander Kreitmayr after his letter became known . The whistleblower should then advise the leadership of the KSK on the reform.

Amnesty through the return of stolen ammunition

In February 2021, it became known that at the verbal order of the KSK commander, the KSK soldiers were able to return misappropriated ammunition from March to May 2020 and had no negative consequences to fear. This resulted in a larger amount of ammunition than was missing. Shortly thereafter, Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer admitted that she had known about the amnesty for months and had kept it secret from the Defense Committee.

Announced reforms in the wake of the revealed grievances

In response to the right-wing extremist incidents, Federal Minister of Defense Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer announced a reform package comprising 60 individual measures at the end of June 2020, the implementation of which should be completed in October 2020, and announced the use of an "iron broom". The measures include the dissolution of the 2nd command company of the KSK, which took place on August 1, 2020, the outsourcing of training, which the KSK had previously organized independently, to the infantry school and thus subordinate it to the training command ; In addition, a future maximum length of stay for KSK soldiers, which is accompanied by a transfer to other units of the Bundeswehr before they can be transferred from there to the KSK again. Furthermore, a stricter control of weapons and ammunition stocks for the KSK was announced, since - according to a report to the Bundestag - the whereabouts of 85,000 rounds of ammunition and 62 kilograms of explosives is unclear.

On June 29, 2020, MAD President Gramm spoke to the Parliamentary Control Committee for the first time about references to “right-wing extremist networks”. However, according to the general inspector's final report of June 9, 2021, this suspicion has not been confirmed.

assignment

Job definition

The Bundeswehr divides the KSK's mission into four main mission profiles and formulates it as follows:

• Protection of German institutions and forces abroad as well as of people in special situations
• Rescuing, freeing and evacuating people
• Military reconnaissance to create one's own information superiority
• Fight against high priority targets in enemy or enemy-occupied territory

The KSK is particularly capable of rapid and targeted commando operations while avoiding any escalation and so-called collateral damage as much as possible. Special forces are either used as a supplement to conventional military personnel or instead of them if the use of conventional forces is not indicated. The KSK is used in peacetime on the instructions of the Federal Minister of Defense when special tasks of great importance for strategic and operational management are to be fulfilled, which conventional military forces either cannot carry out at all or cannot carry out with the necessary effect. According to the German Armed Forces, the planning and execution of KSK operations must be carried out with a high level of secrecy, as otherwise the soldiers and the mission's objectives would be unnecessarily endangered.

Mission profile

enlightenment

(Remote) reconnaissance and monitoring of relevant military targets is used to obtain key information about troop movements, positions and human and material resources of the enemy. This can be done by special forces both in uniform and with covert operations . This range of operations also includes exploration and sounding out of possible areas of operation as part of advance commands as a decision-making aid for the further deployment of troop contingents. The preventive defense against enemy command units ( infiltration attempts ) and covertly operating forces also belong to this area. Soldiers of the KSK can also as a forward observer and as a forward air control are used to fire the artillery to direct or close air support to conduct.

Counterterrorism

The range of operations of the KSK also includes the defense against terrorist threats of all kinds. It not only contributes actively but also passively by protecting its own forces and facilities in crisis areas to ensure the freedom of operation of conventional troops. Other areas of responsibility include the liberation of hostages from all conceivable scenarios and personal protection of commanders and civil dignitaries abroad at risk. A military hostage rescue by the KSK never took place (as of June 2020).

Rescue, evacuation and recovery

Another type of operation is the evacuation, rescue and recovery from terrorist and war-related threats to personnel and equipment behind enemy lines (also using military force). The KSK is trained for search and rescue missions in combat situations (CSAR).

Commando operations

The classic use of the KSK takes place in command operations. These include the targeted capture, rendering useless or destruction of key enemy positions such as airfields, communication and command centers, artillery and missile positions, bridges, ports, supply bases, bunkers or other particularly valuable infrastructure of the enemy. These raids ( direct action ) are carried out in a coup, either at the front or, after successful infiltration, in the enemy rear.

Military advice

The KSK is involved in military cooperation and training support for potential NATO host countries.

Legal basis and legal issues

Like the rest of the German military, the KSK cannot take part in armed operations abroad without the consent of the German Bundestag . The only exception is imminent danger for German citizens . In this case, Parliament should be consulted as soon as possible.

Results of the committee of inquiry into the Kurnaz affair

The investigation into the Kurnaz case has shown that the legal basis for the capture of enemy combatants and terror suspects in Afghanistan is shaped by the national law of the allies. There is no common legal basis for action. In the opinion of the defense policy spokesman for Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen , Winfried Nachtwei , this “problem of legal interoperability” has led to the “deployment spectrum being shifted to the less intensive levels”.

The committee of inquiry into the Kurnaz affair highlighted many situations in which the soldiers act in a legally unclear framework. According to the FAZ, the possibility of torture by KSK soldiers after the Kurnaz affair could no longer be ruled out.

The Stern reported on the legal gray area in which KSK soldiers sometimes have to operate :

“ We saw in Afghanistan how disgusting US soldiers jumped at Afghans, kicks and butts were still harmless. You treated them like subhumans . The Germans had also seen the Americans flatten entire villages and tear out door locks during Operation Anaconda : Here boys, free to plunder . The high-ranking ex-KSK man says: The pictures of Abu Ghraib , the torture in Iraqi prisons, did not surprise me at all. Officially, the Ministry of Defense says that KSK soldiers only took a handful of prisoners in Afghanistan and let them go again. The truth is that we always had Americans with us when prisoners were taken. That's how they arrested the suspects, not us. Actually, German soldiers are not allowed to hand over prisoners to a country where the death penalty is imposed. Basically, it's a mess to send our boys in there with an unresolved legal situation , says the ex-officer. Will our 28-year-old trooper have one leg in jail if the Americans execute his prisoner? "

Lack of transparency due to the confidentiality practice

The KSK is perceived in society as a proven "elite force" that carries out secret operations in secret and possibly does so without sufficient parliamentary control. In contrast, the Bundeswehr tries to relativize this elitist character, because this can only be reconciled with the model of the citizen in uniform with a few difficulties . The Bundeswehr also regularly emphasizes that there are no special legal operational bases for the KSK and that, for this reason, it is on an equal footing with all other Bundeswehr units.

The political understanding of society has not yet developed sufficiently and the role of the special forces as an instrument of German foreign and security policy has so far been insufficiently discussed in public, also because of the lack of a strategic-operational target system for foreign missions of the Bundeswehr.

However, the federal government nourishes the public's distrust because it refuses to comment on the course of action and on successes or losses even after the missions have been completed. This non-transparent information policy is understandable with regard to a corresponding weighing of interests between the operational safety of the KSK on the one hand and the right to information of the public on the other hand, but it feeds doubts about the legitimacy of the KSK operations. Such a practice of secrecy also does not correspond to the political culture of the Federal Republic, since state action is usually public there.

The information and scandals repeatedly published by the press in its function as the “fourth power” do not contribute to promoting the public's trust in lawful action by the troops. At the same time, the federal government's restrictive public relations work underpins this perception.

The peace movement also criticizes the government's failure to inform parliament about the operations, either before or after. According to Section 6 of the Parliamentary Participation Act (ParlBetG) of 2005, the executive branch has a duty to inform the parliament, but as with previous deployments of special forces, it ignores these requirements, as it assesses the operational safety of soldiers as higher than that in the context of a public-law weighing of interests Parliament's right to participate. Even the representatives of the parliamentary groups would not receive all the information they wanted. For this reason, a number of parliamentarians are of the opinion that they are not adequately informed and criticize that they are not able to properly exercise the necessary parliamentary control.

In view of the contradiction between the Parliamentary Participation Act and the required secrecy, state practice has developed an informal procedure in which the Federal Ministry of Defense informs the representatives in the Defense Committee confidentially about such operations. Because this procedure continues to be criticized, the Federal Government has committed itself to informing the chairmen and deputies of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee every six months. Nevertheless, the question remains whether we can actually continue to speak of a “ parliamentary army ” when only 14 members of the Bundestag out of a total of 709 find out more about the KSK operations. This practice also does not change the informal character of this procedure and is therefore not suitable for allaying doubts about the constitutionality of this practice with regard to the parliamentary approval for the use of armed forces.

The German government responded to the question of ensuring parliamentary control of operations requiring confidentiality in 2007 with a letter to the parliamentary group chairmen with the suggestion that the informal procedure that is currently practiced should be slightly further developed, but retained. A bill by the FDP parliamentary group instead provides for the establishment of a parliamentary control body for special foreign missions, similar to that of the secret service committee . No decision has yet been made. Nevertheless, according to Georg Axer, legal assistant to Professor Seifert (University of Erfurt), the establishment of a Bundestag committee for special missions in the sense of the consistent requirement of parliamentary participation in operations requiring confidentiality would be a suitable measure to adequately resolve this tension between parliamentary control and confidentiality . However, only if the original draft of the FDP were modified in such a way that the legislature also included the “flexible operational army ” formulated in the 2006 White Book of the Bundeswehr in the design of the regulations on parliamentary participation.

The legitimacy of this practice is thus called into question by parts of the public, as they are of the opinion that the KSK is in fact more of a force of the executive than a part of a "parliamentary army".

In September, the Defense Committee found that the federal government had not yet adequately fulfilled its legal obligation to inform parliament about KSK deployments and that there was a need for regulation for an information procedure that would meet the requirements of the Parliamentary Participation Act (ParlBetG), but without to endanger the required operational safety of the soldiers.

The Bundeswehr Operations Command (EinsFüKdoBw) is responsible for conveying information about operations by the command . Journalists are mostly dependent on inside information, targeted, but not named “indiscretions from informed circles”, for example from entrusted MPs.

After repeated criticism of this practice, both by MPs and by the media, the German government has announced with the extension of the mandate for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that it will improve the information policy in agreement with the chairmen of the parliamentary groups.

In November 2018, the Bundeswehr started an extensive web series about the KSK, which initiated a paradigm shift in the association's public relations work after 22 years.

organization

The KSK is integrated into the structure of the Bundeswehr and is a regular unit of the army in terms of service.

The large association KSK is divided into the staff as well as command and support forces.

The KSK has a nominal strength of around 1,100  soldiers . The majority of these are deployed in the support, staff or telecommunications area, which is supposed to ensure the logistical supply, management support and operational readiness of the association. The actual command forces in the command core area form a small part that can only operate and function with the help of these support forces. The exact number of ready-commandos (command and command sergeant) than classified information classified. According to press reports, it is said to be between 400 and 500 commandos, a number which, however, was never reached due to a lack of qualified applicants.

The 2nd command company was dissolved on August 1, 2020 as part of the comprehensive reforms following an accumulation of right-wing extremist incidents . Personnel transfers from the KSK or to other areas of the KSK were ordered.

structure

The Special Forces Command (KSK) in Calw is divided into:

• Special Forces Command (KSK)
  • Psychological service
  • Language service
  • 1. Command company
  • 3. Command company
  • 4. Command company
  • Special command company
  • Special reconnaissance company
• Support staff
  • Supply company
  • Telecommunications company
  • Support company
    • Supply / transshipment train
    • Repair train
    • Parachute and air handling train
  • Medical center
• Training area (will be separated from the structure of the KSK in the future and subordinated to the training command)
• Development area

Staff and command support company Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) in Hardheim (was removed from the KSK structure in March 2021 and reports directly to the DSK )

guide

For operations, the forces of the KSK are subordinate to the special operations department in the command and control command of the German Armed Forces in Geltow near Potsdam , and in the case of multinational operations, tactically and operationally , a combined joint forces command post , a Combined Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) . This ensures central management of all special forces within an operation.

KSK staff (command staff)

The command staff supports the commander in his leadership role and is responsible, among other things, for coordinating training, exercises and operations. He is led by the "Commander KSK", a brigadier general ( B 6 post ). The commander of the KSK also fills the position of " General Special Forces ". The command staff differs from a conventional brigade staff. Although it is also structured according to basic management areas, it also has the "Operation and Exercise" department, which is responsible for all training and exercise projects and also serves as a situation and planning center for the higher-level KdoFOSK, which it has operational responsibility for supported for KSK operations. A special feature are the language service integrated in the command staff and the psychological service , which is responsible for recruiting and aptitude tests as well as for looking after the soldiers before, during and after operations.

List of commanders

Previous commanders were:

Surname	Beginning of the appointment	End of appointment
Brigadier General Markus Kreitmayr	June 26, 2018
Brigadier General Alexander Sollfrank	23rd June 2017	June 26, 2018
Brigadier General Dag Knut Baehr	March 27, 2013	23rd June 2017
Brigadier General Heinz Josef Feldmann	October 1, 2010	March 27, 2013
Brigadier General Hans-Christoph Ammon	June 29, 2007	October 1, 2010
Brigadier General Rainer Hartbrod	August 18, 2005	June 29, 2007
Brigadier General Carl-Hubertus von Butler	November 14, 2003	August 18, 2005
Brigadier General Reinhard Günzel	November 23, 2000	November 5, 2003
Brigadier General Hans-Heinrich Dieter	October 1, 1998	November 23, 2000
Brigadier General Fred Schulz	September 20, 1996	September 30, 1998

Command forces

The command forces of the KSK consist of three command companies as well as a special command company and the special reconnaissance company.

Special command company

In October 2004 the special command company was set up. The special command company provides particularly skilled teams in the tasks of combat control (tactical airspace control), joint tactical fire support , counter IED and EOD (defense against threats from explosives), special demolitions and special service dogs. All soldiers' specializations are based on their basic qualifications as commandos. As a rule, older and experienced commando soldiers serve here, who support the command companies in operations and exercises if necessary. The special command company is usually the first and last in the area of ​​operations, as their motto is: "First in, last out".

Special reconnaissance company

Specific reconnaissance skills are provided by the special reconnaissance company, depending on the situation and mission. Their staff consists mainly of commandos and specially selected and trained reconnaissance soldiers. They are able to work directly with the commandos, even under stress in special operations, and contribute their skills for drone-based, technical and multispectral reconnaissance as well as the detection and identification of NBC warfare agents or hazardous substances. In addition, the reconnaissance soldiers enable so-called “female engagement”, where the cultural conditions in the operational areas require it.

Command company

The manpower of a command company is estimated at around 100 soldiers, 64 of whom are emergency services. Because of the confidentiality, there is no official information on the exact numbers. Each of the three command companies consists of six platoons : a command group and five command platoons , each with a specialization that relates to the type of deployment and type of operation. This means the ability to reach an operational area in a certain way in order to carry out a command there (land, air, water and mountains):

• Special train for land / desert :

The soldiers of the Landzug are specialists in complex land-based commando operations and desert warfare. In addition, they are particularly capable of driving many vehicles in use in the Bundeswehr and of repairing combat damage (minor repairs) and of acquiring (looted) enemy vehicles and making them usable. They are also experts in driver safety training and driving and controlling vehicles under full load. This ability can be particularly useful in covert operations when a target (person or vehicle) tries to escape observation or access (pursuit) by escaping.

• Special parachute pull : so-called vertical pull, freefaller, trained for HAHO jumping techniques (High Altitude - High Opening) :

The soldiers of the vertical platoon are trained to jump from fixed-wing aircraft (aircraft) as well as from rotary-wing aircraft (helicopters) for military freefall. Flat parachutes enable gliding operations over distances of up to 40 kilometers between the point of departure and landing in order to penetrate the depths of the enemy space unnoticed. They are also able to bring non-qualified external specialists such as doctors, members of the intelligence services or negotiators as well as heavy loads into the operation area in a tandem jump .

• Amphibious train: Amphibious warfare , (reduced) combat swimmer training and jungle fighting :

Amphibious transport specialists are particularly skilled in overcoming standing and flowing waters as well as sea-based beach exploration, and some are trained as combat divers. The focus here is on the movement through water to the target, the KSK does not carry out any attacks on sea targets (this is the task of the Special Forces Command of the Navy - KSM). The third specialization is the jungle fight, the so-called "jungle concept".

• Mountain / Arctic Range: Mountain War and Winter War :

The troop leaders of the mountain range are trained army mountain guides and are therefore able to safely guide people (e.g. civil or intelligence experts) without alpine knowledge through mountain regions. The troop soldiers have the training level of mountain hunters and are all specially trained for winter combat and arctic environment.

A KSK sniper in a ghillie suit during an international exercise

• Remote scout / sniper platoon:

The sniper and reconnaissance platoon forms the reconnaissance element of the command company. The ability to sniper special forces and complex reconnaissance skills distinguish this element.

This division ensures that each command company is trained in all command deployment procedures and can also carry them out.

Command platoon

Each train in the command company has its main focus (specialization), but also undergoes some of the transfer training for the other trains. In addition, all trains can be tactically deployed from the air over their area of ​​operation. The vertical pulls are particularly skilled in manual parachute deployment. A command platoon consists of four commandos with 16 soldiers. The KSK in its entirety is an airborne association with various transport options. However, the shipment is only ever seen as the route to deployment. The focus is and remains on the ability to rescue and free , in which the KSK now plays a leading role within the German special forces, also and especially in comparison to the GSG 9 of the Federal Police . The reason for this lies in the extended training of the KSK, which also allows her to work in “unsafe surroundings”, which is the decisive difference to special police units. For example, a liberation operation in enemy-controlled areas is associated with completely different operational tactical aspects and dangers than a hostage liberation by the domestic police. However, the KSK also uses police-like tactics in its own military environment. The federal and state governments regularly delegate officials from their special police units to training and courses in Calw in order to gain experience and exchange information.

Command Squad

The command squad (KdoTrp) is the basic element in the command fight. Each command group consists of four command soldiers , one of which in each case as weapons -, pioneering , telecommunications and - medical specialist is formed. Since the squad usually operates independently, the paramedics (KSK internally called "Medic") have additional training in trauma medicine in addition to their qualification as paramedics , and their medical skills extend far beyond those of their civilian colleagues. They are allowed to access, intubate , perform surgical procedures, and administer medication and narcotics . The command group is regularly led by an experienced command sergeant in the rank of main sergeant (HptFw). Several troops or, depending on the situation, larger troops are led by an experienced officer. The command officers (KdoOffz) basically go through the same training and specialization as the command sergeants (KdoFw) and are also more challenged and trained accordingly in the tactical-operational area. This basic structure can be deviated from depending on the location and the order.

Since 2005, an organizational and conceptual change has also been considered. The so far smallest tactical unit, the command group consisting of four specialists, is to be enlarged to five to six men, because the sheer weight of the required equipment can now hardly be carried by four men. Renowned special forces such as the British Special Air Service and the Israeli Sajeret Matkal have already increased the core team to five, and the South African Recce Commandos to six.

Medical special train

The special medical train (SanSpezZg) of the Special Forces Command (KSK), which was newly set up at the beginning of 2018, supports the command forces in global operations and ensures their medical care. The train consists of four groups.

Each group consists of three teams with different specializations, such as altitude and technical rescue or medical NBC protection, i.e. care for the wounded under NBC threat. The squads are airborne rescue teams - everyone on the team is parachutist. Each squad includes two sergeants trained as emergency paramedics and one non-commissioned officer as emergency paramedic. Depending on the scenario, a doctor can be assigned to each squad, who then becomes an air-mobile doctor squad. The squad leader is trained as a commando soldier. All the others in the team have additional military training in addition to their medical services in order to be able to keep up with the commandos. Each of the four groups is assigned to one of the KSK operations companies.

Support area

The support area consists of three companies and the medical center. He is responsible for ensuring the operational capabilities of the operational forces worldwide. In principle, this must also be able to be guaranteed independently of the local infrastructure . His tasks include the care and maintenance of jumping equipment (e.g. parachute packing ), transport of all kinds, maintenance and repair of the emergency vehicles and the maintenance of all telecommunications.

• Staff and supply company: It is the KSK company with the best staff: It comprises the "staff train", the "material train", a supply group including the catering group, the "transport train" and an ammunition and operating material group.
• Support company: It is responsible for replenishment, repair and supply in the field. It consists of the “supply and handling train”, “repair train” and the “parachute and air handling train”, which is responsible for the constant availability of jumping equipment.
• Telecommunication company: It consists of a company command group and three telecommunication platoons.
• the medical center corresponds to a military hospital with the necessary departments for intensive medicine and traumatology and ensures the medical service not only at the location, but also during exercises and during operations.

Training area

The training and test center (AVZ) is responsible for the selection, training and further education of officers and NCOs to become operational commandos. It is responsible for the training and development of operational procedures of the KSK and carries out potential assessment procedures, ensures the two-year basic training of the commandos and regulates the driver training and further education of the troop, platoon and company commanders. Another task of the AVZ is the technical advice for the transfer and technical specializations and the supervision and organization of special courses. Experienced and field-tested KdoFw and KdoOffz do their job in the AVZ. Since May 4th, 1998 the AVZ has been sponsoring the 1st Battalion of the 10th Special Forces Group in Böblingen .

In the course of the reform of the KSK decided after the right-wing extremist incidents, the training area will be removed from its structure and will in future be subordinate to the army training command in terms of both troops and specialist services. Specifically, an affiliation to the infantry school will take place, but the corresponding training courses will remain at the Calw location, as the highly specialized and cost-intensive infrastructure is only available there (as of August 2020).

Development area

Coat of arms of the group, further development of the special forces command with the motto: pars pro toto

The area of ​​further development of the special forces command (BerWEntwg KSK) is responsible for the needs analysis, development, procurement and introduction of defense material of the KSK, submits initiative applications and conducts tests. He is concerned with the conceptual creation and updating of operational procedures, future operational technologies, regulations, basic documents and the procurement and introduction of equipment. He determines the material needs and ensures that it is covered, such as weapons, explosives and detonators, optical and optoelectronic devices, parachute systems, communication devices and personal clothing. In total, the KSK has more than 20,000 different supply items, many of which are custom-made. These are more different pieces of equipment than an entire Bundeswehr division with around 9,000 men would use. The BerWEntwg is divided into three separate departments: conception , equipment and training . Primarily qualified engineers, technical specialists and particularly experienced veterans of the operational companies serve here, some of which no longer have the combat-ready status for health reasons .

Recruitment and training

basic requirements

Applicants for service at the KSK are generally expected to meet the following basic requirements:

• above-average physical performance
• Teamwork
• Willingness to learn
• mental resilience and willpower
• Stress stability
• Sense of responsibility and confidentiality
• Living in orderly social conditions

Special requirement profile

Since they are intended for particularly sensitive military operations and usually operate in a hostile environment - mostly in isolation, without any support and under the most adverse conditions for a long period of time, mental balance is of particular importance. The commando must, even if he reaches his performance limits due to sleep deprivation , irregular diet, poor hygienic conditions and life-threatening situations, still continuously perform precision work (for example shoot in a split second so that no hostages are hit, but the kidnapper is right next to them). In addition, the ability to work in a team and mental flexibility are important qualities. He must be able to quickly adapt to changing operating conditions and requirements. At the same time, the soldiers psychologically have to cope with the fact that these achievements are hardly ever openly valued due to the secrecy, neither in public, nor in their social environment and not even in their families. This obligation of secrecy about one's own experiences towards friends and relatives is a constant psychological burden.

application

There are two options open to the applicant to become a commando soldier in the KSK: On the one hand, applicants can become members of the KSK if they have a military career as a sergeant or an officer in other military branches. On the other hand, there is a route via the so-called civilian route through training to become a “Sergeant Special Operations”, which since October 2005 has also been open to applicants with no previous military knowledge and team ranks. Around 30 percent of applicants use this option.

Applicants on the so-called civil path first take part in a three-day selection process in one of the Bundeswehr's career centers . If they pass this, they will be transferred to the Special Operations Training Center in Pfullendorf . There, together with the teams and sergeant candidates coming from other units of the Rapid Forces division , a three-year training course to become a “paratrooper sergeant” takes place. After successful completion, all participants take part in the actual potential assessment procedure at the KSK in the Graf-Zeppelin barracks in Calw. This is followed by a two-year training to become a command sergeant. If you fail, you will be employed in the other units of the Rapid Forces division.

Potential determination procedure (PFV)

According to a former commander of the KSK, the training test is "the hardest thing you can expect people to do in a democracy". Since 1995, the KSK's psychological service has developed a profile for commandos that combines endurance, resistance to pain and stress with secrecy, emotional distance and acceptance of rest periods (not deployed). The PFV lasts twelve weeks and has replaced the ten-week aptitude assessment procedure (EFV) since November 2020. In addition to personal suitability, the Military Counter-Intelligence Service checks whether the applicant passes the security check . In addition, the candidate's “foundation of values” has been examined since the reform .

Block 1 (physical and mental selection process)

At the beginning there is a three-week physical and psychological selection process (“first block”). At the beginning, the candidate goes through the most demanding physical fitness test of the Bundeswehr, which is only comparable to that of combat swimmers. The "Physical Fitness Test" requires the achievement of at least three points in each tested sub-discipline and a total of at least twenty. This includes a seven-kilometer cross-country run with 20 kilograms of marching equipment in a maximum of 52 minutes, overcoming the obstacle course with combat suit, gloves and a combat helmet in 100 seconds, 500 meters swimming in a maximum of 15 minutes and at least five pull-ups on the instep grip . Once this has been successfully completed, the psychological selection process (“psychological data collection”) begins with an assessment center process based on questionnaires, computer tests and group situation procedures. If the applicant has also successfully passed this test, he is admitted to the subsequent second part of the selection process.

Block 2 (survival and penetration)

The first block is followed by a ten-week preparation program in which the aspirants are specifically prepared for the second part of the PFV by means of marches, abseiling exercises, obstacle courses and team tasks. Particular emphasis is placed on finding a team and solving problems together.

This is followed by block 2, an approximately five-day “penetration exercise” (weekly exercise), which at the end includes a survival course for special forces . In this test with high marching performance, the applicants are systematically pushed to their performance limits in the so-called "hell week" in a group, but also on their own, as they have to cope with tasks under time pressure under constant stress and sleep deprivation. According to a former KSK major , a 160-kilometer march is followed by an interrogation simulation in which the applicant is interrogated in a bunker for over eight hours. Methods such as “bright light, loud rock music, blindfolds, freezing cold, water that is poured over the head from buckets” are used. These measures are, however, approved in detail by the Defense Commissioner of the German Bundestag . The exercise for dealing with a capture and interrogation situation is in parts comparable to the SERE training of the special forces of the US armed forces .

This tough selection is intended to filter out unsuitable applicants as early as possible in order to reduce the drop-out rate in the cost-intensive training to become commandos. Later failures are therefore mostly due to injuries.

Successful graduates of Block 2 are qualified for the subsequent basic training; if they fail, they are transferred back to the sending unit (core unit).

At the beginning of the 21st century, the success rate of KSK candidates was around ten percent. Thanks also to the improved preparation of KSK applicants, the success rate rose significantly and is currently at an average of 20 percent. Those responsible at the KSK emphasize “that it is by no means easier today to pass the selection test compared to the past. However, in the present the soldiers are better prepared for the challenges to be overcome. "

education

After the following two-year basic training, the prospective commando soldier receives the so-called combat-ready status and is transferred to one of the four command companies. Depending on the area of ​​application, this is followed by a further one-year specialization in the areas of telecommunications technology , weapons , explosives and pioneering , medical services , mountain combat and free-fall parachuting as well as amphibious operations . A candidate can be expelled from the KSK at any time during these three years if it is determined that they are unsuitable.

During this period he may be able to attend up to 20 courses in 17 schools and training institutions worldwide. During the shooting training alone, every future commando soldier will be trained on all common weapons. "We build stress tests for the men with lightning-fast friend-foe recognition, in which less than ten percent of the participants pass," said a responsible training officer. The acquisition of very good knowledge of two foreign languages ​​is also part of the training. The commandos of the vertical platoons are trained in military freefall . The minimum commitment period is six years after completing the basic training. As part of the training, especially members of the high mountain ranges undertake expeditions .

At the end of this path, the special badge is awarded to the commando soldier. In addition to his grade-related salary, the graduate receives a monthly command allowance of currently 963 euros, with other armed forces-specific allowances being offset. A commando soldier has to prove his skills and his command suitability annually in a further test procedure, the so-called "stress test". As long as he passes this test and continues to perform physically, he can remain in command.

Training locations

KSK demonstration at the ILA  2000

The KSK trains its soldiers at various locations around the world. The high degree of specialization and readiness requires intensive training, which means that a commando is "on practice" for around 250 days a year. The training locations include:

•  Norway : Winter Fight (Arctic)
•  Canada , Goose Bay : sniping
•  Austria : mountain fight
•  United States , Eloy , Arizona : Parachute training in military free fall
•  United States , San Diego , California : Amphibious Warfare
•  United States , El Paso , Texas : Desert Warfare
•  France , Régina , French Guiana : Jungle combat training in the Center d'entraînement à la forêt equatoriale
•  Belize : jungle training

Personnel development

The Bundeswehr is planning to increase its staff from the current 1,100 to 1,300 posts, although the KSK has not yet been able to achieve the current target strength.

The Bundeswehr has responded by introducing the ten-week preparatory program for the second block of the potential assessment procedure, shortening the minimum promotion times for NCOs, opening the KSK to suitable crew ranks and a general command allowance of 1125 euros (compared to the previous allowances of around 490 euros) with retroactive effect from January 1, 2008. The commanders of the KSK had fought for it for years. "This appropriately compensates for the special loads and difficulties," emphasizes Ammon. Another incentive is the almost safe assumption of fully trained commandos as professional soldiers when their six-year commitment period ends. An extensive bonus system was introduced in 2012. The following rules currently apply: “Those who pass the highest requirements for the physical aptitude test will receive 3,000 euros. With the start of the training at the KSK, an allowance of 963 euros (gross) is paid per month. At the end of the two-year training period, the KSK man is awarded the coveted job badge - a sword in an oak wreath - at a ceremony. In addition, he receives a bonus of 10,000 euros. After completing the six compulsory years in the emergency services, the employer pays him a bonus of 5,000 euros for each additional year that he remains as a commando soldier in Calw. "

In addition to the small number of candidates in command, the migration of fully trained commandos to private security and military companies is a problem for the personnel planning of the KSK. Because of the relatively low financial compensation, such companies often find it easy to poach suitably qualified soldiers. The KSK is therefore exposed to constant competition with the globally prospering private security market, which can pay much higher salaries.

The former commander Feldmann emphasized that women should go through a special selection process that was still in the trial phase in the winter of 2012/13. The training of women should also include combat training, but the focus is on other areas: “Among other things, they are taught in-depth knowledge of conversation clarification, interpreting and forensics. There should be no quota regulation in this area, as is the case with some special police units. "

In the 2012 annual report presented by the then Defense Commissioner of the German Bundestag , Hellmut Königshaus , it became known that to date only one woman has successfully passed the selection process. The report shows that a soldier from a battalion for electronic warfare applied for admission to the KSK and successfully passed all aptitude tests over a period of six months. However, the transfer to the KSK was prevented by the armed forces base after the selection process on the grounds that the woman belonged to a deficient training and employment series. In the annual report, this was highlighted as a "particularly serious case of loss of confidence".

In addition, the number of women in the command units is to be increased through improved support for female applicants in preparatory courses. Although female soldiers are free to register for a potential assessment procedure for the command companies, they have so far only been represented in the KSK in the area of ​​support and, since 2018, in the special reconnaissance company. During the demonstration of a hostage rescue in front of the incumbent Federal Minister of Defense, one of the soldiers involved was a member of the KSK. The ministry thus confirms that women also serve in the KSK. The special forces commandos have so far not had a woman in their ranks.

The average age of the commandos is 34.5 years (mid-2010), whereby they have to leave active service in the KSK by the age of 41 at the latest.

equipment

Facilities and equipment

The KSK has access to the most modern weapons and equipment. It is partly decoupled from the army's regular procurement system. In addition, the equipment is constantly being further developed in our own training and testing center. All necessary modifications to material and equipment can be carried out in our own weapons workshop. These changes include the conversion and special construction of weapons, the adaptation of equipment and the production of special ammunition , for example to modify the subsonic ammunition required for the use of silenced weapons in such a way that the disadvantage of reduced penetration is minimized. The KSK's armory keeps samples of all common foreign weapons ready for training purposes.

Due to this special equipment priority and the existing technical weapons resources, the KSK also functions as a kind of practical test unit for planned weapons introductions by the army.

The KSK has its own shooting range ("Building 8"), which is considered to be the most modern facility of its kind in the world and in which units from more than 60 countries have already trained. The system enables training in a variety of deployment scenarios with live ammunition. Monitored by video cameras, computer simulations or live ammunition are used here on three floors. The entire facility (walls, corridors, stairs, doors, windows) can be moved under computer control. For example, the floor plan of every German embassy can be recreated in order to prepare the emergency services for a possible occupation.

Furthermore, since 2018 the KSK has had a multifunctional training center that is unique in Germany. Train and develop various amphibious tactics.

Armament

HK USP

HK MP5 SD3 with integrated silencer

H&K G36 with AG36 grenade launcher

G22 - sniper rifle from Accuracy International

Under the name P8C (P8 Combat), a variant of the HK USP (universal self-loading pistol) was first introduced at the KSK , before it became the standard pistol in the German armed forces. Compared to the P8 , the P8C does not have a manual safety device. The combined safety and release lever of the standard version only serves as a release lever, which makes it particularly suitable for personal protection, as there is no separate release. Secondary weapons designed for special operations, such as the P12 (HK USP Tactical offshoot) in .45 caliber (11.43 mm), the P30 and the 40 mm grenade pistol are also available. The KSK also has Glock pistols and revolvers in caliber .357 Magnum from Ruger and in caliber .22 lfB .

The variants of the HK MP5 and the MP7 (PDW) in caliber 4.6 × 30 mm, which offer improved penetration against common bullet-resistant vests , are particularly used in urban areas . The UMP submachine gun is also used.

In 1996, the KSK was the first unit of the Bundeswehr to be equipped with the new G36 assault rifle , including the following modifications and extensions: AG36 grenade launcher (attached as an accessory to the primary weapon below the barrel), G36KA1 and G36KA2. But the HK G3 is still in use. In addition, the HK416 and the G27 ( HK417 ) are also in use, which are particularly suitable for special forces due to their reliability and handiness. The AG36 grenade launcher can also be attached here for more firepower. Furthermore, the shortened G36C has been in use since 2005.

In addition, a commando group can use the MG3 , MG4 , MG5 or G8 ( HK21 ) machine guns as a portable support weapon for greater distances. The Browning M2 is available for vehicles.

For the infantry house-to-house fighting , the KSK uses forearm repeater rifles, among others of the Remington 870 type , which are otherwise only in use by combat swimmers and police officers (military police) before access to criminals. These weapons break and penetrate cover. Depending on the ammunition used and the nature of the target, this breaks through doors and walls.

The snipers of the KSK received the G22 in caliber 7.62 × 67 mm (.300 Winchester Magnum) in addition to the emergency services at SFOR . This was an unchanged AWM-F , which was introduced in 1997, slightly modified under the designation G22, as a full-fledged sniper rifle for distances up to 1,100 m. From 2016 it will be replaced by the G29 . Also in use is the large-caliber M107 , which is imported by Heckler & Koch, technically approved and delivered to the German Armed Forces and then marketed under the designation G82 . It uses the largest 12.7 × 99 mm (.50BMG) caliber infantry weapon normally fired by heavy machine guns such as the US- M2HB . With an effective operating range of 1,800 meters, this weapon is not only suitable for normal use, but also for fighting and rendering so-called "hard targets" unusable, such as radar dishes and antennas, communications equipment and rocket positions (shot directly at the missile). At a shorter distance and with the appropriate ammunition, people holed up behind masonry can also be fought through the cover (cover-penetrating weapons effect). The weapon is referred to by the Bundeswehr as a "rifle for long range and technical targets".

In addition to these sniper rifles, the German Armed Forces procured some AW50 and AWS from Accuracy International . With the identifier G25 or G24, these rifles are only used by the special forces within the German Armed Forces in caliber 12.7 × 99 mm and 7.62 × 51 mm. The G27 has also been introduced.

Furthermore, the anti- tank systems anti-tank weapon MILAN , Panzerfaust 3 and the anti-aircraft system Fliegerfaust 2 Stinger are in use at the KSK.

vehicles

Serval with mounted Browning M2

As an initial launch, the new Serval emergency vehicle , also known as the reconnaissance and combat vehicle (AGF), was procured for the KSK . This vehicle is unprotected. The US Browning M2 machine gun, caliber 12.7 × 99 mm, and the grenade machine gun (GMW) developed by Heckler & Koch, with caliber 40 × 53 mm, were introduced as vehicle armament . In 2016, 49 LAPV Enok armored vehicles of the Enok 6.1 type were purchased for the Special Forces Command , which has a permissible total weight of 6.1 tons thanks to improved armor and payload.

For armored transport in action, the KSK has Fuchs armored transport vehicles and uses the GTK .

The KSK also has the multi-purpose off-road vehicle Bv 206 from the Swedish manufacturer Hägglund , all-terrain quads of the Yamaha ATV (All Terrain Vehicle) KODIAC 4x4 Quad and motorcycles ( Enduros ) of the KTM 640 LC 4 type . Bombardier Skidoo snowmobiles are available for winter use LYNX GLX 5900 FC / E Army available.

For fire support , the KSK can also, depending on the order, assign armored weapons carriers of the Wiesel 1 and Wiesel 2 type , for example in the anti-tank ( TOW ) or 120 mm mortar version.

Boats

The amphibious trains are equipped with kayaks, inflatable boats and RHIB boats .

helicopter

On July 11, 2013, the Federal Ministry of Defense and Eurocopter signed a contract for 15 light helicopters of the type EC645 T2 for the Special Forces Command. The aircraft were delivered to the troops between the end of 2015 and mid-2017. The total volume amounted to 194 million euros and, in addition to the helicopters, also provided the appropriate equipment for the requirements of the KSK.

The EC645 T2 LUH has a digital cockpit with full night vision capability and an autopilot . During maneuvers, the special forces benefit from a spacious cabin with two large side sliding doors and double rear doors. The equipment package also includes lowering devices and external load hooks . The other equipment includes on-board armaments and an electro-optical system for reconnaissance. A self-protection system and armor provide additional protection for the crew. The maximum take-off weight is 3.7 tons. The machine should be strategically relocated in an Airbus A400M and used immediately after unloading.

The helicopters and crews are subordinate to the Helicopter Squadron 64 of the Air Force in Laupheim , but are intended for exclusive use by the KSK and the Command Special Forces of the Navy (KSM).

insignia

Association badge

Association badge of the command

Internal association badge

Internal association badge staff / supply company

The blazon of the association badge reads: silver bordered, in blue an upright black arrowhead , consisting of a notched shaft and the two wings, topped with a falling, golden eagle .

The falling eagle is the symbol of the army's airborne forces. The eagle is similarly found in the beret badge of the paratrooper troops . The arrow is a symbol for special forces. It can be found similarly in the tactical symbol for special forces and in the form of upright swords or daggers in the association badges of many special forces worldwide.

With the exception of the color of the shield and the border, the coat of arms is the same as the association badge of the superordinate Division Rapid Forces and the Airborne Brigade 1, which is subordinate to it . Except for the border, it is the same as the association badge of the Special Operations Division and the former association badge of the brigades subordinate to it. The organizational predecessor of the Special Forces Command, Luftlandebrigade 25 "Black Forest" , was the first brigade of the Airborne Division in the Army's numbering system and, in continuation of this counting method, the Special Forces Command was also the first "Brigade" of the Special Operations Division. The association badge of Luftlandebrigade 25, whose association badge was initially continued unchanged after the special forces command was set up, was therefore framed in white following the heraldic tradition of the army. The association badge of the Special Forces Command continues this board unchanged to this day. When the Special Operations Division was reclassified to the Rapid Forces Division, the color of the shield in the division's association badge was changed from blue to silver. The association badge of the special forces command remained unchanged, so that the color of the shield differs from the association badge of the higher-level division.

See also : List of Bundeswehr Association Badges

Internal association badges

In recent years, the internal KSK association badge has been increasingly worn on the service suit on the left or right of the sleeve and is also used for official appearances and on the KSK website on the Bundeswehr's official website.

Rod

The internal association badge of the staff is worn as a breast tag by members of the staff and also appears, for example, in official documents issued by the commander. It is also used as a barracks shield for the association in Calw. It takes up the symbolism of the arrow pointing upwards on the blue heraldic shield. The symbols in the left part of the coat of arms are again borrowed from the tactical symbols. The three parachutes represent the paratroopers. The firs symbolize the Black Forest as well as the traditional reference to Airborne Brigade 25 "Black Forest".

Command badge

The badge "Kommandosoldat" is worn as a patch on the right breast pocket. A silver sword is depicted vertically on a light green base, which is depicted on an oak leaf and an acorn and is surrounded by two rows of gold-colored oak leaves. The commando badge and beret emblem were approved by Federal President Johannes Rau in 2000. As a reason he gave:

"It should be a visible sign that its wearer has achieved the highest levels of physical and psychological performance and has proven his special ability as a soldier in the KSK."

The "command soldier" badge is awarded in a ceremony by the KSK commander after successfully completing several years of commando training.

Beret and beret badge

The Special Operations Division sees itself in the tradition of an airborne division. Therefore, most KSK soldiers (with the exception of, for example, medical specialists), as members of an airborne unit, wear a burgundy red beret , as is common to most airborne units worldwide. As a separate branch of the army, it has a specific metal beret badge. This shows an upwardly facing sword with a slightly curved up to the blade guard in an oak leaf wreath with German flag. The oak leaves are a traditional symbol of the German army; the sword, like the arrow in the tactical symbol, again stands for the special forces abilities of the command. The sword is included in the badge of many comparable military special forces. The current beret badge was awarded in Calw on September 26, 1997. The symbolism of the beret badge is similar to the command badge made of textile .

Gun color

The members of the command form a separate branch of the army .

Your i. d. However , the soldiers usually share the hunter green weapon color (the color of the collar tab or the braid ) with the infantry armies and armored infantry , because the KSK was always counted among the infantry before its own armies were established, or it belonged to a large infantry group.

Tactical sign

The military symbol of the KSK shows in the obligatory rectangle an arrow pointing upwards or a sword (left illustration). In international organization charts with tactical symbols for associations (OrBats), there is an SF for Special Forces in the rectangle (right figure, here a command company).

Association of German commandos

On May 22, 2007, the Association of German Commandosoldaten e. V. (GDK) was founded in Calw on the initiative of former members of the Special Forces Command to institutionalize their relationship to the Command and their networks.

literature

Books and brochures

• Timo Noetzel, Benjamin Schreer : Special forces of the Bundeswehr. Structural requirements for deployment abroad . Published by the Science and Politics Foundation , Berlin 2007 ( PDF ).
• Reinhard Scholzen : KSK. The special forces command of the Bundeswehr . Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 .
• Sören Sünkler: The special units of the Bundeswehr . Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2007, ISBN 978-3-613-02592-9 .
• Sören Sünkler: Europe's elite and special units . Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2008, ISBN 978-3-613-02853-1 .
• Reinhard Scholzen: KSK. Pictures of an elite troop . Motorbuch-Verlag, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-613-03547-8 .

items

• Hans-Christoph Ammon : The special forces command. In: Strategy and Technology. Vol. 51, No. 4, April 2008, ISSN  1860-5311 , pp. 21-26.
• Georg Axer: The “Special Forces Command” between the interests of secrecy and parliamentary approval. In: Journal of Legal Policy . Vol. 40, No. 3, 2007, ISSN  0514-6496 , pp. 82-84.
• Uwe Drews, Dieter Hansen: Behavior in the event of hostage and arrest, interrogation and torture. In: Klaus Puzicha et al. (Ed.): Psychology for use and emergency. International troop psychological experience with foreign deployments, accidents, disasters. Bernard & Graefe, Bonn 2001, ISBN 3-7637-6216-7 , pp. 72-78.
• Hans-Günter Fröhling: More transparency. The Special Forces Command (KSK) from the point of view of Inner Leadership. In: Detlef Bald , Claus Freiherr von Rosen and others. (Ed.): Trimmed back, devoid of meaning, misunderstood. The internal leadership of the Bundeswehr (= democracy, security, peace . Vol. 187). Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-3508-5 , pp. 134-138.
• Günter R. Kreim: Stress management at the special forces command. In: Klaus Puzicha et al. (Ed.): Psychology for use and emergency. International troop psychological experience with foreign deployments, accidents, disasters. Bernard & Graefe, Bonn 2001, ISBN 3-7637-6216-7 , pp. 492-504.
• Jörg Kronauer : Secret War in Afghanistan. Flimsy arguments to withdraw, uncertainty about possible deaths. The use of the KSK. In: Telepolis , July 19, 2005 ( online ).
• Stefan Wolfgang Schäfer: The medical service of the special forces command. In: Military medicine and military pharmacy. Vol. 32 (NF), No. 1, 2008, ISSN  0043-2148 , pp. 36-37.
• Reinhard Scholzen: Who should free German hostages abroad? In: European Security. Vol. 59, No. 7, July 2010, ISSN  0940-4171 , pp. 82-85.
• Karl Ulrich Voss: Ad hoc rule of law? Application of the reservation of the law and the reservation of parliament for foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr. In: Journal for Legal Policy (ZRP). Vol. 40, No. 3, 2007, ISSN  0514-6496 , pp. 78-81.
• Reinhard Scholzen: Between secrecy and transparency In: Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift Vol. 179, No. 8, August 2013, ISSN  0002-5925 , pp. 32–34.
• Reinhard Scholzen: Diverse Elite Unit In: DWJ . No. 9, 2013, ISSN  0341-8936 , pp. 58-65.
• Reinhard Scholzen: Opportunities and Risks. The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. In: Courage. Forum for culture, politics and history . No. 548, September 2013, ISSN  0027-5093 , pp. 70-77.

Web links

Commons : Special Forces Command  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

• Special forces command in Calw on the Army website
• Special forces command (KSK) on the website of the Militarization Information Center
• Special Forces Seminar Day 1 - Part 5 . SP Guide Publications and CENJOWS , April 25, 2011 (video on YouTube , 33:23 minutes; English) - Hans-Christoph Ammon , former commander of the KSK, will give a lecture in March 2011 at a symposium of the Indian armed forces on the history, organization and missions of the KSK.
• n-tv Documentation The KSK - Together Against Terror 1/2
• n-tv Documentation The KSK - Together Against Terror 2/2
• Youtube series of the Bundeswehr: With Olli at the KSK (6 episodes)
• Youtube series from Bundeswehr Exclusive: KSK (22 episodes)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Technical delivery conditions. TL 8455-0085. Association badge, woven. (PDF) Federal Office for Equipment, Information Technology and Use of the Bundeswehr (BAAINBw), February 27, 2018, accessed on June 2, 2018 . 
2. ↑ Fig .: 286. Special Forces Command (KSK) . ( Memento from June 25, 2018 in the Internet Archive ) In: Suit regulations for soldiers of the Bundeswehr . Bundeswehr, Center for Inner Guidance , Central Guideline A2-2630 / 0-0-5, as of October 2016, p. 146. Accessed June 25, 2018 (PDF).
3. ↑ Uniforms of the Bundeswehr . ( Memento from June 25, 2018 in the Internet Archive ) Federal Ministry of Defense , March 2016, p. 37. Accessed June 25, 2018 (PDF; 4.4 MB).
4. ↑ KSK elite soldier exposed as Islamist. Retrieved June 18, 2020 . 
5. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The command of special forces of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , p. 108.
6. ↑ Ansgar Meyer takes over as KSK boss. In: sueddeutsche.de, September 1, 2021.
7. ^ Special forces command in Calw. In: deutschesheer.de. Bundeswehr, May 16, 2019, accessed on July 21, 2019 . 
8. ↑ […] Excerpt from the article Shrouded in mystery elite fighters by Stephan Löwenstein, see at faz.net , accessed on August 29, 2008.
9. ↑ Stephan Löwenstein's elite fighters shrouded in secrecy , see faz.net , accessed on August 29, 2008.
10. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Konstantin von Hammerstein, Matthias Gebauer: Neo-Nazis in the Bundeswehr Elite Association KSK: eyes - right! Retrieved June 27, 2020 . 
11. ↑ Alexej Hock, Christian Schweppe: Right-wing extremism at the KSK - a chronicle of many inglorious things. In: Welt online . July 2, 2020, accessed January 20, 2021 . 
12. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The command of special forces of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , pp. 32–33.
13. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l} history. (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on December 8, 2008 ; Retrieved August 7, 2008 . 
14. ↑ […] The troop was formed based on experience in 1994. Deutsche Welle employees had to be rescued in Rwanda, which was ravaged by the genocidal civil war. Because the Bundeswehr did not have its own troops that were equipped and trained for this, the then Belgian Para-Commando took over. […], Excerpt from the article Shrouded in mystery elite fighters by Stephan Löwenstein, see at faz.net , accessed on August 29, 2008.
15. ↑ ^{a b c} Sören Sünkler: The special units of the Bundeswehr. 2nd Edition. Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2007, ISBN 978-3-613-02592-9 , pp. 86-87.
16. ↑ ^{a b c} Sören Sünkler: Elite and special units of Europe. Motorbuch Verlag, 2008, ISBN 978-3-613-02853-1 , p. 37.
17. ↑ BVerfG : BVerfGE 90, 286 - Out-of-area operations. In: German-speaking case law (DFR). Axel Tschentscher, July 12, 1994, accessed January 5, 2014 . 
18. ^ Roman Herzog : Address by Federal President Roman Herzog at the German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn. (No longer available online.) March 19, 1995, archived from the original on December 5, 2008 ; Retrieved September 23, 2008 . 
19. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , pp. 39–43.
20. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen : Who should free German hostages abroad? In: Europäische Sicherheit 59, 2010, Issue 7, pp. 82–85.
21. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: The end of the armed scouts. It took several years for special military units to be recognized as a necessity within the German Federal Armed Forces. But then everything went very quickly and resulted in the special forces command, KSK for short ... (No longer available online.) In: kimme-korn.de. Archived from the original on February 17, 2010 ; Retrieved September 23, 2008 . 
22. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The command of special forces of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2009, ISBN 978-3-613-02998-9 , pp. 37-39.
23. ↑ Tobias Pflüger: Bundeswehr missions all over the world? from July 2, 1998 at friedenskooperative.de , accessed October 5, 2008.
24. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The command of special forces of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , p. 89.
25. ↑ See at asfrab.de ( Memento from February 2, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), accessed on September 13, 2008.
26. ^ Wording of the small question of December 18, 1996 at dip.bundestag.de , accessed on September 29, 2008.
27. ↑ Answers of the Federal Government to the Minor Inquiry from December 18, 1996 at dip.bundestag.de (PDF; 529 kB), accessed on September 24, 2009.
28. ^ Dosed violence , Der Spiegel, March 31, 1997, accessed July 22, 2019.
29. ↑ ^{a b} Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , p. 45.
30. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The command of special forces of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2009, ISBN 978-3-613-02998-9 , pp. 44-45.
31. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n} Uli Rauss: The professionals. at stern.de , accessed on September 14, 2008.
32. ↑ […] It was not until 2000 that Lieutenant General Willmann officially confirmed in a TV report by ARD that the KSK had already been used several times in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo […] at deutschesheer.de ( memo from December 8, 2008 in Internet Archive ), accessed September 11, 2008.
33. ↑ Background: The mandates for the military operation in Afghanistan on: Homepage of the Federal Foreign Office
34. ↑ Bundestag printed paper 15/5996 of September 21, 2005.
35. ↑ Bundestag printed paper 16/10720 of October 29, 2008 (PDF; 85 kB)
36. ^ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. November 14, 2008, p. 4.
37. ↑ ^{a b c d} Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , p. 48.
38. ↑ [1]
39. ↑ [2]
40. ^ Secretary of the Navy: Presidential Unit Citation to Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - South. (No longer available online.) In: navyseals.com. October 26, 2004, archived from the original on January 13, 2005 ; accessed on August 24, 2016 . 
41. ↑ John Perkins: TAR Officer Receives Bronze Star Medal For Actions In Afghanistan. ( Memento from June 20, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) March 17, 2003.
42. ↑ ^{a b} JTF2: Canada's super-secret commands. CBC News , July 15, 2005, accessed August 24, 2016 . 
43. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Stephan Löwenstein: Elite fighters shrouded in mystery. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . August 7, 2008.
44. ↑ ^{a b} Bundeswehr elite troops in Afghanistan not challenged. In: The world. September 18, 2008, accessed September 18, 2008.
45. ↑ […] It's now known that the KSK, Germany's crack troops, were directly involved in Operation Anaconda against the remaining Taleban units in the Tora Bora hills. […], BBC, May 13, 2002, Letter from Berlin - Rob Broomby on Germany's emerging international role , accessed on September 18, 2008.
46. ^ Austin Mansfield: Enduring Freedom Task Force Earns Presidential Unit Citation. In: navy.mil. December 8, 2004, accessed on October 7, 2008 : "[...] their outstanding courage, resourcefulness, and aggressive fighting spirit in combat against a well equipped, well trained and treacherous terrorist enemy." 
47. ↑ Kurnaz gave the interview in the Beckmann broadcast on October 16, 2006 ( Memento from May 1, 2009 in the Internet Archive ).
48. ↑ Spiegel-Online from October 20, 2006.
49. ↑ Investigations against KSK soldiers stopped (Sueddeutsche.de of May 29, 2007)
50. ↑ Investigative Committee "Murat Kurnaz" ended: Evidence does not allow any conclusions to be drawn about ill-treatment. (No longer available online.) German Bundestag, PuK 1 - Press - Radio - Television, September 18, 2008, archived from the original on September 22, 2008 ; Retrieved August 26, 2014 . 
51. ↑ ZEIT ONLINE; dpa: Kurnaz case: allegations against KSK soldiers remain unresolved . September 18, 2008.
52. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , pp. 51-53.
53. ↑ KSK forces want to leave Afghanistan. In: welt.de. October 28, 2002, accessed January 24, 2020 . 
54. ↑ "We don't want Rambos" . In: Welt am Sonntag. August 24, 2003.
55. ↑ ^{a b c} Sören Sünkler: The special units of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2007, ISBN 978-3-613-02592-9 , p. 93.
56. ↑ In a tight spot . In: Der Spiegel . No. 38 , 2006, p. 127 ( online - September 18, 2006 ).
57. ↑ See at defenselink.mil ( Memento from December 13, 2007 in the Internet Archive ). Retrieved August 29, 2008.
58. ↑ Excerpt from the "Van Heyst" report at geopowers.com , accessed on October 2, 2008 (PDF).
59. ↑ Jochen Bittner: A general accounting at zeit.de (January 17, 2008) , accessed on October 2, 2008.
60. ↑ Der Tagesspiegel : Expert opinion: Afghanistan mission consistently inadequate at tagesspiegel.de (January 16, 2008) , accessed on October 2, 2008.
61. ↑ Bundeswehr succeeds in anti-terrorist attack. Success in Kunduz: Together with the Afghan security forces, KSK soldiers of the Bundeswehr dug up two arsenals. Several people were also arrested on suspicion of involvement in attacks. (No longer available online.) In: Spiegel Online . April 26, 2008, archived from the original on December 12, 2014 ; Retrieved December 12, 2014 . 
62. ↑ Secret operation: KSK finds weapons depot in Afghanistan. Secret operation in the Hindu Kush: Soldiers from the Special Forces Command (KSK) dug up a huge arsenal in mid-July. According to information from SPIEGEL, Afghan police officers were also involved in the action. (No longer available online.) In: Spiegel.de. August 2, 2008, archived from the original on February 26, 2014 ; Retrieved December 12, 2014 . 
63. ^ P. Blechschmidt: Afghanistan: Bundeswehr arrests Taliban leader . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung . May 17, 2010 ( sueddeutsche.de ).
64. ↑ Afghanistan: KSK summarizes terror planners . In: The world . May 8, 2009 ( welt.de ).
65. ^ Hauke ​​Friederichs: Afghanistan Mandate: Creating Peace under Arms. In: Zeit Online . February 26, 2010, accessed on August 24, 2016 : "It remains unclear whether this will cover actions such as the Taliban hunt by Task Force 47." 
66. ↑ Helmut Michelis: KSK commander Ammon in conversation: Killing is part of the job. Bundeswehr, May 27, 2010, accessed on May 27, 2010 . 
67. ↑ German elite soldiers are targeting the Taliban. In: Tagesspiegel . August 16, 2010, accessed August 24, 2016 . 
68. ↑ Matthias Gebauer: KSK elite command summarizes top Taliban. In: Spiegel.de. September 22, 2010. Retrieved September 22, 2010 . 
69. ↑ "Bild": KSK arrests important Taliban leader in northern Afghanistan. (No longer available online.) In: Zeit Online . November 1, 2012, archived from the original on January 16, 2016 ; accessed on August 24, 2016 . 
70. ↑ Afghanistan: Bundeswehr arrests Taliban leaders. In: handelsblatt.com. October 23, 2012, accessed August 24, 2016 . 
71. ^ "Shadow governor" of Kunduz: KSK snatches Taliban leaders. In: n-tv.de. October 23, 2012, accessed August 24, 2016 . 
72. ↑ Access in Kunduz: KSK snatches top Taliban in Afghanistan. (No longer available online.) In: N24.de. October 23, 2012, archived from the original on December 31, 2014 ; accessed on August 24, 2016 . 
73. ↑ Afghanistan: German soldier killed. On May 4, 2013 at around 11.43 a.m. Central European Summer Time, German special forces accompanied and supported an Afghan operation in the area north of OP-North. Insurgents opened fire on the Afghan and ISAF forces. Close air support was used. May 5, 2013, accessed June 4, 2018 . 
74. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: Opportunities and Risks. The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. In: Courage, forum for culture, politics and history. No. 548, September 2013, pp. 70-77.
75. ↑ Deadly Exercises. at Welt.de , accessed on September 17, 2008.
76. ↑ KSK mission in Libya. (No longer available online.) Frankfurter Rundschau, archived from the original on December 31, 2014 ; Retrieved May 19, 2011 . 
77. ↑ Matthias Gebauer: Foreign deployment of the Bundeswehr: Corona crisis accelerates withdrawal from Afghanistan. In: Spiegel Online. March 24, 2020, accessed July 31, 2020 . 
78. ↑ Arthur van Beveren: trainen adviseren, én operaties ondersteunen. September 10, 2019, accessed March 24, 2020 (Dutch). 
79. ↑ Dutch and German Special Forces support the Afghanistan Triple 8 wearing NoizeBarrier TAC. In: OttoFedMil.com. Accessed March 24, 2020 . 
80. ↑ Bundeswehr in the Sahel: Probably longer, maybe different? - eyes straight ahead! Retrieved June 27, 2020 . 
81. ↑ More than expected: there may still be hundreds of Germans in Afghanistan. In: Der Spiegel. Retrieved August 20, 2021 . 
82. ↑ Mike Szymanski: Afghanistan: KSK saves a dozen Germans with helicopters. Retrieved August 26, 2021 . 
83. ↑ Steffen Lüdke: Protocol of an Escape: How a Munich high school graduate escaped from Kabul. In: Der Spiegel. Retrieved August 26, 2021 . 
84. ^ Matthias Gebauer, Steffen Lüdke: Afganistan: Munich family rescued from Kabul. In: Der Spiegel. Retrieved August 23, 2021 . 
85. ^ Secret operation in Kabul: Munich family rescued by elite soldiers. August 24, 2021, accessed August 26, 2021 . 
86. ↑ Peter Carstens, Berlin: Secret operation in Kabul: KSK brings people in need of protection from the city to the airport . In: FAZ.NET . ISSN  0174-4909 ( faz.net [accessed August 26, 2021]).
87. ↑ […] Especially since the Germans, who (as an American four-star general later once judged) may be capable boys, but did not even have their own helicopters. Stephan Löwenstein: Elite fighters shrouded in secrecy at Command Special Forces - Elite fighters shrouded in secrecy - faz.net , accessed on September 8, 2008.
88. ↑ Ems-Köppken II / 2008; Information from the 15th Middle Army Aviation Regiment (PDF) (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on March 25, 2016 ; accessed in 2008 . Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  
89. ↑ German Bundestag Printed Matter 16/4354, 16th legislative period February 20, 2007 (question and answer No. 20 at the bottom;. PDF; 86 KB), access on 29 September 2008.
90. ^ Answer by Parliamentary State Secretary Thomas Kossendey of January 14, 2008 . In: Written questions with the answers received from the federal government in the week of January 14, 2008 . German Bundestag, printed matter 16/7794, January 18, 2008 (PDF; 427 kB).
91. ^ Government press conference on February 5. (No longer available online.) Federal Government , May 2, 2008, archived from the original on September 27, 2013 ; Retrieved October 10, 2008 . 
92. ^ ^{A b} Susanne Koelbl , Alexander Szandar: "The most important enemy" . In: Der Spiegel . No. 21 , 2008, p. 46 ( online - May 19, 2008 ).
93. ↑ ^{a b} Martin Gehlen: There was no exemption at fr-online.de ( memento from December 31, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), accessed on October 6, 2008.
94. ^ FAZ-NET: Liberated tourists landed in Egypt. September 29, 2008 , accessed September 30, 2008.
95. ↑ ^{a b} DER SPIEGEL, Hamburg, Germany: Abductions: Just a piece of heaven. DER SPIEGEL 42/2015, accessed on June 27, 2020 . 
96. ↑ Matthias Gebauer, DER SPIEGEL: Afghanistan: German GIZ development worker is free again - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. Retrieved June 27, 2020 . 
97. ↑ Martin Kaul, Hannes Munzinger, Heiko Pinkert Nepotism in the desert? , Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 14, 2021, p. 6
98. ↑ ^{a b} Jochen Scholz: Geheime Krieger: Covert operations in lawless areas . In: Der Freitag , No. 43/2006, October 27, 2006. Taken on the website of the Peace Research Working Group : online . Retrieved December 16, 2018.
99. ↑ Answer of the Federal Government to the small question Criminal Wehrmacht Division as a possible tradition giver for the Special Forces Command and the GSG 9 of the MPs Ulla Jelpke, Sevim Dağdelen, Heike Hänsel, Inge Höger and the parliamentary group DIE LINKE, BT-Drs. 16/5082 , 20. April 2007.
100. ↑ Spiegel-Online: Ex-KSK boss praises Nazi special unit as a role model (February 24, 2007)
101. ↑ Criminals as role models? In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 2007, p. 16 ( online - February 26, 2007 ).
102. ↑ Struck fires Elite General. In: Hamburger Abendblatt. November 5, 2003, p. 1.
103. ↑ Outrage over Hohmann. In: FAZ. November 1, 2003, p. 4. Hohmann excluded. In: FAZ. November 15, 2003, p. 1.
104. ^ Government press conference on May 2. (No longer available online.) Federal Government , May 2, 2008, archived from the original on September 27, 2013 ; Retrieved August 25, 2016 . 
105. ↑ ^{a b} Disciplinary fine for KSK critics . In: Der Spiegel . No. 25 , 2008, p. 22 ( online - June 16, 2008 ).
106. ^ Board of Directors of the Darmstadt Signal ( Memento from December 17, 2005 in the Internet Archive ).
107. ^ Matthias Gebauer: "Reichsbürger" suspicion - Bundeswehr suspends elite soldiers. In: Spiegel online . February 8, 2019, accessed June 17, 2020 . 
108. ^ ^{A b} Matthias Gebauer: Bundeswehr elite KSK: Captain sends a call for help to Kramp-Karrenbauer. In: Spiegel online . June 12, 2020, accessed June 12, 2020 . 
109. ↑ DER SPIEGEL: Despite suspicion of right-wing extremism: KSK officer is allowed to stay in the Bundeswehr - DER SPIEGEL - politics. Retrieved December 18, 2020 . 
110. ↑ Matthias Gebauer: Investigations by the Bundeswehr - How right does the special forces command tick? In: Spiegel online . February 8, 2019, accessed June 17, 2020 . 
111. ↑ Sebastian Erb, Christina Schmidt: "Hannibal" has to go to court. taz, September 23, 2019
112. ^ Daniel Schulz: Investigations in the "Hannibal" case: lone perpetrators everywhere. taz, September 23, 2019
113. ^ Founder of a right-wing network: "Hannibal" leaves the Bundeswehr. taz, September 25, 2019
114. ↑ Zeit Online: Around 550 right-wing extremist suspected cases in the Bundeswehr (January 26, 2020)
115. ↑ Matthias Gebauer, DER SPIEGEL: Bundeswehr Secret Service: MAD exposes nine right-wing extremist soldiers in the elite unit KSK - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. Retrieved March 5, 2020 . 
116. ↑ SWR Aktuell, SWR Aktuell: Right-wing extremism? Apparently further investigations at the KSK. Retrieved September 19, 2021 . 
117. ↑ KSK elite soldier exposed as Islamist. Retrieved June 22, 2020 . 
118. ↑ Joachim Käppner Mild judgment for KSK soldier , Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13./14. March 2021, p. 5
119. ^ ^{A b c d} Sarah Ulrich, Sebastian Erb: Right KSK soldier in the Bundeswehr: At home with the "Nazi Grandpa". In: taz . May 15, 2020, accessed July 3, 2020 . 
120. ^ Y collective , Radio Bremen , Panorama (NDR) : Bundeswehr (KSK) - birthday party with Hitler salute, pig's heads and right-wing rock. In: Youtube . August 17, 2017, accessed July 3, 2020 . 
121. ↑ Sarah Ulrich: KSK soldier in court: weapons, images of Hitler, inflammatory pamphlets. The daily newspaper: taz, January 22, 2021, accessed on March 16, 2021 . 
122. ↑ ^{a b c} KSK soldier in Saxony possessed not only weapons, but also explosives and Nazi literature. In: Welt online. June 26, 2020, accessed June 27, 2020 . 
123. ↑ ^{a b c} Christina Schmidt, Sebastian Erb: "Schäfchens" weapons store. In: The daily newspaper . May 27, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020 . 
124. ↑ ^{a b} dpa : Police find weapons and explosives at the KSK man. In: t-online.de . May 13, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020 . 
125. ^ Matthias Gebauer: Right-wing extremists in the Bundeswehr - investigators find AK-47 and explosives in KSK elite soldier. In: Spiegel online . May 13, 2020, accessed May 26, 2020 . 
126. ^ ^{A b} Matthias Gebauer: The armory of the KSK fighter. In: Spiegel online. May 26, 2020, accessed May 26, 2020 . 
127. ↑ ^{a b} Christian Schweppe: The well-filled weapon hiding place of the KSK soldier. In: Welt online . May 26, 2020, accessed May 26, 2020 . 
128. ↑ Sebastian Erb: Army on probation. In: The daily newspaper. July 3, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020 . 
129. ^ Christian Schweppe: After explosives found - arrest warrant against elite soldiers of the KSK. In: Welt online . May 13, 2020, accessed May 26, 2020 . 
130. ^ Explosives found in the garden: KSK soldier on the loose again. Retrieved December 4, 2020 . 
131. ^ Matthias Gebauer: This is how Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to fight against right-wing extremists in the Bundeswehr. In: Spiegel Online. June 30, 2020, accessed July 3, 2020 . 
132. ↑ Matthias Gebauer, Maik Baumgärtner: MAD investigators passed investigation details on to KSK soldiers. In: Spiegel Online. June 18, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020 . 
133. ↑ Markus Kreitmayr: Fire letter to the members of the KSK. (PDF) Retrieved May 28, 2020 . 
134. ↑ Mark Kreitmayr : KSK-letter . Ed .: KSK. ( Online [PDF]).
135. ↑ Lorenz Hemicker: Right-wing extremism at the KSK - A commander sees red. In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . May 26, 2020, accessed May 28, 2020 . 
136. ↑ New working group develops measures against right-wing extremism in the KSK. Federal Ministry of Defense , May 27, 2020, accessed on May 28, 2020 . 
137. ↑ After cases of extremism, the KSK is thoroughly screened. In: Welt online. May 27, 2020, accessed May 28, 2020 . 
138. ↑ Joachim Käppner Mild judgment for KSK soldier , in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13./14. March 2021, p. 5
139. ^ Judgment against KSK soldiers is final. Retrieved March 19, 2021 . 
140. ↑ KSK officer describes right-wing extremist tendencies in a letter. In: Tagesschau . June 12, 2020, accessed June 14, 2020 . 
141. ↑ ^{a b} Matthias Gebauer, Maik Baumgärtner, DER SPIEGEL: Bundeswehr: Whistleblower may stay with KSK after a fire letter - DER SPIEGEL - Politics. In: Spiegel online . Retrieved June 15, 2020 . 
142. ↑ Volkmar Kabisch, Martin Kaul and Sebastian Pittelkow, NDR / WDR: Suspicion of thwarting punishment. In: www.tagesschau.de. February 19, 2021, accessed February 20, 2021 . 
143. ↑ Markus Decker: Amnesty amnesty at KSK: Pressure on Kramp-Karrenbauer increases. In: www.rnd.de. February 24, 2021, accessed February 24, 2021 . 
144. ^ ^{A b} Matthias Gebauer: This is how Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to fight against right-wing extremists in the Bundeswehr. In: Spiegel Online. June 30, 2020, accessed June 30, 2020 . 
145. ↑ Peter Carstens: The KSK is partially dissolved. In: faz.net . June 30, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020 . 
146. ↑ Second company of the KSK disbanded. In: DW.com (Deutsche Welle). July 30, 2020, accessed July 31, 2020 . 
147. ↑ Against right-wing extremism: Special forces command gets restructuring on probation (addendum: report) - eyes straight ahead! Retrieved June 30, 2020 . 
148. ↑ Peter Carstens: The KSK is partially dissolved. FAZ.net , June 30, 2020, accessed June 30, 2020 . 
149. ↑ Christof Gramm : Initial statement by the MAD President for the hearing before the Parliamentary Control Committee 2020. In: Bundeswehr.de . June 29, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020 . 
150. ↑ Thomas Wiegold : Documentation: MAD President speaks for the first time of right-wing extremist networks in the Bundeswehr. In: eyes straight ahead! June 29, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020 . 
151. ↑ https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/generalinspekteur-etzt-vergleichbericht-ksk-vor-5092704
152. ↑ Order. (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on December 9, 2008 ; Retrieved August 29, 2008 . 
153. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i} Hans-Christoph Amann: The Special Forces Command in Strategy and Technology, April 2008 issue, Report Verlag, ISSN  1860-5311 , pp. 21-22.
154. ↑ Hartmut Schauer: US Navy SEALs. Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2000, ISBN 3-613-01864-0 , p. 15.
155. ↑ The Special Forces Command will in the future carry out hostage rescue on a discarded Airbus A320. Bundeswehr, February 5, 2019, accessed on July 26, 2019 . 
156. ↑ ^{a b} Hartmut Schauer: US Navy SEALs. Motorbuchverlag, Stuttgart 2000, ISBN 3-613-01864-0 , p. 14.
157. ↑ Direct Action missions are short duration strikes that are used when Special Forces want to seize, capture, recover or destroy enemy weapons and information or recover designated personnel or material. at goarmy.com ( accessed June 17, 2008)
158. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - Pictures of an Elite Troop. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-613-03547-8 , pp. 8-17.
159. ↑ Jörg Kronauer: Secret War in Afghanistan : Flimsy arguments to withdraw, lack of clarity about possible deaths: The use of the KSK. heise-online from July 19, 2005 .
160. ↑ ^{a b c d} Georg Axer: The “Special Forces Command” between the interests of security and parliamentary approval. In: Journal for Legal Policy (ZRP). Vol. 40, No. 3, 2007, ISSN  0514-6496 , pp. 82 and 48.
161. ^ ^{A b} Hans-Günter Fröhling: More transparency. The operational implementation of operations by the special forces of the Bundeswehr must be subject to strict secrecy. From a legal point of view, however, there is no explicit basis for this. The Parliamentary Participation Act, which requires extensive information from parliamentarians, also applies to KSK operations. Clear definitions could resolve the dilemma. (No longer available online.) In: IF - magazine for inner guidance. Volume 52 Issue 1. 2008, SS 33 , archived from the original on December 5, 2008 ; Retrieved in 2008 ( ISSN  1864-5321 ). 
162. ↑ BMVg, White Paper 2006 on Germany's Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, pp 65 and 67.
163. ↑ Andreas Förster: The time of secrecy is over. In: Berliner Zeitung. October 25, 2006.
164. ↑ Lisa Ludwig: How the Bundeswehr copied first-person shooters for their new web series. In: vice.com. November 8, 2018, accessed June 17, 2021 . 
165. ^ Structure of the KSK. In: deutschesheer.de. Federal Ministry of Defense , accessed on November 22, 2018 . 
166. ↑ Franz Solms-Laubach: No woman made it into the KSK. (No longer available online.) In: welt.de. May 20, 2008, archived from the original on December 4, 2014 ; accessed on December 12, 2014 : “The Special Forces Command is an elite unit of the Bundeswehr. But although all members of the armed forces can apply for the special unit, no woman has yet been accepted. That should change according to the will of the Ministry of Defense. However, the plans are controversial. [...] "Up to 90 percent of the applicants fail," said a spokesman for the Federal Ministry of Defense (BVMG). " 
167. ↑ [...] Because the service in the KSK is extremely tough and requires special fitness, the association has never been able to achieve the planned target strength of a good thousand soldiers since it was founded in the mid-1990s. [...], excerpt from the article "Bundeswehr elite troops want to send women soldiers to the front" at spiegel.de , accessed on September 11, 2008.
168. ↑ KSK company disbanded after right-wing extremist incidents - STIMME.de. Retrieved July 30, 2020 . 
169. ^ Appeal to dissolve the 2nd Company of the KSK. Retrieved August 1, 2020 . 
170. ↑ KSK - structure. German Army, November 14, 2018, accessed on November 14, 2018 . 
171. ↑ Investigation report KSK, pp. 15-17.
172. ↑ Investigation report KSK, p. 19.
173. ↑ The order remains the same: SOCC company now with the DSK. www.bundeswehr.de, March 26, 2021, accessed on May 16, 2021 . 
174. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The command of special forces of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , p. 74.
175. ↑ Schwarzwälder Bote, Oberndorf, Germany: Calw: KSK: New commander is coming - Calw - Schwarzwälder Bote. Retrieved May 21, 2018 . 
176. ↑ Life without KSK is hard to imagine. Retrieved June 27, 2017 . 
177. ↑ ^{a b} Mittler Report Verlag GmbH: 20 years of KSK. (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on November 19, 2018 ; accessed on November 19, 2018 (English). 
178. ↑ ^{a b c} Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , p. 97 ff.
179. ↑ ^{a b c d} Hans-Christoph Amann: The Special Forces Command in Strategy and Technology, April 2008 issue, Report Verlag, ISSN  1860-5311 , pp. 25-26.
180. ↑ ^{a b c} Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-613-02384-9 , pp. 110-111.
181. ↑ Alexandra Möckel / Ulrich Reinecke: The ultimate challenge: The medical special train at the KSK. Bundeswehr Medical Service, November 21, 2018, accessed on July 25, 2019 . 
182. ↑ More than healing and saving: The KSK's medical special train. Retrieved July 25, 2019 . 
183. ↑ Investigation report KSK, pp. 15-17.
184. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Hans-Christoph Amann: The Special Forces Command in Strategy and Technology, April 2008 issue, Report Verlag, ISSN  1860-5311 , pp. 23–24.
185. ↑ ^{a b} Killing is part of the mission. Düsseldorf (RPO). Brigadier General Hans-Christoph Ammon, Commander of the Special Forces Command (KSK) of the German Armed Forces in Calw, on the critical situation in Afghanistan, on secrecy during operations, on the problem of killing, on the difficult recruitment of young people, on the ideal of combatants and on women as commandos. Retrieved June 4, 2018 . 
186. ↑ ^{a b} Aert van Riel: On the right path. January 21, 2021, accessed January 22, 2021 . 
187. ^ German Army - aptitude test procedure in Calw. (No longer available online.) Formerly in the original ; Retrieved on August 26, 2014 (Similar information available onlnoie here .).  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  
188. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - Pictures of an Elite Troop. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-613-03547-8 , p. 51.
189. ↑ Archive link ( Memento from March 4, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) First KSK expedition successful Verband Deutscher Heeresbergführer eV
190. ↑ ^{a b} KSK without legend. (No longer available online.) In: y.online Magazin der Bundeswehr. Archived from the original on November 6, 2008 ; Retrieved October 8, 2008 . 
191. ↑ See for training: Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - pictures of an elite group. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-613-03547-8 , pp. 54–81.
192. ↑ Special Forces Command. (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on October 15, 2008 ; Retrieved October 2, 2008 . 
193. ^ ^{A b} Franz Solms-Laubach: No woman made it into the KSK. The Special Forces Command is an elite unit of the Bundeswehr. But although all members of the armed forces can apply for the special unit, no woman has yet been accepted. That should change according to the will of the Ministry of Defense. However, the plans are controversial. (No longer available online.) In: welt.de. May 20, 2008, archived from the original on December 4, 2014 ; Retrieved December 12, 2014 . 
194. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - Pictures of an Elite Troop. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-613-03547-8 , pp. 114–115.
195. ↑ Markus Euskirchen: Privatization Victims Command Special Forces of April 17, 2008 at who-owns-the-world.org , accessed on October 5, 2008.
196. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: Diverse elite unit. In: DWJ, 9, 2013, pp. 58–65. Here p. 62.
197. ↑ Hellmut Königshaus: Annual Report 2012 (54th report) . Ed .: German Bundestag. January 29, 2013, p. 11 .
198. ↑ [...] Accordingly, the female elite soldiers should initially be accepted into three support companies. However, it is thought to use them in the medium term on the front line with the commandos. [...], excerpt from the article "Bundeswehr elite troops want to send women soldiers to the front" at spiegel.de , accessed on September 11, 2008.
199. ^ Minister of Special Forces and Helicopter Squadron 64. (No longer available online.) July 15, 2014, archived from the original on August 8, 2014 ; accessed on June 4, 2018 : “For example, on the 25-meter course, the targets - sometimes in the dark or in poor visibility - must be recognized, identified and fought in fractions of a second - or not. After all, no innocent person should be injured or even killed when a hostage is released. Here, too, the minister was particularly impressed. But not only from the excellent shooting results of the shooters. One of them turned out to be a KSK soldier after taking off his helmet and mask. " 
200. ↑ "Context: Women Soldiers Historically and Worldwide." www.bundeswehr.de, as of: September 6, 2016, accessed on September 14, 2018.
201. ↑ Hans-Jürgen Hölle: Not just structural changes at the KSK. September 2, 2016, accessed August 1, 2019 . 
202. ↑ Training in the multifunctional hall / KSK Special. December 8, 2018, accessed August 1, 2019 . 
203. ^ Bundeswehr procures a new G29 sniper rifle. In: board.kdospezop.org. Retrieved February 13, 2016 . 
204. ↑ Sören Sünkler: snipers of the Bundeswehr. 1st edition. Motorbuch Verlag, 2011.
205. ↑ Bundeswehr buys 84 Enok ( memento from September 19, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) at www.esut.de, accessed on January 12, 2016.
206. ↑ 15 from the end of 15: KSK receives EC645 T2. (No longer available online.) In: Strategy & Technology. July 14, 2013, archived from the original on April 24, 2018 ; accessed on June 4, 2018 . 
207. ↑ { https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/heer/organisation/division-schnelle-kraefte/kommando-spezialkraefte Command special forces on bundeswehr.de
208. ↑ Reinhard Scholzen: KSK - Pictures of an Elite Troop. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart 2013, ISBN 978-3-613-03547-8 , p. 74.
209. ↑ Stuttgart District Court, VR 330816.

Coordinates: 48 ° 42 ′ 30 ″  N , 8 ° 46 ′ 19 ″  E

This article was added to the list of excellent articles on October 25, 2008 in this version .