Task Force 47

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The Task Force 47 (abbreviated TF 47 ) is a military operational unit consisting of special forces of the Armed Forces with the use priorities reconnaissance and fight against terrorism . It is primarily intended to ensure the protection of the German contingent as part of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and operates under the mandate of the protection force.

Lineup, composition and strength

The task force, which is operationally called Task Force 47 at ISAF and is often referred to as reinforcement forces (VerstKr) in German military jargon , was set up in Camp Kunduz in October 2007 . It consists of soldiers from the Special Forces Command (KSK) and the Rapid Forces Division (DSK) (including reconnaissance ) of the German Armed Forces and is supported by military intelligence personnel and employees of the Federal Intelligence Service . In December 2009, Task Force 47 had a team of 120 men, about half of whom belonged to the KSK. According to other information, it comprised around 200 men in February 2010. The federal government stated in September 2010 that since 2009 a strength of up to 120 soldiers has been planned. The sleeve badge of Task Force 47 corresponds to that of the KSK, with the exception of number 47. The meaning of the numbering is unknown. However, comparable special forces of the ISAF troop providers operate in other regions of Afghanistan under similar names (such as the Italian Task Force 45 in the west and the Polish Task Force 49 in Ghazni and other areas in the east and south of the country).

assignment

In September 2010, the federal government expressed itself as follows: “Task Force 47 is tasked with consolidating the picture of the situation of the opposing networks in the area where the German contingent is deployed and providing information about people involved in attacks against the security forces and the Afghan state authorities standing, to be verified. ”If the ISAF criteria are met, the Afghan partners will also act together with the Afghan partners against those persons for the purpose of their arrest - but under no circumstances their targeted killing. Task Force 47 continues to provide “military support for selected units of the Afghan security forces in order to enable them to carry out their security tasks independently in the medium term.” However, compared to the other forces of the German contingent, the association does not have any special powers. It operates on the basis of the mandate of the United Nations for the international protection force (ISAF), the mandate of the Bundestag and the rules of engagement .

To fulfill its mandate, the association maintains its own command post ( Tactical Operations Center , TOC ) in Camp Kunduz . This is located in an area of ​​around 500 square meters, separated from the rest of the camp by a two meter high concrete wall, at the northwest end of the camp. The area is shown on maps as a "special construction area" and is located in the immediate vicinity of a helicopter landing pad and the listening devices of the Strategic Reconnaissance Command (KdoStrat Aufkl or KSA) . One of the main tasks of Task Force 47 is to investigate and defend against attacks on the camp by rocket or mortar fire as well as other possible sources of danger for German soldiers. Employees of the Federal Intelligence Service support the work of the unit on site by providing this information. At the same time, they use the technical aids available in the TOC to carry out their own tasks, which include not only warning the Bundeswehr of attacks, but also analyzing attacks that have occurred.

To protect their identity, the members of Task Force 47 wear fancy names which are not attached to their uniforms. According to reports, some of them within the Kunduz field camp deliberately stand out from the other soldiers with their longer beards and partly gelled hair, for whom stricter clothing regulations apply.

guide

When carrying out its multinational operations, Task Force 47 reports to the ISAF Commander in Chief (COM ISAF). The latter has delegated the corresponding command authority ( Operational Control , OPCON) to the commander of the ISAF Special Operations Forces (COM ISAF SOF), who acts through the ISAF Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). In addition, the German commander of the Regional Command North (COM RC-N) was granted limited authority ( Tactical Control , TACON) to lead Task Force 47 “to manage specific tactical tasks” . In national matters, the association is managed as part of the German ISAF contingent both operationally (according to Operational Command , OPCOM) and troop service by the commander of the Command Management Operations of Special Forces (KdoFOSK) in Schwielowsee . The strategic and military-political leadership is currently still part of the operational command of the Federal Ministry of Defense (EinsFüStab) (Section 7: Fundamentals and Operations Special Forces / Specialized Forces; national crisis prevention ). However, after its dissolution as part of the realignment of the Bundeswehr , it is to be transferred to the newly created Strategy and Deployment Department of the Federal Ministry of Defense ( Special Forces Unit , National Crisis Preparedness ) with effect from April 1, 2012 .

Calls

Since it was set up, Task Force 47 has been used to provide support in the ISAF Northern Region. The main areas of operation are the provinces of Badakshan, Baghlan and Kunduz. According to official reports, these are the only special forces deployed by the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan.

In addition to other German units, on June 15, 2009, Task Force 47 secured the retreat of a joint patrol of Belgian and Afghan soldiers at the police station of Tsar Kharid-i-Sufla, who had been ambushed by the enemy and had been involved in heavy fighting several times.

During an enemy rocket attack on the Kunduz field camp on July 20, 2009, Task Force 47 reported an impact 20 meters west of their building within the camp.

On August 22, 2009, Task Force 47 came under fire with handguns in Archi, four kilometers from the border with Tajikistan . In the course of the battle, air support was requested and an Afghan army member was wounded.

According to various media reports, the unit played a role in the context of the controversial bombing of two tanker trucks near the German camp in September 2009. According to NATO reports , the information and command chain during the attack was largely via the command post of Task Force 47 in Kunduz. At the beginning of July 2011, however, the first contents of the final report on the Kunduz Investigative Committee in the German Bundestag became known, according to which there was "demonstrably no operation by Task Force 47 and no involvement of the Federal Intelligence Service" in connection with the air attack.

Supported by Task Force 47, Afghan security forces searched a property associated with insurgent activities in Kunduz Province on October 10, 2009. They arrested a total of 15 suspects and then took them - also with the support of the German special forces - to the provincial capital for further personal checks. Field intelligence forces of the German Armed Forces also took part in the questioning of the detainees carried out there, under the responsibility of the responsible Afghan authorities.

On January 17, 2010 an incident occurred on the western outskirts of Kunduz during the investigation of a suspicious vehicle by soldiers from Task Force 47. A Toyota drove towards the temporary checkpoint at high speed and could not be stopped by warning shots. Finally, the soldiers fired targeted shots at the two vehicle occupants with handguns, injuring them. One of the injured later succumbed to his wounds in hospital.

In response to a parliamentary request from MP Hans-Christian Ströbele , the Federal Ministry of Defense announced in August 2010 that Task Force 47 had carried out over 50 planned reconnaissance operations and had been involved in a total of 21 "offensive operations" with the Afghan security forces. However, there were no killings by the members of the special forces. So far, a total of 59 people have been arrested, at least temporarily. A little later, the federal government announced that the arrests themselves had been carried out exclusively by the Afghan security forces, who had dealt with the prisoners “in accordance with the national legal system”. You go together against target persons on the Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPEL) of the ISAF. In the operations of Task Force 47, "tactical close air support " was also used several times , which in two cases included the use of air-to-ground weapons in addition to the pure overflight of combat aircraft ("Show of Force").

Together with the Afghan security forces, Task Force 47 succeeded in arresting Maulawi Roshan, a high-ranking member of the Taliban in the Kunduz area, on September 21, 2010 as part of an ISAF operation. Among other things, he is considered to have been the mastermind behind numerous attacks against ISAF troops and the Afghan state authority in the region since mid-2009.

At the end of December 2010, Afghan police officers and German special forces from Task Force 47 arrested six insurgents in the village of Khalazai (Chahar Darrah district near Kunduz), among whom, according to the police, the Pakistani booby-trap expert Hayatollah was said to have been. The detainees were then shown to journalists.

According to a statement by the KSK, Afghan security forces, with the support of Task Force 47, arrested a man apparently involved in the 2010 Good Friday fighting in Isa Khel in the Chahar Darrah district, around ten kilometers west of Kunduz . After his transfer to Kabul and various interrogations, he is said to have been released at the beginning of June at the behest of the investigating public prosecutor's office "in the absence of sufficient evidence that he was directly involved in the crime". After it became known in August 2011, this news initially caused outrage in the German public. A little later, citing German security groups, it became known that the person arrested had actually been an innocent man who merely had a name similar to one of the suspects and had been wrongly arrested.

In April 2011 it was announced that Task Force 47 had been supporting the establishment and training of the Provincial Response Company (PRC) of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Kunduz since May of the previous year . In Baghlan, too, the construction of a PRC is to begin "as soon as possible" with the help of the German special forces. The PRCs are specialized units of the Afghan National Police, which can be deployed, among other things, in special threat situations and whose tasks include targeted access operations, arrests and armed action against anti-government forces.

On 1 June 2011 it came during a joint night operation of Afghan and allied security forces in the district of Nahri Shahi (province of Balkh ) for noncombat arrest of a former companion of Osama bin Laden and close associate of senior al-Qaida -Leader. According to information from the British media, the coalition forces involved were mainly a German command that cooperated with newly trained Afghan special forces and US officers. It can be assumed that the German soldiers belonged to Task Force 47.

Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière was informed about the situation on the ground during his second troop visit to Afghanistan on June 17, 2011 in the Kunduz field camp, in particular from soldiers from Task Force 47.

According to media reports in the Bild newspaper on April 18, 2020, members of the KSK and the Provincial Response Company Baghlan attacked the Taliban on October 12, 2012 in the village of Zahman Khel, Baghlan Province - Commander Hassan Jan and 16 other Taliban in the access operation “Mah Taabi ”arrested. It is said to have resulted in intense fighting lasting several hours, in which several Afghans were killed and four Germans wounded. Details of the operation were not confirmed by the Bundeswehr or the ISAF protection force .

According to media reports in the Bild newspaper on October 23, 2012, members of the KSK on October 19, 2012 in the village of Ghunday Kalay, Chahar Darreh district, the " Taliban - shadow governor " of Kunduz province, together with members of an allied Afghan, Mullah Abdul Rahman Police special unit arrested in a night raid. Details of the operation were not confirmed by the Bundeswehr or the ISAF protection force .

On May 5, 2013, Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière informed the public for the first time that a KSK soldier had died in action. This happened at noon on May 4, 2013 during an operation with Afghan security forces near the village of Zaman Khel at the junction of the Kunduz River in Baghlan province .

On July 20, 2013 Afghan soldiers and policemen came in a so-called Search and Clear operation against insurgents in the district of Baghlan-e Jadid (Baghlan Province), on the Afghan about 700 security forces and members of the Task Force 47 under the Partnering were involved, including Bombardment. Close air support was requested, which ultimately resulted in two bombs being dropped by two Dutch F-16 fighter jets . In the course of the action, two Afghan police officers lost their lives and a third was wounded. Several attackers were also killed. German soldiers were not harmed.

Individual evidence

  1. a b KSK supported Colonel Klein in the night of the bombing at spiegel.de, December 10, 2010 (accessed on June 11, 2011)
  2. Questions about Afghanistan. A catalog of questions and answers. (PDF) The Federal Government, August 2010, archived from the original on December 24, 2014 ; Retrieved December 24, 2014 .
  3. a b c Ulrike Demmer, Markus Feldenkirchen, Ullrich Fichtner et al .: A German crime. In: Der Spiegel , February 1, 2010 ( online )
  4. a b KSK Task Force for two years in Kunduz at faz.net, December 17, 2009 (accessed June 11, 2011)
  5. a b c Matthias Gebauer: The dark secrets of the KSK warriors. In: Der Spiegel, February 10, 2010 ( online )
  6. ^ A b Michael Schmidt: Secret Squad 47 - almost completely normal soldiers. In: Der Tagesspiegel , August 13, 2010 ( online )
  7. cf. the answer of the parliamentary state secretary in the BMVg, Thomas Kossendey of April 23, 2010 to a written question from the MP Hans-Christian Ströbele ( online )
  8. a b c d German Bundestag, 17th electoral period - Drs. 17/2884: Answer of the Federal Government of September 8, 2010 to the minor question from the MPs Schmidt, Nouripour, Keul et al. and the parliamentary group BÜNDNIS 90 / DIE GRÜNEN regarding information policy on the Afghanistan mission (Drs. 17/2757) ( online ; PDF; 189 kB)
  9. Gianandrea Gaiani: Forze Speciali Italiane all'attacco in Afghanistan. In: Blog of Panorama magazine , July 19, 2010 ( online ( memento of the original from September 21, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove them Note. ) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / blog.panorama.it
  10. ^ Institute for the Study of War (Wesley Morgan): Coalition Combat Forces in Afghanistan. Afghanistan Order of Battle (November 2011). , Note 7 ( online ; PDF; 154 kB)
  11. a b c German Bundestag, 17th electoral period - Drs. 17/7400 (25.10.2011): Recommendation for a resolution and report by the Defense Committee as the 1st investigative committee in accordance with Article 45a, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law ( online ; PDF; 9.4 MB)
  12. Fabian Löhe (DAPD): German shadow warriors in Afghanistan In: Tages-Anzeiger , July 28, 2010 ( online )
  13. cf. Answer of the Parl. State Secretary Thomas Kossendey, BMVg, of April 30th 2010 to the written question of the deputy Omid Nouripour. In: German Bundestag, 17th electoral period - printed matter 17/1645 from May 7, 2010: Written questions with the answers of the federal government received in the week of May 3, 2010 ( online )
  14. cf. Ronald M. Johnson: Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan: Is Unity of Effort Good Enough? A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations. Newport, RI, 2009. ( online )
  15. The command for command of operations by special forces . Internet presence on the homepage of the armed forces base, March 1, 2011 (accessed on January 6, 2012) ( online )
  16. cf. Federal Ministry of Defense - Section ASUBw - Org 1: Organizational plan of the Federal Ministry of Defense. New edition November 2010 . ( online ; PDF; 590 kB)
  17. cf. Federal Ministry of Defense: State of play on the reorganization of the Federal Ministry of Defense. Annex 2: BMVg target structure. Status: October 4, 2011 ( online ; PDF; 5.0 MB) and the corresponding article by Thomas Wiegold: The next little puzzle stones: The new BMVg . Blog entry AugenGeradeaus.net from October 10, 2011 ( online )
  18. (Enemy Action) Direct Fire rpt RC (N) from June 15, 2009 at WikiLeaks.org - Afghan War Diary (accessed January 31, 2012)
  19. (ENEMY ACTION) INDIRECT FIRE RPT PRT KDZ: 0 INJ / DAM from July 20, 2009 at WikiLeaks.org - Afghan War Diary (accessed January 31, 2012)
  20. (ENEMY ACTION) DIRECT FIRE RPT (Small Arms) TF47: 1 HNSF WIA from August 22, 2009 at WikiLeaks.org - Afghan War Diary (accessed January 31, 2012)
  21. Elite unit KSK was involved in the air strike at welt.de, December 10, 2009 (accessed on June 11, 2011)
  22. Fairness in the evaluation of the committee of inquiry called for . Press release from the defense policy spokesman of the CDU / CSU parliamentary group , Ernst-Reinhard Beck , from July 5, 2011 ( online )
  23. cf. Answer of the Parl. State Secretary Christian Schmidt, BMVg, to the oral question 38 of the deputy Hans-Christian Ströbele during the question time in the German Bundestag. In: German Bundestag, 17th electoral period - plenary minutes 17/61: Stenographic report of the 61st meeting on September 29, 2010 ( online ; PDF; 739 kB), p. 6344f.
  24. Afghanistan: Another incident at the German surveillance point (update) . Press release of the Bundeswehr from January 18, 2010 ( online )
  25. "Task Force 47" - "Involved in 21 operations" at sueddeutsche.de, August 18, 2010 (accessed on June 11, 2011)
  26. German and Afghan forces arrest high-ranking Taliban leaders . Press release of the Bundeswehr from September 22, 2010 ( online )
  27. Thomas Wiegold : RC N Watch: Bundeswehr injures civilian trucks in Baghlan . Blog entry AugenGeradeaus.net from December 22, 2010 ( online )
  28. J. Reichelt: "Afghans release the murderers of our soldiers!" at bild.de, August 12, 2011 (accessed August 15, 2011)
  29. "Dismissed Afghan not involved in attack" at badische-zeitung.de, August 12, 2011 (accessed on August 15, 2011)
  30. German Bundestag, 17th electoral period - Drs. 17/5665: Answer of the Federal Government of April 26, 2011 to the minor question from the MPs Ulla Jelpke, Jan Korte, Christine Buchholz, other MPs and the DIE LINKE parliamentary group. - Printed matter 17/5406 - Status of the structure of the Afghan police ( online ; PDF; 157 kB)
  31. Thomas Wiegold: RC N Watch: KSK chases bin Laden accomplices? Blog entry AugenGeradeaus.net from June 3, 2011 ( online )
  32. Troop visit to the Hindu Kush . Press release of the Bundeswehr from June 17, 2011 ( online )
  33. The most dangerous mission by our elite warriors. ( Article from Bild on Sunday April 18, 2020 )
  34. Bundeswehr involved in the arrest of a Taliban leader. Article of the FAZ October 24, 2012 ( [1] )
  35. ( - ( Memento of the original from February 18, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link has been inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this note. ) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.isaf.nato.int
  36. bundeswehr.de
  37. focusonline
  38. SpiegelOnline
  39. Reinhard Scholzen: Opportunities and Risks. The special forces command of the Bundeswehr. In: Courage, forum for culture, politics and history. No. 548, September 2013, pp. 70-77.
  40. Dead KSK soldier: Bundeswehr doubts cooperation with the Afghans - SPIEGEL ONLINE
  41. ^ Matthias Gebauer: Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Dutch bombs put an end to dangerous KSK operation. In: SPIEGEL ONLINE, July 24, 2013 ( online )
  42. Thomas Wiegold: RC N Watch: Dutch people drop bombs in Baghlan to support German soldiers. Blog entry AugenGeradeaus.net from July 24, 2013 ( online )