Aman
Aman (אמ״ן) is the Hebrew acronym for the Department of Military Reconnaissance (Agaf ha-Modi'in - אגף המודיעין) and denotes the intelligence service of the Israel Defense Forces (Tzahal) . The Tel Aviv-Jaffa service was founded in 1948.
assignment
The Aman is an independent intelligence service to gain knowledge about the military capabilities of other states, but especially of the neighboring Arab countries. He is on an equal footing with the Israeli army , navy and air force .
He prepares comprehensive security analyzes for the Prime Minister and the Knesset , observes potential enemies of Israel, assesses the risks of crises and conflicts and also uses his own agents in other countries.
The army maintains its own service for reconnaissance purposes, the intelligence corps (חיל המודיעין) or Haman. This was spun off from the Aman during the Yom Kippur War , but remains under its jurisdiction. In addition, since 2000 the army has also owned the Modash (מוד״ש) or the Field Intelligence Corps, which is directly subordinate to the army headquarters.
According to the "Lexicon of National Security" 1976, the tasks of the Aman are:
- intelligence assessment of security strategies, military plans and security situations and in the dissemination of intelligence information to the army and government bodies:
- Securing the General Staff,
- Securing military censorship,
- Management and coordination of news gathering services,
- Creation of map material and provision and dissemination of information for the creation of maps,
- Development of special technology for intelligence work,
- Development of the intelligence doctrine,
- Head of the Israeli military attachés abroad.
organization
The number of staff in the service is estimated at around 7,000 full-time employees (as of 1996). The Aman also includes smaller naval and air force intelligence units that act semi-autonomously. The Luftwaffe intelligence units are used primarily for aerial reconnaissance and for intercepting and evaluating electronic signals that provide information about the strength and targets of opposing air fleets. But aerial images are also obtained using airplanes and drones.
The naval intelligence units collect data on fleet activities in the Mediterranean Sea and on coastal fortifications in preparation for possible landing operations or air strikes.
The Aman's foreign affairs department is responsible for liaising with the secret services of other countries and for the Israeli military attachés. They also maintain ties with states with which there are no diplomatic relations.
He also maintains organizational, technical and administrative, but not operationally, a unit for reconnaissance deep in enemy territory ("Deep Reconnaissance Unit"), the Sayeret Matkal (German: "The scouts of the chief of staff", the Ramatkal ). This formation, known only as "the unit" in Israeli security circles, is considered to be the most important anti-terror and counter-espionage component in Israel. It is directly under the command of the General Staff and forms the operational military arm for all other Israeli services, but mainly for the Mossad .
Much of the information sought is collected by evaluating electronic signals ( SIGINT ). There are corresponding monitoring stations at the borders with the neighboring countries Syria and Lebanon , for example at Har Avital on the Golan Heights (against Syria) and on Mount Hermon (against Syria and Lebanon).
history
In the founding phase of the Israeli state , the Haganah military organization was primarily responsible for obtaining intelligence information, or one of its elite units, the Scherut Jediot (secret service), or Shai for short.
At the end of the 1940s, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion commissioned the Shai to create a secret service structure for Israel. The Shai man Re'uwen Schiloach founded four independent services out of the Shai, in addition to Aman and Schin Bet these were the foreign intelligence service (Machleket Hacheker) and the institute for illegal immigration (Mossad le- Alija Bet ), which only existed until March 1952 . In addition, Shiloah created the Committee of Secret Service Chiefs in mid-1949 as a higher-level body. From 1963 the foreign intelligence service was officially called the "Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks" (ha-Mosad le-Modi'in u-le-Tafkidim Mejuhadim) for short, Mossad.
Another branch of the Ministry of Defense was the lesser-known technology intelligence service Lakam , whose existence was long considered a state secret. It served to obtain scientific and technological information. In the 1980s, however, the Lakam lost a large part of its previous importance.
Yom Kippur War
Attack intent not recognized
The Aman's analyzes for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and the daily situation reports including the assessment of the war risk were good and valued for years. A fatal failure occurred in October 1973, when insufficient intelligence warnings were received about the surprise attack by Egypt and Syria that led to the Yom Kippur war . Subsequent investigations showed that although numerous signs had been noticed by the Aman, they were ignored at a higher level.
Battle for the Hermon
On October 6, 1973, helicopters carried a command unit of the 82nd Syrian Paratrooper Regiment to the 2,800 m high snow-covered Mount Hermon in the Golan Heights , on which there was an Aman listening post with 41 military technicians, who was protected by only 13 infantrymen. The storm succeeded, with 18 Israeli soldiers falling and 31 wounded. The top secret eavesdropping equipment was immediately evaluated by Syrian and Soviet specialists. An attempt to recapture Israel with two companies of the Golani Brigade on October 8th failed with the loss of 25 dead and 51 wounded. It was not until October 22nd that the Golani Brigade managed to recapture the mountain and eavesdropping station, 55 soldiers of the brigade fell and 79 injured because the Syrian troops in the mountain position were effectively fighting the advancing Israelis in the open landscape with Dragunov sniper rifles and RPGs could. The fight was one of the bloodiest of the whole war.
Invasion of Lebanon 1982
The Aman correctly assessed the weakness of the Christian militias on which Israel relied for the 1982 invasion of Lebanon . It was therefore correctly predicted that there would be a direct clash with the Syrian troops . The then chief of the Aman, Saguj, reported this assessment to the General Staff via official channels and personally communicated the assessment to the Prime Minister.
Nevertheless, he is accused of not having been able to make his doubts clear at the cabinet meeting because he shied away from the open disagreement with Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon . The Kahan Commission later recommended that he resign because of the breaches of duty it had found in the Sabra and Shatila massacre , an act of revenge by Christian militias in the Palestinian refugee camps after the murder of Christian leader Bashir Gemayel .
Operations that have become known
The Aman caused one of the greatest defeats for the Israeli intelligence services in the 1950s. In the course of the so-called Lawon affair , the then defense minister Pinchas Lawon had to resign. Actually, Israeli agents and saboteurs were supposed to carry out attacks on Western facilities in Egypt in the "Operation Susannah" led by Aman . The aim was to disrupt the good connections between the USA and the Egyptian head of state Gamal Abdel Nasser . The US should believe that the Egyptian state is powerless against religious organizations. Egypt managed to blow up the agent ring. Ten members were sentenced in a show trial in January 1955, two of them to death. Lawon resigned a month later, followed by Benjamin Gibli, Aman's director at the time, two weeks later . Ultimately, President Ben Gurion also gave up his post in 1963 after he was worn down by ongoing discussions.
ladder
The head of the Aman is on an equal footing with the head of the domestic secret service (Schin Bet) and that of the foreign secret service (Mossad). Together they form the Committee of Chiefs of Intelligence (Vaadat Rashei Hasherutim), which meets once a week.
| Surname | Beginning of the appointment | End of appointment |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | ||
| Aviv Kochavi | 2010 | 2014 |
| Amos Yadlin | 2006 | 2010 |
| Aharon Zeevi-Farkasch | 2002 | 2006 |
| Moshe Jaalon | 1995 | 2002 |
| Uri Sagi | 1991 | 1995 |
| Amnon Lipkin-Shahak | 1986 | 1991 |
| Ehud Barak | 1983 | 1985 |
| Yehoshua Saguj | 1979 | 1983 |
| Schlomo Gazit | 1974 | 1978 |
| Eli Zeira | 1972 | 1974 |
| Aharon Jariv | 1964 | 1972 |
| Meir Amit | 1962 | 1963 |
| Chaim Duke | 1959 | 1962 |
| Yehoshafat Harkabi | 1955 | 1959 |
| Benjamin Gibli | 1950 | 1955 |
| Chaim Duke | 1949 | 1950 |
| Isser Be'eri | 1948 | 1949 |
References
literature
- Ronen Bergman: The Shadow War. Israel and the Mossad's secret killings. DVA, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-421-04596-6 .
- Ian Black / Benny Morris: Mossad, Shin Bet, Aman , Palmyra 1994, ISBN 3-930378-02-7
- Michael Wiener: Alpinist in mountain and winter combat in the Israeli army in Berett 2/2001 p. 45–47 (In addition to the battle for the snow-capped summit of Mount Hermon (2,200 m) in the Yom Kippur War and the mountain unit of the Israeli army, The author also introduces Aman, who operated a listening station for electronic warfare on the Hermon.)
