Abundance (local law)

Abundance (lat. Abundantia, "Abundance") is in municipal law the term for communities whose financial power (control force) is higher than its financial needs, so that they no key assignments from the municipal financial compensation received.

General

The fact of the abundance does not necessarily mean that the municipality in question does not have any budget or financial problems. In terms of household status, an abundant municipality can definitely find itself in the budget security concept or even emergency budget law . The term “abundance” can therefore be misunderstood. In terms of content, these are municipalities which, according to the standardized, fictitious calculation bases of the respective municipal financing law, have a financial strength that exceeds the financial requirements. However, this has nothing to do with actually excessive financial power. The question of abundance and the number of - fictitiously - classified as abundant municipalities is rather dependent on the amount of the total financial compensation amount. In this respect, an abundance can also occur if the financial equalization is underfunded, the degree of equalization is increased, the difference between the actual and fictitious real tax rate is large or the intermunicipal disparities to be compensated are extreme. For these reasons, abundant communities may even have to take out cash loans . In the case of abundant congregations it is assumed that they can meet their expenses from their own financial sources.

From a budgetary point of view, abundant communities do not receive any key allocations. In the case of non-abundant municipalities, these are freely available in the municipal administrative budget. These are payments from municipal financial equalization that only flow to financially weak municipalities. For these municipalities, the difference between financial strength and financial requirements is determined within the framework of the state-specific regulations on municipal financial equalization. For most municipalities, the financial requirement before the financial equalization is higher than their financial strength, so that they are entitled to compensation via the municipal financial equalization in the form of key allocations. An abundant congregation can also receive needs allocations through financial equalization if it has a budget deficit .

Determination of the key figure

If the demand measurement figure (BMZ) exceeds the key figure (SMZ) ( ), municipalities receive key assignments. Abundance then means: ${\ displaystyle {\ mbox {BMZ}}> {\ mbox {SMZ}}}$

{\ displaystyle {\ text {Abundance}} = {\ frac {\ text {SMZ}} {\ text {BMZ}}}> 100 \, \%}

If both amounts are the same or if the financial strength is higher, the municipality does not receive any financial compensation in the form of key allocations, but does not have to pay anything in some territorial states. In some federal states, abundant municipalities receive minimum key assignments. The key allocation results from the fictitious financial requirement per inhabitant, multiplied by the number of inhabitants (financial requirement per inhabitant x number of inhabitants = requirement measurement figure - tax force measurement figure = code number x distribution ratio = key allocation).

Abundance levy

Abundant communities face two disadvantages, depending on the state. On the one hand, they do not receive any income from key allocations; on the other hand, in some federal states they have to make intermunicipal transfers to financially weak municipalities (“redistributive function”) because they are abundant. The tax power of a municipality is thus reduced through inter-municipal levies (“abundance levy”). According to Section 8 of the Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania Financial Equalization Act, municipalities whose tax power exceeds their financial needs as measured by municipal financial equalization by more than 15% are levied a financial equalization charge that is distributed between municipalities (i.e. SMZ / BMZ> 115%). According to the state constitutional court of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, this does not restrict the right to local self-government. In terms of constitutional law, there are also no concerns about the levy of abundant municipalities. In Article 106, Paragraph 6, Clause 6 of the Basic Law, allocations based on real taxes are permitted. Even after the development history, levies that are levied by the federal states for the purposes of intermunicipal horizontal financial equalization should remain unaffected. The municipalities are entitled to the revenue from property tax and trade tax with the restriction that, in accordance with state legislation, property tax and trade tax in particular can be used as a basis for assessment ( Article 106, Paragraph 6, Sentence 6, Basic Law). Against this background, a number of federal states have introduced financial equalization levies in the form of the abundance levy, such as Baden-Württemberg , Brandenburg , Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony , Rhineland-Palatinate , Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein .

Abundance levies must not, however, cause the municipalities obliged to pay into a financial emergency or exacerbate an existing one. In 2011, out of 396 municipalities in North Rhine-Westphalia, 66 municipalities (16.7%) were abundant, of which 40 municipalities (10.1%) could only achieve budget balance through the release of equalization reserves, 8 had a structural budget balance, 3 had a budget balance Approved budget security concept, 15 municipalities were in emergency budget law. In 58 municipalities (14.6%), an abundance levy would either accelerate the consumption of equity or exacerbate the emergency budget situation.

Individual evidence

↑ Martin Junkernheinrich u. a., Budget adjustment and debt reduction in NRW , 2011, p. 248 (PDF; 1.9 MB)
^ Günter Püttner, Handbook of Municipal Science and Practice , 1985, p. 320 f.
↑ LVerfG Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, judgments of 26 October 2012, Az .: 18/10 and 33/10 ( Memento of 14 April 2015, Internet Archive ) (PDF, 223 kB)
↑ BVerfGE 83, 363, 391 f.
↑ http://www.lkt-nrw.de/cms/upload/pdf/finanzen_und_sparkassen/2011-11-02_StaerkungspaktG_-_Stellungnahme.pdf, (link not available)

[1] Martin Junkernheinrich u. a., Budget adjustment and debt reduction in NRW , 2011, p. 248 (PDF; 1.9 MB)

[2] Günter Püttner, Handbook of Municipal Science and Practice , 1985, p. 320 f.

[3] LVerfG Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, judgments of 26 October 2012, Az .: 18/10 and 33/10 ( Memento of 14 April 2015, Internet Archive ) (PDF, 223 kB)

[4] BVerfGE 83, 363, 391 f.

[5] ttp://www.lkt-nrw.de/cms/upload/pdf/finanzen_und_sparkassen/2011-11-02_StaerkungspaktG_-_Stellungnahme.pdf, (link not available)