Article 4 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany

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Article 4 of the German Basic Law (GG) is in the first section of the Basic Law, which guarantees basic rights . The article guarantees freedom from religion , conscience and worldview . He also grants the right to refuse military service with a weapon. The constitutional provisions on state church law , which are contained in Article 140 of the Basic Law, are thematically related to Article 4 of the Basic Law .

Art. 4 GG guarantees extensive freedoms, the content of which results largely from the self-image of the holder of the fundamental right and which, according to the wording of the fundamental right, can only be restricted under high conditions. In view of the increasing pluralization of society in matters of religion, this leads to an increased potential for conflict. Therefore the interpretation of Art. 4 GG is extremely controversial in jurisprudence.

Normalization

Article 4 of the Basic Law - a work by Dani Karavan on the glass panes on the Spree side at the Jakob-Kaiser-Haus of the Bundestag in Berlin

Since the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany came into force on May 24, 1949, Art. 4 GG has read as follows:

(1) Freedom of belief, of conscience and freedom of religious and ideological creed are inviolable.

(2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.

(3) No one may be compelled to do military service with a weapon against their conscience. The details are governed by a federal law.

Art. 4 GG protects the freedom of belief and conscience. These aspects are closely related to the human dignity protected by Article 1, Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law , which is why the jurisprudence gives them a particularly high priority in the legal system.

The freedoms guaranteed by Art. 4 GG primarily serve to ward off sovereign interference by those who have fundamental rights, which is why they represent freedoms . In addition, they establish a duty of protection for the state: The state must create a sphere for the holders of fundamental rights within which they can develop religiously. In addition, it should protect against disruptions in the free exercise of fundamental rights. Finally, Article 4 of the Basic Law contains an element of equality law in that it obliges the state to be neutral with regard to religion and belief. This principle of neutrality can be seen in three forms: The state must not identify with individual religious communities, it must exercise tolerance towards different faiths and treat them in the same way.

According to Art. 1 Paragraph 3 GG, Article 4 of the Basic Law obliges the executive , legislative and judicial powers of the state against the holders of fundamental rights. Art. 4 GG therefore has no direct application between private individuals. However, as a constitutional norm, it influences the handling of subordinate legal clauses, such as civil laws . By binding the judiciary to the fundamental right, courts are required, for example, to take into account the freedoms guaranteed by Article 4 of the Basic Law when applying legal clauses. This indirect third party effect particularly influences the interpretation of indefinite legal terms . As a result, the guarantee of Art. 4 GG also has an effect in private law. For example, employers must, in exercising their right to direct in accordance with Section 106 of the Trade Regulations, take into account the freedom of religion of employees when issuing instructions at their reasonable discretion .

History of origin

Until 1949

In the late Middle Ages and early modern times, the legal protection of religion was limited to the fact that several religions were allowed to coexist peacefully. There was therefore no individual right to freedom of belief. Such a guarantee only developed in the course of the Enlightenment , which led to an increasing secularization of state power. Freedom of religion was codified together with freedom of conscience in the Prussian General Land Law of 1794.

The freedom of belief and conscience was also protected by the Paulskirche constitution of 1849. Due to the resistance of numerous German states, however, the Paulskirche constitution did not prevail, so that this guarantee had no legal effect. However, elements of this constitution, including freedom of belief and conscience, found their way into some constitutions of German states, such as the Prussian constitution of 1850.

The constitution of the German Empire of 1871 contained no fundamental rights. However, freedom of religion was guaranteed by law.

The Weimar Constitution of 1919 protected freedom of religion in Article 135. A special feature of this guarantee was that it did not see freedom of religion primarily as freedom of religious communities, but also as freedom of the individual. It expressly abolished state churches through Art. 137 WRV.

Since 1949

In the course of drafting the Basic Law between 1948 and 1949, the Parliamentary Council decided to include a guarantee of freedom of religion and conscience in the Basic Law. When designing these, the council was guided by the corresponding provisions of the Weimar Imperial Constitution. It was controversial whether the basic right should be made subject to a legal reservation. Ultimately, the view prevailed that guaranteed the fundamental right without reservation, so that freedom of belief and conscience can only be restricted by the state under special circumstances. While the council agreed on the scope of individual freedom of belief, this did not succeed in relation to state church law. As a compromise solution, he decided to include some provisions of the Weimar constitution in the Basic Law. This is implemented by Art. 140 GG, which incorporates several articles of the Weimar Constitution into the Basic Law, so that these continue to apply as constitutional law.

The right to conscientious objection was introduced to the Parliamentary Council in April 1948 through an application by the SPD . Germany was the first country in the world to include this right in its constitution.

Freedom of belief

Protection area

Freedom of belief protects citizens from restrictions on their right to freely choose and practice a religion. To this end, it guarantees a sphere of freedom that sovereigns may only intervene under certain conditions . This sphere is called the protection area . If a sovereign intervenes in this and this is not constitutionally justified, he thereby violates the freedom of belief.

Jurisprudence differentiates between the personal and factual areas of protection. The personal protection area determines who is protected by the fundamental right. The objective area of ​​protection determines which freedoms are protected by the fundamental right.

Personally

Art. 4 GG does not restrict the group of fundamental rights holders , so that the fundamental right protects everyone. All natural persons are therefore bearers of freedom of belief . For minors , the parents exercise the basic right to religious freedom by virtue of their parental responsibility until they have the necessary insight to form their own opinion about their creed. Legal studies refer to Section 5 of the Law on Religious Upbringing as an indication of the legal age of majority. According to this, minors from the age of fourteen can choose to which religious community they belong, so that their fundamental rights of age is assumed from this age.

Domestic associations of persons , in particular legal persons under private law, can be bearers of the freedoms protected by Art. 4 paragraph 1 GG in accordance with Art. 19 Paragraph 3 GG. This presupposes that the fundamental right is essentially applicable to them. This applies in particular to associations that serve the practice of a religion, such as churches and their institutions. The legal form in which the association is organized is irrelevant for its status as a holder of fundamental rights. Fundamental rights holders are therefore all religious communities, not just those that are organized as public corporations. It is controversial in jurisprudence whether the Church of Scientology is a religion. The Federal Labor Court denied this for the Church of Scientology Hamburg, since commercial interests were in the foreground with this connection.

Factual

Art. 4 paragraph 1 GG guarantees freedom of religion. According to this, the holder of basic rights is allowed to form his or her own belief and practice it.

Concept of religion

The definition of the term religion causes practical difficulties for jurisprudence: Since the fundamental right aims to provide comprehensive protection of individual and collective belief, it would run counter to this group to finally define which religions are protected by Article 4 of the Basic Law. Finally, the existence of religion is judged to a large extent from the perspective of the believer. However, a definition is necessary in order to give the fundamental right specific contours that make it useful in legal disputes. An essential feature of religions is the reference to a transcendent power that the individual feels as binding for himself. The Federal Constitutional Court tends to interpret the term religion broadly because of its reference to human dignity. However, the assertion of a holder of fundamental rights that they practice a religion is not sufficient for the acceptance of a religion. Rather, the assumption of a constitutionally protected religion presupposes that objective and plausible criteria speak for the existence of a religion.

Guarantees of religious freedom

Art. 4 GG names several guarantees that protect individual religious freedoms: Art. 4 Paragraph 1 GG guarantees freedom of belief and religious belief. Freedom of belief includes the right to join a religious community based on one's own conviction. Freedom of religion, on the other hand, includes the right to openly profess a religion. Law refers to the former as forum internum, the latter as forum externum. Art. 4 paragraph 2 GG protects the right to practice a religion. This guarantee applies to acts that are carried out for religious reasons.

The Federal Constitutional Court regards the individual guarantees of Art. 4 GG as components of a uniform fundamental right to religious freedom. This protects the right to align one's entire life with one's own beliefs. This includes the formation of a religious conviction, the announcement of this as well as acting according to one's own religious conviction. The following are protected, for example, for cultic acts such as building churches , wearing special clothing and following religious rules of conduct. Other acts protect the freedom of religion insofar as they are carried out out of religious motivation. This can apply to charitable activities, for example. However, activities in which religious motivation is merely feigned are not protected by Art. 4 GG. In connection with the parental right from Art. 6 Paragraph 2 GG, religious freedom protects the right that parents raise their children according to their own religious convictions.

In the past, the Federal Constitutional Court assumed that the basic right only protects those activities that had developed among today's civilized peoples on the basis of certain consistent basic moral views in the course of historical developments. In doing so, the court wanted to avoid that the scope of application of Art. 4 GG is expanded too far. The court later refrained from this criterion of cultural adequacy. Since then, it has required that whoever claims that an act is based on religious motivation explain this conclusively.

The guarantees of religious freedom have, in addition to their positive components, a negative component. According to this, the basic right also protects against rejecting religions and belief in the transcendent. In jurisprudence, this is predominantly referred to as negative religious freedom. Their range is controversial in jurisprudence. The jurisprudence based on the negative religious freedom, for example, the ban on putting up crucifixes in the classrooms of a school . Some legal scholars oppose this decision by stating that negative religious freedom does not protect against mere contact with symbols with religious connotations, but only against forced identification with them.

In addition to individual religious freedom, the basic right protects the collective exercise of faith. Art. 4 GG protects the union of several believers in a religious community. A denominational community is an organized association that serves the comprehensive promotion of a faith. It is not necessary for the association to be organized in a specific legal form. However, an association that only serves to cultivate the faith at certain points does not count as a religious community. The legal framework in which a religious community is allowed to operate is largely influenced by the state church law, the main features of which are regulated in the articles of the Weimar Imperial Constitution, which are incorporated into the Basic Law via Article 140 of the Basic Law. A fundamental statement is contained in Art. 140 GG in conjunction with Art. 137 Paragraph 3 WRV, which guarantees the self-determination of religious societies. According to this, the religious communities organize and manage themselves independently. This guarantee is important, for example, in labor law , where numerous special features apply within the churches . According to Art. 140 GG in conjunction with Art. 137 Paragraph 5 Clause 1 WRV, religious societies can have the status of a corporation under public law . These include all communities that were organized as public corporations at the time when the Weimar Constitution came into force. This applies to the Christian and Jewish communities of faith. Other communities can acquire corporate status upon request. This presupposes that the religious community offers a guarantee of duration and compliance with the law.

Finally, freedom of belief obliges the state to protect creeds. Art. 140 GG in conjunction with Art. 139 WRV contains an explicit protection mandate. This is followed by the obligation to legally protect Sundays and the nationally recognized public holidays as days of rest from work and spiritual exaltation. The Federal Constitutional Court saw the opening of all Advent Sundays for sale as a violation of this obligation.

Freedom of worldview

The freedom of ideology is also protected. This includes beliefs that, in contrast to religions, do not refer to transcendent elements. A demarcation between religion and worldview is not necessary in legal practice, since both are equally protected.

Fundamental rights competitions

If the area of ​​protection of several fundamental rights is affected in one issue, these are in competition with one another.

As a special right of freedom, freedom of belief supersedes general freedom of action ( Art. 2, Paragraph 1, Basic Law). Other freedoms, such as freedom of occupation ( Art. 12 Paragraph 1 GG) and freedom of expression ( Art. 5 Paragraph 1 GG), can suppress freedom of belief due to its broad objective protection. The same applies to the freedom of assembly ( Art. 8 GG).

Intervention

An encroachment occurs when the guarantee content of a basic right is shortened by sovereign action.

According to the classical understanding, an encroachment on fundamental rights is characterized by the fact that a sovereign affects a right in a final, immediate, legal and with a coercive manner. This applies, for example, to the ban on wearing a headscarf for religious reasons. In this case, one sovereign consciously denies another the opportunity to dress according to his beliefs. Another classic encroachment on fundamental rights is the duty to take a religious oath in court , as this forces a person to undertake an act with religious connotations. The criminal prosecution of faith-based actions also represents a targeted interference. After all, it represents an interference with the freedom of belief when a person is disadvantaged because of their belief.

According to modern understanding, other state actions can also have the quality of intervention, insofar as this affects the exercise of religious freedom. Due to the breadth of the scope of protection of the fundamental right, numerous measures can fall under this which make the exercise of a belief more difficult. The case law assumes the existence of an interference, if the measure impairs the exercise of the freedom of belief in an unreasonable manner. The discriminatory, defamatory or falsifying warning of a religious community in a sovereign function also has the quality of intervention.

Justification of an Intervention

If there is a sovereign interference with the freedom of belief, this is lawful if it is constitutionally justified. Art. 4 GG does not expressly provide for the possibility of restricting freedom of belief. It is disputed in jurisprudence whether a possibility of restricting freedom of belief can be derived from other constitutional provisions.

Reservation of law

Some voices in jurisprudence derive an authorization to intervene from Art. 136 paragraph 1 WRV incorporated into the Basic Law. According to this provision, civil rights and duties are neither conditioned nor limited by the exercise of freedom of belief. In terms of content, this is a simple legal reservation . However, for systematic and historical reasons, the Federal Constitutional Court does not apply this provision to freedom of belief, which is why it does not constitute a fundamental rights barrier.

According to Art. 137 Paragraph 3 WRV, each religious society organizes and administers its affairs independently within the limits of the law applicable to all. This provision only refers to an excerpt from the freedom of belief, which is why it does not represent a general retention of the freedom of belief.

Constitutional barriers

In the absence of a general legal reservation, the justification of an interference in the freedom of religion and belief can only result from conflicting constitutional law. This possibility of restriction is based on the fact that constitutional provisions, as rights of equal rank, do not displace one another, but are brought into a relationship of practical concordance in the event of a collision . According to this, the conflicting goods must be brought into a proportionate balance.

For example, the parental right is limited to the religious upbringing of their child by the fact that the state, in accordance with Article 6, Paragraph 2, Sentence 2 of the Basic Law, ensures that the upbringing of a child serves its well-being. Therefore, the religious freedom of the parents does not justify the refusal of necessary medical treatment for their child on grounds of belief.

The state goal of animal protection , standardized in Art. 20a GG, can prohibit slaughter for religious reasons. This is a special method of slaughtering in which the animal is not anaesthetized. According to Section 4a (1) of the Animal Welfare Act (TierSchG), this is generally not permitted. Exceptionally, slaughtering may be permitted in accordance with Section 4a (2) number 2 TierSchG if this is imperative for reasons of religion. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that religious freedom can justify a right to a permit for ritual slaughter. However, this judgment was issued before Article 20a of the Basic Law was introduced, so that the current legal situation on slaughtering is unclear.

Religious rituals that violate a person's personal rights may also be inadmissible. As far as religious activity leads to a violation of human dignity, it is illegal.

The exercise of faith in public office is restricted by the requirement of state neutrality. This does not oblige the state to strictly separate state and religion , but it is not allowed to influence its citizens in the interests of individual religions. Therefore, the requirement of neutrality can oppose the showing of religious symbols by public servants. Often the case law dealt with the permissibility of wearing religious headscarves in schools and other public institutions. In a decision of 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court considered the ban on wearing religious symbols to be fundamentally permissible, as it could impair the neutrality and thus the functionality of public institutions. It does, however, require that such a prohibition be based on a sufficiently specific legal basis. In 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that headscarf bans in schools only constitute a proportionate encroachment on religious freedom if they are linked to a specific threat to school peace. If there is no such thing, a ban would be disproportionate . Equally controversial is the furnishing of public facilities with religious symbols, such as crucifixes, as these can interfere with the negative religious freedom of visitors to the facility. The jurisprudence saw a violation of the negative religious freedom in crucifixes in school classrooms, since it develops a strong appellative effect that the pupils can hardly avoid.

Freedom of conscience

Art. 4 paragraph 1 GG continues to protect the freedom of conscience.

Protection area

Every natural person is the bearer of freedom of conscience. By its very nature, the fundamental right does not apply to legal persons.

Freedom of conscience protects the citizen from the sovereign compulsion to act against a personal decision of conscience. Jurisprudence considers the orientation towards the categories of good and bad as well as the inner bond of the person who carries conscience to be essential characteristics of a decision of conscience. In its scope, freedom of conscience corresponds to freedom of belief. It therefore protects the right to align one's life with one's own conscience.

Intervention

An encroachment on the freedom of conscience occurs when a sovereign measure triggers a conflict of conscience in the holder of fundamental rights. The jurisprudence demands that the holder of fundamental rights substantiate this conflict and present it plausibly. As a rule, there is no interference with the freedom of conscience if the holder of fundamental rights could have avoided the conflict of conscience through their own actions. For example, a police officer may not refuse to carry a service weapon for reasons of conscience.

Justification of an Intervention

The Basic Law does not make freedom of conscience subject to legal reservation. Therefore it can only be restricted by conflicting constitutional law. Such is the case in Article 12a, Paragraph 2, Sentence 1 of the Basic Law. According to this, a person who refuses military service with a weapon for reasons of conscience may be obliged to perform alternative service. Due to the suspension of compulsory military service , this authorization to intervene is currently without function.

Conscientious objection

A special form of freedom of conscience is contained in Article 4, Paragraph 3, Clause 1 of the Basic Law: According to this, no one may be forced to do military service with a weapon against their conscience.

This guarantee covers all areas of military service in which the holder of basic rights uses a weapon, i.e. combat service and weapon training. Anyone who cannot reconcile it with their conscience may refuse to work. This presupposes that the compulsion to take up arms led to a serious conflict of conscience. Since this is a purely subjective element of the offense, the case law requires a particularly conclusive explanation of the impending lack of conscience. This must relate to the general service on the weapon, so it is not enough to just refuse a specific use.

The right to conscientious objection is available to every natural person. In addition to conscripts, professional soldiers can also refer to Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Basic Law.

This right to freedom is encroached upon by any compulsion to use the weapon. The implementation of a procedure which serves to establish a lack of conscience does not constitute an encroachment on fundamental rights. Art. 4 paragraph 3 sentence 2 of the Basic Law urges the legislature to create one.

Art. 4 paragraph 3 GG does not provide for the possibility of restricting the right to conscientious objection. Therefore, interference with this right can only be justified by conflicting constitutional law.

literature

  • Michael Germann: Art. 4. In: Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Hrsg.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th Edition 2017.
  • Roman Herzog: Art. 4 . In: Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig (ed.): Basic Law . 81st edition. CH Beck, Munich 2017, ISBN 978-3-406-45862-0 .
  • Hans Hofmann: Art. 4 . In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  • Hans Jarass: Art. 4 . In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  • Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 . In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  • Juliane Kokott: Art. 4 . In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  • Michael Morlok: Art. 4 . In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume I: Preamble, Articles 1-19. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, ISBN 978-3-16-150493-8 .
  • Christian Starck: Art. 4 . In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 1 . Preamble, Articles 1 to 19. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  • Heinrich Wolff: Art. 4 . In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Handkommentar . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ BVerfGE 33, 23 (28) : Refusal of the oath for reasons of faith.
  2. ↑ Juliane Kokott: Art. 4 , Rn. 4. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  3. ↑ Heinrich Wolff: Art. 4 , Rn. 11. In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: hand commentary . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .
  4. ↑ Till Holterhus, Nazli Aghazadeh: The principles of the religion constitutional law . In: Juristische Schulung 2016, p. 117 (118).
  5. ↑ Heinrich Wolff: Art. 4 , Rn. 15. In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: hand commentary . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .
  6. ↑ Michael Morlok: Art. 4 , Rn. 48. In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume I: Preamble, Articles 1-19. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, ISBN 978-3-16-150493-8 .
  7. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 4 , Rn. 5. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  8. ^ Christian Bumke, Andreas Vosskuhle: Casebook Constitutional Law . 7th edition. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2015, ISBN 978-3-16-153977-0 , Rn. 531.
  9. ↑ Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 , Rn. 166. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  10. ↑ BAG, judgment of February 24, 2011, 2 AZR 636/09 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2011, p. 3319 (3320–3321).
  11. ↑ Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 , Rn. 1-3. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  12. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 295.
  13. ↑ Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 , Rn. 5. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  14. ^ A b Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 22, Rn. 1.
  15. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 4 , Rn. 3. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  16. ↑ Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 , Rn. 12-17. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  17. ↑ Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 , Rn. 18. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  18. ↑ Hans Jarass: Preparation before Art. 1 , marginal no. 19-23. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  19. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 6, Rn. 2.
  20. ↑ Hans Jarass: Preparation before Art. 1 , marginal no. 19-23. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Comment . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  21. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 6, Rn. 2.
  22. ↑ a b c Hans Hofmann: Art. 4 , Rn. 25. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  23. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 299
  24. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 22, Rn. 18-19.
  25. ↑ BVerfGE 42, 312 (323) : Incompatibility / Church Office.
  26. ↑ BVerfGE 57, 220 : Bethel.
  27. ↑ Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 , Rn. 74. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Hrsg.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  28. ↑ BAG, judgment of March 22, 1995, 5 AZB 21/94 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1996, p. 143.
  29. ↑ BVerfGE 138, 296 (329) : Headscarf ban in North Rhine-Westphalia.
  30. ↑ Heinrich Wolff: Art. 4 , Rn. 5. In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Hand Commentary . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .
  31. ↑ Karl-Hermann Kästner: Art. 4 , Rn. 30-42. In: Klaus Stern, Florian Becker (Ed.): Basic rights - Commentary The basic rights of the Basic Law with their European references . 2nd Edition. Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne 2016, ISBN 978-3-452-28265-1 .
  32. ↑ BVerfGE 83, 341 : Bahá'í.
  33. ^ Volker Epping: Basic rights . 8th edition. Springer, Berlin 2019, ISBN 978-3-662-58888-8 , Rn. 308
  34. ↑ Till Holterhus, Nazli Aghazadeh: The principles of the religion constitutional law . In: Juristische Schulung 2016, p. 117 (117–118).
  35. ↑ BVerfGE 12, 1 (4) : enticement of faith.
  36. ↑ BVerfGE 138, 296 (328) : Headscarf ban in North Rhine-Westphalia.
  37. ↑ BVerfGE 32, 98 (106) : Healthy prayers.
  38. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 572.
  39. ↑ BVerwGE 138, 166 .
  40. ↑ BVerfGE 24, 236 (247) : (Action) Rumpelkammer.
  41. ↑ BVerfGE 105, 279 (293) : Osho.
  42. ↑ BVerfGE 41, 29 (44) : Simultanschule.
  43. ↑ BVerfGE 12, 1 (4) : enticement of faith.
  44. ↑ BVerfGE 24, 236 (246) : (Action) Rumpelkammer.
  45. ↑ BVerfGE 41, 29 (50) : Simultanschule.
  46. ↑ Martin Borowski: The freedom of belief and conscience of the Basic Law . Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2006, ISBN 978-3-16-148565-7 , p. 422 .
  47. ↑ BVerfGE 83, 341 (353) : Bahá'í.
  48. ↑ BVerfGE 93, 1 (15) : Crucifix.
  49. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 22, Rn. 46.
  50. ↑ Christoph Link: Stat Crux? - The “crucifix” decision of the Federal Constitutional Court . In: Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1995, p. 3353.
  51. ↑ BVerwGE 123, 49 (54).
  52. ↑ BVerfGE 53, 366 (401) : Denominational hospitals.
  53. ↑ BVerfGE 70, 138 : Duty of Loyalty.
  54. ^ Rüdiger Krause: Comment on BAG, judgment of November 20, 2012, 1 AZR 179/11 . In: Legal worksheets 2013, p. 944.
  55. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 587.
  56. ↑ BVerfGE 102, 370 (395): Jehovah's Witnesses.
  57. ↑ BVerfGE 125, 39 : Advent Sundays Berlin.
  58. ↑ Michael Germann: Art. 4, Rn. 13. In: Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Eds.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th Edition 2017.
  59. ↑ Michael Morlok: Art. 4 , Rn. 68. In: Horst Dreier (Ed.): Basic Law Comment: GG . 3. Edition. Volume I: Preamble, Articles 1-19. Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2013, ISBN 978-3-16-150493-8 .
  60. ↑ Juliane Kokott: Art. 4 , Rn. 147. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  61. ↑ Christian Starck: Art. 4 , Rn. 156. In: Hermann von Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law. 6th edition. tape 1 . Preamble, Articles 1 to 19. Vahlen, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-8006-3730-0 .
  62. ^ Michael Sachs: Constitutional Law II - Basic Rights . 3. Edition. Springer, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-662-50363-8 , Chapter 8, Rn. 1.
  63. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 22, Rn. 22nd
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  65. ↑ BVerfGE 32, 98 (106) : Healthy prayers.
  66. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 4 , Rn. 24. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  67. ↑ BVerfGE 104, 337 (349) : Shafts.
  68. ↑ BVerfGE 105, 279 (294) : Osho.
  69. ↑ Michael Germann: Art. 4 , Rn. 47-47.3 . In: Volker Epping, Christian Hillgruber (Hrsg.): Beck'scher Online-Comment GG , 34th edition 2017.
  70. ↑ BVerwGE 112, 227 (231).
  71. ↑ Martin Heckel: On the future viability of German "State Church Law" or "Religious Constitutional Law"? In: Archives of Public Law 2009, p. 309 (377–378).
  72. ↑ BVerfGE 33, 23 (31) : Refusal of the oath for reasons of faith.
  73. ↑ BVerfGE 28, 243 (261) : Refusal to serve.
  74. ↑ BVerfGE 41, 29 (44) : Simultanschule.
  75. ↑ Tristan Kalenborn: The practical concordance in case processing . In: Legal worksheets 2016, p. 6.
  76. ↑ BVerwG, judgment of May 17, 2001, 7 C 1.01 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2001, p. 2867.
  77. ^ Andreas Dietz: Schächten in the area of ​​tension between religious freedom and animal protection . In: Public Administration 2007, p. 489.
  78. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 22, Rn. 43.
  79. ^ Hans-Georg Kluge: Schächten as a test case of the state goal of animal protection . In: New Journal for Administrative Law 2006, p. 650 (654).
  80. ↑ Kristin Köpernik: The legal situation for religious slaughter in Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey . In: Journal for Legal Policy 2011, p. 243.
  81. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 22, Rn. 29
  82. ^ Friedhelm Hufen: Staatsrecht II: Grundrechte . 5th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-69024-2 , § 22, Rn. 30th
  83. ↑ BVerfGE 138, 296 (339) : Headscarf ban in North Rhine-Westphalia.
  84. ↑ BVerfGE 108, 282 : headscarf.
  85. ↑ Stefan Muckel: Comment on VG Augsburg, judgment of June 30, 2016, Au 2 K 15.457 . In: Legal worksheets 2017, p. 78.
  86. ↑ Michael Sachs: Comment on BVerfG, decision of January 27, 2015, 1 BvR 471/10 and 1 BvR 1181/10 . In: Legal Training 2015, p. 571.
  87. ↑ BVerfGE 93, 1 : Crucifix.
  88. ↑ a b Heinrich Wolff: Art. 4 , Rn. 19. In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: hand commentary . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .
  89. ↑ BVerfGE 12, 45 (55) : Conscientious objection I.
  90. ↑ BVerfGE 48, 127 (173) : Compulsory military service amendment.
  91. ↑ Thorsten Kingreen, Ralf Poscher: Fundamental rights: Staatsrecht II . 32nd edition. CF Müller, Heidelberg 2016, ISBN 978-3-8114-4167-5 , Rn. 590.
  92. ↑ BVerwGE 89, 260 (264).
  93. ↑ BVerwGE 56, 227 (228).
  94. ↑ Heinrich Wolff: Art. 4 , Rn. 22. In: Dieter Hömig, Heinrich Wolff (Hrsg.): Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: hand commentary . 11th edition. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2016, ISBN 978-3-8487-1441-4 .
  95. ↑ BVerfGE 12, 45 (56) : Conscientious objection I.
  96. ↑ Hans Jarass: Art. 4 , Rn. 54. In: Hans Jarass, Bodo Pieroth: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary . 28th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66119-8 .
  97. ↑ Hans Hofmann: Art. 4 , Rn. 69. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  98. ↑ Juliane Kokott: Art. 4 , Rn. 110-111. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  99. ↑ Hans Hofmann: Art. 4 , Rn. 67. In: Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, Hans-Günter Henneke (eds.): Commentary on the Basic Law: GG . 13th edition. Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2014, ISBN 978-3-452-28045-9 .
  100. ↑ Juliane Kokott: Art. 4 , Rn. 106. In: Michael Sachs (Ed.): Basic Law: Comment . 7th edition. CH Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66886-9 .
  101. ↑ BVerfGE 48, 127 (166) : Compulsory military service amendment.