Bandon (military)

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Bandon (pl. Banda) was a unit of the Byzantine army and was also called Tagma , numerus or Greek arithmos . Each bandon was commanded by an officer called a comes , tribunus, or tagmarchos .

After the topics were created , the bandon referred to both a tactical unit and a kind of military district in which the respective unit was stationed. Originally both terms are likely to have been congruent, but have diverged over the centuries.

cavalry

The Strategikon (written around 600) indicates the strength of a bandon for the cavalry with 300 to 400 men. It is emphasized that a bandon (in the field) should not be less than 200 men and only in elite units more than 400 men. Units that comprised fewer than 200 men and were therefore too small should not be grouped with other units, but were not allowed to carry their own banner . It is mostly assumed that the Bandon had 500 men on paper (just like the units from which they emerged) during this period. Depending on the actual number of troops, however, the unit could fluctuate between 200 and 400 men. This was due, on the one hand, to losses already suffered in combat, the absence of unit members assigned elsewhere and the ability to compensate for losses already suffered by recruiting new recruits. The Byzantines took advantage of this fact to deceive their opponents about the real strength of their army. So it was deliberately avoided to bring the banners to a uniform thickness and assigned two banners to each bandon. One for the Comes and one for his deputy. On the day of the battle, however, only the Comes banner was brought into the field.

At first glance, the tactics written by Leo VI around 900 appears to be . to follow the guidelines of the earlier Strategikon regarding the troop strength of the Bandon. Chapter IV also specifies a strength of 200 to 400 men for the bandon. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that this had other reasons than in the Strategicon. Similar to the Meros , Moira and Droungos , the strength of the unit was not based on the organizational units from which it was formed, but could fluctuate according to the size of the available troops. So 200 men were the recommended minimum number for small armies and 400 men the recommended maximum number for very large armies. Again, however, the units should be of different sizes to confuse the opponent.

In Chapter XVIII of Tactics (written around 900) the organization of a themed army is set out on the basis of a 4,000-strong cavalry unit. From the list of officers listed therein, numerous historians have concluded that a bandon consisted of 200 men in this period. In fact, this should have been a small army in the sense of tactics. Accordingly, all Banda are only 200 men strong. In addition, it is noticeable that even the small man's bandon is too big for armies of this size . Instead of dividing the army into Banda on the battlefield, the army is divided into 9 Meroi. Of these, the 3 Meroi of the first battle line are each 500 men strong and the 6 Meroi of the second and third battle lines are only 250 men strong. As a tactical unit, the bandon is only used for the two units that are left and right of the order of battle for ambushes.

The Meroi can be divided into units of 50 men, but not in banda of 200 men. Presumably this is the real reason why in the Praecepta Militaria, which was written only around 60 years after the tactical, the term bandon is only used for units with a strength of 50 men. Contrary to what many historians have suspected, the unit name and the title of the commanding officer may simply have been transferred to a much smaller unit: the Pentecontarchy cavalry .

infantry

For the infantry , no information is given in the Strategicon regarding the strength of the units. The reason for this is given by the author that the troop strength of the tagmata fluctuates even more with the foot troops than with the cavalry . This is probably due to the fact that various units of the old army i. e. Cohorts , legions and auxilia were incorporated into the new system as a banda .

For the infantry, the tactics follows the guidelines of the older Strategicon, but makes it clear that the structures and types of troops described therein were no longer in use at the time. In fact, the infantry seems to have been organized in Chiliarch or Droungoi , Hekatonarchy and Pentecontarchy .

swell

  • Maurice's Strategicon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy. Translated by George T. Dennis. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia PA 1984, ISBN 0-8122-7899-2 (Reprinted ibid 2001, ISBN 0-8122-1772-1 ).
  • The tactics of Leo VI. = Leonis VI Tactica (= Dumbarton Oaks Texts 12 = Corpus fontium historiae Byzantinae. Series Washingtoniensis 49). Text, Translation and Commentary by George T. Dennis. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Washington DC 2010, ISBN 978-0-88402-359-3 .
  • Eric McGeer: Sowing the Dragon's Teeth. Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century (= Dumbarton Oaks Studies 33). Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Washington DC 1995, ISBN 0-88402-224-2 .
  • Three Byzantine Military Treatises. = Tres tractatus Byzantini de re militari (= Dumbarton Oaks Texts 9 = Corpus fontium historiae Byzantinae. Series Washingtoniensis 25). Text, Translation, and Notes by George T. Dennis. Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, Washington DC 1985, ISBN 0-88402-140-8 .

literature

  • Warren Treadgold: Byzantium and Its Army. 284-1081. Stanford University Press, Stanford CA 1995, ISBN 0-8047-2420-2 .
  • John Haldon: Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204 (= Warfare and History ). UCL Press, London 1999, ISBN 1-85728-495-X .