Economically optimal network

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The term business optimal network (BON, partly also business optimized network ) was used from 1975 for a national rail network that covers costs and is not geared towards economic benefit, but solely towards economic success. It arose from the public discussion at the time about the increasing financial losses of the Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB).

Starting point and content

In view of the apparently inexorably growing deficit of the Federal Railroad, Kurt Gscheidle , who was appointed Federal Transport Minister in May 1974, with the support of the Federal Cabinet, set 13 corporate policy targets for the DB Executive Board in December 1974. One of them contained the order to examine each individual route to what extent it could be operated to cover costs. At a press conference on June 9, 1975, DB CEO Wolfgang Vaerst presented the consequences of these targets from his point of view. In particular, he included an “economically viable basic network”, which would only make up a third of the route network of 29,000 km at that time. This provoked an intense public discussion.

In January 1976 the DB board presented the Federal Minister of Transport with the “Report on the results of an economically optimal network for DB”. With the target horizon of 1985, he named a network of exactly 15,945 km for which a balanced economic result was achieved. The two high-speed lines that had been under construction since the early 1970s were already included, as were 268 km of new S-Bahn lines. Rationalization measures were also included, such as the concentration of freight traffic on fewer marshalling yards, the electrification of further routes and the automation of ticket sales. Vaerst emphasized that DB had thus drawn up the statement it required for an economically optimal network and that it was now the task of politicians to determine on which routes recommended for decommissioning they would like additional rail operations, and then to finance them.

Although the concept received harsh criticism from the public, it failed to have the expected effect of persuading politicians to fundamentally rehabilitate the Federal Railroad, including its organization and expenditure, and to clearly define its social and public service tasks. On the contrary, in 1976 both the government and the opposition distanced themselves from such drastic plans. A fundamental restructuring of the state-owned railway did not take place until 18 years later with the railway reform , also in the course of German reunification and the merger of the Federal and Reichsbahn.

implementation

The direct consequence of the concept was initially that in the years that followed, up to 1979, almost no routes were allowed to be closed for procedural reasons. In 1978/79, so-called regional talks took place in which the federal government negotiated with the regions and municipalities about the continued operation of the individual routes. The concept originally examined five options for the future total network between 6,000 and 29,000 km. From the point of view of DB, three of these were economically acceptable:

  • 6,000 km of railway network, mainly long-distance routes with large profit margins
  • 10,000 km of railway network, still profitable, is just about self-sufficient
  • 15,000 km of railway network, slightly deficit, but still manageable

Public pressure and the influence of local politics ultimately led in 1979 to the fact that at least 23,000 km of routes were to be retained and the remaining 6,000 km were divided into three roughly equal categories:

  • 2,189 km of routes for which the decommissioning procedures according to the Federal Railroad Act (BbG) must be completed without delay and whose passenger traffic must be shifted to the road as soon as possible
  • 1,833 km of routes for which the procedures according to the BbG are to be suspended for the time being
  • 2,082 km of routes whose passenger rail traffic is to be retained for structural reasons

(Total: 6,104 km.)

As a result, from 1980 to 1986 DB-wide lost 300 to 500 km of routes per year (except 1982), including some routes in the middle category. Many branch lines lost their freight traffic at the same time or shortly afterwards and were dismantled. In 1982, the office of DB CEO was transferred from Wolfgang Vaerst to the former IBM top manager Reiner Maria Gohlke .

prehistory

After the DB had recorded losses for the first time in 1952 , which at that time were still small and easy to compensate, it was for the first time in 1960 that a large number of line closures were used as a means of reducing costs. In 1964 , driven by its debt burden, which had now grown to billions, the DB published plans to reduce its rail network by 7,000 km as part of the upswing in trucks and the associated reduction in the share of rail freight. They no longer saw themselves in a position to be able to maintain previously cross-financed sectors such as local rail passenger transport (SPNV) to the usual extent. In addition to the growing competition in the road and waterway sector, it also had to bear the burden of many railroad workers who were wanted by politicians and who had to be paid. In the area of ​​labor-intensive repair shops , too , the respective regional politicians tried to preserve as many works as possible. An agreement to transfer such "social charges" to the federal government was finally rejected, public service obligations with comparatively low regional rail transport compensation payments and debt reduction could not be brought to a common denominator, whereupon loud, indirect public demands including creeping route closures and the change of mode of transport were used. For example, as early as 1960, but also to a large extent for the 1975 summer timetable, Sunday operations were discontinued on many branch lines of the DB and partially replaced by rail buses, so that the line could not be manned by local staff (dispatchers and gatekeepers).

literature

  • Jürgen Leindecker: Farewell to the rails . In: Railway courier . tape 15 , no. 92 . Eisenbahn-Kurier Verlag GmbH, Freiburg (Breisgau) May 1980, p. 13-21 .
  • Horst Weigelt, Ulrich Langner: Chronicle of the Deutsche Bundesbahn: 44 years of contemporary history . 2nd, revised and expanded edition. Hestra-Verlag, Darmstadt 1998, ISBN 3-7771-0277-6 , p. 368, 381, 389-390 .
  • A deadly mistake . In: Der Spiegel . No. 4 , January 17, 1977 ( [1] [accessed April 20, 2019]).