Bolivarian Revolution

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Bolivarian Revolution or Bolivarian Revolution ( Spanish Revolución Bolivariana ) is a process founded by the former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez , which was supposed to align society with the socialism of the 21st century propagated there and to redesign political life. Bolivarian politics led to Venezuela's economic collapse and mass emigration , but was continued after Chavez's death by his successor Nicolas Maduro .

designation

While the Venezuelan Embassy and some authors use the term Bolivarian Revolution , many also use the term Bolivarian Revolution , derived from Bolivariana from Spanish. What is meant is the revolution in the spirit of Simón Bolívar ascribed to him . The term Second Bolivarian Revolution is often used, and the work of Bolívar itself is considered the first.

Emergence

Chávez had been an avid supporter of the Caracas-born South American independence fighter Simón Bolívar since his youth . The later founding of his movement, the MBR-200 , also took place on July 24, 1983, Simón Bolívar's 200th birthday. During his student days, Chavez and other officers developed a left-wing nationalist doctrine called Bolivarianism over the course of several years . Although this was partly based on Bolívar, it was strongly influenced by the writings of the Marxist historian Federico Brito Figueroa , whom Chávez had encountered during his studies, but also integrated influences from left theories, e.g. B. Fidel Castros , Che Guevaras or Salvador Allendes and since 2007 also Leon Trotsky .

From the beginning of Chavismus the influence of the Cuban advisors had been discussed. Not only doctors, nurses, teachers and sports teachers had come to the country from Cuba, but also military advisers and intelligence officers, who continued to play a role in monitoring citizens and combating dissidence in 2019 . Luis Almagro had called a number of 15,000 Cubans an "army of occupation" in 2017.

core items

The proclaimed points of Bolivarianism are:

  • national independence
  • Unification of Latin America, or at least South America
  • political participation of the population through referendums and referendums
  • economic independence
  • an ethic of service to the people
  • fair distribution of the extensive oil revenues
  • Fight against corruption

implementation

Since Chavez's policy wanted to rely heavily on popular support and the integration of grassroots democratic elements into politics should be an essential feature of Bolivarianism, Chavez called for the establishment of the Bolivarian Circle in 2000 . The circles were able to obtain funding from the state for local projects. These circles, which were organized decentrally at district and block level and, despite their origins, were autonomous, should actually bring Bolivarian ideas to the population and form a forum for practical cooperation. But different from z. B. Neighborhood committees were not limited in their competence to local politics, but also expressed themselves on general political issues. One criticism of the circles is that although they sounded like grassroots participation, they also turned out to be a "sophisticated instrument of social surveillance".

In place of the circle were many other forms of basic organization, including around the from 2003 Misiones called social programs in education, health care, care for the homeless, the elderly and single mothers, training u. a.

As a parallel structure to the institutions resulting from general elections, the establishment of municipal councils began in 2005 as an initiative from below . The foundation and central decision-making body of these councils are the neighborhood assemblies. In April 2006, the National Assembly passed a law for local councils. Several communal councils can merge to form a comuna and several comunas and councils can finally merge to form a communal city . In 2009 there were around 30,000 municipal councils across Venezuela, with around 200 to 400 families in urban areas. Around 200 comunas were under construction. The councils are largely financed by the state and its institutions.

As part of the revolution, paramilitary gangs close to the government, so-called colectivos, had also been established . In 2014, the journalist Antonio María Delgado, who was awarded for reporting on Venezuela, wrote that nobody doubts that the colectivos are armed. You were the violent face of the revolution, responsible for intimidating civil society. Even in the neighborhoods in which they exercised absolute control right up to the judiciary, they were never loved, but always only feared.

In April 2017, during the great supply crisis, President Maduro announced that the previous colectivos would be increased from 100,000 to half a million and that all would be armed. Cardinal Jorge Urosa Savino , however, demanded the disarming of the existing militias, which were held responsible for the killing of demonstrators. Not only their number and strength is unclear, but also their actual task and hierarchical classification. In 2018/2019 they were presumably subject to Diosdado Cabello , who had boasted of 60,000 members of the Colectivos in action during the unrest in April 2017.

In the years 2013 up to the disempowerment of the opposition parliament in 2017, the Chavists had not won any more elections, in the early presidential election of 2018 opposition candidates could not register because the date for this - in the exact opposite direction to the election - was postponed had been.

Privilege system

The Chavists "bred" a privileged ruling elite, popularly called "boligarchs" ( suitcase word from the Bolivarian revolution and oligarchs ), which after the loss of the parliamentary majority in 2015 clung to power by all means.

The loyalty of the military to the Chavist government was based on material privileges: Despite all the (war) rhetoric, a default with the USA never occurred during the supply crisis of 2015–2017, as the government needed open financial channels for the foreign exchange income it used loyalty bought itself. According to Edgardo Lander, a large number of generals are jointly responsible for the high level of corruption that characterized the Maduro government in 2018; it is greatest where active or retired military officials rule. He described the government, with a third generals among all ministers and governors, as a military government.

Government employees lived for free and had meal allowances; they were threatened with losing these privileges if they betrayed the government.

The inflow of American dollars via PDVSA, which is vital for this privilege system, was capped by the Trump administration on January 28, 2019, when it was decreed that oil payments no longer had to be made to the oil company PDVSA, but had to be transferred to blocked accounts. In the following, gold sales were used to acquire foreign currency.

Nationalizations

Textile and paper factories were nationalized in 2005, followed by telephone, electricity, steel and cement factories and a bank in 2007. In 2009, companies in the food industry were nationalized and 5 million hectares of agricultural land were also nationalized.

Supply crisis from 2015

The system had bought the support of the population with social programs financed by oil revenues. The available money decreased due to a further drop in the oil price in 2014, and the production capacity also declined because the entire income had been used for this purpose and thus the most necessary investments in oil production had not been made.

When the socialists had largely lost the support of the population in the context of the supply crisis from 2015 and after the victory of the opposition in parliament, the last bulwark against the disempowerment of Nicolas Maduro's regime was to select one unconstitutionally and in advance in 2017 The “Constituent Assembly” appointed candidates to “anchor the achievements of the Bolivarian Revolution in the Constitution”. Many true Chavez supporters were dissatisfied with Maduro's intention to rewrite the constitution created by Chavez.

In the official language of the ministry, the Carnet de la Patria card, which was introduced in January 2017, linked “the citizen directly with the president”, without intermediaries and corruption and is a “means of social justice and participation”. Public service employees, as well as retirees, employees of state companies and students were pressured to obtain such a card. Use the card food, housing, health care and jobs were distributed, in addition, they were required to be at the University enroll or medications for chronic diseases to get. The card owners had to provide information about their place of residence, children, animals, their monthly income, the existence of social media accounts, party affiliation, participation in non-profit associations and membership in organizations. In the 2017 local elections, voters were asked to have their Carnet de la Patria scanned at stands ("puntos rojos") right next to the voting booths run by militant members of the Socialist Party. When the card was introduced in January, it was already commented that the card would serve to buy political votes. The Communist Party of Venezuela also criticized the unequal treatment of citizens, because "constitutional rights should not be granted graciously by anyone".

The Bishops' Conference called the supply situation in April 2019 a "crime against humanity" and all this is happening "under the smug gaze of the authorities".

criticism

While Hugo Chavez was still alive, critics suspected populism . They point out that it is partly a new form of non-religiously shaped assistantism .

Even in Chavez's time, the economy was steered with little expertise with decrees from the presidential palace. Although the intention was to reduce the dependence on oil, the few profitable companies were ruined instead. The petro-industry was also "plundered" by the officials installed by the leadership: In Switzerland, at least $ 100 million in potential bribes had already been blocked in 2014 from a case involving a billion dollars. Proceedings pertaining to PDVSA were pending in American courts and the Swiss banking supervisory authorities. According to a report by the Venezuelan parliament, no less than eleven billion dollars were diverted between 2004 and 2014. The former Vice Minister of Energy until 2006 was arrested with three other PDVSA functionaries in Spain in October 2017.

A constant companion of Chavez's rhetoric were conspiracy theories , often mixed with anti-Semitism since 2006 . In principle, conspiracies and foreign countries were to blame for any inadequacies, which continued and intensified under President Maduro. Maduro insulted Barack Obama as "the highest of all devils" and compared Trump to Hitler. Due to Maduro's propaganda statements in February 2019, according to which the aid supplies from abroad were poisoned, there were people who did not want to accept food from strangers even during the food shortage during the nationwide power failure one month later.

literature

  • Dario Azzellini : Venezuela Bolivariana. 21st century revolution? , Neuer ISP Verlag, 2006, ISBN 3-89900-120-6 , 320 pp.
  • Dario Azzellini: "Participation. Workers' Control and the Comune". Movements and social transformation using the example of Venezuela . VSA, Hamburg 2010, ISBN 978-3-89965-422-6 (416 pages).
  • Hannes Bahrmann : Venezuela - The failed revolution . Ch. Links Verlag, 2018, ISBN 978-3-86153-985-8 .
  • Helge Buttkereit: “We are no longer afraid”. Interviews, reports and analyzes on Venezuela in Bolivia . Pahl-Rugenstein successor, Bonn 2011, ISBN 978-3-89144-448-1 (167 pages).
  • Oliver Diehl, Wolfgang Muno: Venezuela under Chavez - New beginnings or decline? Vervuert Verlagsges., Frankfurt a. M. 2005, ISBN 978-3-86527-180-8 (175 pages).
  • Ralph Luger: The Bolivarian Revolution and its historical requirements - Venezuela's path to a delegative democracy . WVB, Vienna 2007, ISBN 978-3-86573-383-2 (diploma thesis, 173 pages).
  • Ingo Niebel: Venezuela not for sale: visionaries against neoliberal putschists . Homilius, Berlin 2006, ISBN 978-3-89706-870-4 (334 pages).
  • André Scheer: Struggle for Venezuela, Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution . Neue Impulse Verlag, 2004, ISBN 978-3-910080-49-2 (169 pages).
  • Rafael Sevilla, Andreas Boeckh (ed.): Venezuela - The Bolivarian Republic. , Bad Honnef, 2005, ISBN 3-89502-197-0
  • Christoph Twickel: Hugo Chávez. A biography. , Edition Nautilus, 2006, ISBN 3-89401-493-8
  • J. Winter, A. Schamansky: Are the Andean states ungovernable? Causes of the political crisis in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. In: Zeitschrift Entwicklungspolitik No. 14, year 2005, pages 30–34. Download from: wiso.uni-koeln.de ( Memento from June 12, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  • Michael Zeuske: Small History of Venezuela . Beck, Munich, ISBN 978-3-406-54772-0 .
  • Michael Zeuske: From Bolívar to Chávez. The history of Venezuela . Rotpunktverlag, Zurich, 2008, ISBN 978-3-85869-313-6 .

Movies

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ With Spies and Other Operatives, a Nation Looms Over Venezuela's Crisis: Cuba , The New York Times, January 26, 2019; Cubans remain a key component in the intelligence and military sectors, providing assistance with domestic surveillance, electronic wiretapping, and internal military surveillance - to help squelch dissent and shore up loyalty, analysts said.
  2. ^ Dario Azzellini , Venezuela Bolivariana. 21st century revolution? , Neuer ISP Verlag, 2006, ISBN 3-89900-120-6 , pp. 295-299.
  3. ^ Arrow in the heart , Weltwoche 07.19, p. 38ff
  4. ↑ Iselin Åsedotter Strønen: Grassroots Politics and Oil Culture in Venezuela: The Revolutionary Petro-State , Verlag Springer, 2017, ISBN 9783319595078 , p. 115
  5. ↑ Dario Azzellini: 10 years of the Bolivarian process in government. In: arranca! Archived from the original on February 17, 2010 ; Retrieved February 14, 2010 .
  6. ↑ We're losing a whole generation. NZZ, June 7, 2017.
  7. ↑ Antonio María Delgado: El Nuevo Herald: Los colectivos, orden y terror chavista en Venezuela , accessed on runrun.es from January 1, 2014 (Spanish); Anthony Daquín, ex asesor de seguridad del Ministerio de Interior y Justicia: “El [Chávez] llegó a llamar a los colectivos como el Brazo Armado de la Revolución, y es una designación que sigue siendo utilizada dentro del chavismo”
  8. ↑ The Devolution of State Power: The 'Colectivos' , insightcrime.org, May 18, 2018
  9. ↑ “It is very worrying that Maduro wants to arm these groups”: José Miguel Vivanco, Director of Human Rights Watch ( Memento of May 23, 2017 on the Internet Archive ), ntn24america.com, April 18, 2017
  10. ↑ El cardenal de Caracas exige a Maduro desmantelar sus “colectivos” armados , abc.es, April 13, 2017
  11. ↑ The last step to dictatorship. NZZ, March 31, 2017.
  12. ↑ The terror of the «Colectivos» - this is how Maduros motorcycle gangs hunt opponents of the regime , Watson , January 31, 2019
  13. ↑ a b c It's five to twelve in Venezuela. NZZ, August 5, 2017.
  14. ↑ Venezuela crisis: What remains of the Caracas middle-class? , bBC, May 14, 2019
  15. ↑ Alex Baur: Bankrott Weltwoche 14.17, page 12
  16. ↑ When will the state go bankrupt? NZZ, April 11, 2017.
  17. ↑ Edgardo Lander: Against one's own constitution , medico.de, May 17, 2018
  18. ↑ Venezuelan opposition prepares to fight on as controversial election begins , sky.com, July 30, 2017
  19. ↑ USA issues sanctions against important oil sector , SRF, January 29, 2019
  20. ↑ Hugo Chavez forces march into socialism , Die Welt, March 13, 2009
  21. ↑ a b Symbol of Venezuela's oil collapse , Tagesschau.de, April 5, 2019
  22. ↑ Can Venezuela Still Be Saved ? , NZZ, December 5, 2017; "The social programs financed from the oil revenues would have created an economic dependence of the voters on the state in order to secure the retention of power and thus the continuation of the Bolivarian revolution."
  23. ↑ Maduro's regime strikes again. NZZ, August 2, 2017.
  24. ↑ a b c Venezuela: The homeland card (carnet de la patria), including issuance procedures, usage, and physical characteristics; extent to which homeland cards have been distributed (2016-May 2018) , refworld.org, May 18, 2018
  25. ↑ Inside Venezuela: The crypto currency Petro cannot stop the inflation crisis, gq-magazin.de, August 21, 2018
  26. ↑ Leonardo Padrón's criticism of the "Map of the Fatherland" ( Memento from January 24, 2017 in the Internet Archive )
  27. ↑ "Carnet de la patria is a policy of exclusion," says the PCV , efectococuyo.com, January 26, 2016
  28. ↑ Venezuela: "We provide quasi terminal care" , kath.net, April 7, 2019
  29. ↑ So z. BC Romero, T. Keppeler, Germ cells from discipline and passion , http://www.woz.ch/1237/musikunterricht-in-venezuela/keimzellen-aus-dislinien-und-leidenschaft , Die Wochenzeitung September 13, 2012
  30. ↑ Chavez-Entourage made millions in Switzerland , Der Bund, February 20, 2018
  31. ^ Anti-Semitism in Venezuela ( Memento from March 9, 2017 in the Internet Archive )
  32. ↑ "We will fight their war" , Novaya Gazeta , March 24, 2019 (Russian); "In Venezuela, the diagnosis of" malnutrition "is banned, women are being sterilized, the shopping center has become a torture center and the regime is blaming other countries"
  33. ^ Anti-Semitism in Venezuela: Maduro regime traffics in hateful conspiracies , February 26, 2019
  34. ↑ Why the US President interferes in Venezuela , SPON, January 25, 2019
  35. ↑ Panne d'électricité géante au Venezuela: “A Caracas c'est le chaos” , Le Monde, March 12, 2019