Charter of Joint National Action
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| Official language | Arabic | |||
| Capital | Baghdad | |||
| Form of government | republic | |||
| Residents | 20 million | |||
| surface | 624,000 km² | |||
| president | Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr | |||
| Members | ||||
| Existence period | January 1979 to July 1979 | |||
 Syria (orange) and Iraq (green) |
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The Syria-Iraq joint national action charter signed in October 1978 ( Arabic ميثاق العمل القومي المشترك, DMG mīṯāq al-ʿamal al-qaumī al-muštarak ) was a declaration of intent by the Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq to want to cooperate as closely as possible militarily and economically. In January 1979 , a Syrian-Iraqi union state was even agreed, but the project failed in July 1979.
One state, one party and one people
After almost simultaneous revolts in both Iraq and Syria, the Ba'ath Party had seized power in both countries in early 1963 ( March 8th Revolution ). After internal Baathist wing battles, however, the party lost power in Iraq again in November 1963 ( military coup of November 18, 1963 ) and after an internal party change of direction in 1966 in Syria, a renewed takeover of power in 1968 in Iraq and the intra-Baathist corrective movement in Syria in 1970, both states became hostile Ba'ath factions ruled each other. In fact there were two Ba'ath parties, the “old Ba'athist” party founder Michel Aflaq fled to Iraq from the Syrian “neo-Ba'athists”. Although there had been Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation attempts in 1969 and 1972 , and in 1973 Iraq had supported Syria during the October War against Israel, from 1975 bilateral relations had deteriorated again.
The Federation of Arab Republics agreed between Egypt, Libya and Syria before the October War failed because of the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations in 1977, and the rejection front formed by Syria, Libya, Algeria and the PLO without Iraq did not offer Syria sufficient military protection from Israel ( Lebanon War 1978 ), let alone sufficient support for a liberation of the Israeli-occupied areas of Syria ( Golan Heights ).
Iraq took a supposedly more hostile position to lead a front of steadfastness and liberation , and during a visit to Damascus on October 7, 1978 , Iraq's Special Envoy Tariq Aziz invited Syria's president to Baghdad.
National Charter of Action
During the state visit to Baghdad, the Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and the Iraqi President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr surprisingly signed a “Charter for Joint National Action” on October 26, 1978, which mainly contained economic and military cooperation and integration goals. The passport and visa requirements between the two countries were lifted and the border, which had been closed for years, was opened. At the following Arab League summit in Baghdad in November , Iraq pledged $ 1.8 billion in annual support to Syria. A Joint High Political Committee was formed, as well as sub-committees for the various cooperation goals. On November 7, 1978, both sides announced that even more far-reaching measures for the complete unification of the two brother countries would be initiated immediately.
But even with Syria's most important concern, military cooperation, the corresponding sub-committee initially failed because of differences and mutual mistrust. Syria did not want Iraqi troops to be permanently stationed on Syrian territory and was also not prepared to disband the elite brigades that existed solely to protect the Syrian Baath regime. The ideas also diverged on the question of the form of the desired unit. Syria only favored a closer alliance or a loose confederation ( federation of states ), Iraq pushed for a federation ( federal state ) or a complete integral union .
Syrian-Iraqi Union
On January 15, 1979, Syria and Iraq officially agreed to form a union. The union should have a common name, a common flag, a common president or presidential council and a common federal government. The president should alternate between Iraqis and Syrians, initially al-Bakr as president and Assad as vice-president. The federal government should be responsible for a common foreign, defense and cultural policy. The combined army would have included 380,000 men, 4,300 tanks and 730 fighter jets. There were differences, however, about the future foreign policy thrust of this army. Syria sought a military counterweight to Israel and Egypt, while Iraq sought to push back the Islamic Revolution in Iran and wanted to increase its influence in the Persian Gulf.
The Syrian ambassador to Germany nevertheless declared on February 12, 1979 that the formation of the unitary state would be completed by the end of 1979. To prepare for this unified state, al-Bakr and Assad formed a United Political Leadership in June 1979 .
Contrasts and failure of the project
In addition to the differing views on the form and speed of the state, there were also differences regarding the goals of such an association. Iraq's Foreign Minister Saadun Hammadi said that more than just a military alliance would emerge, while Syria's Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Haddam assured Jordan that it would not have to fear a complete annexation of Syria to Iraq.
Syria was primarily interested in economic and military aid to Iraq, but not in complete subordination. The demographic composition of Syria, Iraq and the planned state as a whole were threatening to the Syrian Assad regime. In Syria, the Sunni majority, like the (neo) Ba'ath party, was ruled by a minority of the Alevite military. In Iraq, however, a minority of Sunni party functionaries ruled over a Shiite majority and the army. A merger would have strengthened the Sunni mass base of the Iraqi Baathists, but would have weakened the already thin Alevite power of the Syrian military regime.
A central and quite obvious integration goal was therefore ultimately unacceptable for the Syrian regime: Iraq's Vice President Saddam Hussein insisted that the state unification must be preceded by the reunification of the Baath party and its reconciliation with Aflaq. Iraq showed understanding for Syria's desire not to rush into unity. Assad and al-Bakr then refrained from a quick merger and agreed on a gradual, slow integration of the two states. With that, the project had in fact already failed.
The unified dream finally burst in July. On July 16, 1979, al-Bakr resigned as president for health reasons and recommended Saddam Hussein as his successor. At first, Saddam Hussein also stuck to the idea of the gradual unity idea, but on July 28 he had an alleged plot to overthrow the Iraqi government uncovered and accused a “foreign power” of being involved. Although Syria was not directly accused, the subsequent purge within the Iraqi Ba'ath Party mainly fell victim to supporters of the union with Syria.
epilogue
Instead, the Syrian regime formed an alliance with Shiite Iran, tried a union with Libya in 1980 and had another old Baathist Sunni founding father of the party, Aflaq's campaigner Salah ad-Din al-Bitar , murdered. In the Iraqi-Iranian war , Syria finally supported Iran against Iraq from 1980. As a result, the Iraqi regime broke off relations with Syria in October 1980 and supported the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in 1980/82 . In return, Syria closed the borders with Iraq in 1982 and cut the Iraqi oil pipeline to the Mediterranean. Only in 1987 did Saddam Hussein and Assad meet again, but a reconciliation failed. Syria merely offered a restart of the cooperation originally agreed in the national charter of action, while Iraq demanded the cessation of Syrian support for Iran. After the end of the Iraqi-Iranian war, it was Iraq that offered Syria a reorientation towards the original cooperation goals in 1988 (especially in military terms with Israel) and in 1989 the participation in the establishment of an Arab cooperation council , but Syria refused because of Iraq's support the anti-Syrian military in Lebanon. After the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait in 1990, Syria even took part in the US-allied war against Iraq in 1991. It was only in 1997 that relations between the two neighboring Baathist countries could normalize.
literature
- Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett: Iraq since 1958 - From revolution to dictatorship , pages 212-221. Frankfurt / Main 1991
- Martin Stäheli: Syrian foreign policy under President Hafez Assad - balancing acts in global upheaval , pages 157f. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001
- Gustav Fochler-Hauke (Ed.): Der Fischer Weltalmanach 1980 , pages 722, 804 and 854. Frankfurt / Main 1979
- Malik Mufti: Sovereign Creations - Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq , pages 210-217. Cornell University Press 1996
- David Jan Slavicek: Syrian-Iraqi relations after the Second Gulf War - the rapprochement from 1997 in the light of third world state foreign policy , page 29ff. Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg 2008
Web links
- Center for Research and Development: Syria and Iraq, relations and prospects (PDF; 4.7 MB), page 73.Washington 1984