China Northern Airlines Flight 6901
| China Northern Airlines Flight 6901 | |
|---|---|
 An identical SAIC MD-82 from China Northern Airlines |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Controlled flight into terrain |
| place |
Ürümqi , Xinjiang , People's Republic of China
|
| date | November 13, 1993 |
| Fatalities | 12 |
| Survivors | 90 |
| Injured | 30th |
| Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type |
 SAIC MD-82
|
| operator |
China Northern Airlines
|
| Mark |
B-2141
|
| Departure airport |
Beijing Airport , People's Republic of China
|
| Destination airport |
Urumqi-Diwopu Airport , People's Republic of China
|
| Passengers | 92 |
| crew | 10 |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
The China Northern Airlines Flight 6901 (Flight number: CJ6901 ) was a scheduled domestic flight to the Chinese airline China Northern Airlines from Beijing to Urumqi airport-Diwopu . On November 13, 1993, a SAIC MD-82 was flown off-road on this flight , killing 12 people.
plane
The aircraft involved in the accident was a SAIC MD-82 that was 2 years old at the time of the accident. The machine was one of 30 MD-82s that were not assembled at the McDonnell Douglas facility in Long Beach, California , but at the SAIC facility in Shanghai . The SAIC MD-82 was certified for air travel by the FAA on July 2, 1987.
The aircraft used on scheduled flight CJ6901 was delivered new to China Northern Airlines on December 31, 1991. The aircraft had the factory number 49849 and the model serial number 1772. The machine was registered with the aircraft registration number B-2141 . The twin- engined , narrow -body aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-217A engines. At the time of the accident, the machine was operating for 26,700 hours.
the accident
The flight from Beijing was initially without incident. The pilots had received clearance for runway 25. The autopilot deactivated itself on the final approach to Urumqi . Since the captain believed that the autopilot would still be in approach mode, he then tried to reactivate it. When activated again, the autopilot went into vertical speed mode and indicated a speed of -800 feet (approximately -245 meters) per minute. An audio warning was given: “Glideslope! Glideslope! " . The systems thus clearly signaled that the machine was not on the glide slope. The crew did not respond to this warning. Another warning followed: “Sink rate!” There was no reaction either. Shortly afterwards the ground proximity warning system activated . Another and final warning followed: “Pull up!”, “Pull up!” (“Pull up!”). Apparently, due to their poor command of English , the pilots had not understood any of the warnings. When the warning message "Pull up!" Was issued because the aircraft was too low and before it hit the ground . the first officer turned to the captain and asked what those words meant. He replied that it would mean "pull up and commute". Otherwise, the two pilots also ignored this warning message. Shortly afterwards, at 2:56 p.m., the machine flew into high-voltage lines and then brushed against a wall until it finally hit a rice field. Of the 102 people on board, 12 were killed and 30 injured. The visibility in the area around Ürümqi was around 1000 meters at the time of the accident.
Cause of accident
The inability of the crew to switch off the autopilot and land the machine manually had contributed to the accident. Another factor was the pilots' poor knowledge of English, which prevented them from understanding that the systems were warning them of an impending collision with the ground. These findings revealed serious training deficits by the airline.
The autopilot must have been switched off by one of the pilots. The reason for this could not be determined; it may have been an oversight. With the correct setting, the autopilot offers an optimal landing profile with the correct glide angle by using the instrument landing system (ILS).
When a crew member switched on the autopilot again, which was needed to be able to use the ILS, the pilot responsible made a serious mistake. Instead of activating the "glideslope mode", which the machine would then have followed, the "vertical speed mode" was activated. This was telling the autopilot to maintain its current rate of descent, which at the time of activation was 800 feet per minute instead of the required 700 feet. As a result, the MD-82 increasingly sank below the optimal glide path. Since the crew had concentrated on the landing, they did not notice their mistake.
swell
- Accident report in the Aviation Safety Network
- Company history MD-82, B-2141 at Planespotters
- Accident report on md-80.com
- MD-80 in Chinese - the "SAIC MD-80" - production and delivery list
Coordinates: 43 ° 54 ′ 26 " N , 87 ° 28 ′ 27" E