Memorandum Moltke / Ludendorff

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The Moltke / Ludendorff memorandum of December 1912 is a memorandum that laid down the military goals of the German Empire for the following years from the perspective of the German General Staff. It was written by Helmuth Moltke the Younger and Erich Ludendorff shortly after the council of war on December 8, 1912 and was kept secret.

The main points of the memorandum were:

  • Despite artillery and general material superiority: Increase in the strength of the peace presence of the Reichswehr by 300,000 men; Training of all military teams.
  • "If, in the event of war, it is possible to formulate the casus belli in such a way that the nation enthusiastically takes up arms, then one will be able to face even the most difficult tasks with confidence."
  • Under these conditions, one can " look forward to a three-front war [against all major opponents of the Entente ] with confidence."

The implementation of the general conscription required here took place from 1914, along with a "concentrated armament bomb" from 1912 to 1914, "on the ruins of fiscal arms control between 1909 and 1911." The "casus belli" also formed the Russian general mobilization at the end of July 1914, which Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg wanted to "blame for the erupting European conflict".

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Michael Geyer : German Armaments Policy 1860 to 1980 , 1984, p. 90.
  2. ↑ John CG Röhl : On the threshold to world war - a documentation about the council of war from December 8 , 1912 ; in: Military history messages , Freiburg i. Br. 1977 (in: A. Gasser: Preussischer Militärgeist und Kriegsentfesselung 1914 , 1985, p. 87).
  3. ↑ John CG Röhl: On the threshold to world war - a documentation about the council of war from December 8 , 1912 ; in: Military history messages , Freiburg i. Br. 1977 (in: A. Gasser: Preussischer Militärgeist und Kriegsentfesselung 1914 , 1985, p. 109).
  4. ^ Michael Geyer: German Armaments Policy 1860 to 1980 , 1984, p. 92.
  5. ^ Michael Geyer: German Armaments Policy 1860 to 1980 , 1984, p. 84.
  6. ↑ Imanuel Geiss : July crisis and outbreak of war. A Collection of Documents , 1963/64, Volume 2, Document No. 793.