Council of War of December 8, 1912

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The so-called war council of December 8, 1912 was a secret meeting between Kaiser Wilhelm II and the military leadership in the Berlin City Palace . Historians such as Fritz Fischer and John CG Röhl already see the decision on the First World War or at least an important contribution to such a decision-making process before the July crisis , others - such as Hew Strachan , Christopher Clark or Holger Afflerbach  - consider this interpretation to be exaggerated and wise The meeting does not have any particular significance for the later escalation.

prehistory

Concerned by the course of the First Balkan War and the looming victory of the Balkan League over the Ottoman Empire , influential forces in Austria-Hungary called for further expansion of the sphere of power of Serbia to be limited by force if necessary. Support was hoped for from the German Reich , which, however, had until then taken a largely neutral position in the Balkans inquiry. At the insistence of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg , Kaiser Wilhelm II actually gave up his motto "non-intervention at any price", which had previously been used in relation to the Balkans; as early as November 22, 1912, he declared to the Austrian chief of staff, Schemua , that Austria-Hungary could “fully count on Germany's support under all circumstances”.

However, that went too far for Bethmann Hollweg and State Secretary Kiderlen-Wächter , which is why Kiderlen-Wächter had an article published in the government-affiliated Norddeutsche Zeitung that warned of Austria-Hungary's military action in the Balkans. caused considerable irritation and bitter comments. This prompted the Chancellor to give an assurance of an alliance in the Reichstag on December 2, 1912, which in turn was classified by the British government as threatening, so that Lord Chancellor Haldane expressly warned the German Ambassador Lichnowsky in London the next day that Great Britain would become Austria-Hungary if it invaded In Serbia it is difficult to remain the “silent spectator”, and one cannot tolerate a renewed defeat of France if Germany were to attack France in connection with a Russian-Austrian conflict.

When the Kaiser took note of the report, he was beside himself: “Out of envy and hatred of Germany, England will definitely stand by France and Russia against us. The eventual struggle for existence that the Teutons in Europe (Austria, Germany) will have to fight against the Slavs (Russia) supported by the Romans (Gauls) finds the Anglo-Saxons on the side of the Slavs. Reason: jealousy, fear of our growing up! ”- Immediately after receiving the report from London, the Kaiser called a meeting by telegram for Sunday morning, December 8th, at 11 o'clock, which Bethmann Hollweg later called a“ council of war ” , participants were Wilhelm II., Graf von Moltke (chief of General staff ), August von Heeringen (chief of naval staff ) Alfred von Tirpitz (State Secretary at the Admiralty ) and Georg Alexander Muller (chief of naval Cabinet ).

content

A number of records exist about this council of war, although they differ from one another in individual points, but essentially agree. Von Müller summarized the course of the conversation in his diary on the same evening: The Kaiser had announced that “If we attacked France, England would definitely help France because England could not tolerate the balance of power in Europe being disturbed ". The emperor greeted with a clear head against Bethmann Hollweg

“This announcement as a welcome clarification of the situation to those who felt safe from the press friendlyness of England in recent times. Austria had to act forcefully against the foreign Slavs (the Serbs), otherwise it would lose power over the Slavs of Austria. Monarchy. If Russia supported the Serbs, which it evidently did ( Sasonov's declaration that Russia would immediately enter Galicia if Austria were in Serbia) the war would be inevitable for us too. But we could hope that Bulgaria u. Romania u. also to have Albania, perhaps also Turkey, on our side. [...] If these powers take Austria's side, then we are free to wage the war with all our might against France. The navy must of course prepare for the war against England. The […] case of a war against Russia alone would, according to Haldane's declaration, be disregarded. So immediately submarine war against English troop transports in the Scheldt or. near Dunkirk, mine war in Thames. "

Tirpitz was asked by Wilhelm II to quickly build additional submarines. General von Moltke said, according to von Müller's notes: “I consider a war to be inevitable. the sooner the better. But we should better promote the popularity of a war against Russia in the sense of the Kaiserl through the press. Prepare statements. ”Wilhelm II agreed and, due to his well-known good press contacts, asked Tirpitz to“ work in this direction ”with his press materials. Tirpitz pointed out that "the Navy would like to see the great battle postponed by 1½ years". According to Heeringen, Tirpitz said literally, “Our chances are currently very poor. But in 1914, when the [Northeast Sea] Canal and [the submarine harbor] Heligoland were ready, things would be different ”. Moltke disagreed, according to Müller, “the navy would not be ready even then. the army would find itself in an increasingly unfavorable position, because the opponents armed more than we, who are very tied up with the money. "

Müller criticized Moltke's attitude in his notes as inconsistent: "The war the better, the better, but he does not draw the conclusion that it would be to put Russia or France or both before an ultimatum." The result of the discussion was therefore, according to Müller, "so." pretty much equal to zero ”, since the decision to go to war was not followed by any concrete considerations about the diplomatic prerequisites for a successful opening of the war.

The Bavarian Military Plenipotentiary, Karl von Wenninger , who was subsequently informed, reported on the Emperor's attitude on December 15: “The emperor was reluctant to let himself be determined to postpone [the war]. The next day he only told the Kr [iegs] -M [inister] that he should prepare a new major army draft at once. Tirpitz received the same order for the fleet. "

Follow-up time

The army bill had already been requested several times before the war council; on November 25, Moltke had submitted a corresponding memorandum, and war minister Josias von Heeringen accordingly presented the plans for the new army bill to the Reich Chancellor on December 2 at a cost of (initially) 220 to 300 million marks before, to which the Chancellor raised no objections from a factual point of view. The plans were then presented to the emperor on December 4th and 5th, who gave the appropriate approval. In the opinion of the Fischer School, the War Council accelerated the process; on December 9, the Minister of War, on the orders of the Emperor, asked the Chief of the General Staff to specify his demands. The army bill was passed by the Reichstag on June 30, 1913 . It contained the largest army reinforcement in German history, the draft provided for an increase of 117,000 men, 15,000 NCOs and 5,000 officers, which would then result in 884 million marks as a one-off payment and additional annual costs of 183 million marks.

It turned out to be fatal that - in the opinion of Fritz Fischer, apparently based on the results of the war council - from April 1, 1913, the plan for deployment to the east was no longer processed, which meant a commitment to the Schlieffen Plan , the premises of which made a significant contribution that a world war developed from the July crisis .

Immediately after the meeting, Admiral Müller informed the Chancellor that "the press should now inform the people about the major national interests that would also be at stake for Germany in a war resulting from the Austro-Serbian conflict. [...] The people must not be put in a position to ask themselves the question of what interests Germany has to fight for in this war only when a great European war breaks out. Rather, the people must be made familiar with the idea of ​​such a war beforehand. "

reception

Although the meeting was secret, the contents of the German leadership quickly became known as a result of Kaiser Wilhelm's indiscretions.

In historical studies, however, the council of war was first discussed in the 1960s, when it played a role in the later phase of the Fischer debate . In Fischer's opinion, the Council of War definitely decided to wage war for supremacy in Europe, only the time was postponed. Some opponents of Fischer - such as Egmont Zechlin  - denied any importance to the council of war, others - such as Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Klaus Hildebrand  - were skeptical of Fischer's interpretation, mainly referring to the absence of political representatives at the meeting . Fischer objected that, after taking note of the results of the war council, according to a report by the emperor of December 14, 1912, "he has now got used to the idea of ​​war, and that he, who had spoken out a year ago, would become it never be able to advise a war. "

Even John CG Röhl , whose research falls in the decades after fishing, said in 2008: "Today, the main responsibility of the German and Austrian governments for achieving the great war is no longer in question in July 1914, and the council of war 'from December 8, 1912 does not stand there as an inexplicable and apparently inconsequential derailment of a politically meaningless and not entirely sane monarch [...] the military-political discussion on that Sunday morning [can be] embedded smoothly in a decision-making process whose beginnings went back a long way and which finally ended in the summer of 1914 in the catastrophe of the world war should result. It would also have been easier for Fischer's opponents to refute his theses if the world war had not been brought about at the point in time envisaged in December 1912, immediately after the canal was completed - by means of a 'race war' between Austria and Serbia ”. .

However, this view is contradicted. Holger Afflerbach, for example, sees the meeting as only “one of the crisis meetings that were held in all European capitals at the time against the background of worst-case thinking that also included the outbreak of war in his calculations, but without wishing it or to want to actively bring about it. ”The meeting did not initiate“ any systematic German war preparation ”, but“ continued upgrading ”, which“ like in other European countries ”was, however, based on the principle of equilibrium. In 2002, Friedrich Kießling summed up what he believed to be the predominant view of the so-called War Council of 1912, contrary to Röhl's opinion: “The thesis that this was the beginning of German war planning is now fairly unanimously rejected in historical research. “Hew Strachan argues in a similar way: The meeting had largely without consequences politically and militarily, as Bethmann Hollweg continued to stick to his balancing-oriented course and it was not followed by any armament of the Army that went beyond the new Army proposal, as was the logic of the meeting their fixation on Russia would have required it. The Australian historian Christopher Clark assesses the council of war similarly. This "remained an episode": the new army bill had already been drawn up and the council of war had no longer any influence on it. Rather, Bethmann Hollweg made sure that the meeting had no impact on politics and that its resolutions were not implemented.

Even Volker Ullrich feels more to the "Haldane during his visit to Berlin in February 1912 stated chaos at the top of the Empire as [at] a long-term, single-minded, by all decision-making bodies equally borne planning a Hegemonialkrieges of 1914". The importance of the council of war is seen today at least "in the renewed and more emphatic than previously stated disposition of the military to start the war, which was considered inevitable, at the most favorable time possible," which is also reflected in Stephen Schröder's analysis of the effects of Anglo-Russian naval negotiations the German readiness for war - published in 2006 - ultimately does not want to relativize.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Hew Strachan : The Emperor's War . In: Spiegel Spezial , 1/2004, p. 17.
    Holger Afflerbach: The Triple Alliance. European great power and alliance policy before the First World War. Böhlau, Vienna 2002, p. 737.
  2. ↑ Gerd Krumeich: July 1914. A balance sheet. With an appendix: 50 key documents on the outbreak of war , Schöningh, Paderborn [u. a.] 2014, ISBN 978-3-506-77592-4 , p. 36.
  3. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd edition, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 226 ff .; John CG Röhl: Wilhelm II. , Volume 3: The way into the abyss, 1900-1941. CH Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-57779-6 , pp. 958 ff .; Wolfgang J. Mommsen : Was the emperor to blame for everything? Wilhelm II and the Prussian-German power elites. Ullstein, Munich 2002, ISBN 978-3-548-36765-1 , p. 194.
  4. ^ John CG Röhl: Wilhelm II. , Volume 3: The way into the abyss, 1900-1941. CH Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-57779-6 , pp. 958 f .; Diary entry by Georg Alexander von Müller from December 8, 1912. Federal Archives N 159/4 fol. 169-171. Quoted from "German History in Documents and Pictures" .
  5. ^ John CG Röhl: Wilhelm II. , Volume 3: The way into the abyss, 1900-1941. CH Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-57779-6 , pp. 958 f .; Diary entry of Georg Alexander von Müller from December 8, 1912. Federal Archives N 159/4 fol. 169–171. quoted from "German History in Documents and Pictures"
  6. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd edition, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 233 f .; Diary entry of Georg Alexander von Müller from December 8, 1912. Federal Archives N 159/4 fol. 169–171. Quoted from "German History in Documents and Pictures" .
  7. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd edition, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 234 f.
  8. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd edition, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 251 ff .; Holger Afflerbach: Falkenhayn. Political thinking and acting in the German Empire. Oldenbourg, Munich 1996, ISBN 3-486-56184-7 , p. 106.
  9. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd Edition. Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 240 f.
  10. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd edition, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 235; John CG Röhl: The dress rehearsal. On the history and significance of the “Council of War” of December 8, 1912 . In: Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, Peter Christian Witt (eds.): Industrial society and political system . Series of publications by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung , Bonn 1978, pp. 357–373, here: p. 369.
  11. ^ John CG Röhl: Kaiser, Hof und Staat. Wilhelm II and German politics. Beck, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-406-49405-6 , p. 190.
  12. ↑ Volker Ullrich: The nervous great power: Rise and fall of the German Empire 1871-1918 . 2nd Edition. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt 2010, ISBN 978-3-596-17240-5 , p. 234.
  13. ↑ Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd Edition. Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 235.
  14. ^ John CG Röhl: Wilhelm II. , Volume 3: The way into the abyss, 1900-1941. CH Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-57779-6 , p. 966.
  15. ↑ Holger Afflerbach: The Triple Alliance: European great power and alliance policy before the First World War . Böhlau Verlag, Vienna 2002, p. 737.
  16. ↑ Holger Afflerbach: The Triple Alliance: European great power and alliance policy before the First World War . Böhlau Verlag, Vienna 2002, p. 737.
  17. ↑ Friedrich Kießling: Against the “great” war? Relaxation in international relations 1911-1914. (= Studies on International History, Volume 12), Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2002, p. 157 (footnote 33).
  18. ^ Friedrich Kießling: Against the "great" war ?: Relaxation in international relations 1911-1914 . In: Studies on International History . tape 12 . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2002, ISBN 978-3-486-56635-2 , p. 157 (in footnote 33) .
  19. ↑ Christopher Clark: The Sleepwalkers. How Europe moved into World War I. Translated from the English by Norbert Juraschitz. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-421-04359-7 , p. 427 ff. (Quote: p. 428).
  20. ↑ Volker Ullrich: The nervous great power: Rise and fall of the German Empire 1871-1918. 2nd Edition. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt 2010, ISBN 978-3-596-17240-5 , p. 234.
  21. ↑ Volker Ullrich: The nervous great power: Rise and fall of the German Empire 1871-1918. 2nd Edition. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt 2010, ISBN 978-3-596-17240-5 , pp. 234, 725; Stephen Schröder: The Anglo-Russian Naval Convention. The German Reich and the fleet negotiations of the Triple Entente on the eve of the First World War . Verlag Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2006, ISBN 978-3-525-36069-9 , p. 662 ff.