August von Heeringen

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August von Heeringen (born November 26, 1855 in Kassel , † September 29, 1927 in Berlin ) was a German naval officer , most recently an admiral , chief of the admiralty staff and thus a participant in the council of war on December 8, 1912.

Life

August Heeringen was the second son of the court marshal and theater manager Josia von Heeringen (1808–1885) and his wife Karoline, née von Starkloff, born in Kassel. His older brother Josias von Heeringen (1850–1926) was later the Prussian Minister of War. August von Heeringen joined the Imperial Navy in 1872 and was for a long time the closest employee of the State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt Alfred von Tirpitz . Together with Tirpitz, from 1894 onwards, he developed the guidelines for “effective” propaganda to create favorable conditions for the implementation of German naval armament in politics, the state and the public. From 1896 he was responsible for the "public relations work" of the fleet construction program .

The institution created especially for this in the Reichsmarineamt was the news office (N), which was directly subordinate to the State Secretary Alfred von Tirpitz. From 1897 August von Heeringen was the first boss, co-initiator and main actor in the establishment of this propaganda and news center of the imperial navy. In order not to be in constant competition with the large number of other existing news agencies from the outset, he was ordered to concentrate primarily on marine-related information. But that didn't always work out as required. The most difficult thing was to enforce the desired position vis-à-vis the Foreign Office, because at that time only this institution had the right to submit press releases directly to Kaiser Wilhelm II . The main objective of the news office in the first few years was to collect and process information about the imperial navy for distribution to the daily press, magazines and other news organizations, including the Wolf'sche Telegraph Office (WTB), which was one of the main cooperation partners. Gradually, the specifically developed network could be expanded to include individual institutions of the Reichstag and, above all, to the press offices of selected companies. Here it was mainly heavy industry companies, at the top the Friedrich Krupp AG group and Thyssen-Krupp AG . The majority of the sponsorship money for the operation of the news center also came from them. For the first two years the office employed two naval officers and a few clerks. In addition to the manager, Eduard von Capelle (1855–1927) was initially part of the permanent staff. It was not until its heyday between 1899 and 1901 that the number of naval officers was 5, who were mainly assigned to the reading service. In 1900 a total of 63 journalistic organs, including daily newspapers, weekly papers, monthly magazines and irregularly published dispatch services, were evaluated, depending on their form of publication. It was not until 1900 that the news office began to adopt its own publications, together with publishers, to publish marine literature and periodicals on maritime topics. In doing so, they made use of external scientists who were involved in the work, including the reading service, on a fee basis or through sponsored funding. These included above all the two economists Prof. Ernst Levy von Halle (1868–1909) and Prof. Max Sering (1857–1939), who were simply referred to as the “fleet professors” because of their external work. Active naval officers were also included in the work to publish the Tirpitz fleet plans, partly to broaden public relations, partly to present the practical aspects of naval policy. Here, however, there were repeated examples of senior naval officers who, through their contributions or articles, undermined the desired uniformity or heroism in the external image of the imperial fleet, were subjected to strict disciplines.

The news office under August von Heeringen already exhausted a wide range of possibilities for influencing the people, politics and parliament in its initial phase. The main target group was the educated and wealthy bourgeoisie, who could be influenced in their organizational forms such as parties and associations, in their economic positions and the civil servant structures for a more offensive naval policy. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Reichstag, however, ultimately passed judgment on the political strategy and the financing of the oversized naval policy. He must be so courted and fed, according to Heeringen's view, “as if the Reichstag is the one who does everything”, or at least it should appear that way to him. After the passage of the 2nd Naval Law in 1900, the effectiveness of the news office decreased significantly, which also changed the status of the institution within the Reichsmarinamt. The staff was reduced to "only" 2 naval officers and voices were raised that summed up the increasing isolation of the office from the really sensitive information. In addition, there was a further circumstance that after heavy pressure from the Admiral's Chief of Staff Otto von Diederichs (1843-1918) von Tirpitz gave in and had to allow the establishment of a news office (N) from 1900 also at the Admiral's staff. This created a second institution in the field of information gathering within the imperial navy, which, however, primarily saw itself as a news office (N) for foreign countries.

In 1900, August von Heeringen, after 3 years in office as head of the news office, changed to commandant of the SMS "Bach", received a command to Shanghai and from 1903 the higher-level area of ​​responsibility of the central office in the Reichsmarineamt. Captain Friedrich Gädecke (1866–1935) took over the management of the news office. In the following years von Heeringen was from 1905 director of the General Naval Department and deputy authorized representative of the Federal Council, but still as a close confidante of Tirpitz. From 1907 to 1910 he was used as commander of the reconnaissance ships. From March 12, 1911 to March 31, 1913, he then acted as head of the Admiralty's staff and was thus a participant in the council of war on December 8, 1912 . At the same time, his brother Josias von Heeringen had been Prussia's Minister of War from 1909 . Subsequently August von Heeringen was commanding admiral of the naval station in the North Sea from 1913 . His replacement by Hugo von Pohl was solely due to personal tactical reasons. He was for the July 15, 1914 disposition while à la suite made of Seeoffizierskorps.

In 1912 he analyzed the strategic situation of the German naval development clairvoyantly: If the English really relocated to long-distance blockade with consistent restraint of his battle fleet, the role of our beautiful ocean-going fleet in the war could become a very sad one. In August 1914 this situation actually occurred.

August von Heeringen died on September 29, 1927 in Berlin.

Awards

literature

  • Dermot Bradley (eds.), Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot: Germany's Admirals 1849-1945. The military careers of naval, engineering, medical, weapons and administrative officers with admiral rank. Volume 1: A-G. Biblio Publishing House. Osnabrück 1988. ISBN 3-7648-1499-3 . Pp. 33-34.
  • Marcus König, agitation-censorship-propaganda. The submarine war and the German public in World War I, ibidem Verlag, Munich, 2014
  • Sebstijan Rojek, Sunken Hopes, The German Navy in Dealing with Expectations and Disappointments 1871–1930, De Gruyter Verlag 2017
  • Alfred von Tirpitz, German powerlessness policy during the World War, Berlin, 1926

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Gunda Stöber: Press policy as a necessity. On the relationship between the state and the public in Wilhelmine Germany, 1890–1914. Franz Steiner. Stuttgart 2000. ISBN 3-51507-521-6 . P. 151.
  2. Hans Georg Steltzer: The German fleet. A historical overview from 1640 to 1918. Societäts-Verlag. Frankfurt am Main 1989. ISBN 3797304765 . P. 173.
  3. Marcus König, Agitation-Censorship-Propaganda. The submarine war and the German public in World War I, ibidem Verlag, Munich, 2014, p. 41ff.
  4. ^ Wilhelm Deist, Fleet Policy and Fleet Propaganda, Stuttgart 1976, p. 92
  5. August von Heeringen to Alfred von Tirpitz from August 1897, in: Wilhelm Deist, Flottenpolitik und Flottenpropaganda, Stuttgart 1976, p. 129
  6. Hans Meier-Welcker, Military History Research Office (ed.): Handbook on German military history. 1648-1939. Edition 8. Bernard & Graefe. Frankfurt am Main 1964. p. 190.
  7. ^ William Michaelis: Tirpitz 'strategic work before and during the world war. In: Werner Rahn (Ed.): German Marines in Transition. From a symbol of national unity to an instrument of international security. Oldenbourg, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-486-57674-7 , pp. 397-426, here: p. 421.
  8. ^ Wulf Diercks: The influence of personnel control on the German naval warfare 1914 to 1918. In: Werner Rahn (Hrsg.): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel. From a symbol of national unity to an instrument of international security. Oldenbourg, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-486-57674-7 , pp. 235–268, here: p. 250.
  9. ^ William Michaelis: Tirpitz 'strategic work before and during the world war. In: Werner Rahn (Ed.): German Marines in Transition. From a symbol of national unity to an instrument of international security. Oldenbourg. Munich 2005. ISBN 3-486-57674-7 . Pp. 397-426. here: p. 412.
  10. ^ Gerhard Hirschfeld (Ed.): Encyclopedia First World War. Ferdinand Schöningh. Paderborn 2003. ISBN 3-506-73913-1 . P. 1003.
  11. a b c d e f g h i j k l m Ranking list of the Imperial German Navy. Ed .: Marinekabinett . Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Son . Berlin 1914. p. 107.