Determinate and determinable

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In modern ontology , determinates and determinables are properties, objects or processes that are related to each other in a specific way . Entities that are specified by determinates are considered determinables. For example, “colored” is the determinable of “red” and “red” is the determinable of “vermilion”. Conversely, “red” is a determinate for “colored” and “vermilion” is a determinate for “red”. The relationship between determinate and determinable is a transitive , non-reflective and asymmetrical relation.

history

The pair of terms determinate and determinable was coined in 1921 by the British philosopher and logician William Ernest Johnson . In addition to colors, Johnson uses geometric figures in particular for illustration purposes , for example the geometric “shape” is determined by “polygon”, “polygon” by “square” and “square” by “square”. A determinable can have different determinates, in the case of a polygon, for example, triangle, square, pentagon, etc. The determinates that fall under the same determinable differ and, according to Johnson, are comparable in their differences Square less than between a triangle and a pentagon.

In the 1950s, Johnson's coining of the term was received and continued by Arthur Norman Prior , Stephan Körner and John Searle , among others . Searle argues that not every form of specification represents a determinate-determinable relationship and tries to distinguish this from the relationship between species and genus . According to Searle, the main difference arises from the fact that within a species the individuals share certain characteristics that distinguish them as a subset of the genus. For example, it is correct to say that humans are mammals with a specific biological and cognitive structure. Something analogous is not possible with determinate and determinable, since different shades of red, apart from their “blush”, do not share any properties.

Absolute determinates

The specification function of the determinates raises the question of whether there is an “absolute determinate” in the sense of a complete specification. For example, David Armstrong explains : "A physical object is determined in all aspects, it has a completely precise color, temperature, size, etc. It is pointless to say that an object is light blue but has no definite shade of blue." Armstrong The assumption of absolute determinates runs into obvious problems , particularly in the context of vague objects. For example, due to imprecise boundaries, it seems impossible to ascribe a precise mass or size to a mountain, a cloud or a sandy beach. To make matters worse, even with apparently precise macroscopic objects, the boundaries of the object can no longer be precisely defined on a microphysical level.

A radical variant of the idea of ​​absolute determinates can be found in Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives : The existence of determinables is rejected. Gillett and Rivers assume that all causal explanations are already possible at the level of the absolute determinates, so that determinables are causally superfluous and can be deleted from the ontology using Ockham's razor .

Applications

The relationship between determinates and determinables has been discussed intensively in recent years, including in relation to the problem of mental causation . The basic assumption is that the determinate and the determinable can equally be understood as causes without them being in causal competition. So has Stephen Yablo designed a thought experiment in which a dove out conditioned is to peck at red objects. You now place a scarlet triangle in front of the pigeon that is pecking at the triangle. Regarding the cause of the behavior of the pigeon one seems to be able to refer to the determinate scarlet red as well as to the determinable red. Yablo now proposes to understand the mental causation in analogy to the thought experiment : As in the case of scarlet red and red, one can also understand a physical and a mental state as causes without a causal competition arising.

Yablo's argument has provoked a variety of objections. Philosophers such as Douglas Ehring and Sven Walter , among others, have denied that physical states relate to mental states as determinates relate to determinables. According to Ehring, two determinates can always be distinguished with regard to the determinable - scarlet red and carmine red are different with regard to their redness. In contrast, philosophy of mind generally assumes that the same mental state can be realized through different physical states. Gilletts and Rives' denial of the existence of determinables also implies that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved in the way suggested by Yablo.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Eric Funkhouser: The Determinable-Determinate Relation , in: Noûs 40/3 (2006), pp. 548-569, here 549.
  2. ^ William Ernest Johnson: Logic , Part I, Chapter XI, 1921, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  3. ↑ Arthur N. Prior: Determinables, Determinates, and Determinants , in: Mind 58/1 (1949), pp. 1–20 and pp. 178–194.
  4. ↑ Stephan Körner: On Determinables and Resemblance , I, in: The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 33, Harrison and Sons, London 1959, pp. 125-140.
  5. ↑ John Searle: On Determinables and Resemblance, II , in: The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 33, Harrison and Sons, London 1959, pp. 141–158.
  6. ↑ For a critical discussion see: Richmond Thomason: "Species, Determinables and Natural Kinds", in: Noûs 3 (1969), pp. 95-101.
  7. ^ David Armstrong: Perception and the Physical World , London 1961, p. 59.
  8. ↑ David Sanford, “Determinates vs. Determinables ”in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  9. ^ Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives: "The Non-Existence of Determinables: Or, a World of Absolute Determinates as Default Hypothesis" in: Noûs 39/3 (2005), pp. 483-504.
  10. ^ Jens Harbecke: Mental Causation. Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World , Ontos, 2008, chapter 3
  11. ↑ Stephen Yablo: "Mental Causation", in: The Philosophical Review 101/2 (1992), pp. 245-280.
  12. ^ Douglas Ehring: "Mental causation, determinables and property instances", in: Noûs 30/4 (1996), pp. 461-480.
  13. ^ Sven Walter: "Determinables, determinates, and causal relevance", in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37/2 (2007), pp. 217-243.

literature

  • David Armstrong: A world of states of affairs , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chapter 4
  • Eric Funkhouser: The Determinable-Determinate Relation, in: Nous , 2006, Volume 40, Issue 3, p. 549.
  • Sven Walter: Mental causation. An introduction. , Paderborn, Mentis, 2006, Chapter 3

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