Clapham Junction Railroad Accident
The Clapham Junction railway accident on December 12, 1988 at Clapham Junction Railway Station in the London borough of Battersea was caused by an incorrectly wired signal . There were three trains involved in him. 35 people died and 500 were also injured.
Starting position
In the apron of the Clapham Junction station , the four-track railway line runs in a cut in the terrain, which is intercepted directly on the tracks by retaining walls and secured at the top by a fence.
Work on the signal systems had been carried out there a few weeks before the accident . These were urgently needed because the systems were completely outdated and by 1984 there had been three incidents in which the signal system had failed. The relevant parts of the railway were under considerable pressure to quickly carry out the work on a number of points in the network. New cables were laid in the area of the later accident site , but the old cables were accidentally not removed. The functional test took place on a weekend in voluntarily worked overtime by the railway workers. The technician who caused the error had been on duty for thirteen weeks, seven days a week. The new installation was not checked by independent third parties. The error was overlooked in the final examination.
On 12 December 1988 ranged from 8:10 in the morning rush-hour traffic more heavily infested trains on the subsequent accident site to:
- A train from Basingstoke to London Waterloo , a heavily occupied commuter train consisting of three four-unit electric multiple units of the class 423.
- It was followed by another train made up of one class 423 railcar and two class 438 railcars .
- A third train followed at a block distance .
- An empty train was traveling in the opposite direction .
the accident
The day before the accident, equipment was rearranged in the area of the signal system. The old, not dismantled cables were shifted in such a way that a short circuit was created, which prevented the decisive signal from showing "Stop" when the stretch of road ahead was occupied.
The driver of the train from Basingstoke showed a signal "free travel" when approaching Clapham Junction station. As he approached the signal, it switched to "Stop". The braking distance was too short to stop before the signal. The train only came to a stop before the next signal. From there he called the interlocking via the line telephone and was informed that there was no signal interference. At that moment the next train hit the one from Basingstoke. The driver, who was still on the phone, informed the signal box almost "live" about the accident. The employee in the signal box immediately set all signals to which he had access to "Stop" and informed the neighboring operating points . However, he could not access the automatic signaling technology. Then he called the station master and asked him to alert the emergency services.
Immediately afterwards, the empty train passed the scene of the accident on the neighboring track, into which debris from the previous accident protruded, and collided with them. The next train following the first two trains showed the signal "Expect slow speed". Since the power rail was damaged by the accident and no voltage led more he just rolled with reduced speed. When the driver saw the scene of the accident, he was able to brake in good time without driving into it.
consequences
35 people died and 500 were also injured. Students and teachers from a neighboring school were the first to reach the scene of the accident and give first aid . They were later honored for this by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher . The rescue work was difficult because of the fence and retaining walls in the cut in the terrain. It was not until around 4 p.m. before the last dead person was recovered.
The official commission of inquiry, chaired by Anthony Hidden, QC , from the Ministry of Transport recommended that safety-related work on the railway infrastructure should only be carried out under the supervision of a responsible project officer and that it should be checked by independent third parties. It found that the technical staff had been insufficiently trained, selected, monitored and audited. Signal malfunctions should be reported to the railway supervisory authority in the future. The introduction of train radio and loudspeaker systems in the trains were recommended.
The fact that the technician who had caused the failure, for thirteen weeks in a seven-day week was in use was in the official investigation report as a gross shortage in the occupational safety of British Rail criticized. British Rail was fined £ 250,000 for this .
The Clapham Junction rail crash was one of the reasons that the Council on Legislation (Law Commission) for England and Wales recommended in 1996, in the criminal law the offense of manslaughter by legal entities introduce (Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide), which was done of 2007.
A memorial stone to the accident was erected on Windmill Road in Spencer Park at the top of the cut in the terrain in which the railway line runs.
See also
literature
- Anthony Hidden: Investigation of the Clapham Junction Railway Accident . Ed .: Department of Transport, London 1989 (PDF; 7.9 MB).
- Adrian Vaughan: Tracks to Disaster . Ian Allan, 2000, ISBN 0-7110-2985-7
Web links
- BBC news about the accident.
- Pictures of the scene of the accident .
Individual evidence
- ↑ Hidden, p. 5.
- ↑ Hidden, p. 5.
- ↑ House of Commons: Minutes of Question Time v. December 13, 1988 .
- ^ Hidden, pp. 120, 169.
- ^ Hidden, pp. 171, 174.
- ↑ Hidden.
- ^ Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter . ( Memento of the original from August 28, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Ed .: The Law Commission , London, March 4, 1996 (PDF; 490 kB).
- ^ Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 .
Coordinates: 51 ° 27 '15.1 " N , 0 ° 10' 35.9" W.