Feminist Epistemology

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Under feminist epistemology a number of positions are combined, examine the social, cultural and political influence of gender on the production of knowledge. All approaches are linked by the focus on the context-dependence of scientific knowledge, whereby the knowing subject is assigned a decisive role. Feminist epistemology can be understood as a criticism of classical epistemology , insofar as the classical historical, economic and social contexts of knowledge are neglected in favor of objectivity, uniformity or neutrality.

Overview

Feminist epistemology distinguishes itself from traditional epistemology insofar as "feminist theorists [...] assume that the question of whose knowledge we are talking about when we talk about knowledge and science should be placed in a central analytical position" . In the classical epistemology from René Descartes to Karl Popper the focus is mostly on the rational explanation and justification of scientific knowledge. Singular and subjective influences to which a researcher is exposed are not taken into account. For feminist epistemology, the main focus is on the factual origin of knowledge and the view of the knowing subject. Knowledge is then always considered to be situated , i.e. as being in a cultural, social, economic or historical context. Questions about the impact of gender on the cognitive process, but also of social and ethnic origin on entry opportunities and acceptance in science and research were previously largely ignored and were for the first time put into an epistemologically relevant context by representatives of a feminist epistemology.

The scientific discipline, which has been developing since the 1980s, has a heterogeneous spectrum of positions (see positions ). What they all have in common is the observation that women are underrepresented in science and structurally disadvantaged, which, however, cannot be explained by differences in the biological sexes . Instead, this phenomenon is based on an orientation of society - and consequently also of science - towards male interests and ideals ( androcentrism ). This also includes stereotypical ascriptions such as the association of masculine with rational, analytical on the one hand and feminine with emotional, intuitive on the other. The original focus on women as a disadvantaged group came under increasing criticism in the context of the third wave of feminism and was expanded to an intersectional approach that shifts the perspectives of marginalized groups in general to the center. This development is based on the knowledge that when analyzing inequality and power relations, other social structural categories such as social class , sexual orientation and ethnicity are important in addition to gender .

An important catchphrase in the field of feminist epistemology is the concept of the malestream . This criticizes the fact that knowledge is typically acquired by male, white Europeans or middle-aged North Americans who come from a higher educational level. Based on the paradigmatic theory of situated knowledges cognizant subjects sees the feminist epistemology in this restriction to a very limited and homogenous group, the risk of cognitive distortion ( English bias ). Making this epistemological distortion visible and improving the chances of marginalized people is a fundamental concern of feminist epistemology.

Positions

In dealing with the question of the subject of knowledge, different directions and approaches of feminist epistemology have developed. The British philosopher Susan Haack offers one way of structuring the heterogeneous field . According to Haack, the various approaches can be divided into two currents based on the respective interpretation of a woman's point of view : on the one hand, in approaches that describe feminist epistemology as "the way women see the world" and on the other in approaches that describe a woman's point of view as "serving the interests of women". The subject of the first group of approaches is therefore the specifically feminine aspect of the respective concept of knowledge, while the subject of the second group is more the circumstances of the cognitive process with regard to women and thus aspects such as sexism and androcentrism are also relevant. The first perspective in particular is problematic insofar as Haack sees a gender-specific essentialism in the concept of specifically female knowledge , from which she not only distances herself, but which is also not represented within the approaches she describes. The philosopher Mona Singer proposes an alternative classification of the approaches , according to which three orientations within feminist epistemology can be distinguished.

Feminist point of view theory

The oldest approach in feminist epistemology is feminist point of view theory . The question posed in 1981 by the philosopher Lorraine Code whether the gender of the knower plays a role in the attainment of knowledge is answered in the affirmative. In addition, according to feminist point of view theory, women can potentially gain a more adequate and complex view of the world than men. This statement is based on the assumption already found in Hegel that the groups suppressed within a system have an epistemological advantage over the respective ruling group, since in the cognitive process they not only recognize the respective object, but also the systemic framework conditions. Accordingly, feminist point of view theory assumes that women, unlike men, are counted among the oppressed in a historical context and that such a social positioning leads to more objective knowledge. It should be noted that from the point of view of women, no completely objective knowledge can be obtained. Rather, a more objective view of the social and institutional conditions in the sciences can be achieved if the living conditions and experiences of women are taken into account. The "better" point of view of women merely approximates the ideal of scientific objectivity in knowledge. The fact that feminist point of view theory originally only counted women among the oppressed, and thus exclusively with regard to their gender, often led to criticism and multiple revisions of this approach, especially in the wake of the third wave of feminism since the 1990s. A central revision within feminist epistemology leads to the so-called dialogical point of view theory , which states that there is not one point of view that can claim a comprehensive critical view, but that an exchange of the various points of view is necessary.

In 1990 the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins developed the concept of a black feminist standpoint with postcolonial intent . Collins shares the assumptions of point of view theory that oppressed people better incorporate the rules of oppression into their cognitive activity and can therefore take a more complex point of view. In her concept of oppression, however, she no longer just refers to the characteristic of gender, but extends the approach to include various, overlapping aspects of oppression such as skin color, ethnicity and disability. In Collins' view, it is therefore necessary to bring the specific experiences of African-American women into scientific discourse. According to Collins, these are excluded as subjects in the “mainstream science discourse” and thus assume an outsider role in the Western feminist discourse. Their model demands that the standpoints of the outsider-within , i.e. those positions that are on the fringes and have little say in the powerful discourses, are to be preferred, and that these suppressed standpoints enter into a dialogue critical of domination. This concept can be viewed as a position of dialogical point of view theory, as Collins explains that there is no point of view that can claim a comprehensive critical view. Rather, there are only different perspectives and standpoints, between which common ground can be established through critical dialogues.

The scientific theorist Sandra Harding has included Collins's postcolonial criticism in her work, for example because of the reflection on her own privileged western location. So Harding revised her previous point-of-view theory to the effect that it is now not just the life of women, but the life of all marginalized people that must be assumed. In her opinion, a revised point of view theory is best suited to addressing the diversity of women. Among other things, Harding argues that privileged white women should critically question their privileged positions, i.e. their own privileged point of view, and learn from the knowledge and experience of the “outsiders-within” described by Collins. Harding's concept of “strong objectivity” states that the context in which it originated, i.e. the pre- and environment of scientific knowledge processes, should be clarified and democratized in order to obtain more objective knowledge, that is, knowledge in its complex production contexts. As many different perspectives as possible should be included in science, which are marginalized in the prevailing discourse. Harding's conclusion is that the more heterogeneous the scientific communities, the greater the chance of producing more objective knowledge. Harding sees the advantage of such a dialogical standpoint epistemology in the fact that previously ignored modes of knowledge and experience can be incorporated into scientific knowledge processes and thus the different standpoints enter into a dialogue.

Feminist empiricism

Like empiricism in the classical sense, feminist empiricism also assumes that sensual , mostly empirically obtained findings are the basis of knowledge. In contrast to the more positivist approaches of empiricism, in which the context of the origins of knowledge is viewed as external to science, feminist empiricism revises this assumption to the effect that it regards science as a social enterprise and thus devotes more attention to the context of the cognitive process. Part of this changed view is also that there is in fact no scientific freedom from values ​​and that social contexts that are constitutive for knowledge are also taken into account. Based on the thesis that empirical theories are underdetermined by the evidence, representatives such as the philosopher Helen Longino question the classic canon of values ​​in the sciences: when an empirical theory cannot be fully substantiated by the empirical data collected, but the theory is always preceded by background assumptions that are not themselves can be empirically justified, then these background assumptions must become the subject of epistemology. Longino is so classic "scientific virtues" (scientific virtues) such as objectivity , consistency , uniformity and simplicity of statements against a new set of virtues, in addition to empirical adequacy and ontological includes diversity, novelty and complexity of studied references and relationships.

Postmodern epistemology

The approach of postmodern epistemology advocates the thesis that there are only constructions in the sciences. According to this, facts are always ideologically charged and scientific knowledge is more associated with power than with truth. The question of the subject of knowledge is also rethought in this regard: instead of claiming a rational, autonomous and psychologically and physically unified subject, it must itself be understood as being created discursively between language, meaning, the unconscious and power, like the Philosopher Jane Flax writes. The focus of postmodern epistemology is an orientation "which focuses on local and perspective limitations, contingency and instability, ambiguity and fundamental contestability of all knowledge claims."

Critique of feminist epistemology

Since feminist epistemology is a heterogeneous field, the criticism of it is also very different. The philosopher and feminist Susan Haack criticizes that the endeavors of feminist epistemologists should not be based on strengthening an exclusively female perspective, but rather on the common humanity of men and women and their equality. In this context, Haack doubts the assumption that there is a decidedly “female gaze” that has so far been neglected by the androcentric scientific community. However, it should be noted that the idea of ​​a distinctive female access to experience is not asserted by many proponents of feminist epistemology.

Haack also made the point that there is no uniform, coherent or consistent argumentation within feminist epistemology. As described above, however, feminist epistemology can be understood more as a collective term for a series of heterogeneous positions and therefore does not pretend to be uniform. What all positions have in common, however, is the premise that knowledge is situated.

In relation to this premise common to all approaches, there is the reproach that a subject of knowledge characterized as situated, the scientific claim to objectivity is lost in favor of a relativistic arbitrariness. In addition, through this basic assumption, feminist epistemology is too concerned with values, since it tries to include societal, political, social and gender-specific influences in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. According to this objection, feminist epistemology mixes empirical studies that are considered objective with the advocacy and propagation of sociological contexts. Haack even sees this approach as a real danger, which must be counteracted when she speaks of the “ambitions of imperialist feminism” to “ colonize ” epistemology . This criticism is countered by the fact that the thesis that knowledge is situated does not argue in favor of replacing the freedom of values ​​of the sciences in favor of politicizing decisions. Rather, in line with the findings of the sociology of science and science studies, it is emphasized that scientific knowledge is never value-free, but rather must be described and understood as a process in social, political and economic contexts. By disclosing the respective circumstances of recognition, it is important for the respective researchers to deal responsibly with their decisions and to always reflect on the framework of knowledge. The transparency of the contexts even represents an epistemological advantage for code compared to classical positions, as it enables versatile perspectives to be developed.

However, this perspective diversity leads to the accusation of epistemological relativism , which the philosopher Kathrin Hönig rejects. She sees in the relativistic tendency, especially in the code approach, primarily a rhetorical problem, which finds a more accurate description through the reformulation in an "anti-anti-relativistic" attitude. What is meant here is that Code and others do not essentially take a relativistic position, but rather argue against universalistic or essentialistic, ie anti-relativistic, objections.

Objections are also encountered when explicitly referring to the relevance of the sociological category of gender in gaining knowledge. The criticism is based on the general assumption that the knowing subject is sexless and thus constituted purely objectively. The gender of the researcher is therefore irrelevant for the results. However, the gender category clearly plays a role in the scientific community. From a historical perspective, knowledge has always had a gender-specific connotation, and sexist treatment of female researchers is also based on gender-related prejudices.

See also

literature

  • Elizabeth Anderson: Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2020 (English; revised version of February 13, 2020: online at sydney.edu.au).
  • Lorraine Code: Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant? In: Louis P. Pojman (Ed.): The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 3. Edition. Wadsworth, Belmont 2003, ISBN 978-0-534-55822-2 , pp. 559-571 (English).
  • Susan Haack: Knowledge and Propaganda: Reflections of an Old Feminist. In: Susan Haack (Ed.): Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998, ISBN 978-0-226-31136-4 , pp. 123-136 (English).
  • Sandra Harding: Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives. Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1991, ISBN 978-0-8014-9746-9 (English).
  • Patricia Hill Collins: Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. Unwin Hyman, Boston 1990, ISBN 978-0-04-445137-2 (English).
  • Helen Longino: In Search of Feminist Epistemology. In: The Monist. Volume 77, No. 4, 1994, pp. 472-485 (English).
  • Helen Longino: Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology. In: Louis P. Pojman (Ed.): The Theory of Knowledge. Classical and Contemporary Readings. 3. Edition. Wadsworth, Belmont 2003, ISBN 978-0-534-55822-2 , pp. 571-580 (English).
  • Mona Singer: Feminist criticism of science and epistemology: requirements, positions, perspectives. In: Ruth Becker, Beate Kortendiek (Hrsg.): Handbook women and gender research. 3. Edition. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-531-17170-8 , pp. 285-294.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Mona Singer: Feminist criticism of science and epistemology: requirements, positions, perspectives . In: Ruth Becker, Beate Kortendiek (Hrsg.): Handbook women and gender research . 3. Edition. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-531-17170-8 , p. 285-294, here p. 285 .
  2. ↑ a b c d e Lorraine Code: Is the Sex of the Knower Epistemologically Significant? In: Louis P. Pojman (Ed.): The Theory of Knowledge. Classical and Contemporary Readings . 3. Edition. Wadsworth, Belmont 2003, ISBN 978-0-534-55822-2 , pp. 559-571 .
  3. ↑ Heinz-Jürgen Voss: Feminist criticism of science: Using the example of natural science, biology . In: Ulrike Freikamp u. a. (Ed.): Criticism with method? Research methods and social criticism . Dietz, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-320-02136-8 , pp. 233-252 .
  4. ^ A b c Susan Haack: Knowledge and Propaganda: Reflections of an Old Feminist . In: Susan Haack (Ed.): Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate . University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998, ISBN 978-0-226-31136-4 , pp. 123-136 .
  5. ^ A b Mona Singer: Feminist criticism of science and epistemology: requirements, positions, perspectives . In: Ruth Becker, Beate Kortendiek (Hrsg.): Handbook women and gender research . 3. Edition. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-531-17170-8 , p. 285-294 .
  6. ↑ Patricia Hill Collins: Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment . Unwin Hyman, Boston 1990, ISBN 978-0-04-445137-2 .
  7. ↑ Sandra Harding: Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives . Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1991, ISBN 978-0-8014-9746-9 .
  8. ↑ a b Helen Longino: In Search of Feminist Epistemology . In: The Monist . tape 77 , no. 4 , 1994, pp. 472-485 .
  9. ↑ Jane Flax: Disputed Subjects. Essays on Psychoanalysis, Politics and Philosophy . Routledge, New York 1993, ISBN 978-0-415-75222-0 .
  10. ↑ Mona Singer: Feminist criticism of science and epistemology: requirements, positions, perspectives . In: Ruth Becker, Beate Kortendiek (Hrsg.): Handbook women and gender research . 3. Edition. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008, ISBN 978-3-531-17170-8 , p. 285-294, here p. 296 .
  11. ↑ English : “My diagnosis is that the New Cynicism in philosophy of science has fed the ambition of the new, imperialist feminism to colonize epistemology.” Susan Haack: Knowledge and Propaganda: Reflections of an Old Feminist . In: Susan Haack (Ed.): Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate . University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1998, ISBN 978-0-226-31136-4 , pp. 123-136, here p. 128 .
  12. ↑ Kathrin Hönig: Relativism or Anti-Anti-Relativism? Epistemological and Rhetorical Moves in Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science . In: European Journal of Women's Studies . tape 12 , no. 4 , 2005, p. 407-419 .