Fleet order of October 24, 1918

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Map of the planned German advance into the English Channel in October 1918 and the expected British reaction

With the naval order of October 24, 1918 , the German naval command intended to bring about a decisive battle with the British Grand Fleet shortly before the end of the First World War . After the order to prepare for the departure of the deep sea fleet , isolated mutinies broke out in the German naval bases , and later a far-reaching sailors' revolt . The uprising was the starting point of the November Revolution , which led to the proclamation of the Republic . Even after the first mutinies, the battle plans were dropped.

The starting point for the order was the exchange of notes between the new German government under Max von Baden and US President Woodrow Wilson . The Chancellor asked for an armistice to be arranged. The cessation of submarine warfare on October 20 was one of Wilson's conditions for mediating with France to begin. With the end of the submarine war against merchant ships, however, both the submarines and the large ships that had previously taken on escort duties were free for new ventures.

The submarines were then stationed in front of the British bases. By October 24, a plan was worked out to seek a decisive battle against the Royal Navy. Since the Grand Fleet had its bases in Scotland, it would have a two-day approach, which would be endangered by the submarines , airships and mine blocks. The high seas fleet was supposed to advance against the Flemish coast and the Thames estuary in a quick night-time operation. There she should take action against "armed forces and traffic", with which civilian casualties were accepted. On the march back, a decision should be made in front of the island of Terschelling against the Grand Fleet expected there and possibly weakened.

Classification in the politico-military situation at the end of October

The rapidly deteriorating situation on the western front and the surrender of Bulgaria led to Erich Ludendorff's nervous breakdown on September 29, 1918 . He demanded immediate ceasefire negotiations and feared a complete collapse of the front within days. As a result of the government reshuffle on September 29, government power was transferred from the military to a parliamentary government under Max von Baden , which asked Wilson to broker an armistice on the basis of the 14 points. Based on the 14 points and the subsequent speeches by Wilson, a peace based on a withdrawal from the occupied territories appeared possible. The results of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty could stand. Perhaps Alsace-Lorraine could also be kept. During the next three exchanges of notes, the Allies in Belgium and France advanced rapidly with a massive offensive, but the front did not collapse, although the number of operational divisions rapidly decreased. The sinking of another passenger ship by the German submarines led to Wilson's demand that the submarine war be stopped immediately. In addition, under pressure from Congress and France, Wilson made the following demands by the third note on October 21:

  • complete disempowerment of the emperor
  • by surrendering war equipment making it impossible to restart the war, too
  • Internment of the deep sea fleet in England
  • Handover of Alsace-Lorraine, the left bank of the Rhine and three bridgeheads near Cologne, Koblenz and Mainz
  • Abolition of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk.

Erich Ludendorff therefore wanted to break off further negotiations, demanded, contrary to his previous steps, a continuation of the war and had such an announcement distributed to the troops via Hindenburg on October 24, 1918:

“ For announcement to all troops. Wilson said in his response that he would propose to his allies that they enter into armistice negotiations. The armistice must make Germany so defenseless militarily that it could no longer take up arms. He would only negotiate peace with Germany if it complied with the demands of the allies with regard to its internal structure […] Wilson's answer for us soldiers can only be an invitation to continue the resistance with the utmost strength. When the enemies will realize that the German front with all its victims cannot be broken through, they will be ready for a peace that will secure Germany's future for the broad strata of the people. "

- In the field, October 24, at 10 o'clock in the evening, signed v. Hindenburg

However, this led to his dismissal on October 26, 1918. In contrast to the troops on the Western Front, the ocean-going fleet was apparently intact and the war continued unabated during the negotiations. After the armistice, the fleet was lost anyway due to the threat of internment in England. The fleet management therefore saw the planned decisive battle as an opportunity to improve the negotiating position through a victory or to save the war over the winter break in order to be able to negotiate under better conditions next year. The order as such was classified as "top secret". As a result, it was only accessible to the senior officers and was also kept secret from the parliamentary government. The naval leadership saw their going it alone legitimized by the fact that they still had freedom of operation from the time before the constitutional reform. However, on October 15, 1918, the Kaiser had clearly decreed: "The Chief Military Officer makes all his orders and decisions in agreement with the Reich Chancellor or the representative appointed by him."

Objective of the military

The fleet management saw the prospects of military success, as the deep-sea fleet as the attacker would have the initiative and could operate not far from their own bases. The British always had to first clarify whether the ships they saw were friendly or hostile. Furthermore, the German fleet at this point in time was stronger than in the Skagerrak Battle of 1916 due to various new and modified ships. The British fleet was also by no means prepared for such an action. All in all, in the opinion of the military, this would have given the German fleet an advantage that would have compensated for the numerical inferiority. In addition, Britain was absolutely dependent on its fleet to maintain the sea ​​blockade and protect its own sea routes. In contrast, Germany was blocked, and the blockade was not lifted later with the armistice. A severe British defeat with the breach of the blockade, so the calculation of the naval command , would have given the Reich a better negotiating position again. The associated high risk was accepted, since for the fleet management an honorable defeat was seen as better than remaining inactive in port and handing over the fleet without a fight:

"Even if it is not to be expected that this will lead to a decisive change in the course of things, from a moral point of view it is a question of honor and existence for the Navy to have done its utmost in the last fight."

- Entry in the war diary of October 25, 1918

Behavior of the sailors

The war-weary sailors judged the upcoming battle both as a senseless sacrifice of their own life and in the political implications of the request for an armistice and thus the imminent end of the war. The Grand Fleet was far superior and the sailors did not want to die in order to save a military honor that was only available to the officer corps. On the other hand, they saw themselves as defenders of the parliamentary government and wanted to prevent the military leadership from jeopardizing the chances of success of the government's request for a ceasefire by acting too hastily. The hope of victory was gone after the failure of the offensives of spring 1918, and the moral breakdown of the land forces had spread to the sailors. Their resistance was expressed in the Kiel sailors' uprising , which triggered the November Revolution, in the course of which there was cooperation with the previous civil administration and the military commanderships were eliminated.

Justification of the naval command for the planned naval advance

The government of Max von Baden asked for information about the events surrounding the prevented naval advance. There was a preliminary meeting of the naval leadership on November 3rd in Wilhelmshaven. In this preliminary meeting they agreed on the presentation that, after the end of the unrestricted submarine war, the naval warfare had now planned the purely military use of the submarines on a larger scale by laying out submarine lines in a semicircle around the German North Sea ports. In order to lure the enemy into the restricted area, the fleet should make a sortie in the direction of the Hoofden (Dutch name for the southern North Sea north of the Strait of Dover). Had the English succeeded in breaking through, this would have threatened the German coast and would have forced the fleet to defend the fatherland against this attack.

Due to the revolutionary events, however, there was no further discussion with the government. Admiral Franz von Hipper, chief of the deep-sea fleet, published an "official" report at the end of November 1918 in which he delivered a new version: It was then planned to relieve the right wing of the army by hindering the supply of the British. If the English fleet had then been called in, the German submarines previously positioned could have "tried their luck". Presumably Hipper felt compelled to deliver a new version because the version of his superior command authority left the question open, why should the entire deep-sea fleet take action for the operation they described.

The planners did not confess their true intentions to a wider public until the Munich stab process (Oct./Nov. 1925). But before that, Scheer had already indicated the intention in 1919 and Magnus von Levetzow had for the first time admitted the actual planning in the April issue of the “Süddeutsche Monatshefte” in 1924. In this article Levetzow also reported that on October 26, 1918, at a naval throne lecture, the Kaiser said that he (Kaiser Wilhelm II) had given his consent to the subordination of military authority to civil authority, which had been decided in the Reichstag on the same day. Levetzow did not provide an explanation for the apparent disobedience to his former supreme warlord. Levetzow declared that he was opposed to the now clearly superior government by stating that Max von Baden's government had behaved incorrectly, and in particular he made the "patriotic behavior" of government members Payer (DVP) and Scheidemann (MSPD) for Germany's defeat and the in his view, the hasty armistice was responsible.

“… The use of the deep sea fleet at this hour […] remained a question of life for the navy and a question of honor for its […] crews - before our proud, glorious fleet, the winner of the Skagerrak battle, before it became a commercial object in a shameful peace , their commitment was required. The responsible decision for this was and remains correct. "

Levetzow openly admitted that the naval leadership opposed the government and that the peace efforts demanded by Ludendorff should be undermined.

literature

  • Wilhelm Deist : The Policy of the Naval War Command and the Rebellion of the Fleet at the end of October 1918 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte , 14, 1966, issue 4, pp. 341–368; ifz-muenchen.de (PDF; 6.2 MB)
  • Operation order No. 19 of the High Seas Army Command of October 24, 1918 is printed in: Gerhard Granier: The German Naval War Command in the First World War - Documentation. Volume 2, Koblenz 2000, pp. 193-195.
  • Gerhard P. Groß : A question of honor? The naval command and the last naval advance in 1918 . In: Hansjörg Duppler, Gerhard P. Groß (Hrsg.): End of war 1918. Munich 1999. (Published again in: Werner Rahn (Hrsg.): Deutsche Marinen im Wandel . Oldenbourg, Munich 2005.)
  • Leonidas Hill: signal for counter-revolution? - The plan for the last advance of the German deep-sea fleet on October 30, 1918 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte , 1988, issue 1, pp. 113–130.

Historical environment

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Mark Jones: The Fleet Order of October 24, 1918. Sinking or starting gun for the final battle . In: Sonja Kinzler, Doris Tillmann (eds.): The hour of the sailors. Kiel and the German Revolution 1918 . Darmstadt 2018, p. 92.
  2. ↑ Leonidas Hill: Signal for the counter-revolution? - The plan for the last advance of the German deep-sea fleet on October 30, 1918 . In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte , 1988, issue 1, pp. 113–130. here p. 113, 128 f.
  3. ^ Gerhard Granier: The German naval warfare in the First World War - documentation. Volume 2, Koblenz 2000, pp. 193-195.
  4. ↑ Erich Ludendorff: My War Memories 1914-1918. Berlin 1919, p. 613: "The more we learn about the struggle, the more we recognized the small, thin, dangerous thread on which our success hung."
  5. ↑ Memories and Documents. Volume II. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1927. New edition by Björn Bedey, Severus, Hamburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-86347-124-8 , pp. 203-204 ( books.google.de ).
  6. ↑ Erich Ludendorff: My War Memories 1914-1918. Berlin 1919, pp. 614-615.
  7. ↑ Wolfdieter Bihl (Hrsg.): German sources for the history of the First World War. Darmstadt 1991, p. 478 f.
  8. ^ Wilhelm Deist: The politics of naval warfare and the rebellion of the fleet at the end of October 1918. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 4th issue, Stuttgart 1966, p. 341–368, here p. 366 f. Accessible online (accessed February 25, 2020) at: [1] .
  9. ↑ Holger H. Herwig: The emperor's elite corps. The naval officers in Wilhelmine Germany. Hamburg 1977, p. 199.
  10. ↑ Anonymous: The last exit of the imperial class. In: Kiel Latest News, November 20, 1918 p. 2.
  11. ↑ Magnus von Levetzow: The last act. In: Süddeutsche Monatshefte. Vol. 21 (1924), No. 7 pp. 55-71.
  12. ^ Levetzow, last act, p. 66.