Deep sea fleet

Ships of the line of the deep sea fleet (1917)

From 1907, the high seas fleet was the name of the active home fleet of the Imperial Navy of the German Empire .

Until the end of the 19th century it was common practice to keep fleets active only in the summer months, while most ships were laid up in winter . After the activation in the spring, great efforts were required to make ships and crews operational. For this purpose, the warships of the Imperial Navy were drawn together every year from 1873 to exercise or maneuver squadrons and from 1891 were placed under a fleet command. In 1903 the training fleet was renamed Active Battle Fleet, from 1907 it was renamed the High Seas Fleet. Missions and self-sinking of the deep sea fleet in the First World War are not the subject of this article and are therefore only briefly touched upon.

The training squadron 1873 to 1885

Starting in 1873, the large warships of the Imperial Navy were drawn together every year to form an association that undertook joint maneuvers. The so-called "training squadron" existed only in the summer months.

Maneuver period	Squadron commander	flagship
1873 - 10.06. – 11.09.	Rear Admiral Henk	SMS Hertha
1874 - 06.06. – 21.09.	Rear Admiral Henk	SMS Crown Prince
1875 - 03.06.-24.09.	Rear Admiral Henk	SMS King Wilhelm
1876 - May 22 - September 18.	Rear Admiral Batsch	SMS Kaiser
1877 - May 28 - October 22.	Rear Admiral Batsch	SMS Kaiser
1878 - May 27th - September 6th.	Rear Admiral Batsch	SMS King Wilhelm
1879 - May 22 - September 15.	Rear Admiral Kinderling	SMS Friedrich Carl
1880 - May 24th - September 17th	Commodore from Wickede	SMS Friedrich Carl
1881 - May 24th - September 18th	Commodore from Wickede	SMS Friedrich Carl
1882 - 14.05. – 17.09.	Rear Admiral of Wickede	SMS Friedrich Carl
1883 - 13.05. – 17.09.	Rear Admiral of Wickede	SMS Kaiser
1884 - April 22nd - September 30th.	Rear Admiral Count of Monts	SMS Baden
1885 - June 1st - September 23rd.	Rear Admiral of Blanc	SMS Stein

From the maneuver squadron to the maneuver fleet 1886 to 1892

In 1886 the designation exercise squadron was abolished. The association that was formed this year for the summer months was called the maneuver squadron instead. It consisted of two divisions, the 1st Division with the battleship Baden as its flagship and the 2nd Division with the school squadron . In the autumn of 1887, the squadron was still by the torpedo boat flotilla as III. Division and the armored vehicle flotilla reinforced as IV Division. In 1888, the squadron chief first used the title of “also chief of the maneuvering fleet”. The actual maneuvering squadron was again formed by the 1st division, the school squadron by the 2nd division. In 1889 a "training squadron" was set up again. This formed next to the I. Division, the maneuver squadron, now the II. Division of the maneuver fleet (the school squadron had been dissolved). It stayed that way in 1890 and 1891.

Maneuver period	Chief of the maneuver squadron at the same time chief of the maneuver fleet	flagship
1886	Rear Admiral of Wickede	SMS Baden
1887	Rear Admiral Paschen	SMS King Wilhelm
1888	Rear Admiral von Knorr	SMS Baden
1889	Rear Admiral von Kall	SMS Baden
1890	Vice Admiral Deinhard	SMS Baden
1891	Vice Admiral Deinhard	SMS Baden
1892 spring	Vice Admiral Schröder	SMS Baden

The (autumn) training fleet 1892 to 1903

In 1892, the term "autumn training fleet" was used for the first time for the active and reserve units drawn together for the autumn maneuvers. A year later, the term maneuvering fleet was dropped, and the entire squadron again carried the title of autumn training fleet. The term was shortened to "training fleet" in 1896–1902 and was not referred to until 1903 again and for the last time as the autumn training fleet.

Maneuver period	Chief of the training fleet at the same time fleet chief	flagship
1892 - 08/23 - 09/26	Admiral von der Goltz	SMS Mars
1893 - 08/20 - 09/23	Admiral von der Goltz	SMS Mars
1894 - 08/19 - 09/21	Admiral von der Goltz	SMS Wörth
1895 - 08/19 - 09/15	Admiral von Knorr	SMS Mars
1896 - 09.08. – 15.09.	Admiral von Knorr	SMS Blücher
1897 - 14.08. – 17.09.	Admiral von Knorr	SMS Blücher
1898 - 08/14 - 09/17.	Admiral von Knorr	SMS Blücher
1899 - 08/16 - 09/16	Admiral von Koester	SMS Blücher
1900 - 08/15 - 09/19.	Admiral Hoffmann	SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II.
1901 - 11.08. – 15.09.	Admiral von Koester	SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II.
1902 - 08/17 - 09/12.	Admiral von Koester	SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II.
1903 - 08/15 - 09/12.	Admiral von Koester	SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Active battle fleet 1903 to 1907

In 1903, AKO created the "Active Battle Fleet" on August 4, 1903, in place of the autumn training fleet. According to the 2nd Fleet Act , the active battle fleet should be formed from the 1st and 2nd squadrons, along with a reserve battle fleet from the III. and IV. Squadron. All units of the active battle fleet were to be kept in service all year round. The instruction (AKO of September 26, 1903) read:

The two active squadrons and the assigned reconnaissance ships become the "Active Battle Fleet ".
The chief of the 1st squadron is also chief of the active battle fleet.

The First Squadron existed for 1901/02 from the battleships of the emperor - and the Wittelsbach class . For the first time there was a fleet flagship in addition to the flagship of the 1st Squadron. On June 29, 1903, a cabinet order decreed the formation of a second squadron, but the formation could not begin until 1904/05 after the Brandenburg class had been partially rebuilt . It was initially materially weak and only reached in 1907/08 with the battleships of the Braunschweig - and Germany class full strength. Only then was the Emperor's request for two active squadrons met.

Command period	Fleet chief	flagship
09/22/1903 - 02/25/1906	Admiral Hans von Koester	SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II.
09/26/1906 - 02/16/1907	Admiral Prince Heinrich of Prussia	SMS Germany

The deep sea fleet from 1907 to 1919

The deep sea fleet in Kiel before the start of the First World War (around 1913)

On February 16, 1907, the active battle fleet was renamed "Hochseeflotte". This happened at the suggestion of Tirpitz, who believed that the term “active battle fleet” had an unintentional aggressive connotation and should not be interpreted as such. In 1908 the deep-sea fleet began to expand its exercises into the Atlantic. Between autumn 1909 and spring 1912, the 1st Squadron replaced the standard ships of the line with large ships of the Nassau class and Ostfriesland class . With an amendment to the fleet law, the formation of the active III began in the summer of 1912. Squadron. It was completed in autumn 1914. From 1909, submarines took part in the maneuvers of the deep sea fleet, from 1913 naval aviators .

Command period	Fleet chief	flagship
02/16/1907 - 09/30/1909	Admiral Prince Heinrich of Prussia	SMS Germany
01.10.1909 - 28.01.1913	Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff	SMS Germany
01/29/1913 - 02/02/1915	Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl	SMS Friedrich the Great
02/03/1915 - 01/09/1916	Admiral Hugo von Pohl	SMS Friedrich the Great
01/24/1916 - 08/07/1918	Admiral Reinhard Scheer	SMS Friedrich the Great
August 11, 1918 - November 30, 1918	Admiral Ritter Franz von Hipper	SMS Baden
December 1st, 1918 - January 5th, 1919	Rear Admiral Hugo Meurer	SMS Baden
01/06/1919 - 01/10/1919	Commodore Victor Harder	SMS Baden

With the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, the Imperial Navy was faced with the problem of a very large superiority of opponents in the North and Baltic Seas. In the North Sea alone, the Royal Navy had 26 capital ships (battleships and battle cruisers), which the Imperial Navy had to oppose only 18 comparable units . British superiority was even greater with older ships of the line, cruisers and torpedo boats. The concept of the naval command was initially based on the assumption that the German deep sea fleet would have to take action against a tight blockade of the German North Sea coast and thereby force the enemy into a decisive battle in a sea area that would not allow the full development of the Grand Fleet at all. This assessment quickly turned out to be a mistake. The main aim of Great Britain was to secure its own sea connections and to interrupt those of the enemy in a remote blockade in front of the English Channel and the northern exit of the North Sea. The long-term blockade also resulted in a severe supply crisis for the enemy, which seemed suitable to subdue Germany without major losses.

In view of this situation, the naval leadership, admiral staff as well as fleet chief, first placed their hopes on the depletion of the strength of the British naval forces, which was to be achieved through a submarine and mine offensive . After that, the use of the deep sea fleet in a decisive battle was planned, whereby it was still assumed that the enemy would also seek the confrontation. Here, however, Tirpitz 's calculation of the “ risk fleet ” paid off, that is to say the British were not willing for their part to put the “ Home Fleet ”, the backbone of their sea blockade, at risk in a battle of destruction .

On the German side, the deep-sea fleet was initially limited to securing the German Bight . It consisted of a belt of nine to ten torpedo boats in an arc of 35 nautical miles in front of the lightship Elbe 1 . Behind it were three to four small cruisers . The heavy units of the fleet were in the roadstead in front of Wilhelmshaven . In addition, fleet chief Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl demanded more room for maneuver in order to achieve a balance of forces through battles with parts of the Grand Fleet. However, he was ordered not to seek battle for the foreseeable future, but to avoid such a risk and to hold back. At the beginning of November and December 1914, the deep sea fleet made its first forays on the British east coast, during which battle cruisers shelled port cities and small cruisers laid mine barriers. The first venture came as a surprise to the British Admiralty . But the Admiralty knew about the second venture of Rear Admiral Franz von Hipper from the deciphering of German radio messages . However, it remained hidden from the establishment of a remote cover by the ocean fleet, which was also leaving. Therefore, the Admiralty sent only two squadrons of the Grand Fleet to the Dogger Bank , actually exactly the constellation Ingenohl had hoped for for a battle that promised victory. But when it came to first contact, Ingenohl gained the impression from a few reports that he was facing the entire Grand Fleet. He broke off the operation and began the march back. He put Hipper in a dangerous position with his battlecruisers off the British east coast. Only with tactical skill and luck, Hipper was able to evade the now superior opponent.

For January 24, 1915, the fleet chief ordered an investigation into the Dogger Bank . Remote backup was not even considered. The order to operate was issued as a radio message , although Hipper and his units were in front of Wilhelmshaven and could easily have been informed by dispatch boats. The British radio reconnaissance (" Room 40 ") deciphered the radio message, and so the Royal Navy succeeded in surprising the German association at Doggerbank with superior forces. The loss of the armored cruiser SMS Blücher and the severe damage to the battle cruiser SMS Seydlitz weighed so heavily that Ingenohl was replaced in early February 1915.

The new fleet chief, Admiral Hugo von Pohl , made only shorter advances from March 1915. A retreat into the German Bight should be possible at any time as soon as the enemy reacted with his superior forces. In 1915 the fleet undertook a total of seven ventures that did not go further than 120 nautical miles beyond Heligoland and - strategically speaking - remained ineffective. At the end of 1915, Admiral von Pohl had to resign because of a serious illness. In January 1916, Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer took over the management of the deep sea fleet.

Scheer did not take up the goal of a decisive battle either. But he wanted to make further advances beyond the protected area of the German Bight. After several attempts in March and April 1916, including off the British east coast, an advance on May 31, again after radio decryption by the British intelligence service, led to the Skagerrak battle , with the result of which neither in England nor in Germany are satisfied could. The annihilation victory hoped for by the British had not materialized. On the German side, claims to victory were asserted due to major material losses by the opponent, but they could not withstand a sober assessment of the situation. For Germany, the battle had not even brought about a balance of forces, because the strength of the two fleets to one another remained unchanged. After the Battle of the Skagerrak, the deep-sea fleet made only two advances in the North Sea: in August 1916 to the British east coast and in April 1918 to the north as far as Bergen. Both remained without direct contact with the enemy. They did not change the basic attitude ordered by the emperor that the fleet acted primarily as a "fleet in being", it was supposed to bind opposing forces through its presence in the North Sea, but its existence could not be jeopardized. However, the fleet was not worthless from a military point of view, because it secured its own coastal area, blocked the Baltic Sea from supplies to Russia and offered the smaller units of the German naval forces support in securing the entry and exit routes.

Only immediately before the surrender, with a naval order of October 24, 1918 , did the German naval command intend to bring about a decisive battle with the British Grand Fleet in the English Channel shortly before the end of the First World War. After the order to prepare for the departure of the deep-sea fleet, isolated mutinies broke out in the German naval bases in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven , and later a far-reaching sailors' uprising . It led to the starting point of the November Revolution and the foundation of the Weimar Republic . Even after the first mutinies, the battle plans were dropped.

After the end of the fighting, the German deep sea fleet was interned in accordance with the armistice regulations at the British naval base Scapa Flow (Scotland). On June 21, 1919 just before the signing of the Versailles Treaty , granted Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter , the commander of the interned German naval forces, the order to scuttle through the scheduled German Notbesatzungen. He suspected that the German government would not accept the Versailles peace treaty and that a state of war would therefore soon be restored. The German fleet should not then fall into the hands of the British without being destroyed. The preparations for the scuttling had already been made without the British guards noticing. On Reuter's orders, ten large ships, five large cruisers, five small cruisers and 32 torpedo boats sank within a few hours. Few units could be prevented by the intervention of British seamen from sinking and towed into shallow water. The end of the German ocean-going fleet was thus sealed.

Displacement tables

1873

Squadron flagship SMS Hertha (KAdm. Henk) SMS Arcona , SMS Vineta , SMS Ariadne , gunboat SMS Nautilus .

1886

Squadron flagship SMS Baden , I. Division (VAdm von Wickede) Flagship SMS Baden , SMS Sachsen , SMS Württemberg , SMS Oldenburg , SMS Zieten ( Aviso ), II. Division = school squadron (Commodore Stenzel) flagship SMS Stein , SMS Moltke , SMS Prinz Adalbert , SMS Sophie , SMS Hansa , III. Division = torpedo boat flotilla (KK Tirpitz).

1889

Fleet flagship SMS Baden , I. Geschwader = maneuver squadron (VAdm von Wickede) flagship SMS Baden , SMS Sachsen , SMS Oldenburg , SMS Wacht , SMS Irene , II. Geschwader = training squadron (KAdm. Hollmann) flagship SMS Kaiser , SMS Germany , SMS Prussia , SMS Zieten .

1896

Fleet flagship (Adm von Knorr) SMS Blücher , 1st Squadron (VAdm Thomsen) flagship SMS Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm , SMS Weißenburg , SMS Wörth , SMS Zieten , 2nd Squadron (KAdm Barandon) flagship SMS Baden , SMS Württemberg , SMS Oldenburg , SMS Greif ,

1903

Fleet flagship SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II. , Tender SMS Grille , I. Squadron (Admiral von Koester) flagship SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II. , SMS Kaiser Friedrich III. , SMS Kaiser Wilhelm der Große , SMS Kaiser Barbarossa (until December 14th), then SMS Mecklenburg , SMS Kaiser Karl der Große , SMS Zähringen , SMS Wittelsbach , SMS Wettin , Second Squadron (VAdm Fritze) flagship SMS Hildebrand , SMS Frithjof , SMS Odin , SMS Beowulf , reconnaissance ships (KAdm Gustav Schmidt) flagship SMS Prinz Heinrich , SMS Victoria Louise (until December 12th), then: SMS Friedrich Carl , SMS Amazone , SMS Ariadne , SMS Frauenlob , SMS Niobe , SMS Medusa , Arcona .

1909

Liner squadron from the third division of the second squadron in the roadstead in front of Travemünde (1908)

Fleet flagship SMS Deutschland , I. Geschwader (VAdm. Von Holtzendorff , KAdm Grapow ) flagship SMS Hannover , SMS Silesia , SMS Mecklenburg , SMS Zähringen , flagship SMS Wittelsbach , SMS Kaiser Karl der Große , SMS Kaiser Barbarossa , SMS Wettin , II. Geschwader ( VAdm. Schröder , KAdm. Gühler ) flagship SMS Preußen , SMS Schleswig-Holstein , SMS Hessen , SMS Alsace , flagship SMS Braunschweig , SMS Pommern , SMS Lothringen , reconnaissance group (VAdm von Heeringen , KAdm Jacobsen ) flagship SMS Yorck , SMS Gneisenau , SMS Danzig , SMS Koenigsberg , flagship SMS Roon , SMS Berlin , SMS Lübeck , SMS Stettin

literature

Hans H. Hildebrand, Albert Röhr, Hans-Otto Steinmetz: The German warships. Biographies - a mirror of naval history from 1815 to the present , Köhler: Hamburg 1973 ff.
Hans Jürgen Witthöft: Active battle fleet, deep-sea fleet, training fleet, maneuvering squadrons and training squadrons . In: Lexicon on German naval history . 2 volumes, Koehler: Herford 1977

Web link

Commons : Deep Sea Fleet - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

^ Jürgen Rohwer : Politics and Fleet Construction [1889–1914]. In: Elmar Potter / Chester Nimitz / Jürgen Rohwer (ed.): Seemacht: A naval war history from antiquity to the present. Pawlak: Herrsching 1982, pp. 315-342 - comparison table p. 294, dislocations graphics p. 323 (1904), p. 325 (1906), p. 327 (1908), p. 329 (1912). ISBN 3-88199-082-8 .
^ Ellery H Clark / Klaus Jürgen Müller: The First World War: The operations at the beginning of the war . In: Elmar Potter / Chester Nimitz / Jürgen Rohwer (ed.): Seemacht: A naval war history from antiquity to the present . Pawlak: Herrsching 1982, p. 345. ISBN 3-88199-082-8 .
^ Werner Rahn : The German naval warfare 1914-1918 . In: Stephan Huck / Gorch Pieken / Matthias Rogg (eds.): The fleet falls asleep in the harbor: Everyday life in the war 1914 - 1918 in sailors' diaries . Sandstone: Dresden 2014. ISBN 3-95498-095-9 .
↑ Werner Rahn: The influence of radio reconnaissance on German naval warfare. In: Winfried Heinemann (Ed.): Leadership and means of leadership . Military History Research Office: Potsdam 2011. ISBN 978-3-941571-14-3 .
↑ Frank Nägler : Battle of the Skagerrak 1916 . In: Stephan Huck / Gorch Pieken / Matthias Rogg (eds.): The fleet falls asleep in the harbor: Everyday life in the war 1914 - 1918 in sailors' diaries. Sandstein: Dresden 2014, p. 68. ISBN 3-95498-095-9 .

[1] Jürgen Rohwer : Politics and Fleet Construction [1889–1914]. In: Elmar Potter / Chester Nimitz / Jürgen Rohwer (ed.): Seemacht: A naval war history from antiquity to the present. Pawlak: Herrsching 1982, pp. 315-342 - comparison table p. 294, dislocations graphics p. 323 (1904), p. 325 (1906), p. 327 (1908), p. 329 (1912). ISBN 3-88199-082-8 .

[2] Ellery H Clark / Klaus Jürgen Müller: The First World War: The operations at the beginning of the war . In: Elmar Potter / Chester Nimitz / Jürgen Rohwer (ed.): Seemacht: A naval war history from antiquity to the present . Pawlak: Herrsching 1982, p. 345. ISBN 3-88199-082-8 .

[3] Werner Rahn : The German naval warfare 1914-1918 . In: Stephan Huck / Gorch Pieken / Matthias Rogg (eds.): The fleet falls asleep in the harbor: Everyday life in the war 1914 - 1918 in sailors' diaries . Sandstone: Dresden 2014. ISBN 3-95498-095-9 .

[4] Werner Rahn: The influence of radio reconnaissance on German naval warfare. In: Winfried Heinemann (Ed.): Leadership and means of leadership . Military History Research Office: Potsdam 2011. ISBN 978-3-941571-14-3 .

[5] Frank Nägler : Battle of the Skagerrak 1916 . In: Stephan Huck / Gorch Pieken / Matthias Rogg (eds.): The fleet falls asleep in the harbor: Everyday life in the war 1914 - 1918 in sailors' diaries. Sandstein: Dresden 2014, p. 68. ISBN 3-95498-095-9 .