Sea warfare in the First World War

The Skagerrak Battle can be interpreted as the "greatest naval battle in world history", but it did not change the overall strategic situation. In the picture, the Queen Mary explodes , only nine of the 1275 crew survived.

The submarine war developed into the most important facet of the naval war in World War I: sinking of a British cargo ship in the Mediterranean by the submarine U 35 in April 1917. U 35 sank no fewer than 226 ships and is therefore probably the most "successful" Warship of world history.

The naval war in World War I was fought on all oceans, but had its main focus in the North Sea .

Before 1914, many military officials and decision-makers ascribed a large or even decisive role to the war at sea . In fact, it was in the First World War not to universally expected decisive battle, although the Battle of Jutland as "the greatest naval battle of World History" rezipiert was. The naval war may not have been decisive in the outcome of the First World War, but its indirect effects were significant.

The blockade of the North Sea by the Royal Navy contributed to the exhaustion of the Central Powers , the blockades of the Baltic Sea and the Dardanelles played a major role in the defeat of the Russian army . Actions by the German Mediterranean Division prompted the Ottoman Empire to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. The cruiser war - the means of numerically inferior naval forces - had only an insignificant part of the war due to the lack of preparation on the part of the German admiralty and the lack of bases. Amphibious actions like the Battle of Gallipoli ended partly disastrously, partly like the Albion enterprise they were successful and models for actions of later wars. Unexpectedly, the submarine war emerged as the most important facet of naval warfare. Since the submarine was underestimated as a weapon on all sides, people were generally poorly prepared for the submarine war. Nevertheless, German submarines brought the Entente into serious trouble, especially in the first half of 1917. The submarine war, however, indirectly led to the entry of the United States into the war and thus ultimately to the defeat of the Central Powers. The order for the decisive battle at sea was not given until the Supreme Army Command had given up the war, and led to the Kiel sailors' uprising , which in turn triggered the November Revolution.

Strategic constellation

prehistory

The strategic considerations of both the British Royal Navy and the Imperial Navy - as the main enemy at sea - were strongly influenced by the work The Influence of Sea Power upon History by the American Alfred Thayer Mahan from 1890. Naval forces in the form of a battle fleet are here as regarded as an indispensable instrument of a great power, in the event of war, the battle decision was considered the royal road to attaining naval supremacy.

On the German side, in 1894 in the High Command of the Navy, with the significant participation of Alfred von Tirpitz, a concept was drawn up according to which the strategic offensive was the “natural destination of a fleet”, and that “the battle had to come as soon as possible”. Although there were (realistic) counter-proposals that aimed at a balanced defensive fleet with a strong cruiser component, they had no chance in view of the cognitive connection of the battle fleet with national prestige and the desired world power position. The cruiser war option also posed the problem of a lack of bases on the world's oceans. The Imperial Navy started from the idea that the Royal Navy would take an offensive action in a war against Germany according to old tradition and set up a blockade in the German Bight directly in front of the German North Sea coast. The Reichstag followed Tirpitz's corresponding demands with the naval laws of 1898 and 1900 and their amendments in 1906, 1908 and 1912, which ultimately triggered the German-British naval competition .

In 1899 Wilhelm II took over the supreme command of the Imperial Navy; thereupon the hitherto existing high command of the navy was dissolved, from this only the Admiral's staff directly subordinate to Wilhelm II remained, whose influence remained rather limited, not least due to the instigation of Tirpitz. In addition to the Admiral's staff, there were three other command authorities of the Imperial Navy: the Reichsmarineamt under Tirpitz as the operator of the battle fleet, the naval cabinet and the office of the inspector general of the navy . The fragmentation of the naval leadership without a commander-in-chief, comparable to the First Sea Lord in England, was a major disadvantage compared to the future enemy. It was not until much too late, in August 1918, that a unified leadership was to be created with the naval warfare .

The Dreadnought was the first ship of the new type of dreadnought named after her and is considered the prototype of all battleships of the 20th century

The German "answer" to the British dreadnought battleships were u. a. the "large line ships" of the Helgoland class and the turbine-powered Kaiser class . The Thuringia pictured took part in the Battle of the Skagerrak and sank the armored cruiser Black Prince .

The deep-sea fleet was also intended as a kind of substitute for an alliance that was intended to weaken Germany's increasing isolation. A fleet that developed from the sixth to the second strongest in the world (after Great Britain) within a few years, however, did not perceive foreign countries as defensive, but rather as a threat. The First Lord of the Admiralty Selborne said in the British Cabinet in 1902: "I am convinced that the large new German fleet is being built with a view to war with us." In Great Britain there was also concern about the fleet supremacy, all the more when Britain the two-Power standard (1889 two Power standard ) had set up, according to the British Navy next stronger the two must be grown; the British Naval Defense Act 1889 at the time was corresponding .

Since the First Morocco Crisis (1905–1906), the British Admiralty had come to believe that Germany was the only real danger. In the following period, the overseas squadrons under the leadership of the First Sea Lord Admiral John Fisher were reduced against the resistance of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Ministry and the presence in the North Sea was increasingly strengthened, what the British public called the "recall of the legions" and the end of the Pax Britannica has been interpreted.

Fisher pushed for the modernization of the fleet: 150 old ships were scrapped, with the HMS Dreadnought and the HMS Invincible (the latter sunk in the Skagerrakschlacht ) the new types of ships of the dreadnought or battleship and the battle cruiser were created, which put all previous ships of the line in the shade . However, this gave a new start to armaments, as the stocks of older liners were greatly devalued: Germany was thus able to reduce the gap to Great Britain.

The dreadnought type was also a consequence of the evaluation of the sea ​​battle at Tsushima , taking into account the fact that the battle was opened at a distance of over 8 km, so the main artillery was decisive, not the middle artillery - accordingly dispensed with the latter in favor of the heaviest artillery. The Imperial Navy, presumably based on the relevant combat analysis, also included the technically demanding turnaround in its exercise program, which saved it from the otherwise likely destruction in the Skagerrak Battle when it - like the Russian fleet in the naval battle of Tsushima - several times in the fatal crossing the T position.

In view of the German armament at sea, the two-power standard was abandoned in 1909 because it was financially impossible to build against Germany and the United States. Tirpitz's notion that England would not dare to endanger overseas interests for the sake of concentration in the North Sea proved to be a mistake. In particular, the Naval Scare of 1909 triggered the fateful naval battle.

In England, both the British public and politicians saw the equilibrium of power in Europe and British naval power inextricably linked. Edward Gray commented on this in 1912 before the Committee of Imperial Defense (national defense council):

“If […] a European conflict breaks out in which the struggle is obviously about supremacy in Europe, yes, that we are in the same situation again as in the days of Napoleon, then it is our business to take part in this war participate so that we can prevent a merger in Europe that would lead to the loss of our maritime domination. "

As early as January 3, 1906, the warning to Germany that Great Britain could not stand aside in a Franco-German war marked the end of splendid isolation . As early as 1908 and finally on August 23, 1911, during the Second Moroccan Crisis , the Committee of Imperial Defense decided in war planning that the Royal Navy should limit itself to keeping sea routes free, and amphibious operations on the German coast were excluded.

When the German Admiral's staff recognized this operational reorientation of the Royal Navy through an evaluation of the British naval maneuvers in 1912, Admiral's Chief of Staff August von Heeringen came to the realistic prognosis:

“If the English really do the long blockade with consistent restraint of their battle fleet, the role of our beautiful ocean-going fleet in the war can be a very sad one. Then the submarines will have to make it. "

However, no conclusions were drawn from this insight.

During the Second Moroccan Crisis, the British fleet was made ready for war and the government issued barely disguised warnings to Germany. Ultimately, it led to the initiation of naval talks between France and Great Britain, which resulted in a tacit agreement, later formalized in the Naval Convention of 1913, according to which the British would take over the protection of the French Channel and Atlantic coast in the event of war. France moved its entire battle fleet to the Mediterranean and took over the protection of the Suez Canal , which allowed the British to withdraw parts of the Mediterranean fleet to the Home Fleet .

Distance block

Due to its geostrategically advantageous location, Great Britain was able to block the North Sea in the English Channel and north at Scapa Flow with its superior fleet . The main bases of the Royal Navy are marked in red, those of the deep sea fleet in green.

Due to the geographical location, the British Admiralty was able to commit itself to a wide sea ​​blockade ("distance blockade") and thus avoid the risky narrow sea blockade of earlier wars. Shortly before the start of the war, the British Admiralty moved 21 dreadnoughts, eight pre-dreadnoughts and four battlecruisers to secure the northern exit of the North Sea to Scapa Flow and 19 pre-dreadnoughts to Portland to seal off the southern exit. The deep sea fleet, however, could only use 13 dreadnoughts, 16 pre-dreadnoughts and five battle cruisers.

A failure of the German fleet in the Atlantic via the northern route would have led to a sea battle under extremely unfavorable circumstances, and in the event of an advance through the English Channel , the Grand Fleet could shut off the retreat of the deep-sea fleet. The stationing of the fleet at the North Sea exits was the safest strategy imaginable for England, even if the public and the Navy itself expected the decisive great naval battle on both sides, which however did not occur. With this, however, the idea of ​​the German Admiralty to put the British fleet in a decisive battle in the German Bight - after being weakened beforehand by individual operations - had already failed.

As all the operational considerations of the German naval command had been concentrated on the all-important major battle, the actual aim of any naval warfare, the protection of one's own and the combat of the enemy sea connections, was largely out of focus. In view of the reality of the war, the strategic concept of the Imperial Navy brought naval warfare to the fore. Despite the foreseeable situation, the leadership had not adequately prepared for their use in terms of thought or material: A “ruthless mine and submarine offensive” was intended to balance forces afterwards the use of the deep sea fleet in a battle under favorable circumstances was planned, whereby it was still wrongly assumed that the Royal Navy would seek the confrontation in the southern North Sea - but also with the Royal Navy one believed that the deep sea fleet was itself against all reason would put the superior force in a great battle.

In addition, there was hardly any coordination with the Supreme Army Command in the first years of the war . For example, the deep-sea fleet did nothing to support the army with strategic pressure on the Allied supply lines in the English Channel. In addition, there were no corresponding requirements on the part of the army command, in response to inquiries from the navy command, the army command denied any need for support.

With a wrong strategic decision, the German deep sea fleet narrowed itself further: In order to prevent the British naval forces from breaking into the Baltic Sea, at the beginning of the war Denmark was asked to block the Belte , whereby the Reich leadership gave the assurance that the German naval forces would avoid the blocked sea areas would. With this waiver, the deep-sea fleet had severely restricted its maritime strategic options (advance in the northern area of ​​the North Sea), and an advance by the Royal Navy would probably have been an advantage given the strategic options provided by the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal .

SMS Ulan and SMS Zenta in action off Castellastua (Adria) on August 16, 1914, the SMS Zenta is sunk by French ships

The maritime strategic situation of the Austro-Hungarian Navy was even more unfortunate than that of the German deep-sea fleet. The main naval port of Pula was in the northernmost corner of the elongated Adriatic . The fleet could only have achieved strategic success on the Malta - Cape Matapan line , but the Austrian surface forces never got that far. The Allies blocked the Strait of Otranto ( Otranto Barrier ), the Italians had already taken the Vlora opposite Otranto in December 1914 before entering the war . There were just as little momentous or decisive operations in the Adriatic as in the North Sea, as the Allies saw no need to bring about a decisive battle here either. In 1914 the French advanced several times into the Adriatic Sea, primarily to bring aid to the allied Montenegro by sea. In December 1914, the French battleship Jean Bart was torpedoed by the Austrian submarine U 12 ; since then the French have ceased their advances. After Italy entered the war there was a major attack on the Italian coast, but this was not followed by any further major attacks and, above all, none with strategic effects. By blocking the Strait of Otranto, the Austrian Navy was limited to actions within the Adriatic and could have practically no influence on the course of the war.

The blockade of the Baltic Sea and the Dardanelles played a major role in the exhaustion of Russia in the course of the war: 70 percent of imports into the Tsarist Empire went through the Baltic Sea before the war, while the remaining 30 percent predominantly crossed the Black Sea . These routes for imports and for Allied aid deliveries were blocked during the war.

Strategic stalemate of the battle fleets

The modern German ocean-going fleet and its opponent ...

... the numerically superior Grand Fleet

In all theaters of war there was a clear superiority of one side: England over Germany in the North Sea, Germany over Russia in the Baltic Sea (in fact), France and Italy over Austria-Hungary in the Mediterranean Sea (except the Adriatic Sea) and Russia (since late 1915) over the Turkey in the Black Sea, although Turkey still managed to block the Black Straits. The seas were predominantly space for the war fleets, merchant ships and troop transports of the Entente, but not for those of the Central Powers.

The main task of the Royal Navy was to block German maritime traffic overseas, to protect the British Isles against an enemy invasion or extensive bombardment and, above all, to secure its own sea connections. The British were not averse to a great naval battle because of their superiority, but they were by no means willing to jeopardize the naval dominance that was exercised even without a battle.

For the German deep-sea fleet, the problem was the other way round: their only chance of winning was a decisive naval battle, but given the balance of power, the fleet management did not dare to do so. Destroying the high seas fleet would have given the Royal Navy undreamt-of options for action, including amphibious action in the rear of the German front; the high seas fleet protected the northern flank of the empire. Even Tirpitz wanted to allow a sea battle only up to a maximum distance of 100 nautical miles from Heligoland . Winston Churchill , First Lord of the Admiralty since 1911, ruled on this on October 8, 1914:

"In my opinion, the enemy is pursuing a wise policy, if he refuses the battle, by holding back his fleet in the port, he is securing German naval dominance in the Baltic Sea with everything that rests on it by threatening the Russian wing, protects the German coast and secures supplies from Sweden and Norway. "

In October 1914 the British General Staff feared an attack by the deep-sea fleet in the Canal at a favorable moment, and there were always several. On the one hand, these favorable moments were not recognized because the Germans, in contrast to the British, were largely in the dark about the enemy fleet's strength. In contrast, the British were able to fall back on an excellent messaging, listening and decoding system (e.g. in Room 40 ). Another problem was that from around 1900 the growing German fleet played an important role in the self-portrayal of the empire and, above all, of the emperor. At the request of Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl to release the fleet for the decisive battle, the Kaiser expressly reserved the order for the fleet to be deployed, and the fleet also had to avoid actions "that could lead to greater losses". After the unsuccessful naval battle near Heligoland and especially after the battle on the Doggerbank , the emperor issued even more restrictive instructions, Ingenohl had to go.

A strategic stalemate ensued in the North Sea: “Each side wanted to engage in a sea battle under conditions that it had chosen itself, under conditions that were unfavorable for the enemy and therefore caused him not to accept the battle. Only on a few occasions in the course of the First World War was this mutual insistence on 'safety first' given up - and then usually by the Germans, who had everything to lose and nothing to gain from the stalemate on the maritime strategy. While the English were more and more careful not to go into the North Sea with their valuable warships out of fear of the submarines, the Germans did the same out of fear of being defeated by superior surface forces ”.

Since there were more warships under construction in Great Britain than in Germany at the beginning of the war, the superiority grew with the length of the war. The English capital ships had a larger gun caliber on average, a mostly higher speed and a larger radius of action. In the course of the war it turned out that the German ships had greater stability and greater safety against sinking, and the effect of the German tank explosive shells was greater, but this could not compensate for the disadvantages in the general balance of power.

Unintentionally there was the only massive clash between the two fleets in the Skagerrak Battle , which was interpreted as a German victory due to the higher losses of the numerically superior British fleet, but did not change the strategic location. This is what Admiral Reinhard Scheer's final report to the Kaiser on the Battle of the Skagerrak said:

“There can be no doubt that even the happiest outcome of a high seas battle will not force England to peace in this war: the disadvantages of our military-geographical position compared to that of the island kingdom and the great material superiority of the enemy will not be offset to the same extent by the fleet that we can master the blockade directed against us or the island kingdom ourselves. "

Following a near-collision between the English and German fleets on August 19, 1916, British Admiral John Jellicoe decided to allow the Grand Fleet to sail into the North Sea only with adequate destroyer protection. After this collision, the German Admiral Scheer stated that the deep-sea fleet could not venture out without a sufficient number of submarines. The submarines were supposed to clear up and weaken the superior enemy battle fleet.

These submarines were withdrawn from Scheer after the near-collision in order to disrupt the British trade with them. The naval war in the North Sea practically came to a standstill for the battle fleets in autumn 1916.

For the Royal Navy this meant a not insignificant decline in its reputation: Compared to the battle of the army, the contribution of the navy seemed little glorious. The sea blockade was also only one piece of the mosaic to victory, since overseas imports and the colonies were not as important for Germany as they were for England, as German foreign trade was or could be concentrated mainly on mainland Europe. But the reputation of the deep-sea fleet also suffered from inaction, which was further reduced by the mutiny in November 1918. “The Imperial German fleet did not fail technically and tactically in the Skagerrak battle, the hour of probation, but strategically it turned out to be a failure, because it could neither prevent Great Britain from entering the war nor intervene effectively in the struggle for the German colonial empire bring about a decision against Great Britain in the North Sea. "

In the Baltic Sea - the main area of ​​activity of the deep sea fleet in the last two years of the war - it was used successfully in the struggle for coastal areas and islands. Due to the use of the deep sea fleet in the Baltic Sea given by the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal , the Russian Navy was on the defensive from the start, despite its numerical superiority (compared to the actual German Baltic Sea contingent). The important iron ore deliveries from northern Sweden to Germany were thus able to run undisturbed across the Baltic Sea.

In the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean division of the Imperial Navy - consisting only of the large cruiser ( battle cruiser ) SMS Goeben and the small cruiser SMS Breslau - made a significant contribution to the Ottoman Empire entering the war on the side of the Central Powers. The German ships were able to prevent a clear superiority of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea until 1915; only at the end of 1915 did the Russian Black Sea fleet receive two modern capital ships, which guaranteed the superiority of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea until 1917.

The British blockade led to deficiencies in the Central Powers, the successes of the submarines drained the British substance, but neither the blockade nor the trade war were decisive in the course of the war, the collapse of tsarist Russia may be an exception. The pre-war role of the battleship as the main weapon and the submarine as an auxiliary weapon had been turned into its opposite.

Cruiser war

The Dresden in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal . The Dresden escaped thanks to the through the turbine drive -related greater speed is the only ship of the destruction of the German East Asia Squadron in the Battle of the Falkland Islands

The destroyed cruiser Königsberg in the Rufiji Delta off German East Africa , July 1915. The Royal Navy used a ship of the line , nine cruisers , two monitors , an auxiliary cruiser and six aircraft to pursue the ship .

Larger ships were mainly the East Asia Squadron and individual ships such as the Königsberg and the Karlsruhe overseas. In the German colonies there were several smaller gunboats, a well-known case is the barge Graf Goetzen , which is still sailing on Lake Tanganyika . However, these boats could not be used in naval warfare and were mostly sunk by their crews in the first months of the war.

The East Asia Squadron was intended for the cruiser war , which theoretically would have been very promising due to the large number of potential targets. Correspondingly, the British, who were much more dependent on imports than Germany, pursued German warships overseas. The main problem for a cruiser war was the lack of bases for coal, bringing in the prizes , repairs and supplies of food, etc. A cruiser war had also hardly been prepared in the German naval war planning, one was fixated on the great naval battle in the North Sea and assessed the cruiser war as a solution to the problem, saw only the tonnage result and coastal bombardments, without paying attention to the enormous diversion effect (i.e. the diversion of the enemy from his war aims by the opening of further theaters of war).

Routes and stations of the German East Asia Squadron 1914–1915

As Japan entered the war on the side of the Allies in August 1914 and the siege of Tsingtau began, the East Asia Squadron had lost its base and marched from the East Asian region towards the eastern Pacific. Vice-Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee did not want to engage in a cruiser war in the narrower sense, according to the general way of thinking in the Imperial Navy, but instead wanted to take action against military objects in a closed formation. Spee therefore only dismissed the small cruiser Emden for the cruiser war , which the Emden waged very successfully (23 merchant ships brought up, 2 warships sunk). The squadron was perceived by the Allies as a considerable threat, which intensified after the sea ​​battle at Coronel , which was successful for the East Asia squadron , so that the Royal Navy had to send heavy units to the South Atlantic, where it took the East Asian squadron to the Falkland Islands in the sea ​​battle in the Falkland Islands Destroyed Dresden . The Emden had already been sunk on November 9th , the Dresden followed in March 1915 and the Königsberg in July 1915. The Karlsruhe , one of the most modern and fastest ships of the Imperial Navy, sank 14 merchant ships, but exploded in the November 1914. Winston Churchill commented on the general and fast German cruiser disaster as follows:

“With the Battle of the Falkland Islands the cleansing of the world's oceans was complete, and soon the German flag had ceased to fly on any vehicle in any corner of the world, with the exception of the landlocked waters of the Baltic and Black Seas and the defended area the Helgoland Bay. "

Oil tanks set on fire by the Emden near Madras, September 1914

The German cruisers were (militarily) successful, tied up numerous enemy ships and shot at several coastal towns. The latter included:

• the ports of Bône and Philippeville in Algeria (bombardment by Goeben and Breslau , August 4, 1914)
• the port of Zanzibar (attack by Koenigsberg , September 20, 1914, sinking of the British cruiser Pegasus )
• the roadstead of Papeete on Tahiti (attack by Gneisenau and Scharnhorst , September 22, 1914, sinking of the French gunboat Zelee )
• the oil plants near Madras in India (bombardment by the Emden , 23 September 1914)
• the port of Penang in Malaysia (attack by the Emden , October 28, 1914, sinking of the Russian cruiser Shemchug and the French torpedo boat destroyer Mousquet )
• the port of Orleans on the east coast of the United States (attack by the U-cruiser U 156 , July 21, 1918, see also: attack on Orleans ).

From mid-1915, however, the cruiser war was only carried out rudimentarily by a few auxiliary cruisers , which were very successful in isolated cases (such as the Möve or the Wolf ), but due to their small number no longer posed a serious threat to Allied shipping as a whole. In the absence of bases to supply coal, a sailing ship, the Seeadler , was converted into an auxiliary cruiser, one of the last sailing ships in the war. The recourse to a sailing ship also made clear the helpless situation of the German surface ships on the world's oceans.

Submarine war

War zone of the German submarines on February 18, 1915

U 9 ​​also had a kerosene drive whose white plume of smoke made it easy to locate the boats when they were crossing the water. U 9 was nevertheless one of the most successful submarines of the war

German submarines in the home port of Kiel, in the foreground (from left to right): U 22 , U 20 , U 19 and U 21

The Austrian submarine U-12 entering the port of Pula

May 27, 1915, Battle of Gallipoli : Sinking of the Majestic by the German submarine U 21

German submarine type UC I , used from 1915

A built towards the end of the war, long-range submarine - minelayer of Class II UE for use off the American coast

Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz initially thought little of submarines and remained fixated on the battle fleet at the beginning of the war. The first war submarines were built in Germany for the Russian Navy, only then did the Imperial Navy order the first submarine for its own Navy, the U 1 built in 1904/5 (today in the Deutsches Museum ). By the start of the war, 28 submarines were in service, most of them still equipped with petroleum engines. Only the boats from U 19 onwards got diesel engines , the development of diesel engines should bring a considerable development boost through the use in submarines up to 1918.

→ Main article : Diesel engines for submarines of the Imperial Navy

Tirpitz only wanted to use the submarines as support for the deep sea fleet. One also did not think of an operation against merchant ships because they did not appear suitable to carry out a cruiser war according to the price order. A rethink began when the U 17 succeeded in doing just that in October 1914 and U-Boats had also achieved several spectacular successes against warships (sinking of the British armored cruisers Aboukir , Hogue and Cressy by U 9 in a naval battle on September 22, 1914 ). Against this background, people began to think about the submarine as a trade weapon (" submarine war "). On February 4, 1915, a war zone around the British Isles was declared, in which not only enemy ships but also neutral merchant ships could be attacked. On February 18, the attacks were to begin according to the prize order, although attacks could also be carried out without warning under certain conditions. In May 1915 the U 20 sank the Lusitania and in August 1915 the U 24 sank the Arabic , American citizens died on both ships - especially on the Lusitania . Due to the American protests, the Kaiser ordered on May 13, 1915, neutral ships and enemy passenger steamers to be spared, and on September 18, the unrestricted submarine war over the British Isles to end. In the Mediterranean, on the other hand, it was continued with a few boats but considerable numbers of kills.

In view of the increasing armament of merchant ships and the use of submarine traps , Tirpitz called for unrestricted submarine warfare (especially sinking without warning), which the government did not want to allow. At the beginning of March 1916, a campaign initiated by the Reichsmarineamt began by sections of the press in favor of unlimited submarine warfare ("Better war with America than starve"), which, however, annoyed the emperor seriously, so that Tirpitz received a sharp cabinet letter on March 5th : The emperor had the impression

“That a systematic hate speech has been initiated in the sense of urging the Reich government into ruthless submarine warfare. His Majesty regards this as an unheard-of procedure, which in the last instance exposes the person of the emperor as the supreme leader of imperial politics and warfare in front of the whole people. "

Since he was also able to prove incorrect information about the number of operational submarines, Tirpitz had to resign on March 15, 1916 from his post. Nonetheless, just two weeks later, a German submarine torpedoed the British passenger steamer Sussex because it was mistaken for a mine-layer, resulting in another sharp American note.

In the autumn of 1915 and 1916, however, the submarines were only used in the context of naval operations, although the successes were relatively minor - not least because the British intelligence service was able to decipher the German radio signals (e.g. in Room 40 ) and so often via the Positions of the submarines was informed.

Even before the Battle of the Skagerrak it had become clear that the German Reich could only survive the global naval war if the vital transatlantic connections of the British Isles could be interrupted. As things stood, only submarines came into question. This insight deepened with the Battle of the Skagerrak, which, despite the happy outcome, revealed the strategic dilemma of the battle fleet. Scheer now felt compelled to write a memorandum in which he recommended the concentration of all maritime forces on unrestricted submarine warfare. As early as April 1916, the head of the OHL, Erich von Falkenhayn, had been urging the Kaiser to engage in submarine warfare, otherwise he would have to adjust to the "war of exhaustion" and give up the battle for Verdun .

Because of the deteriorated overall military situation and the relatively high number of operational submarines at the beginning of 1917, the Admiral's staff offered an alleged solution: If unrestricted submarine warfare was released, England could “in.” With sinking rates of more than 600,000 GRT per month within five months the knees “be forced even before a possible entry into the war by the USA could have an impact. The Supreme Army Command urged the government to reopen unlimited submarine warfare: Henning von Holtzendorff , Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff agreed to finally wrest the Kaiser’s consent to unlimited submarine warfare and to overthrow Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg , if he refuses. Above all, the military stated that militarily in France, due to a lack of crews, only more defense was possible and that in 1917 the overall situation was expected to deteriorate. On January 8, 1917, the Kaiser agreed; On January 9, the Chancellor once again put forward all the opposing reasons, but, in contrast to the discussions in 1915 and 1916, no longer raised any fundamental objections. On January 9, 1917, the Privy Council decided to open the unrestricted submarine war on February 1, 1917 without further negotiations or advance notice. On January 31, the neutrals received a short corresponding notification, which on February 3 immediately led to the breakdown of diplomatic relations by the USA and together with other incidents (e.g. Zimmermann dispatch ) and sinkings for the American declaration of war on April 6, 1917 led - ultimately the submarine war was counterproductive for Germany, since a complete victory of the Entente after the departure of Russia would have been questionable without the entry of the USA .

The targeted 600,000 GRT the submarines only reached in two (or according to other information: three) months (April, May, June 1917). The Allied losses were enormous in the first half of 1917, Winston Churchill later wrote:

“In 1917 the threat posed by submarines took on enormous, terrible dimensions [...]. The throttling of shipping was acute [...] our production completely dependent on the available tonnage [...] even though the Allies could not hope to win in the country in 1917 [...] there was no risk of ruin in France; the bugbear lurked below sea level. "

In April 1917, the First Sea Lord John Jellicoe stated :

"The Germans will win if we don't put an end to these losses."

Defense measures and, above all, the introduction of the convoy system increasingly reduced the losses of the Allies, while at the same time the losses of submarines increased. In the last five months of the war, the submarines were only able to sink an average of 177,000 GRT per month (record month April 1917: 841,118 GRT). The German submarines had previously sunk merchant ships with their on-board cannons, usually in surface travel. Only a relatively small number of shells per merchant ship was necessary for this, so that a single submarine could sink many merchant ships (the record is 54 merchant ships sunk in the course of a single patrol and was set by U 35 ). After the introduction of the convoy system, the only option left for the German submarines was to attack with torpedoes. However, since the submarine types of that time could only carry very few torpedoes (depending on the type there were only 2 to 16 torpedoes on board), it was inevitable that the same high level of sinking results could never be achieved. In addition, an underwater attack using torpedoes was significantly more complex and difficult to carry out than an above water attack using an on-board cannon.

A total of 380 German submarines put into service sank in addition to many warships at least 5,554 Allied and neutral merchant ships with 12,191,996 GRT. The Imperial Navy lost 187 submarines. The German submarines were able to sink 38 percent of the British trading tonnage in 1914 (7.75 million tons). The boat U 35 sank 224 merchant ships and two warships alone, making it probably the most successful warship in world history.

course

1914

The balance of power at sea was as follows in 1914 (the numbers differ in the literature due to different counting methods):

Ship type	Great Britain	Germany	France	Austria-Hungary	Russia	Japan	Italy	United States
Battleships	20th	15th	4th	3	0	2	4th	10
Battle cruiser	9	4th	0	0	0	2	0	0
Ships of the line	40	22nd	20th	12	12	14th	12	25th
Armored cruiser	34	9	22nd	3	6th	13	14th	17th
Protected cruisers	73	41	12	9	8th	18th	11	17th
destroyer	256	149	84	33	103	49	63	61
Submarines	78	28	55	6th	28	15th	20th	38

The battleship Audacious struck a German mine on October 27, 1914 and sank.

The Japanese liner Suwō , flagship of the siege of Tsingtau

The Scharnhorst , the flagship of the German East Asia Squadron

The East Asia Squadron (in the background) leaving Valparaíso (Chile) after the sea ​​battle at Coronel

Mainly the Imperial Navy of Germany and the Grand Fleet of Great Britain faced each other on the world's oceans . Due to the overwhelming power of British ships, the Germans could not go on the offensive in 1914, and the British took control of large parts of the North Sea . They initiated a sea ​​blockade to separate Germany from all overseas approaches. Furthermore, the control of the sea area enabled the British expeditionary force to cross the English Channel undisturbed. Heligoland in particular was equipped with a strong coastal defense and thus secured the German Bight together with the deep sea fleet .

The German Navy began the sea war on August 2nd in the Baltic Sea with the laying of mines off Libau and the bombardment of Russian ammunition depots by the small cruisers SMS Augsburg and SMS Magdeburg . On August 3, the Imperial Government published the German Prize Regulations .

On August 4, the Mediterranean Division , the battle cruiser Goeben and the small cruiser Breslau , shelled transport ships and port facilities near Bône and Philippeville on the Algerian coast. The ships then docked in Messina for carburizing and left there on August 6th. Since, due to the great superiority of the French and British fleets in the Mediterranean, neither the breakthrough to the Atlantic nor to the Austrian naval port of Pula appeared possible, Admiral Chief of Staff Hugo von Pohl sent the ships to Istanbul on Tirpitz 's advice to influence Turkey's attitude towards entering the war. In Turkey there was a predominantly German-friendly mood and, above all, outrage that the Royal Navy had confiscated two battleships built for Turkey and also almost paid for from donations from the people.

In the North Sea on August 5th, the auxiliary mine-layer Queen Luise advanced against the Thames estuary and was there u. a. Sunk by the cruiser Amphion , the Amphion sank the next day through the mines laid by Queen Luise .

On August 6, Denmark announced the closure of the Great and Little Belts and the Danish part of the Øresund through its own mine locks.

According to the Franco-English naval convention of August 6, the French took over the protection of the sea route to India through the Suez Canal and the transport of troops from North Africa to France as well as the blockade of the Austrian Navy in the Adriatic Sea and the security of the access routes for Montenegro and Serbia .

The first loss of a German submarine ( SM U 13 ) took place on August 9, 1914, the sister boat SM U 15 sank just three days later.

The German Mediterranean division, pursued by superior British and French forces, escaped to the Dardanelles between August 6 and 10 , the Ottoman Empire formally bought the two ships on August 16, the Goeben became the Sultan Selim Yavuz , and the Breslau the Midilli . The German crew stayed on board.

On August 14, the cruiser SMS Emden began the independent cruiser war.

On August 15, the Japanese government issued an ultimatum to the German Reich, according to which all German warships were to be withdrawn from Chinese and Japanese waters and Tsingtau or Kiautschou to be handed over to the Japanese. After the ultimatum expired on August 23, Japan declared war on the German Reich, and the blockade of Tsingtau from the sea began on August 27. The East Asia Squadron was at Pagan , but no longer had a base. The siege of Tsingtau began on September 13th (Tsingtau surrendered on November 7th).

On August 26, 1914, the small cruiser Magdeburg ran aground off Odensholm , whereby the signal books of the Imperial Navy fell into the hands of the Russian army, the copies also passed on to the British (" Room 40 "). In terms of communications technology, this gave the Allies a head start that was to last throughout the war.

On August 28, the British undertook a surprising advance against the outpost lines in the German Bight , which resulted in the first sea ​​battle at Heligoland, which was costly for the German deep-sea fleet . As a result, Kaiser Wilhelm II, as the supreme commander of the fleet, ordered the future restraint and avoidance of actions that could lead to greater losses (October 1).

The submarines first demonstrated their efficiency with the sinking of the protected cruiser Pathfinder by U 21 on September 5th: The Pathfinder was the first ship at sea to be sunk by a submarine with a torpedo. On September 13, the British submarine E9 sank the German small cruiser Hela . A "big bang" provided U 9 on 22 September with the sinking of three British armored cruisers of Cressy class within an hour, even on the next patrol boat also was on October 15 in front of Aberdeen British protected cruiser Hawke sink. This sensational success proved the dangerousness of the weapon, which was underestimated before the war.

The British Glitra was the first merchant ship sunk by a German submarine ( SM U 17 ) on October 20 ; it was placed, boarded and sunk shortly before the Norwegian coast in accordance with the price regulation .

On October 27, one of the largest and most modern British battleships, the HMS Audacious , ran into a German mine and sank. The British Admiralty kept the loss a secret in order not to risk an attack by the short-term almost equally strong deep-sea fleet (several heavy British ships were on the way to combat the German East Asia Squadron in the Atlantic). However, the German Admiralty knew nothing of the temporary weakness.

On October 28, the Emden shelled the port facilities of Penang (Malakka Street) and sank the Russian small cruiser Schemchug and the French destroyer Mousquet there . From October 27 to 31, the Yawuz and Midilli (formerly Goeben and Breslau ) shelled Sevastopol , Odessa , Novorossiysk and Feodosia . The action of the ships still sailing with German occupation was covered by War Minister Enver Pascha , who thus created facts for the Ottoman Empire's favored entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, but not by the entire Turkish government. The Russian envoys asked for their passports on October 28th, and on October 29th the Ottoman Empire was officially at war.

On October 30, British naval forces discovered the berth of the SMS Königsberg off Zanzibar in their hiding place in the Rufiji estuary and fought it with considerable effort, but for a long time unsuccessfully (it was not until July 11, 1915 that its own crew abandoned it and blew up the guns were expanded and used by the German troops in German East Africa).

The German East Asia Squadron, led by Vice Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee, sank two British armored cruisers in the sea ​​battle near Coronel on November 1 , whereupon the British sent a formation with heavy units towards the Falkland Islands , fearing that von Spee could attack the port of Stanley and endanger maritime traffic in the Atlantic.

The British government announced on November 2 that it viewed the entire North Sea as a war zone and thus a no- shipping zone , while Britain expanded the contraband list to include food. Neutral ships were also subject to the control regulations.

German offensive undertakings against the English coast in November and December 1914

German battle cruisers shelled the British coast near Yarmouth and Lowestoft on November 3, 1914 , the first offensive operation of the German deep-sea fleet. Also on November 3, the British declared the entire North Sea and the waters around Iceland and southern Norway a war zone. In view of the British threat of an “economic strangulation through blockade” (Winston Churchill on November 9, 1914) and the success of the submarines, there was increasing concern in Germany about a trade war with submarines.

On November 4th, the German small cruiser Karlsruhe was lost under unexplained circumstances, on November 7th Tsingtau surrendered , on November 9th the cruiser Emden near the Cocos Islands was destroyed by the Australian light cruiser Sydney .

In the overseas war, superior British battlecruisers (the Inflexible and the Invincible ) and other warships destroyed the German East Asia Squadron in a naval battle near the Falkland Islands . When von Spee, contrary to the advice of his commanders, called at the Falkland Islands on December 8th, a British superior force awaited him there. In the ensuing battle, the British sank practically the entire squadron, only the small cruiser Dresden escaped.

German battle cruisers under Rear Admiral Franz von Hipper shelled Hartlepool , Scarborough and Whitby on December 16, 1914 .

1915

The submarine U 24 sank the British pre-dreadnought battleship Formidable in the English Channel on New Year's Day . Even though only three merchant ships were sunk by submarines in 1914, Admiral Hugo von Pohl suggested in a memorandum of January 7 that unrestricted submarine war should be opened in the medium term.

The heavily damaged lion in the battle on the Doggerbank after depiction of the marine painter Willy Stöwer . The Lion was repaired, but was also badly hit in the Battle of the Skagerrak.

Sinking of the German great cruiser Blücher in battle on the Dogger Bank , the crew tries to save themselves in the picture over the ship's walls - one of the most famous war photographs of all. 792 sailors died and 260 were rescued.

The decryption of the German radio telegraphic messages led to the battle on the Dogger Bank on January 24 , in which the German fleet suffered a heavy defeat and lost the large cruiser SMS Blücher , but otherwise managed to escape the superior force. The battle also revealed weaknesses in the British fleet, which almost resulted in the loss of the HMS Lion . Since the squadron leader David Beatty left the badly damaged Lion and transferred his command to the HMS Princess Royal , the confusion that resulted in errors in the transmission of commands, so that Admiral Franz von Hipper managed to escape. The outcome of the battle led to the replacement of fleet chief Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl on February 2nd, who was succeeded by Admiral Hugo von Pohl . The technical consequences of the German fleet were the improvement of turret armor and protection against cartridge fires.

On January 30, the German submarine SM U 20 sank two British merchant ships in the English Channel for the first time without warning, thus reaching a new level of escalation. Until then, the submarines stopped the ships and allowed the crew to disembark before sinking.

War zone around the British Isles in an Austrian newspaper, February 1915

On February 4, the official announcement of the submarine war against merchant ships, which was to begin on February 18 as a countermeasure to the British blockade, the waters around Great Britain and Ireland were declared a war zone. On February 28, the submarine trade war began. However, there were only 21 operational submarines available, of which a third was usually on arrival and on repair. In March, only 21 merchant ships could be sunk in this way. There were also numerous protest notes from neutral states, which had previously protested against the British blockade, but were now directly threatened. The United States stated precisely in its note that the German government would be made “strictly responsible” “if an American ship or the lives of American citizens were to be destroyed”.

Battle of Gallipoli : The Irresistible sank on March 18, 1915 after running aground on a mine.

The British Council of War had decided on January 13, 1915 on the initiative of Winston Churchill to "bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as a further target". On February 19 and 25, the Battle of Gallipoli began with a major attack by the British and French fleets. With the exception of the HMS Inflexible, which had already been badly damaged on March 18, and the HMS Queen Elizabeth, these were ships from the second battle line, as the German deep sea fleet forced the Royal Navy to leave the most modern ships in the North Sea. The Turkish batteries were badly hit, but landings by sailors and marines on March 1st and 4th did not bring the desired results. On March 18, the ships began a new major attack against the Dardanelles fortifications, the Turkish coastal batteries responded and a French ship of the line sank immediately after the attack began. Two British ships of the line followed due to the effects of the mines, two more French ships of the line and the only British battle cruiser - the HMS Inflexible - were badly damaged. This caused the British Council of War to stop the attacks for the time being. At that time, the Turkish coastal batteries had hardly any ammunition, and the mine supplies were also used up.

On March 14, the last cruiser of the East Asia Squadron , the SMS Dresden , was discovered in the neutral Chilean territorial waters of the Robinson Crusoe Island by the British cruisers HMS Kent and HMS Glasgow , shot at and sunk by the crew itself.

The British submarine HMS E17 was the first to break through the closed Dardanelles. It then went on missions in the Black Sea against Turkish shipping.

Painting of the sinking Lusitania

On May 7, the German U-boat sank SM U-20 , the RMS Lusitania , which an international wave of protests triggered. Although the German Embassy in Washington had warned against using the Lusitania for crossing and American citizens were forbidden to travel on ships of warring states during the war, over 200 Americans were on board the ship when it was on May 1, 1915 Left New York Harbor . When the passenger ship, which also carried ammunition and explosives, was sunk on May 7th, 1,198 passengers and crew members died, including 79 children and 127 Americans (the information on the number of Americans and children who died varies in the literature, so it is 94 children were mentioned.) There was outrage in America, followed by an exchange of notes between the American and German governments.

On May 18, 1915, Winston Churchill resigned as First Lord of the Admiralty (Minister of the Navy), as the Conservatives demanded this after their participation in government. The background was the foreseeable defeat at the Battle of Gallipoli and the related resignation of fleet chief John Fisher three days earlier.

Italy entered the war on May 23, the entire Austrian Navy attacked the east coast of Italy on the same day: Ancona , Rimini , Senigallia , and the Potenza estuary were shot at, the Austrian ships returned without losses.

The German submarines received the order on June 6th not to sink any more large passenger steamers.

On July 2, there was a clash of lighter German and Russian-British units near Gotland (“ Gotland Raid ” or “Seegefecht von Gotland”), which ended with losses for the German unit.

On July 11th, the German crew sank the small cruiser SMS Königsberg , which had been shot by British ships, in the Rufiji estuary (see October 30, 1914), but the main guns were dismantled and later used for German land missions in East Africa.

Two advances into the Riga Bay of the German Baltic Sea forces in conjunction with parts of the deep-sea fleet between August 6 and 20 brought the German fleet higher losses than the Russian one and no concrete success.

On August 13, the German submarine UB 14 sank the British troop carrier Royal Edward in the eastern Aegean .

On August 19, the German submarine U 24 sank the British passenger steamer Arabic off the Irish coast without warning . 44 people were killed, including two Americans. As a result, the government severely restricted the submarine warfare over the British Isles in order to avoid further foreign policy conflicts, and passenger steamers of any size were no longer allowed to be attacked.

On the same day (August 19) the so-called Baralong incident occurred , the sinking of the German submarine SM U 27 by the British submarine trap Baralong in the waters south of the Irish city of Queenstown (now Cobh). A British auxiliary cruiser disguised as a merchant ship and sailing under the American flag shot the German submarine incapacitated, the commander of the Baralong then had all the survivors of the submarine crew shot by his crew. With regard to the allegations regarding the German warfare - especially in Belgium - the sea war crime was highlighted by the German government, and notes were exchanged for months.

On the morning of October 23, the Prinz Adalbert was hit with a torpedo by the British submarine E8 about 20 nautical miles from Libau . The torpedo hit the ammunition magazine in the bow. The explosion tore the ship in two, which immediately sank. Only three men of the 675-strong crew could be saved.

On November 5, the German submarine U 35 attacked the Gulf of Sollum in Egypt . The auxiliary cruiser Tara and the gunboat Abbas were sunk (→ action by SM U 35 in the Gulf of Sollum ). The German submarine U 38 sailing under the Austrian flag sank on 7./8. November the Italian Ancona , with 25 (according to other information nine) Americans are killed. There followed an exchange of notes between the American and Austrian governments.

Allied ships began disembarking the Serbian army from Albania on December 12th.

On December 19, the Allies began to clear the Gallipoli peninsula (until January 9, 1916), thus ending the Battle of Gallipoli .

1916

The Sussex torpedoed on March 24th shows the devastating effects of torpedoes on unarmored ships

The bombardment of Lowestoft on April 25, 1916 after a painting by marine painter Hans Bohrdt

Skagerrak Battle : The torpedo hit on the Seydlitz shows how dangerous the weapon is, even for very large and heavily armored ships

One of the 8,648 dead in the Skagerrak battle : Gorch Fock sank on June 1st with the SMS Wiesbaden .

The largest (originally) civilian ship sunk in the war was the HMHS Britannic , a sister ship of the Titanic, which ran into a mine on November 21, 1916 .

Great Britain ended its submarine campaign against Turkish shipping in the Black Sea on January 2nd: 50 percent of Turkish merchant ships were sunk.

Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer became the new commander of the ocean-going fleet on January 24th due to the death of Admiral von Pohl the day before.

On February 1, a German zeppelin succeeded for the first time in sinking a British merchant ship from the air in the English Channel.

The submarine trade war resumed on February 29, with passenger ships expressly excluded. On March 24, the commander of the UB 29 submarine mistook the passenger steamer Sussex in the English Channel for a mine-layer and torpedoed it, which also harmed American citizens. An ultimate note from the American government followed.

Because of the involvement of the press in support of his demand for unrestricted submarine warfare, Minister of the Navy Alfred von Tirpitz was reprimanded by the government and the Kaiser and resigned on March 17th.

On March 22, the Q-ship Farnborough sank a German submarine ( SM U 68 ) with artillery and depth charges for the first time .

Due to the US Sussex protest and fear of US entry into the war, the submarine trade war against the British Isles was stopped again on April 24th. On the morning of April 25, four German battlecruisers shelled the ports of Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft as part of a large-scale advance by the deep sea fleet on the same day .

On 31 May and 1 June it came to the Battle of Jutland (ger .: "Battle of Jutland"). The German fleet chief Scheer wanted to lure the English battlecruiser squadron stationed in Rosyth under David Beatty into an ambush before the bulk of the British fleet from Scapa Flow under Admiral John Jellicoe could appear. However, the plan was not feasible due to the superior British intelligence service (deciphering of the radio signals e.g. in " Room 40 "). After the unexpected appearance of the superior Grand Fleet, the German fleet came into the critical “ Crossing the T ” several times , but was not only able to get ahead with tactical skill - especially with the “ turnaround ” that the British did not consider possible - and with luck bring the British superiority to safety, but despite the numerical inferiority of the Royal Navy cause higher losses than the other way around: On larger ships, the Royal Navy lost the three battle cruisers Queen Mary , Indefatigable and Invincible with practically the entire crew as well as the armored cruisers Defense , Warrior and Black Prince . 6097 British sailors were killed. The German deep sea fleet lost the SMS Lützow (self-sinking, the crew could be saved) and the older Pomeranian ship of the line (no survivors) to larger ships . 2551 German sailors lost their lives, including the writer Gorch Fock . In terms of the tonnage of the ships involved (approx. 1.8 million tons displacement ), the "largest naval battle in world history" did not change the strategic location . In his final report on the battle, Scheer recommended the resumption of submarine warfare.

On June 5, Secretary of War Kitchener embarked on a diplomatic mission to Russia on board the armored cruiser HMS Hampshire . Shortly after leaving the port, HMS Hampshire ran into a German mine; in addition to War Minister Kitchener, a large part of the military staff and crew lost their lives.

The German merchant submarine Deutschland left Bremerhaven on June 23, reached Baltimore (USA) on July 9, and returned with cargo on August 25 (first submarine crossing the Atlantic).

Austrian agents capsized the Italian battleship Leonardo da Vinci in the port of Taranto with an explosive device on July 2nd (according to other information: August 2nd) .

On August 18 and 19, after completing the most important repairs, the deep-sea fleet pushed forward again to catch up with the bombardment of Sunderland that had been planned since May . Again the British managed to decipher the radio messages. The Grand Fleet ran out with superior forces, the two fleets approached within 30 nautical miles. Admiral Scheer turned south due to an - albeit incorrect - airship report. Only the SMS Westfalen is damaged by a British submarine. German submarines were able to sink two English town class cruisers , which led Admiral Jellicoe to conduct the war even more carefully.

SM U 35 , probably the most successful warship in world history, operated mainly in the Mediterranean

On August 20, the submarine SM U 35 returns from a 25-day patrol to the Adriatic base Cattaro , during which 54 merchant ships were sunk under the command of Lothar von Arnauld de la Perière - the most successful patrol of a submarine and probably also of a warship at all.

On October 6th, the German fleet restarted the submarine trade war (sinking but not permitted without warning), and on October 8th, the submarine SM U 53 sank ships off the American east coast for the first time.

On October 26th and 27th, 23 German torpedo boats made a successful advance into the English Channel, a British destroyer and 14 auxiliary ships were sunk.

On November 10th, seven German destroyers sank in a minefield in the Baltic States.

In November, David Beatty replaced John Jellicoe, who was criticized for his cautious approach and the Battle of the Skagerrak , as commander of the Grand Fleet , and Jellicoe became First Sea Lord .

On November 21, the HMHS Britannic - sister ship of the Titanic - sank in the Aegean Sea after running aground on a mine. Shortly before, the German submarine SM U 73 had laid several mines at this point, near the island of Kea .

The German submarine U 52 sank off Portugal on 25/26. November the French liner Suffren , there were no survivors (648 dead).

Despite restrictions (sinking of merchant ships not without warning), German submarines sank ships in December 167 and 1155 throughout the year.

1917

The sinking Cornwallis , hit by German torpedoes east of Malta

Company Albion : German airship and ship of the line (possibly SMS Großer Kurfürst ) of the deep sea fleet

Battle in Moon Sound : wreck of the Russian liner Slawa

GDR postage stamp from 1967 on Max Reichpietsch and the sailors' uprising in July 1917, interpreted as a revolutionary sailor movement

On January 9, 1917, U 32 sank the British liner Cornwallis in the Mediterranean .

The Supreme Command urged the Emperor due to the difficult overall military situation to release the unlimited submarine war, on 8 January 1917, the emperor agreed. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg presented all the counter-arguments again on January 9, but, in contrast to the discussions in 1915 and 1916, no longer raised any fundamental objections. On January 9, 1917, the Privy Council decided to open the unrestricted submarine war on February 1, 1917 without further negotiations or advance notice. This meant that submarine commanders could attack "any ship using any available weapon without notice". Earlier calculations that a blockade of England would require 220 submarines were ignored: At the beginning of 1917, around 110 operational submarines were available. The neutrals received a short notice of this on January 31, which immediately led to the US breaking off diplomatic relations on February 3.

In February 1917 and throughout the first half of 1917, the sinking of ships by German submarines soared to a level threatening the very existence of Great Britain, and the shipping space entering and leaving British ports fell by half compared to the first half of 1914.

On March 8, the February Revolution began in Russia, which also included mutinies on Russian warships.

On March 17, German destroyers succeeded in one of their regular missions in the English Channel, sinking two British destroyers and a merchant ship. On March 18, German submarines sank three American ships.

In April 1917 the first eight destroyers of the Imperial Japanese Navy arrived in Malta to give ships of the Entente escort protection against German and Austro-Hungarian submarines. A total of 14 destroyers and three cruisers were used as part of the 2nd Special Squadron and drove 348 security trips for a total of 788 ships, including a particularly large number of troop transports. They reported 36 attacks on submarines of the Central Powers. The destroyer "Sakaki" was torpedoed off Crete on June 11, 1917 by the Austro-Hungarian submarine U 27, the forecastle broke off, 59 Japanese fell; that was the worst loss of the Japanese navy in Europe.

The United States of America declared war on Germany on April 6th. Woodrow Wilson cited unlimited submarine warfare and the Zimmermann telegram as the primary reason for America to intervene in his April 2 declaration to Congress .

On April 20 and 21, British destroyers fended off another German destroyer attack in the English Channel, since then there were no more German surface attacks in the Channel until 1918.

After lengthy discussions, the Allies gradually introduced the convoy system from May 10th, and the losses caused by submarines sank immediately.

In the Third Battle of Flanders (May 21 to November 6), the British did not succeed in capturing or eliminating the German submarine bases in Flanders, a first attempt by the naval forces on May 7, 8 and 12 against Zeebrugge also failed.

The first attempt by the Austrian Navy to break through the sea barrier on the Strait of Otranto took place on 14/15. May 1917. Three rapid cruisers ( SMS Novara , SMS Helgoland and SMS Saida ) sank six net trawlers, on the way back the SMS Novarra was badly damaged in combat with British and Italian cruisers (including HMS Bristol ).

On three ships of the high seas fleet (including SMS Prinzregent Luitpold and SMS Friedrich der Große ) there were cases of refusal of orders and unauthorized removal from service in July . The crews discussed the implementation of a peace demonstration together with shipyard workers. Involved were u. a. Max Reichpietsch , Albin Köbis , Hans Beckers , Willy Sachse and Wilhelm Weber. Of the death sentences that were subsequently imposed, those against Reichpietsch and Köbis were carried out.

On October 12, the successful combined amphibious operation Albion began , which led to the occupation of the Baltic islands of Saaremaa (Ösel) , Hiiumaa (Dagö) and Muhu (Moon) and the battle in Moon Sound on October 17. The Baltic Fleet had to leave the Gulf of Riga to the German units and its range of action was severely restricted.

A British advance near Heligoland on October 17 brought no results, but on the same day two German cruisers in a naval battle near the Shetland Islands managed to surprise and tear up an Allied convoy.

As German submarines sank Brazilian merchant ships, Brazil declared war on Germany on October 26th.

1918

One of the most modern and largest ships in the Austrian Navy, the SMS Szent István , sinks after a torpedo attack by an Italian MAS

From February 1 to 3, the Kotor sailors' uprising took place in the Austrian base of Kotor under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia, the January strike in Vienna and other spontaneous strikes . On February 1, 1918, the flagship SMS Sankt Georg hoisted the red flag, and a good 40 ships with a crew of 6,000 initially joined. With no outside support or response, the uprising collapsed on February 3rd.

As part of the Finland intervention , the deep-sea fleet deployed a special unit, the Åland Islands were occupied on March 5th, the Russian base in Hangö on April 3rd. On April 5, the German head of the Union, Rear Admiral Hugo Meurer, and a Russian commission agreed an agreement on the conduct of the Baltic Fleet within the framework of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty (March 3), which included their relocation from Helsingfors (Helsinki) to Kronstadt , which resulted in the so-called “ ice march of the Baltic Fleet ”: From April 6th, around 170 Russian ships were returned, so that Räterussland kept practically the entire Baltic fleet.

On April 23, the deep sea fleet made its last advance into the northern North Sea, where a British convoy was to be attacked. Since the fleet completely renounced the use of radio equipment, the ocean-going fleet advanced to the height of mountains without the British responding. When the radio silence was broken on the following day due to a machine failure of the battle cruiser SMS Moltke , the Royal Navy ran out immediately with superior forces, but could not provide the deep sea fleet, although the SMS Moltke had to be towed.

The HMT Olympic (sister ship of the RMS Titanic) sank the submarine SM U 103 with her port propeller on May 7th .

Attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend : wrecks of the sunken block ships in the port entrance of Zeebrugge , but a sufficiently wide fairway remained free for the German submarines.

In the " attack on Zeebrugge and Ostend " the Royal Navy tried unsuccessfully on the 11th and 23/24. April as well as on 9/10 May to block the submarine ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend in occupied Belgium in order to prevent the submarines from leaving.

The second and last attempt by the Austrian Navy to break through the sea barrier on the Strait of Otranto started on June 9, 1918 from Pula . In the early morning of June 10, however, the Italian speedboat MAS 15 sank the battleship SMS Szent István , which was sailing in the formation, off the island of Premuda by two torpedo hits, the attack was then canceled.

On June 27, the submarine U 86 torpedoed the hospital ship Llandovery Castle , and the castaways and lifeboats were shot at to cover up the sinking of the hospital ship; nevertheless, 24 of 258 crew members survived.

On July 18, the submarine cruiser U 156 carried out the " Attack on Orleans ", the only attack by the Central Powers on the US mainland in World War I.

On August 1, Scheer was appointed Chief of the Admiralty's Staff, Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper as Admiral and Chief of the Deep Sea Fleet, and on August 28, a German naval command was established in the headquarters (previously there was no uniform naval command).

On September 29th, the Supreme Army Command informed the Emperor and the government about the hopeless military situation of the Army, and Erich Ludendorff ultimately demanded the start of armistice negotiations. On 4th / 5th October Chancellor Max von Baden asked the Allies for an armistice. Admiral Scheer declared internally that the Navy did not need a ceasefire. During the negotiations, the submarine SM UB 123 sank the British passenger ship RMS Leinster (October 10), which was immediately reflected in the American notes of October 14 and 23. On October 14, the American President Woodrow Wilson called for the submarine war to end on October 20; Wilson's third note, dated October 23, contained, among other things. a. the internment of the deep sea fleet.

At the end of October the still operational submarines of the German Mediterranean flotillas left their ports in the Adriatic and started their journey home to Germany. A month later, eleven of these boats arrived in Kiel in association. The submarine SM UB 50 sank the Britannia west of Gibraltar on November 9th . She was the last Entente ship of the line to be lost in the First World War.

Fireworks of the ocean-going fleet in Wilhelmshaven for the proclamation of the Republic on November 9, 1918

In contrast to the troops on the western front, the deep sea fleet was practically intact in material terms, and despite the October reforms, the authority still rested with the emperor. So it came - with a controversial objective - the fleet order of October 24, 1918 : The high seas fleet was to advance in Southern Bight against the Flemish coast and the Thames estuary in order to seek the decisive battle against the Grand Fleet, weakened by submarines on the approach from Scotland . The statements by Scheer and Adolf von Trotha leave little doubt that it was primarily about the "honor" of the Imperial Navy. The Reich government was deliberately not informed of the plan, but the "rebellion of the admirals" followed, "logically consistent", the "revolution of the sailors": On the night of October 29th to 30th, some ship's crews refused to give orders the naval command dropped their plan of the decisive battle. Nevertheless, the mutiny developed into the Kiel sailors' uprising , which initiated the November Revolution.

The dissolution of Austria-Hungary had already begun. On October 30th, as a reaction to the secession of all non-German areas, the state of German Austria was constituted . The Austro-Hungarian fleet was initially handed over to the newly founded SHS state (Yugoslavia) at the end of October on the orders of Emperor Karl , which owned the former Austro-Hungarian ports - it was hoped that the SHS state would become part of the Danube monarchy. The SMS Viribus Unitis was sunk on November 1, 1918, one day after the handover to Yugoslav naval officers, in the port of Pula by two Italian navy divers with a detention charge.

In accordance with the terms of the armistice, several Allied ships passed the Dardanelles on November 12 and anchored in Constantinople.

Armistice and Versailles Treaty

As part of the armistice of November 11th, the German deep sea fleet was interned in Scapa Flow . On November 21st, Admiral David Beatty instructed the deep-sea fleet that the German flag "should be lowered at sunset and never raised again without permission". It was not without reason that the draft contract for the Versailles Treaty was handed over on May 7, 1919, the fifth anniversary of the sinking of the RMS Lusitania . The Versailles Treaty provided for the delivery of all 74 German warships of the Imperial High Seas Fleet interned in Scapa Flow. Shortly before the signing of the contract took place the self-absorption of most of the ships on the initiative of Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter , which led to harsh consequences, such as the delivery of other warships and most of the remaining German merchant fleet. The Austrian navy - including the ships initially handed over to the SHS state - had to be handed over to the Allies. Mostly the German and Austrian ships were scrapped or used as target ships . The SMS Goeben remained as Yavuz Selim Turkish warship and was not finally retired until 1973. One of the few warships left in Germany was the then outdated German ship of the line Schleswig-Holstein , whose shots on the " Westerplatte " on September 1, 1939, are considered to be the military start of the Second World War .

losses

The Allied merchant navy lost approx. 110 ships with 427,476 GRT (damaged 34,587 GRT) to German auxiliary cruisers, 43 ships with 190,000 GRT to cruisers, and 5874 ships with 12,284,757 GRT to German submarines (and the mines they laid) , according to calculations by the British Admiralty 5334 ships with 12,179,906 GRT. The German merchant navy lost (sunk, taken or held back in Allied ports) 351 ships with 866,533 GRT, the Austrian 32 ships with 111,619 GRT (until January 31, 1915). The following table shows the losses of the navy:

	Germany	Eastern Hungary	Turkey	GB	France	Italy	Japan	Russia	United States	Others
Battleships	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	2	0	0
Battle cruiser	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	0
Ships of the line	2	1	2	11	4th	2	0	2	0	0
Armored cruiser	6th	0	0	13	5	2	3	0	2	0
Protected cruisers	18th	4th	1	12	0	1	2	1	1	2
Submarines	199	9	0	55	15th	10	0	28	3	3
Other warships	239	12	36	257	51	46	7th	197	15th	24
Auxiliary vehicles	319	13	57	765	90	16	0	110	42	9
All in all	784	41	96	1188	165	78	13	232	63	38
Displacement in  ts (without auxiliary vehicles)	362,000	58,000	31,000	652,000	172,000	92,000	48,000	127,000	41,000	?
Fallen	34,836	?	?	34,654	11,500	?	?	?	?	?

(German casualties including marines in Flanders.)

aftermath

On April 16, 1919, the Weimar National Assembly renamed the German Navy the Provisional Reichsmarine , even before the deep-sea fleet was scuttled on June 21, 1919 . The Versailles Treaty limited the strength of the German Navy to six ships of the line (plus two in reserve), six cruisers (plus two in reserve), twelve destroyers (plus four in reserve), twelve torpedo boats (plus four in reserve), 38 minesweepers and more smaller ships. Submarines and new builds were not allowed. The larger ships left with the Reichsmarine were all outdated types.

See also : List of ships of the Reichsmarine

As part of the Leipzig trials , some submarine officers were tried, including commandant Helmut Patzig for sinking the hospital ship Llandowery Castle . On March 20, 1931, the criminal proceedings against Patzig were set in a closed session.

The naval arms race after 1918 led to four international naval conferences . The 1922 Washington Naval Conference also ended de jure British supremacy at sea. The Washington system collapsed in the 1930s. The German-British naval agreement of 1935 replaced the relevant provisions of the Versailles Treaty and allowed the navy to be expanded .

See also

• Chronology of the First World War

literature

• Wolfgang Michalka (ed.): The First World War . Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 .
• Paul G. Halpern : A Naval History Of World War I . Routledge, London 1995, ISBN 1-85728-498-4 .
• Paul M. Kennedy : The Rise and Fall of British Maritime Power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 227-292 .
• Jürgen Mirow : The naval war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X .
• Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 .
• Ian Westwell (Ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 .
• Gerhard Hirschfeld , Gerd Krumeich and Irina Renz (eds.): Encyclopedia First World War . Paderborn 2009, ISBN 978-3-506-73913-1 .
• David Stevenson (Ed.): 1914-1918 . The First World War. Düsseldorf 2006, ISBN 3-491-96274-9 .
• Andreas Leipold: The German naval warfare in the Pacific in the years 1914 and 1915. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2012, ISBN 978-3-447-06602-0 .
• Carl Dick: The cruiser squadron. His becoming, victory and destruction . Ernst Siegfried Mittler and Son, Berlin 1917. (digitized: digital.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de ).
• Jörg-Michael Hormann , Eberhard Kliem: The Imperial Navy in the First World War. From Wilhelmshaven to Scapa Flow. Bucher, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-7658-2031-1 .
• Nicolas Wolz: And we're rusting in the harbor. Germany, Great Britain and the War at Sea 1914–1918 , Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-423-28025-9 .
• Vincent P. O'Hara, W. David Dickson, Richard Worth (Eds.): To crown the waves. The great navies of the First World War. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD 2013, ISBN 978-1-61251-082-8 .
• Norman Friedman: Fighting the Great War at Sea: Strategy, Tactic and Technology. Naval Institute Press, 2014, ISBN 978-1-59114-188-4 .
• Jann M. Witt , Christian Jentzsch: The sea war 1914-1918. The Imperial Navy in the First World War . Theiss, Darmstadt 2016, ISBN 978-3-8062-3272-1 .
• Steve R. Dunn: Blockade. Cruiser warfare and the starvation of Germany in World War One , Barnsley (Seaforth Publishing) 2016. ISBN 1-84832-340-9 . ISBN 978-1-84832-340-7
• Jürgen Elvert / Lutz Adam / Heinrich Walle (eds.): The Imperial Navy in War: A Search for Traces , Stuttgart (Franz Steiner Verlag) 2017. ISBN 978-3-515-11824-8
• Michael Epkenhans / Stephan Huck (ed.): The First World War at Sea . Contributions to Military History, Volume 78.De Gruyter Oldenbourg , Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-110-53123-7 .

Web links

Commons : Naval Warfare in World War I  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Remarks

1. ↑ For example, B. Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 408 . or Eberhard Orthbrandt : Picture Book of German History . H. Pfahl, Laupheim 1961, p. 466 (first edition: 1954). the Battle of the Skagerrak, presumably referring to the total tonnage of the ships involved (approx. 1.8 million tons displacement ).
2. ^ Werner Rahn : Strategic Problems of German Naval Warfare 1914-1918 . In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War . Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 , p. 341 ff .
3. ↑ quoted from Paul M. Kennedy : The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 238 .
4. ^ ^{A b} Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and decline of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 227 ff .
5. ↑ Jürgen Mirow : The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, p. 14th ff .
6. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 240, 252 .
7. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 232 ff., 258 .
8. ↑ quoted from: Werner Rahn: Strategic Problems of German Naval Warfare 1914–1918 . In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War . Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 , p. 345 .
9. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 267 .
10. ^ ^{A b c} Michael Salewski : Sea War . In: Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz (eds.): Encyclopedia First World War . Paderborn 2009, ISBN 3-506-73913-1 , p. 829 f .
11. ^ Werner Rahn: Strategic Problems of German Naval Warfare 1914-1918 . In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War . Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 , p. 346 .
12. ^ Werner Rahn: Strategic Problems of German Naval Warfare 1914-1918 . In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War . Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 , p. 351 .
13. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 31 ff .
14. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 122 .
15. ↑ David Stevenson : Naval Warfare and Blockade . In: David Stevenson (Ed.): 1914-1918. The First World War . Düsseldorf 2006, ISBN 978-3-491-96274-3 , pp. 296 f .
16. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 70 .
17. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 71 .
18. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 269 f .
19. ^ ^{A b} Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 117 f .
20. ↑ ^{a b c} Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 261 ff .
21. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 271 .
22. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 107 ff .
23. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 109 ff .
24. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 30th f .
25. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 274 .
26. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 56 .
27. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 42 ff .
28. ↑ quoted from: Jürgen Mirow: Der Seekrieg 1914–1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 11 .
29. ^ Andreas Leipold: The German naval warfare in the Pacific in the years 1914 and 1915. Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden 2012, ISBN 978-3-447-06602-0 , p. 308 ff.
30. ↑ ^{a b c} Jürgen Rohwer : U-boat war . In: Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz (eds.): Encyclopedia First World War . Paderborn 2009, ISBN 3-506-73913-1 , p. 931 .
31. ^ Kurt Riezler : Diaries - Articles - Documents . Ed .: Karl-Dietrich Erdmann . Göttingen 1972, p. 342 .
32. ^ Alfred von Tirpitz: Political documents. Vol. 2. German powerlessness policy in the world wars. Hamburg / Berlin 1926, p. 491 - quoted. after: Kurt Riezler : Diaries - Articles - Documents . Ed .: Karl-Dietrich Erdmann . Göttingen 1972, p. 338 f. Footnote 11 .
33. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 135 .
34. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 163 .
35. ^ Michael Salewski: Sea War . In: Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz (eds.): Encyclopedia First World War . Paderborn 2009, ISBN 3-506-73913-1 , p. 830 .
36. ^ Kurt Riezler: Diaries - Articles - Documents. (Ed .: Karl-Dietrich Erdmann). Göttingen 1972, p. 351.
37. ↑ ^{a b} Kurt Riezler: Diaries - Articles - Documents. (Ed .: Karl-Dietrich Erdmann). Göttingen 1972, p. 393 ff.
38. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 139 f .
39. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 141 .
40. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 142 .
41. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 285 .
42. ^ Jürgen Rohwer: U-boat war . In: Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz (eds.): Encyclopedia First World War . Paderborn 2009, ISBN 3-506-73913-1 , p. 934 .
43. ↑ The information regarding the sunk ships vary in the various publications, but are always within the specified range.
44. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 20 .
45. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 25 .
46. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 162 .
47. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 14th f .
48. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 29 .
49. ^ ^{A b} Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 122 ff .
50. ^ ^{A b} Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 124 .
51. ^ ^{A b} Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 125 .
52. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 26th ff .
53. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 44 .
54. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 51-54 .
55. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 161 .
56. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 154 .
57. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 47 .
58. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 38 .
59. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 112 .
60. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 26th f .
61. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 126 .
62. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 129 .
63. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 32 f .
64. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 38 .
65. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 132 .
66. ^ ^{A b} Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 138 f .
67. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 141 .
68. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 54 .
69. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 40 .
70. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 136 .
71. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 128 .
72. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 41 f .
73. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 140 .
74. ↑ Telegram to the Admiral's staff to inform them about the sinking of the cruiser squadron in the sea battle near the Falkland Islands in the Federal Archives, accessed on August 29, 2016. ( Memento of the original from March 3, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and still Not checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
75. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 45 f .
76. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 36 ff .
77. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 74 ff .
78. ↑ Compare for example: Rainer Fabian and Hans Christian Adam : Bilder vom Krieg . 130 years of war photography - an indictment. Hamburg 1983, p. 25th f .
79. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 76 ff .
80. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 49 f .
81. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 50 .
82. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 131 f .
83. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 266 .
84. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 58 ff .
85. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 57 .
86. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 67 ff .
87. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 51 .
88. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 60 .
89. ↑ Patrick O'Sullivan : The Lusitania . Myth and Reality. Mittler, Hamburg / Berlin / Bonn 1999, p. 97 ff .
90. ^ Collin Simpson : The Lusitania . Frankfurt a. M. 1973, p. 122 .
91. ↑ Patrick O'Sullivan: The Lusitania . Myth and Reality. Mittler, Hamburg / Berlin / Bonn 1999, p. 85 .
92. ↑ Diana Preston : Have been torpedoed, send help . The sinking of the Lusitania 1915. Munich 2004, p. 318 .
93. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 273 ff .
94. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 64 ff .
95. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 34 .
96. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 164 .
97. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 70 .
98. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 114 f .
99. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 134 .
100. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 74 .
101. ↑ John Horne, Alan Kramer: German war horrors 1914. The controversial truth. Hamburger Edition, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-930908-94-8 , p. 383 f.
102. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 79 f .
103. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 81 .
104. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 82 .
105. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 85 .
106. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 401 f .
107. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 90 .
108. ^ Paul Kemp (ed.): The German and Austrian submarine losses in both world wars . Urbes, Graefelfing vor München, 1998, ISBN 3-924896-43-7 , p. 17 .
109. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 93 .
110. ↑ Numbers after: Eugen Kalau vom Hofe : The sea battle before the Skagerrak . In: The big time. Illustrated war history . tape II . Berlin u. Vienna 1920, p. 202 .
111. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 82 ff .
112. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 96 ff .
113. ↑ On the problems of German naval warfare cf. Werner Rahn: Strategic Problems of German Naval Warfare 1914–1918 . In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War . Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 , p. 341-365 .
114. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 403 ff .
115. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 99 .
116. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 411 ff .
117. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 102 .
118. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 98 .
119. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 107 .
120. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 111 .
121. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 114 .
122. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 165 .
123. ^ ^{A b} Ian Westwell (Ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 115 .
124. ↑ uboat.net: Ships hit during WWI - Britannic
125. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 119 .
126. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 121 f .
127. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 130, 502 .
128. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 123 .
129. ^ ^{A b} Ian Westwell (Ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 124 .
130. ^ Wilhelm M. Donko: Japan in the war against Austria-Hungary 1914-18. The Austro-Hungarian Navy in the fight against Japan's armed forces in East Asia and the Mediterranean . epubli, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-8442-7856-9 , pp. 125-192.
131. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 125 f .
132. ^ ^{A b} Ian Westwell (Ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 131 .
133. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 36 .
134. ^ ^{A b} Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 101 ff .
135. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 118 ff .
136. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 509 ff .
137. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 100 .
138. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 140 f .
139. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , pp. 513 .
140. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 142 .
141. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 157 .
142. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 146 f .
143. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 163 f .
144. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 166 f .
145. ↑ Martin Niemöller: From the submarine to the pulpit . Berlin: Martin Warneck Verlag, 1938.
146. ↑ uboat.net: Ships hit during WWI HMS Britannia (Engl.)
147. ^ Michael Salewski: Sea War . In: Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz (eds.): Encyclopedia First World War . Paderborn 2009, ISBN 978-3-506-73913-1 , p. 831 .
148. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 104 f .
149. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 181 .
150. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 183 .
151. ^ Ian Westwell (ed.): The I. World War . A chronicle. Bindlach, 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , pp. 184 .
152. ^ Martin Schramm: The picture of Germany in the British press 1912-1919. Berlin 2007, p. 509.
153. ↑ Jürgen Mirow: The sea war 1914-1918 in outline . Göttingen 1976, ISBN 3-7881-1682-X , p. 160 f .
154. ^ Walter Schwegler : International Law, Versailles Treaty and the question of extradition . Prosecution for war crimes as a problem of the 1919/20 peace treaty. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1982, p. 348-350 and 354-359 .
155. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 302 .
156. ^ Paul M. Kennedy: The rise and fall of British naval power . Herford 1978, ISBN 3-8132-0013-2 , pp. 319 .