Company Albion

Company Albion

Part of: First World War ( naval war )

SMS Großer Kurfürst , above the naval airship SL8

date	September to October 1917
place	Baltic Sea
output	German victory
Territorial changes	Baltic islands

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Russia
Commander
Oskar von Hutier Hugo von Kathen Ludwig von Estorff Ehrhard Schmidt	Mikhail Bachirew Yuri Karlowitsch Stark Fyodor Matwejewitsch Ivanov Dmitri Alexandrowitsch Sveshnikov
Troop strength
1 battle cruiser , 10 battleships, 9 small cruisers, 1 mine cruiser, 50 torpedo boats, 6 submarines, 19 transport ships, 24,500 soldiers, 8,500 horses, 2,400 vehicles, 150 machine guns, 54 artillery pieces, 12 mortars and ammunition	2 ships of the line, 2 armored cruisers, 1 armored cruiser, 3 gunboats, 21 destroyers, 3 British submarines, around 24,000 soldiers
losses
1 torpedo boat, 7 minesweepers, 9 trawlers and smaller vehicles, numerous ships damaged by mines, 156 dead (including 4 officers) and 60 wounded (navy), 54 dead (including 4 officers) and 141 wounded (including 6 officers) (army)	1 ship of the line, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, 20,130 prisoners, unknown number of dead and wounded 141 artillery pieces (47 heavy), 130 machine guns, 2,000 horses, 2 armored cars, 10 aircraft

Eastern Front

Tagga Bay (Estonian Tagalaht ) on Saaremaa (Ösel), place of the German landings

Operation Albion was an amphibious landing operation of the German Reich as part of the First World War , which was carried out jointly by the army and navy in September and October 1917 to occupy the Baltic islands of Saaremaa (Ösel) , Hiiumaa (Dagö) and Muhu (Moon) . The three islands were part of the Russian Empire and strategically ruled the central and northern Baltic Sea.

prehistory

The naval war in the Baltic Sea had so far been rather unspectacular. The Imperial Russian Navy was located just before the outbreak of war in the first stage of rebuilding after the Russian Empire in the lost Russo-Japanese War had almost lost its entire Baltic and Pacific fleets. The few remaining units were mostly small or out of date, making the Russian naval forces in the Baltic States very weak. In addition, the defensive position of the Gulf of Finland to protect the capital St. Petersburg, the sea ​​fortress of Emperor Peter the Great , was only partially completed. Their outermost western defensive belt included both the Baltic Islands and the Aland Islands. The German Imperial Navy , on the other hand, seemed to be able to draw on the full, but the strategic focus of operations was clearly in the North Sea , where the overwhelming power of the British Royal Navy threatened. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Sea Forces (OdO) Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich of Prussia had only relatively few and mostly outdated units available, mainly older ships of the line , armored cruisers and small cruisers as well as torpedo boats. The mutual weakness as well as the impossibility of seafaring during the ice drift of the winter months determined the strategy , both sides made only short advances into the opposing territory, and battles between randomly encountering combat groups usually ended in a draw. However, the Russians captured the code book of the German naval forces at the beginning of the war, which allowed both them and the British to decipher German radio messages. The Russians in particular used the experience they had with sea ​​mines in the last war and penetrated the shallow Baltic Sea with extensive minefields. The Germans had prepared themselves for mine warfare and followed suit, so that the Baltic Sea became an exceptionally dangerous body of water. Both sides also attempted submarine ambushes.

The situation on land had a decisive influence on naval warfare. In the course of the war, the Germans moved unstoppably along the Baltic coast and gradually conquered the Russian naval bases in the Baltic States, so that the radius of action of Russian ships continued to shrink. The fighting soon concentrated on the Gulf of Riga , where the Germans tried to support and supply their attacking troops from the sea. The Russians tried to prevent this and concentrated their fleet in this area. They also received strong support from their bases in the Gulf of Finland , Hangö , Helsinki , Reval and Kronstadt .

The islands

The three Baltic islands had belonged to Russia since the Great Northern War and were assigned to the Livonia Governorate . The land is flat and interspersed with forests and moors, interrupted by numerous clearings and clearings on which individual farms, no fewer than 131 mansions of the Baltic German nobility and small villages are located. By far the largest settlement was Arensburg , where the administration was also based. The majority of the 50,000 to 60,000 population, who mostly made their living as farmers and fishermen, consisted of Estonians , administrators, the upper class and intelligentsia, on the other hand, almost exclusively of Baltic Germans and a few Russians. During the course of the enterprise the population behaved in a wait-and-see manner and did not take sides with either side.

planning

In the summer of 1917 the German army units had advanced to just before Riga , and the Russian armed forces were on the verge of disbanding as a result of revolutionary unrest and ever increasing war weariness. For further action by Estonia and Latvia in the direction of Saint Petersburg , it was necessary to first conquer the islands of Ösel, Dagö and Moon off Estonia and Latvia in order to protect the flank of the advancing armies from Russian attacks from the sea and to protect their own troops with them Help the fleet to support and supply by sea. Prince Heinrich had long called for an amphibious operation against the three islands in order to limit the Russian operating radius and to prevent supply shipping in the Gulf of Riga , but in the two previous years had moved away from it in favor of extensive mine operations due to the weakness of the armed forces available to him . With the advance of the front into this area, the capture of the islands became even more important. Russian coastal batteries and minefields in the Irben Strait between the southern tip of Ösel and the Latvian mainland blocked the way for German supply shipping into the sea area and thus also hindered supplies for the land army. A swift conquest of the islands should urge Russia to conclude peace in order to free the German and Austro-Hungarian associations bound there for offensives in the west. In addition to these strategic considerations, there were other reasons for the venture. There was strong competition between the army and the navy, and each part of the armed forces sought to improve its reputation with the Commander-in-Chief, Kaiser Wilhelm II , and to outdo the other. The ranks of the army repeatedly accused the navy of cowardice, which faced an overpowering enemy in the North Sea and, after the Battle of the Skagerrak, only carried out operations with the participation of its capital ships sporadically in favor of submarine warfare . As early as May 1917, the Quartermaster General of the Supreme Army Command (OHL) Infantry General Erich Ludendorff had been exploring the possibility of the Navy participating in army operations against the Åland Islands , Kronstadt or Ösel in order to put increased pressure on the Russian government after the United States entered the war . The Åland Islands were the primary destination for the OHL, from there they wanted to carry out operations in the northern and eastern Baltic Sea, which were to persuade Russia to make peace in order to end the two-front war. The Admiralty staff did not flatly oppose such an operation, but expressed concerns about the high concentration of naval forces in the Baltic Sea required for such an operation, which would then be lacking for operations against Great Britain. If such an undertaking came into question at all, then only against the closer Ösel . On September 1, 1917, the army began the crossing of the Daugava and the attack against Riga without the support of the navy, which ended with rapid success. Ludendorff then accused the Navy not only of cowardice, but also of a lack of offensive spirit. The admiral's staff was now ready to support an undertaking against the Åland Islands, but on the condition that Ösel had to be occupied first. With the attack on the heavily fortified islands, the Navy hoped to gain in profile for its part and to counteract the accusation of cowardice, and the crews of the capital ships of the high seas, which were increasingly inactive and which had already been refused to obey at the beginning of August 1917, should join in be engaged in a meaningful task. In addition, an operation against such a strongly secured target could not be carried out without the support of army units. The Supreme Army Command approved the proposal of the Admiralty, and planning of the enterprise could begin.

The company, which was given the code name Albion , was to become by far the largest amphibious operation by German armed forces. The two branches of the armed forces had never worked together on such a significant endeavor, and attacking such a strongly defended target placed enormous demands on operational planning and mutual support. The planning of attacks by the army and navy took into account the experience of recent years. The Battle of Gallipoli , for example, made it clear how important it was on the one hand to have a naval force that ruled the surrounding waters and, on the other hand, to have good coordination between the two armed forces.

The decision to carry out the operation was made on September 11, 1917, a week after the German troops had taken Riga. Another week later, the Supreme Army Command issued the final operational orders, and the troops and ships needed began to gather in Libau . The relevant operational planning on the German side was designed by the staff of the Fleet Command under the leadership of Captain Magnus von Levetzow .

The German armed forces

Army units

The Army provided the 42nd Infantry Division under Lieutenant General Ludwig von Estorff for the landing , consisting of the Infantry Regiment "Graf Barfuß" (4th Westphalian) No. 17, the 2nd Lorraine Infantry Regiment No. 131, the 3rd Lower Alsatian Infantry Regiment No. 138 and the artillery regiments Field Artillery Regiment "von Holtzendorff" (1st Rhenish) No. 8 and the 1st Upper Alsatian Field Artillery Regiment No. 15 existed. The independent 2nd Infantry Cycle Brigade, the Reserve Infantry Regiment 255 and other artillery, communications, engineer and supply units were attached to it. They were all under the German 8th Army (General of the Infantry von Hutier ), the command of the landing troops was held by the Commanding General of the XXIII. Reserve Corps , General of the Infantry Hugo von Kathen . All in all, the deployed army units had around 24,500 soldiers with 8,500 horses, 2,400 vehicles and 150 machine guns, 54 artillery pieces and twelve mine throwers along with the associated ammunition. They brought supplies for thirty days.

Naval forces

As an escort and to support the landings, the troop transporters were provided with the Baltic Sea Special Association . This consisted of the VI. Reconnaissance group summarized already existing Baltic Sea forces, three small cruisers and a mine cruiser , together, expanded by the III. and IV. Squadron with ten modern large-line ships and the II. Reconnaissance Group with five modern small cruisers. There were also forty-one torpedo boats and destroyers with the new small cruiser Emden as the lead ship, as well as numerous minesweepers and clearing boats. Six German submarines had also been ordered into the area. The command was led by Vice Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt , Commander of the 1st Squadron, on board the battle cruiser Moltke , which served as the flagship of the Landungsverband. Schmidt had already commanded the intrusion of German naval forces into the Gulf of Riga in August 1915 and was familiar with the local conditions. As chief of staff, he was supported by the sea captain von Levetzow.

In addition to the ship units, the navy also ordered some of their airships to the area, which were to provide aerial reconnaissance and carry out bombing attacks. The I. Torpedo Aircraft Squadron in Windau also took part in the operations, and the army also parked two of its airships.

Baltic Sea Special Association :

• SMS Moltke , flagship (Vice Admiral Schmidt)
• III. Squadron (Vice Admiral Behncke ): SMS König (flagship), SMS Bayern , SMS Großer Kurfürst , SMS Kronprinz , SMS Markgraf
• IV. Squadron (Vice Admiral Souchon ): SMS Friedrich the Great (flagship), SMS King Albert , SMS Kaiserin , SMS Prinzregent Luitpold , SMS Kaiser
• Reconnaissance Forces (Rear Admiral Hopman , Commander of the Reconnaissance Forces in the Eastern Baltic Sea)
• II. Reconnaissance group (Rear Admiral von Reuter ): SMS Königsberg (II) (flagship), SMS Karlsruhe (II) , SMS Nürnberg (II) , SMS Frankfurt , SMS Danzig
• VI. Reconnaissance group (Rear Admiral Hopman): SMS Kolberg (flagship), SMS Strasbourg , SMS Augsburg , the tender SMS Blitz and SMS Nautilus

Torpedo boats

• SMS Emden (II) ( Commodore Heinrich , I. Führer of the torpedo boats (I FdT)) (flagship)
• II. Flotilla: B 98 (Corvette Captain Heinecke)
  • 3rd half-flotilla (Kapitänleutnant Hans Kolbe ): G 101 (flagship), V 100, G 103, G 104
  • 4. Semi-Flotilla (Korvettenkapitän Faulborn): B 109 (flagship), B 97, B 110, B 111, B 112
• VI. Flotilla: V 69 (Corvette Captain Werner Tillessen )
  • 11. Half-flotilla (Korvettenkapitän Rudolf Lahs ): V 43 (flagship), V 44, V 45, V 46, S 50
  • 12. Half-Flotilla (Korvettenkapitän Zander): V 82 (flagship), S 61, S 63, S 64, V 74
• VIII. Flotilla: V 180 (Korvettenkapitän Nieden)
  • 15. Semi-Flotilla (Kapitänleutnant Vollheim): V 183 (flagship), V 181, V 182, V 184, V 185
  • 16. Half-Flotilla (Kapitänleutnant Stohwasser ): S 176 (flagship), G 174, S 178, S 179, V 186
• X. Flotilla: S 56 (Korvettenkapitän Hundertmarck)
  • 19. Semi-flotilla (Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Rebensberg): T 170 (flagship), T 169, T 172, G 175, T 165
  • 20. Semi-flotilla (Kapitänleutnant Freiherr Röder von Diersburg ): V 78 (flagship), S 65, S 66, V 77, G 89
• 7. Semi-Flotilla (Korvettenkapitän Graf von der Recke-Vollmerstein): T 154 (flagship), T 139, T 140, T 143, T 145, T 151, T 157, T 158, T 160
• SM Gleitboot (Oberleutnant zur See Peytsch) (independent command but affiliated to the 7th THFl)

Submarines

• U-boat flotilla Kurland (Kapitänleutnant Schött),

- UC 56, UC 57 , UC 58 , UC 59, UC 60, UC 78

Mine clearance forces

• Block breaker group (Korvettenkapitän der Seewehr Simonsen): Rio Pardo, Lothar, Swabia, Glatz
• II. Mine-clearing flotilla: A 62 (Kapitänleutnant Doflein).
  • III. Mine-clearing semi-flotilla (Kapitänleutnant von der Marwitz): T 136 (flagship), M 67, M 68, M 75, M 76, M 77 , T 59, T 65, T 68, T 82, T 85 .
  • IV. Mine-clearing semi-flotilla (Kapitänleutnant Maxim von Zitzewitz): T 104 (flagship), T 53, T 54, T 55, T 56, T 60, T 61, T 62, T 66, T 67, T 69 .
• VIII. Mine-clearing semi-flotilla (Kapitänleutnant Koellner ): M 64 (flagship), M 11, M 31, M 32, M 39, A 35 .
• III. Semi-flotilla, outpost flotilla Baltic Sea
  • T 141 (Korvettenkapitän Goethe), 15 motor boats, auxiliary ships Fiora and Primula .
• Mine clearers of the Coast Guard Half Flotilla East (First Lieutenant for the Sea of ​​the Reserve Rudolf Nordman): 6 trawlers
• I. Mining Division (Riga) (Kapitänleutnant Astheimer): 11 vehicles (barges, barges or motor boats)
• II. Mine clearance division (Corvette Captain August Altvater): 12 vehicles, Tender Ammon
• III. Mine-clearing division (Kapitänleutnant Weidgen): 12 vehicles, tender Indianola
• IV. Mine clearing division (Kapitänleutnant Kipke): 10 vehicles, guard boat O2, tender Hochkamp .

Anti-submarine forces

• Search Flotilla Baltic Sea
• T 144 (Frigate Captain von Rosenberg ), driver's ship
  • 1st S-Half Flotilla (Kapitänleutnant der Reserve Sach): T 142 (flagship), A 28, A 30, A 32 , 32 armed fishing vessels
  • 2nd S-half flotilla (captainleutnant of the Seewehr Wahlen): T 130 (flagship), A 27, A 29, A 31 , 24 armed fishing vessels
• Workshop ship Danube , coal ship Adeline Hugo Stinnes 3 , Transporter Castor, Coburg , 3 motor boats
• Escort semi-flotilla "East" (Kapitänleutnant Harder): 6 armed fishing vessels
• Baltic Sea Net Protection Group (Korvettenkapitän Kaulhausen): Steamer Eskimo, Rossal , Netzleger Burgfried , 6 tugs and several barges

Tross (captain of the Seewehr Sachse)
liaison boat T 132 , hospital ships Imperator, Kehrwieder, Titania, Viola , 4 ammunition transporters, 3 food transporters, 1 coal ship, 1 oil transporter, 1 water transporter, cable laying Alster , buoy laying Wilhelms, Mellum

• Rescue group
  • 4 tugs and pump ships, 7 tugs for landing purposes, including Netter, Falkenstein, Jägersburg, Wilhelm Cords, Stein, Sturm , 8 light vehicles, 10 barges, block ships City of Belfast, City of Cadiz

• Transporter fleet (Frigate Captain von Schlick):
  • 1st section (frigate captain Max Fischer): Transporter Chemnitz , Cassel , Batavia , Friedrichsruh
  • 2nd section (Kapitänleutnant Ernst Wather): Transporter Oron, Sangara, Coralie Hörlock, Borderland
  • 3rd Section (Frigate Captain Keller): Transporter Scharnhorst , Buenos Aires , Frankfurt
  • 4th section (Korvettenkapitän Glüer): Transporter Bahia Castillo , Giessen , Schleswig , Badenia , Oswald (pioneer ship), Altenburg (reserve)
  • Pioneer ships: Equity , Corsica

(together 19 troop carriers with a total of 153,664 GRT)

Air Force

• Airships (Korvettenkapitän Wendt): L30, L37, LZ 113, LZ 120, SL8, SL20
• Air forces of the Baltic Sea Special Association (Kapitänleutnant Hermann Berthold): 81 seaplanes and 16 aircraft from the sea flying stations in Libau, Windau and Angernsee
• I. Torpedo Airplane Squadron (Lieutenant Max Stinsky )
• 8th Army Fighter Squadron (Lieutenant Roth)
• Marine-Landjagdstaffel (Reserve) (Lieutenant of the Reserve Wieland)
• Aircraft mother ship SMH Santa Elena (Oberleutnant zur See Holzapfel): 4 seaplanes

The Russian armed forces

Army units and coastal artillery

The Russian leadership , of course, knew the strategic importance of the Baltic Islands and had long awaited an attempt to land. At least in theory, they were also quite well protected, and the commander of the garrison of Kontreadmiral Dmitri Alexandrowitsch Sveshnikov had the 107th Russian infantry division (Brigadier General Fyodor Matveyevich Ivanov) with the three infantry regiments 425 "Kargopolski", 426 "Powenetsky" on Ösel and Dagö. and 427 "Pudoschski" are available. In addition, the division there was subordinate to the 118th Infantry Division 472 "Massalski" regiment and 470 "Dankowski" infantry regiment and the headquarters of the 118th Infantry Division. Two field artillery brigades with 96 field guns were attached to the division. Together, the four regiments of the 107th Division reached a nominal strength of 24,000 men, who were in well-fortified positions, and there were other units on the nearby mainland that could be called in in the event of an attack. However, the actual strength of the garrison was smaller and the morale of the troops was badly affected by the continued defeats on the land and the revolutionary unrest. From the officers' records and correspondence, however, it appears that the official figures may also have been well above the actual numbers. For example, in a letter the strength of the 472nd Infantry Regiment is given as about 1440 instead of 2435 men. The command of the officers was hampered by the establishment of the numerous soldiers' councils, which also exerted influence on the troops and, in view of the worsening war situation, often rejected measures, irrespective of whether they were important or unimportant, in order to save the lives of the men. Allegedly, the morale and organization of the 472nd Infantry Regiment were so badly weakened that men and officers took part in the looting, which led the Russian High Command to leave the 470th Infantry Regiment, which was supposedly in even worse shape, on the mainland.

The coastal artillery was a strong asset , because the entire archipelago had been fortified with a large number of coastal batteries since the beginning of the war, which, in addition to 48 guns over 15 cm, offered 25 units of 7.5 cm guns and numerous smaller weapons. There were eight coastal batteries at strategic points on Ösel, and Dagö had four more.

The focus of defense was the southern tip of the Sworbe peninsula and the northern tip of Dagö at Cape Lechtma . At the southern end of Ösel, Cape Zerel , several batteries with different stroking angles and calibers were set up to cover the entrance to Irben-Strasse , which together comprised 4 × 30.5 cm, 4 × 13 cm and 4 × 12 cm. The batteries at Cape Lechtma measuring 4 × 30.5 cm and 4 × 12 cm, which guarded the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, were similarly heavily armored. The southern mouth of the Moonsund was protected by three heavy batteries with a total of five 25 cm and four 15.2 cm guns. In addition, there were the extensive minefields, which blocked the Irben Strait and the Moonsund in particular and comprised at least 10,000 mines in the Irben Strait alone. The garrison had also greatly improved the road network on Ösel and laid out a number of solid roads that allowed troops to move quickly.

Naval forces

The outbreak of war hit the Russian fleet in a phase of weakness. After the lost war against Japan and the subsequent revolution of 1905, some new ships had been completed, but they were out of date after the beginning of the dreadnought era. Russia had also responded and put the four Gangut- class dreadnoughts under construction, which were now ready for use despite delays. In addition, four other capital ships of the Borodino class were piled up. However, the construction of new ship units was severely hampered by the loss of bases and shipyards on the Baltic coast, and units and machines ordered in Germany before the war had been confiscated by the Imperial Navy. The serious lack of its own industry, in conjunction with the blockade of Russia by the Central Powers, also hindered shipbuilding.

The beginning of the revolution represented a further obstacle , and the failure of the Kerensky offensive had further shaken the soldiers' already weak morale. Mutinies had paralyzed the navy, and the sailors murdered some senior officers and, like the army, formed numerous soldiers' councils. A large part of the Russian Baltic Fleet , under the command of the Supreme Soldiers' Council Zentrobalt, was entrenched in Kronstadt and Reval , including the First Battleship Brigade with the powerful ships of the Gangut class. The lack of experienced officers and the influence of the soldiers' councils that were detrimental to discipline ensured that the combat value and morale of the fleet steadily declined.

After all, the Russians had a few powerful ships at their disposal, which were only slightly affected by the revolutionary unrest and had well-trained and combat-experienced crews. The very shallow Moonsund and the surrounding waters hindered the operations of large combat ships considerably, but the naval command had at least had a canal dredged that led from the Gulf of Finland to the Sound and which, with a water depth of nine meters, was sufficient for the heavy ship units deployed there - not but for the Russian or German dreadnoughts or the newer ships of the line of the Andrei Pervoswanni class. The Russians were also familiar with some passages in the Gulf of Riga that had to remain hidden from the Germans at first. The battleship Slawa was inferior to the opposing capital ships in terms of armament, armor protection and speed, but thanks to a conversion of the heavy gun turrets in 1916, it was able to offer a superior range of the heavy artillery. The shortage of cruisers on the Russian side was partly made up by the numerous modern Novik-class destroyers , and three armored gunboats with 6-inch guns were to prove invaluable in the shallow waters. The command of the units combined in the Riga Bay Operations Group was held by Vice Admiral Mikhail Bachirew , a capable and experienced officer. As chief of his staff was Captain Second Rank Muromtsev.

Naval forces in the Riga Bay (Vice Admiral Bachirew):

• Ships of the line: Slava , Grahdanin
• Cruisers: Bajan , Admiral Makarow (from October 14), Diana (from October 16)
• Gunboats: Chrabry , Grozjashchi , Khivinez

Destroyer group

• Lead ship: Nowik (Admiral Juri Stark )
  • I. Torpedo Boat Destroyer Division (Captain 2nd Ranges Pilsudski): Grom , Pobeditel , Sabijaka .
  • II. Torpedo Boat Destroyer Division (Kontreadmiral Stark): Desna , Samson , Leitenant Ilyin , Kapitan Izylmedew .
  • III. Torpedo Boat Destroyer Division (Captain 1st Ranges Shekelew): Avtroil , Isjaslav , Gawriil , Konstantin .
  • IV. Torpedo Boat Destroyer Division (Captain 1st Rank Postelnikow): General Kondatenko , Progranichnik .
  • V. Torpedo Boat Destroyer Division (Captain 1st rank Ekimow): Donskoy Kasak , Stereguschtschi , Turkmenez-Stavropolski , Woiskowoi , Sabaikalets , Ukraina (from October 14th), Straschny (from October 16th).

Assigned auxiliary ships

• Pechora , Transporter Oka, Libau (Headquarters Division), Vodolej No. 1
• Block ships: Lawa (hospital ship), minelayer No. 4
• Launch : Dozornyi, Ilim, Moryak
• III. Guard Ship Division
  • Steam launch No. 1, No. 2 No. 3, No. 4th
  • Motor launch No. 2, No. 3, No. 8, No. 9
  • Tender Tralshchik No. 12

British submarines

• C26, C27 and C32

Patrol forces and guard ships

• VIII. Torpedo Boat Division: Likhoi (from October 15)
• IX. Torpedo boat division: Dyeyatelni, Dyelni, Gromyaschi, Razyashchi, Silni, Storozhevoi (from October 14th)
• Second Guard Ship Division (Detection Unit) (Senior-Leitenant Beklemishew): Barsuk, Gornostai, Vydra
• III. Guard Ship Division ( Detection Unit ): Khorek, Laska
• 5 auxiliary patrol divisions with 29 vehicles and 2 auxiliary ships

Mine clearance forces

• 5 demining divisions with 13 vehicles
• 2 motorboat demining divisions with 6 vehicles and 1 auxiliary ship

Minelayer Detachment Baltic Sea

• Mine-layer Amur , Volga

Flattening minelayer detachment

• Three shallow mine layers, including Pripyat

Detached unit for the air division :

• Tug Avion

Baltic Sea Transport Division

• III. Transport detachment

Steamship General Zimmermann

• VI. Transport detachment

Obsidian, Vassian , detached transporter Buki , coal ships Glagol, On, Pokoj , refrigerated ship Sukhoma , special transporter Vodolej No. 2

• Pilot and beacon service in the Baltic Sea

Transporter Artelschtschik, Samoed , port ship Brigitowka

In addition, the defenders had about 50 seaplanes and flying boats at their disposal, which operated from the air bases in Arensburg , Lewall and Papensholm . There were also ten land fighters made of Nieuport types. Their fighting strength was also severely limited due to the revolution.

The preparation

Army troops board the transport ships

Already on September 24th, the ships and troops made available for the enterprise were at their starting positions. The heavy units of the III. The 2nd and 4th squadrons were in Putziger Wiek , the 2nd reconnaissance group in Windau, while the transporters and their escorts gathered in Libau. An extended period of bad weather hampered the operations until the beginning of October, so that the start of the landing operation was delayed accordingly. The planned preparatory air strikes could therefore only begin on October 1st. Until October 10th, the German air forces carried out numerous bombing attacks, especially against the coastal fortifications, which also caused some damage. On the night of September 30th to October 1st, one of the magazines of the Zerel heavy battery was detonated by a fire caused by bomb hits. The battery crew suffered heavy losses (more than 110 dead, including the battery commander, and 60 injured), and the loss of a large part of the ammunition weakened the battery's effectiveness considerably. German torpedo planes, which were still in the experimental phase, also flew attacks against supply ships, but did not score any hits. The planing boat armed with a single 45 cm torpedo was also used against them under the command of First Lieutenant zur See Peytsch and left Libau on October 10 at 3 p.m. Shortly after the last sighting from the Michaelsturm lighthouse near Pissen , the battery near Gross Irben observed an explosion, after which the boat was lost. It was probably destroyed by a mine or an explosion on board. The airships were also involved in the attacks, as early as the night of September 24th to 25th, the army airships LZ 113 and LZ 120 bombed the Zerel battery. On October 1, LZ 120 and the naval airships L30 and L37 carried out diversionary attacks in the eastern part of the Gulf of Riga, they bombed the inadequately defended ports of Sophienruhe and Salismünde and met with little resistance. Bad weather prevented further ventures by the airships, which were supposed to cover the advance of the fleet with reconnaissance flights.

Contemporary map with the history of the company

The plan of attack against Ösel envisaged bringing the transporter fleet and their escorts under cover of night to Tagga Bay in the north-west of the island and surprisingly landing engineer units there at dawn. Another flanking landing was planned in Pamerort a little further to the east . As the four infantry regiments advanced south and east, the infantry cyclist brigade, supported by a special assault battalion, was to advance quickly east to the connecting dam to Moon and block it. It was hoped that the Russian garrison would be prevented from escaping and imprisoned. Russian resistance was expected around the capital Arensburg, so that the bulk of the landing troops should march there first. A breakthrough through the well-protected Irben Strait was initially rejected as too risky due to the strong coastal fortifications and dense minefields located there. Nevertheless, the minefields there should be cleared as early as possible in order to enable later operations inside the bay. As early as the beginning of October, the German deminers began to remove the mine barriers in Irben Strasse. Numerous mine clearance boats and the auxiliary ship Cladow were damaged, and several boats were lost. Tagga Bay was not so well defended, provided a good landing site and enough space for the heavy ship units and transport ships to anchor and maneuver. In addition, network barriers could be deployed here to protect the fleet against submarines. However, the approach there was also contaminated by mines and had to be cleared beforehand.

In the navy it was planned to carry out the advance against Ösel quickly and without previous lengthy mine clearing operations in order to be able to surprise the enemy. Prince Heinrich spoke out against this tactic because he feared high losses, but was overruled by the commander in chief of the high seas Admiral Scheer . As soon as the attack areas were reached, the battleships with their heavy artillery were supposed to silence the opposing coastal artillery before the landing of the army troops, to hold down the defenders on landing and to repel attacks at sea. Torpedo boats and cruisers were supposed to deter opposing light naval forces in the narrow and shallow waters, give the dropships closer to shore fire support when landing and protect their own deminers at work.

Russian defense planning

The commander, General Ivanov, knew the islands and possible landing sites well. The area he wanted to protect was large, and he didn't have enough men and equipment to guard, let alone defend, all potential landing zones. A forward defense to completely prevent a landing would have been so unpromising. Instead, he opted for a delaying tactic to hold up the Germans for as long as possible after landing and to protect the crucial coastal batteries until reinforcements arrived from the mainland. Then it would be possible to detain the attackers until winter and the sea freeze over and prevent the enemy fleet from breaking into the waters around the islands. An advance in the interior of the island was only possible via the roads newly laid out by the Russian armed forces, which ran between difficult-to-pass marshland and woodland. Closures on these streets and intersections would cost the attackers time, as they could practically only be taken in a frontal attack. This should enable the defenders to step backwards in a controlled manner, who in turn could quickly redeploy their forces on the remaining roads. Correspondingly, the west of Ösel was divided into three defense zones, each occupied by a regiment. A section (426th regiment) formed the northwest of the island around Tagga Bay and Mustel Bay, where a landing was most likely. There the base of the Hundsort peninsula was fortified with trench lines. Another section was the Sworbe peninsula, where the 425th regiment was to stay behind field fortifications in the event of a landing to protect the key position on Cape Zerel, where the heavy battery made it impossible to pass the Irbenstrasse and clear the minefields there. In between, the reserve regiment (472nd) lay on the road near Kergel in order to be able to provide help quickly in the event of a landing. It was crucial for the strategy, wrote Ivanov, that the Germans were not allowed to advance further east than to Moondamm, so that the connection to the mainland remained open. Both General Ivanov and Admiral Sveshnikov had planned further roadblocks, fortifications, observation posts and batteries, but they lacked the means to implement these measures. Both tried in vain for more soldiers and workers. The Russian secret service SNIS was well informed about the plans and movements of the Germans. Presumably this information came from decrypted German radio messages. Vice-Admiral Bachirew received the first advance warnings on September 24th about an impending major German undertaking and passed them on to the other commanders. From October 3, it was known that the Germans were planning a landing on Ösel, and on October 10, a warning was issued for the start of a German attack in the Baltic Sea on October 11. The British submarine E1 sighted the departing transport ships off Libau, but paid no special attention to the incident and did not report it to anyone.

Initial phase of the company

Approach

Approach way

After the delay caused by bad weather, the attack finally began on October 11, 1917. On the evening of October 10, the heavy units left the Putziger Wiek and united with the units from Windau during the night, and the staff of the army went on board of the flagship Moltke . In the afternoon the transport ships came in and the attack force moved north in four columns at nine knots, while the demining groups cleared alleys through the mine barriers in advance. During the night the swell increased, which disrupted the work of the deminers, and the dense minefields could not be rendered harmless in time, so that the schedule threatened to get mixed up. Vice Admiral Schmidt feared he would lose the surprise effect, so he finally gave the order, despite the danger to the heavily laden transporters and the valuable capital ships, to advance quickly into the operational area without mine clearance assistance. Although the ships ran through the middle of a minefield, there was no serious damage. Only the Corsica , one of the small steamers that the pioneers transported, ran into a mine at around 5 a.m. and was badly damaged. The crew and embarked troops were taken over by torpedo boats, and the ship was put aground in shallow water for repairs.

Start of landing

October 12, 1917

In the early morning the landing formation reached the attack area. When taking the bombardment positions shortly after 5 a.m., the battleships Bayern and Großer Kurfürst were hit by mines. The Großer Kurfürst was only slightly damaged, 280 tons of water penetrated the Wallgang and some coal bunkers. On the other hand, the bow torpedo room on the Bayern was full; with 1,000 tons of water in the foredeck, she had to withdraw later. However, both ships carried out the bombardments assigned to them and, along with the other heavy ships and cruisers, silenced the Russian batteries. Soon the German transport ships lay in front of Tagga Bay on the island of Ösel and began to disembark the troops. The attack troops were composed of infantry regiments 131 (Lieutenant Colonel Fischer), 255 (Colonel Berring) and the 65th Infantry Brigade (Colonel Matthiass), in which infantry regiments 17 and 138 were combined. Attached to them were the 2nd Cyclist Infantry Brigade and a battalion of stormtroopers. Although it turned out that the Russians had learned of the impending landing through intercepted German radio messages, the surprise succeeded. It turned out that the Russian soldiers had been informed of the impending German landing since the end of September, but the constant state of alarm over the past few weeks had damaged their vigilance. The onset of bad weather seemed to be a sign that the invasion was not going to take place, so that the landing nevertheless took place surprisingly. The 426th regiment posted at the landing site seemed paralyzed, and its commander, Colonel Gwaita, who appeared to have no knowledge of what was going on on the beaches, and three reserve companies remained inactive in Mustel. While the artillerymen were firing at the landing Germans, the Russian infantry often fled at the first sign of the enemy. The units disbanded and offered little resistance to the pursuing Germans, but instead streamed southward in disarray to flee to the mainland by ship or over the dam. The attacking troops went ashore largely unhindered with the help of ships and special so-called horse boats and occupied the battered batteries. The mindless reaction of the defenders led the German leadership to change their plans. Instead of first unloading their material as planned, which also included the field artillery, which was considered indispensable, General von Estorff decided to advance inland immediately, leaving almost all luggage and equipment behind. The 131st was to take the Sworbe peninsula and the Zerel coastal battery in the south, and the 255th was to advance in a south-easterly direction towards Arensburg and occupy the city, while the 65th Brigade was to extend south and east. Another landing took place at Pamerort on the north coast of Ösel, here the cyclists and storm troops were put ashore, who had a special task. In order to prevent the Russians from retreating in the direction of Moon, it was planned that they should advance quickly to the east to the town of Orissar and occupy the head of the dam that spans the Lesser Sound between Ösel and Moon and connects the two islands. This would make it more difficult for the enemy to escape to Moon and for reinforcements to be brought in.

Landing in Tagga Bay

Meanwhile, the 1st Division of the IV. Squadron under Vice Admiral Souchon, supported by the 15th Torpedo Boat Semi-Flotilla, launched a diversionary attack on the Sworbe peninsula to make the Russians believe that a landing was also imminent. The two capital ships Friedrich the Great and King Albert and their escorts had already separated from the rest of the fleet the previous evening and anchored in the southeast of the landing group, out of sight from land. At about 4 a.m. they anchored and approached the coast while the torpedo boats shielded them from mines and submarines. The crews of the torpedo boats were inexperienced in mine clearance, so that the attack was delayed, but the German battleships opened fire on the beach anyway. The battery on Cape Zerel did not return fire, although the enemy was within effective range, and the German capital ships continued to Tagga Bay at around 8:35 a.m.

At the same time, the 13th half flotilla occupied the Russian positions near Kielkond and the Papensholm airfield with artillery fire. The torpedo boats silenced the coastal batteries and forced the Russians to retreat. An air strike by Russian planes was unsuccessful, and German fighter pilots reported the shooting down of three flying boats. At around 3:30 p.m. the tips of the 131st Infantry Regiment reached Papensholm and were able to occupy the airfield largely undestroyed. It was available to German airmen the next day. Kielkond was manned an hour in advance. By evening the regiment had reached Mennust , and the 255 RIR. arrived in Irro on the road to Arensburg in the evening , while the 65th Brigade was advancing east from Tagga Bay and had reached Vesike and Mustel by evening .

The landing in Tagga Bay advanced rapidly after the coastal defenses had been eliminated, and by 8 p.m. all infantry and a large amount of equipment as well as 100 vehicles and 530 horses had been landed. Due to navigation errors, some areas of the bay that had been declared safe had to be cleared of mines, while the network blocking units demarcated the place with torpedo nets. A line of trawlers equipped with hydrophones anchored at the network barriers to warn of submarines. All heavy units of the IV Squadron were safely in the bay until 5 p.m.

Battles on the north coast of Ösels

Meanwhile, the light units of the Second S-Half Flotilla were looking for a safe passage through the Soelo Sound, which separates Ösel from Dagö and was of particular strategic importance, immediately east of the landing site. The very flat sea strait was a difficult fairway and only passable for small ships up to destroyer size, but through it the Russians could deploy light naval forces against the landing force, and for the Germans it offered the fastest access to the Kassar Wiek behind it. This arm of the sea between Ösel, Dagö and Moon was of paramount importance for the progress of the company, as access to all three islands could be controlled from there. The Moondamm, via which troops and supplies could be exchanged between the islands of Moon and Ösel, could also be controlled from there, so that the German fleet had to bring the access to the Kassar Wiek under their control. The Russian battery in Toffri caught the light units scouting the sound and scored a hit on the torpedo boat A 62 . But she was silenced by artillery fire from battleship Bayern and the small cruiser Emden . The battery was later blown up by a landing party. Mine clearance boats now pushed into the sound, but sighted the plumes of smoke from the two Russian destroyers General Kondratenko and Progranitschnik , who had been detached from the main Russian power in Moonsund by Kontreadmiral Stark and carried out reconnaissance after reports of the landing on Ösel. They drove the mine clearers back with artillery fire, but were in turn forced to retreat by the fire of the Emden .

By noon the heads of the cyclist battalions had reached the eastern part of Ösel and light naval forces were exploring the Kassar Wiek. Reinforced by the XIII. The Germans again advanced the half-flotilla into the Soelo Sound, but the Russians had received reinforcements from the destroyer Desna and the tank gunboat Grozyashchi . An ongoing battle developed between the two flotillas as they moved eastward. The Russians were reinforced by the destroyers Novik , Grom , Sabijaka and Isjaslav . The Grozyashchi was hit several times, as a result of which her steering gear temporarily failed, and the Russians retreated into Moonsund under the cover of the armored cruiser Admiral Makarow . The Germans, for their part, turned and ran back into the Soelo Sound. By evening a safe passage through the sound had been found and marked. The cyclist battalions reached the eastern part of Ösel with almost no resistance, the few Russian armed forces in the area were surprised and most of them were taken prisoner. The cyclist troops also looted the regional administration in Arensburg's holdings of 200,000 rubles , which were to be brought to the mainland. They reached Orissar around midnight and buried themselves there in order to prevent the Russians from accessing the dam, whereby they could use earthworks prepared by the enemy. However, a first foray into Moon across the dam failed. A few hours later, the Winterfeldt division also arrived and had had to march.

Meanwhile Vice Admiral Schmidt received the news that four opposing submarines had left Hangö, and ordered all ships of the III. With the exception of the Margrave , the squadron returned to the Putziger Wiek. It turned out, however, that the Bayern was too badly damaged for that, and so she slowly ran back to the comparatively safe Tagga Bay , escorted by the Crown Prince and three torpedo boats. The next morning one could drop anchor in the bay and begin makeshift repairs.

Reaction of the Russian High Command

Once the High Command received news of the German landing, the commander of the Baltic Fleet Rear Admiral sat Raswosow as reinforcing the 173rd Infantry Regiment and the newly formed Marine special unit called death battalion in March and asked for further reinforcements from the high command. Rear Admiral Sveshnikov held a council of war with his staff officers and the envoys of the soldiers' councils in the bishop's castle of Arensburg. Little information was available, but the Germans seemed to advance unhindered, their own troops could not withstand the attackers, and there were reports of German troops on their way back to Orissar. The Rear Admiral ordered the remainder of the 107th Division to retreat to the dam and to drive out the German troops on the road, without knowing that Orissar was already in German hands and the withdrawal was thus cut off. The only exception was the 425th regiment on the Sworbe peninsula, which was supposed to protect the vital battery at Zerel. A few hours later, Generals Ivanov and Kolbe appeared and described the situation to the commander. Sveshnikov and his council of war were supposed to bring reinforcements from Hapsal on the mainland, and Sveshnikov embarked on the gunboat Chrabry for Hapsal . The following morning he arrived in Kuiwast and asked Vice-Admiral Bachirew to command him to Hapsal. Both Rear Admiral Razvosov and Vice-Admiral Bachirew reprimanded Sveshnikov for his actions, and the commander of the Russian Army Group Northern Front, General Cheremisow, transferred command of the land forces on the Baltic Islands to Lieutenant General Nikolai Vladimirovich Henrikson. Even the latter did not yet know that Orissar was already in German hands, and ordered a line to be held that ran from Arensburg to Cape Pamerort in the north in order to displace the Germans from the island again with a counterattack. For this purpose he immediately put reinforcements on the march, in particular the 470th Infantry Regiment "Dankowski" belonging to the 118th Infantry Division and the so-called Death Battalion of the Navy; He also planned to deploy the remaining 118th Infantry Division. Sveshnikov was relieved of this and was transferred to Reval. Bachirew ordered the Soelo Sound to be explored by the modern Novik- class destroyers for the next day and planned to close the narrow strait with a block ship and a mine lock for the Germans. A landing corps of 86 sailors and officers was assembled from the crews of the large ships to strengthen the defense of the Moondamm. A disaster with serious consequences occurred at night: the train carrying the mines intended for Pripyat crashed at the port of Rogekul , causing the mines to explode and cause severe damage. The mine-layer was in serious danger from the severe fire and had to throw off the quay, but thanks to the courageous intervention of seafarers, the fire was soon extinguished. Vice-Admiral Bachirew believed the accident was the work of German agents, and the miners' crew had become very insecure, which had its effect the next day.

In the evening General Ivanov gave the order that the garrison should retreat to the east of the island to the Moondamm in order to wait there for reinforcements and to be able to organize a counterattack. Apparently the high command was still unaware of Orissar's fall, and advance train and hospital units with 130 wagons and trucks full of materials and personal belongings of the officers and their families were ambushed with heavy losses or imprisoned, which the news of the German landing impaired the garrison's morale further weakened. The demoralized Russian units mostly only thought of fleeing or surrendering and refused to support comrades willing to resist, or even prevented them from doing so by force of arms.

Location on the evening of October 12th

German troops are disembarked

At the end of the first day, the attackers had finally settled on Ösel and secured a landing head. Except for those at Zerel, the coastal batteries on the island had been taken away or destroyed and the Papensholm airfield occupied, the berth in Tagga Bay was secured against submarines and the disembarkation of the troops proceeded rapidly while the passage through the Soelo Sound in the waters east of the island was explored and secured. The strategically important Moondamm was temporarily cordoned off, making it difficult for the Russians to withdraw from Ösel and for reinforcements to arrive.

Russian countermeasures begin

October 13, 1917

At around 7:30 a.m. on the morning of October 13, the German reconnaissance reported the approach of eight Russian destroyers, which were supposed to block the Soelo Sound together with the mine- layer Pripyat and the steamer Lavwija, which had been prepared as a block ship . However, the Lavwija ran onto a reef before reaching its sinking position, and the Pripyat's crew refused, on the orders of the Soldiers' Council on board, to carry out their mission without a stronger escort, which would later make it much easier for the Germans to break through into the Kassar Wiek. Nevertheless, the destroyers attacked the German minesweepers, which were busy measuring the sound, but were forced to retreat by artillery fire from the Emden . A second foray two hours later ended with the same result. At around 1 p.m., the Russian tank gunboat Chivinetz risked another attack against the German search flotillas, which was also rejected. The rest of the afternoon was uneventful, and the Germans moved their anchorage further east. The torpedo boat V 82 ran aground and suffered severe damage to a screw, so that it was released to Libau for repairs.

In the meantime, the disembarkation of the German troops and their equipment continued in Tagga Bay, despite poor weather conditions, and the attack leaders pushed forward without waiting for supply columns or artillery. The Russians offered little resistance in the west and south, and most of their troops were withdrawing towards Moon. Lieutenant General von Estorff assumed that the Russians would try to hold the capital Arensburg with the support of the Navy, and put the bulk of his forces on march south and south-west to separate them from supplies from Moon. This left the advance departments at Orissar on the dam in an exposed and dangerous position. Towards evening German patrols reached the island's capital, and interrogations of prisoners revealed that the Russians had already evacuated the place. The Russian 425th Infantry Regiment (Colonel Borsakovsky) had moved to the Sworbe Peninsula, but the rest of the garrison were in retreat to reach the Moon dam and wait for reinforcements. They were always in contact with German units that were pushing in from the west and south. Almost all order had vanished before the German barrier around Orissar, stuck columns of vehicles clogged the streets, discarded equipment, debris, horse carcasses and corpses lay around, and the disorganized soldiers were on the verge of panic when they found that their escape route was blocked. Nevertheless, many wanted to fight their way free, and this brought the German units, which had advanced to the connecting dam between the two islands, in a critical position. During the day and also during the night violent fighting raged with the parts of the garrison approaching from the south, whereby the Germans temporarily occupied part of the dam and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. When the ammunition ran out, the attackers withdrew to Orissar, which allowed the Russians to withdraw some of their troops to Moon and bring supplies. Lieutenant General von Estorff, who had meanwhile understood the seriousness of the situation, sent the 255th RIR and the 65th Brigade on a night march to Orissar, although the troops really needed rest after the efforts of the past few days. Only the 131st Infantry Regiment remained in the south of the island and blocked access to the Sworbe peninsula. In Arensburg, the Russian garrison joined the withdrawal of their comrades to Moon; contrary to the command of their commanding officer, the naval forces in the island capital also withdrew towards Moonsund, although they should have provided fire support and evacuation to the withdrawing garrison. Meanwhile, Russian reinforcements slowly began to arrive at Moon. A ragged formation of sailors and marines launched a counterattack at the head of the dam and drove the Germans back to Ösel, and in the course of the afternoon the first soldiers of the 470th and 471st Infantry Regiments as well as the 1st Estonian Regiment and the Navy Death Battalion came out Reval on Moon. However, it turned out to be difficult to form combat-ready formations, since many soldiers of the army formations refused to cross over to Moon, deserted or mutinied. For example, the requested 25th Cossack regiment in Helsingfors preferred to stay in place for fear of the crossing. The army soldiers on Moon remained largely passive, considered resistance to be pointless and did not want to irritate the Germans. They later allowed themselves to be infected by the panic of the troops fleeing from Ösel, and when the torpedo boats began to bomb the dam, most of them threw away their weapons and, despite the officers' best efforts, fled to the port. There they tried to be transferred to the mainland and hindered and demoralized other arriving units. Only the death battalion proved to be fully capable of fighting.

Location on October 13th

In other parts of the island the German advance had advanced rapidly during the day, and large fires at Zerel and Arensburg heralded the withdrawal of the Russians. At Mennust the broken up remnants of the 426th Russian infantry regiment, marching north from Arensburg, got into a violent battle with the advancing Germans and were forced to the east with losses. The Germans took around 1,000 prisoners and captured a number of machine guns and field guns. The clearing of the mine barriers in Irben Strasse also made rapid progress, so that on the evening of October 13 the order was issued to break through Irben Strasse to Arensburg as soon as possible.

Location on the evening of October 13th

On the second day of the attack, a large part of the island of Ösel fell into the hands of the Germans. The navy had measured the Kassar Wiek and brought the Soelo Sound under their control, so that the army units on the north coast of Ösel would soon receive fire support. The demining of the Irben Strait had also begun, so that the way into the Gulf of Riga would soon be open to the battleships.

The conquest of Ösel and the battles in Irben Strasse and Kassar Wiek

October 14, 1917

Advance against Moon and the Kassar Wiek

On the morning of October 14, the command of the 8th German Army decided, in consultation with the naval war command, to extend operations to the island of Dagö. Owning the entire archipelago would ensure control of the Moonsund and the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and with the capture of Dagö the defense of Ösel would be made much easier. The landing should take place on October 16 after the operations on Ösel were completed.

In the north of Ösel the attacks by the German navy continued. The battleship Kaiser was to anchor together with the small cruiser Emden in the entrance of the Soelo Sound, which was inaccessible to them, in order to cover the light units in the Kassar Wiek with their superior firepower. Under her protection, four groups of torpedo boats were to advance and advance to the entrance to Moonsund to clear mines and provide fire support to the German armed forces on land. At about 6 a.m., Emden and Kaiser opened anchor and, escorted by two torpedo boats, approached their anchorages, which had already been cleared of mines. Soon afterwards four Russian destroyers appeared, anchored at the eastern exit of the Soelo Sound, but wisely stayed out of reach of the Emden . At around 11:45 a.m., the Kaiser dropped anchor at the designated location and immediately opened fire on the Russian ships at a distance of 19,200 m. The fire, which was well positioned from the start, drove the destroyers back, and Grom received a hit in the engine room with Kaiser’s second volley , but the 30.5 cm shell did not explode. The torpedo boats pushed into the sound under the protection of the large ships. Due to strong currents and unfavorable wind conditions, some boats got aground, but they still managed to clear the sound of mines and bring them into German hands. The torpedo boat destroyer G 103 suffered damage to a propeller shaft when it hit the ground and later had to be released for repair.

Once in Kassar Wiek, the German torpedo boats split up into four groups and drove eastwards at 17 knots, the shallow water did not allow more. The Russian destroyers approached again and opened fire at around 1:21 p.m. at a distance of 11,000 m. They fought an ongoing battle with the Germans advancing, with both sides scoring hits. On the German side, the G 103 was slightly damaged, while the Russians Pobeditel and Konstantin suffered slight damage and Grom and Sabijaka suffered heavy damage. Around 1:45 p.m., the Russian destroyers received reinforcements from the armored gunboats Chrabry and Chivinetz , which came to the rescue from Moonsund. Grom fell behind the other ships and was shot immobilized, despite the arrival of reinforcements from seven other destroyers, the Russians retreated into the Moonsund. The gunboat Chrabry attempted to tow the Grom , but the towline broke, and in view of the approaching enemy ships, the gunboat took over the crew of the Grom and withdrew. The Germans boarded the burning destroyer and tried to tow it away. However, the damage turned out to be too severe and the Grom sank at 3:10 p.m. The Russians had retreated to the southeast but were staying out of reach. At 3:35 p.m. the German torpedo boats came under fire again, this time the heavy Russian ships Graschdanin , which had meanwhile arrived, and Admiral Makarow, who had just arrived from Reval , were also involved in the cannonade. After ten minutes, however, the fire stopped again and nothing further happened until dark. The torpedo boats of the S-Flotilla Baltic Sea, commanded by the frigate captain von Rosenberg, entered the Lesser Sound to help the beleaguered cyclist battalions near Orissar. During the night the Russian mine- layer Pripyat , whose crew had been replaced in part by more courageous seamen, ventured into the Kassar Wiek again and put a mine barrier unnoticed by the Germans.

The large torpedo boat B 98 with the damaged Russian destroyer Grom in tow

During the day, the German army units commanded by Captain Winterfeldt, located near Orissar, were exposed to strong opposing pressure, despite gradually arriving reinforcements. The garrison advancing from the south pushed against the Moondamm, and Russian marines coming from Moon with two armored vehicles were hard on the Germans to keep the route of retreat open for their comrades. The Russian forces coming from Moon were supported by the 25 cm guns of the heavy battery near Woi in the southeast of Moon. Although the cyclists and the storm companies were able to repel the violent attacks of the disorganized garrison with heavy enemy losses, they had to slowly retreat and were on the verge of defeat due to exhaustion and lack of ammunition. The Navy Death Battalion on Moon could have tipped the balance in this situation. His commander, however, withdrew the exhausted troops under his command from the bridgehead on Ösel in order to let them rest and occupy the positions again the next day. A sent out patrol over the dam was thrown back by the Germans and lost twelve men. The flanking artillery fire of the incoming light torpedo boats of the S-Flotilla Rosenberg from the Lesser Sound proved to be an important support and also prevented an intervention of the Russian troops on Moon. They received urgently needed ammunition supplies from Winterfeldt's troops, and they hit two Russian armored cars, and a third retreated. With the arrival of the first reinforcements from the south and west of the island, the Germans managed to hold their position, and towards evening they were able to advance from Thomel towards the base of the dam and force the Russians to retreat to Moon. This put a stop to the escape of other enemy units to Moon, the cyclist battalions had now received reinforcements from the 65th Brigade, and the Reserve Infantry Regiment 255 was on the line of retreat from Arensburg to Moon.

After the end of the battle in Kassar Wiek, German torpedo boats went into the Lesser Sound and put a liaison officer ashore who was supposed to make contact with his own army troops. But that didn't work until around 4:30 p.m., shortly before dark. Captain Winterfeldt asked for supplies and ammunition for his people and also asked for a bombardment of the Moondamm, but because of the falling darkness this could no longer be carried out. However, most of the Russian garrison was now trapped in a narrow pocket and attacked from the north and south, while the retreat to the east was blocked by the navy and marshes to the west prevented escape.

Attack against Zerel and the Irben Strait

On the same day, the mine clearance operations in the Irben Strait continued. Already in the early hours of the morning the deminers, who had continued their work under cover of darkness and with light fog in favorable weather conditions, reported that usable gaps had been cleared in the two front Russian barriers. When it got light at 8 o'clock, the Russian heavy battery opened fire at Cape Zerel on the mine clearers accompanied by cruisers, who withdrew from the well-positioned volleys and only ventured back a little later. At around 8:45 a.m., the cruisers anchored at the Michaelsbänken near the village of Pissen on the Courland mainland. Mine clearance operations continued into the afternoon, and deminers scouting further east discovered a third and fourth barrier which they began to clear. At around 5 p.m., operations for the night were suspended.

On the same morning the Germans also brought heavy ship units from the west, which were to be used against the Sworbe peninsula. At 9:10 a.m. the battleships Frederick the Great, Empress and King Albert anchored in Tagga Bay and, accompanied by six torpedo boats of the IV and VI. Flotilla heading for the area of ​​operations. At around 3 p.m. they reached the designated positions, King Albert and Empress were to attack the heavy battery at Zerel, while Frederick the Great was to provide artillery support at the request of the commander of the 131st Infantry Regiment. The bombardment positions should actually have been cleared by then, but the torpedo boats entrusted with them had difficulties with their clearing equipment and finally drove directly in front of the Empress . Shortly after 4 p.m., the Zerel battery opened fire on the two accompanying torpedo boats, which were retreating north. The two battleships returned fire, and Frederick the Great , who had not yet been assigned any targets, also took part in the battle. In the next hour, the German ships fired around 120 heavy shells, but most of them were far off. Only a few splinters hit the battery and did no damage, but some of the demoralized crew fled to the nearby forests under the impact of the heavy fire. The Russians fired volleys of two shots each at 17,000 to 20,000 m and scored a few close hits, which is why both King Albert and Empress took zigzag courses. After only a few shots, the gun crew mutinied on the grounds that the grenades were too heavy and that they had worked enough for a day. Despite the officers' efforts, most of the artillerymen abandoned their guns and fled. The 131st Infantry Regiment had meanwhile reached the Tecomardi area that morning , and the regimental commander Lieutenant Colonel Fischer sent a parliamentarian to the Russians to avoid further bloodshed. It was feared that the Russians could strengthen their defense at this point with the heavy guns of the Zerel battery, but this was actually impossible because the guns could not be pivoted through 360 °. The conditions of surrender demanded the undamaged surrender of the facilities on the peninsula and offered the Russian soldiers good treatment and exemption from forced labor, otherwise the peninsula would be stormed and no prisoners would be taken. The parliamentary was arrested, however, and since there was no answer by 3 p.m., Fischer ordered the bombardment of the Russian fortifications at Anseküll at the seam between the peninsula and the rest of Ösel, and the regiment settled on the spot for the night a. When dusk fell, the battle at sea also ended, and King Albert and Empress dropped anchor while Frederick the Great kept moving. In the evening, the situation of the Russian forces trapped on the Sworbe peninsula began to become critical. Although everything remained calm, the demoralized soldiers felt that they were locked in, and the awareness of the generous German surrender conditions also contributed to the extinction of the will to resist. The teams began to lose their heads and left their posts, and the small port town of Mento was already full of refugees, but the Germans had not noticed any of this and continued to expect resistance. In order to restore the collapsing morale, the soldiers' council of the Russian troops assembled on the Zerel peninsula sent an urgent request for help to the fleet by radio, which was answered with a promise of support the next morning.

Location on the evening of October 14th

By the evening of the third day, the attackers had consolidated their position. A large part of the Russian garrison was encircled in the western part of the island and they were about to conquer the Sworbe peninsula. The Kassar Wiek was under the control of the Navy and the deminers would soon be able to open the entrance to Irben Street.

Fight for the Sworbe peninsula

October 15, 1917

On the morning of October 15, with light wind and drizzle, the weather conditions were favorable for the demining operations to continue. The minesweepers took off at 7 a.m. supported by the cruisers of the VI. Reconnaissance group resumed their work, and the two battleships König and Kronprinz had taken over coal in Putziger Wiek and were on their way to bombard the Sworbe peninsula with the ships of the IV Squadron. In response to Zerel's request for help, Vice-Admiral Bachirew had set the ship of the line Graschdanin and the destroyers Stereguschtschi, Turkmenez Stavropolski and Amurez from Kuiwast on the march. The fleet in Moonsund had received reinforcements from the armored cruiser Admiral Makarow , who first had to replenish its coal supplies. The minesweepers, unmolested by the poor visibility of the Russians, went through the third barrier line, which had already been partially cleared, and set about tackling the fourth and last line, which would enable the German ships to pass the Irben Strait. In advance they sighted smoke plumes that belonged to Russian destroyers, but which the minesweepers could not make out because of the poor visibility.

Location on October 15th

In the meantime the battleships König and Kronprinz , who had returned from the Putziger Wiek, were preparing to pass the Irben Strait, to cut off the Russians trapped on the Sworbe peninsula and finally to penetrate the Gulf of Riga. Around 9:30 a.m., the battleships, accompanied by minesweepers and two barrier breakers, reached the designated point north of Pissen. It turned out that the mine barriers on the third and fourth lines were very difficult to clear because the mines were very tightly and skilfully laid. It was not certain whether the cleared streets in the first two lines were actually free. Furthermore, it was not known whether the battery on Cape Zerel could still intervene, so Vice-Admiral Behncke decided not to pass too close to the guns, but to stay close to the Curonian coast. At the same time, the ships of the IV. Squadron took up their bombardment positions from the previous day again, whereby they should only open fire on request from the land, or if they were shot at themselves.

In the meantime - unnoticed by the Germans - the morale of the Russian troops remaining on the peninsula had deteriorated to the point of panic. To many soldiers, further resistance seemed pointless, quite a few had already fled, and the German surrender conditions sounded tempting. The soldiers' council therefore decided to evacuate the batteries undamaged and no longer offer any resistance. Lieutenant Bartinew, the commander of the heavy battery No. 43, was at least able to charge the magazines and generators with explosive charges with the help of a few courageous soldiers. The situation became more and more chaotic, groups of panicked soldiers, contrary to his orders, set fire to some buildings and an arsenal, which produced explosions and billows of smoke that could be seen from afar.

The ships of the IV. Squadron, commanded by Vice Admiral Souchon, had not yet intervened in the battle according to their instructions. At around 12:50 p.m., the thick smoke in the vicinity of the battery signaled that the Russians were vacating their positions and rendering the battery unusable. Further south were the ships of the III. To see the squadron, which together with the minesweepers pushed the Irben Strait. Souchon suspected that increased pressure on the Russian garrison could hasten the collapse of the defense, so between 1:40 p.m. and 2:20 p.m., Souchon left fire on the battery, the other facilities on the peninsula, a steamer identified further east and one open a large barge. This time the fire was much better than the day before and showered the battery with splinters, and Lieutenant Bartinew tried to detonate the explosive charges that had been laid. However, this failed, probably because the German grenades had destroyed the wires to the detonators, and so he set fire to some magazines and warehouses as well as the lighthouse on Cape Zerel instead. The rest of the battery crew withdrew to Mento, where the deserting or withdrawing soldiers were already trying, under chaotic conditions, to get on boats in order to evade the access of the Germans.

During the day the Graschdanin and her accompanying destroyer ran to the Arensburg Bank, where they anchored. Two destroyers went to the Abro Island area east of the Sworbe Peninsula. There they learned from Vice Admiral Bachirev that the defense of the peninsula was collapsing and that they had orders to destroy the battery on Cape Zerel. With the loss of the Zerel battery, the high command considered a further defense of the Irben Strait impossible, and the withdrawal to the Moonsund and the abandonment of Ösel were the consequences. The Graschdanin then went to Cape Kawi in the southeast of the Sworbe peninsula, where in the critical passage in a narrow channel with shallows on one side and mines on the other side, a submarine alarm was wrongly triggered. The ship performed an evasive maneuver in the minefield and fired with the central artillery on both sides, which put the escorting destroyers in danger. At the same time, the ships were attacked by a squadron of German torpedo bombers, which, however, scored no hits. At sunset, Grahdanin reached the port of Mento, where a large number of boats, barges and barges with fleeing soldiers were assembled, all of whom were pressing to be picked up by the destroyers. Grahdanin approached battery No. 43 as close as possible and exposed it to fire from its 12 "and 6" batteries. The two destroyers at Abro headed for Mento and took part of the local garrison on board before they in turn opened fire on the place. The other ships took over other parts of the garrison, they were also joined by the steamer General Zimmermann and four tugs, one of which had a barge loaded with 200 men in tow. At dusk, the Russian ships left the area and set course for Moonsund. During the night, the convoy was sighted by the German submarine UC 57 at around 1:45 a.m. , which, however, was discovered during the attack and had to submerge in front of the turning destroyers. In the early morning hours of October 16, the escort arrived at the roadstead at Kuiwast. During the night, however, the towing connection to the barge was broken, which was now drifting without propulsion east of Sworbe in dangerous proximity to the minefields.

With the beginning of the retreat of the Russians and the failure of the battery, the German minesweepers tried to clear a passage further north before dark so that the heavy ships could still have a direct route to Arensburg that day. By the time they were ready, however, it was almost evening, so instead they continued the work they had begun further east until dark. Empress and King Albert were released to take over coal in Putziger Wiek, while Frederick the Great stayed west of Sworbe.

On land, the 131st regiment moved into Ansekull, which had meanwhile been vacated by the Russians, and marched further south. The men’s ears had heard of the previous day’s favorable surrender conditions and undermined their will to resist, and the Russian Soldiers Council had meanwhile considered further resistance to be pointless. Colonel Borsakowski sent the appointed German parliamentarian back to the regimental staff with an offer for an armistice and surrender negotiations. Although the commander turned down the offer to negotiate, he offered honorable conditions of surrender, which the Russians also accepted. At 6 p.m. the Russians agreed to the terms, but the next morning they succeeded in destroying a large part of the heavy battery, which was almost intact from the fires and explosions as well as the two-sided shelling, before they surrendered. 150 officers and 5,100 men were taken prisoner, 54 machine guns, 150 hauled carts, 27 light and eight heavy guns, 20 anti-aircraft guns, the heavy guns of the batteries and large amounts of supplies fell into the hands of the Germans. After all, Colonel Borsakowski had gained valuable time with this maneuver, which the Russians used to evacuate parts of the garrison, and the clearing of the mines in Irben Strasse was also delayed. The key position of the Russian defense of the Gulf of Riga, however, had easily fallen into the hands of the enemy due to the panicked troops, so that the position could no longer be held.

Final phase of the battles for Ösel

The German plan for October 15 was to secure the eastern exit of the Kassar Wiek and to provide the army units near the Moondamm with artillery support by means of the small, flat-moving torpedo boats of the A- class. Fourteen torpedo boats of the II. Flotilla and XIII. Half-flotilla anchored and went into the sound. Scouts reported from there at least twelve Russian destroyers and a number of other ships that could not be identified due to poor visibility. Again a liaison officer was put ashore, and the small torpedo boats A 31 and A 29 began to bombard the dam. In the meantime, they themselves received fire from the Russian armored cannon boats and destroyers as well as the Admiral Makarow , who fired from Moonsund across the island, but continued their own fire until they ran out of ammunition and they retreated to Tagga Bay. The larger torpedo boats also withdrew to the west around noon to avoid the indirect fire of the Russians. The torpedo boat destroyer B 98 ran into a Russian mine laid the night before, and the forecastle was blown off. Since a large part of the crew was eating below deck at that time, there were high losses. 14 dead and five wounded were mourned, but the boat remained buoyant and was towed to Libau for repairs. The torpedo boats evaded the shallow water further north, where some ran aground and sustained damage.

Meanwhile, the decision was being made in the eastern part of Ösels. During the night, the heavy battery near Woi repeatedly fired on the German positions, and the Russian death battalion, which had arrived in Kuiwast the day before, made three attacks over the dam, all of which were repulsed. In the morning the German line at Lewwa was attacked several times, and the division commander Lieutenant General von Estorff, who had meanwhile arrived, feared that the garrison had already escaped. General Ivanov could do little from his command post at Peude , since the units remaining to him were completely demoralized and hardly obeyed orders. The soldiers gave up the trenches and deserted en masse, so that the officers had to man the machine guns themselves. Attempts to break out by the disorganized mass of escaping and deserting soldiers in the direction of the German 255th Reserve Regiment collapsed with heavy losses. A small Russian flotilla made up of minesweepers Gruz, Kapsyul, Kramvol, Minrep and Udarnik , covered by the destroyers Deyatelny and Delny , approached the coast of Ösel near Kubyassar to take Russian troops on board. Although they reached the beach and silenced a German field battery by shelling them, they had to turn back without having achieved anything, as there were no Russian soldiers on the beach. A general attack by all forces in the division was ordered for 11 o'clock in order to force the Russians to surrender quickly. At the same time, the division command was still uncertain about the location of the 255th RIR, which was on the road from Orissar to Arensburg near the town of Kapra and was in turn unclear about the overall situation. At the start of the attack, the 2nd and 4th Cyclist Battalions advanced near Thomel together with the 38th Infantry Regiment against Lewwa and captured it, while further to the east the 17th Infantry Regiment with the 5th Cyclist Battalion advanced against Ulla without resistance . Meanwhile, Captain Winterfeld and the 18th storm battalion blocked the base of the Moondamm, which was under fire from the ship's artillery, in order to thwart any possibility of escape and relief. In the south, the Reserve Infantry Regiment 255 advanced to Hoppi, but initially remained there due to an acute shortage of ammunition. The regimental commander heard artillery fire from the direction of Peude around noon , correctly concluded that the other forces of the division were arriving and launched an attack in the north. At 2:30 p.m. another attack by the regiment took place, and when the Russians saw enemy troops approaching from the north, they showed the white flag. At around 3 p.m. the Russian 107th Infantry Division surrendered, over 5,000 men with 14 artillery pieces and many machine guns were brought in as prisoners, and only a few hundred Russian soldiers escaped in boats across the Lesser Sound. Most of Ösel was occupied and almost the entire Russian garrison, including General Ivanov and his staff, were taken prisoner. During the fighting, the writer Walter Flex , who was very popular at the time and who led a company of infantry, was fatally wounded near Gut Peudehof and died a day later in the hospital. Little is known about the losses suffered by the Russians, but they were apparently high. In one place alone there were a hundred dead, while in a single village there were four hundred wounded.

At the same time as the last attacks on the Russian garrison on Ösel, the Germans made their first attempt to land on Dagö. At around 9 o'clock two detachments of the Ahlefeld landing corps went ashore near Serro and formed a bridgehead. The cruiser Emden and the torpedo boat T141 anchored near Serro and Emmast to provide artillery support. Around 12:30 p.m., fierce fighting broke out between the garrison and the attackers, and the unexpectedly strong resistance persuaded Captain von Ahlefeld to vacate the bridgehead again by evening, as he believed he would not be able to stay on land overnight. The landing party was taken on board by minesweepers called from the Lesser Sound; the landing should be repeated the next day after heavy bombardment.

Location on the evening of October 15th

At the end of the third day of the attack, Ösel was completely in German hands and the Russian garrison had been captured or driven from the island. The heavy battery at Cape Zerel had been rendered harmless, and the cleaning of the Irben Strait could now continue undisturbed in order to open the way for the German naval forces into the Gulf of Riga, so that the Russian fleet had to rush to withdraw from the area. In Tagga Bay the unloading of the first squadron of transports was nearing the end, and the army units were preparing to cross over to Dagö and Moon; however, a first attempt at landing on Dagö had failed. The Kassar Wiek was controlled by the German fleet, which could also use it to shoot Moon.

Preparations for landing on Moon and Dagö

October 16, 1917

With the shutdown of the heavy battery on Cape Zerel and the conquest of almost all of Ösel, the clearing of the mines in the Irben Strasse could be accelerated, and for October 17th Vice Admiral Schmidt reckoned with the possibility of the III. To bring squadrons into the Riga Bay and with their help to support the landing on Moon. Preparations were made accordingly so that the other ships and army troops would be ready to attack on time.

On that day the weather was good for the third day in a row. At 8 o'clock the battleship Kaiser began a one-hour bombardment of the landing zone on Dagö, after which the landing corps went ashore again at 9 o'clock. The steamer Coburg went close to land near Toffri to serve as a breakwater and to facilitate landing. German patrols advanced inland and skirmishes with the Russians between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. Shortly before 3 p.m. the landing corps embarked again, and Emden approached the coast to fire on the beach again. The high command of the special unit suggested that a cyclist battalion should be landed the next day before the remaining troops could attack Dagö on October 18. A pier under construction on the north coast of Ösel, which would be completed by the date of the attack, should facilitate the embarkation of the troops.

The operations also continued in the Lesser Sound. When it got light, the A- class torpedo boats started again and fired at the end of the dam on Moon and other positions recognized on the island. The transfer to Moon itself, however, was only planned for the next day, if one, with the support of the battleships of the III. Squadron could count, provided they could get through the Gulf of Riga. Material and supplies were carried to Orissar throughout the day so that 2,000 men could dare to land on the following day.

In the Kassar Wiek the IV. Semi-Flotilla was at dawn from the XIII. Semi-flotilla has been replaced. The mine danger, which had still not been eliminated, and the constant cruising between the shallows, exhausted the crews, so that only a small number guarded the exit of the Wiek to the east, while the others lay at anchor northwest of the Keinast peninsula before a short hawser. Around 8:30 a.m., a group of German torpedo boats ran east through the Kassar Wiek to the east, and the Russian armored cannon boats opened fire, whereupon the Germans hid behind a veil of smoke and retreated. Vice-Admiral Bachirew feared that this could be a harbinger of an imminent landing on Moon, and ordered the III. Torpedo Boat Destroyer Division into the area. Soon three Russian destroyers and the two armored gunboats approached from the east and engaged in a battle with the escorts. However, when the German torpedo boats dropped anchor, they withdrew again. Around noon, five minesweepers appeared and set about clearing the center of the Kassar Wiek of mines. The ship of the line Slawa, lying in Moonsund, and the armored cruiser Admiral Makarow began to fire at the torpedo boats over Moon. Both anchored ships were overturned to one side by targeted flooding of divisions in order to increase their artillery and thus increase their range, as had already been done in 1915 when the Germans broke into the Gulf of Riga. The guns on Moon and the destroyers and gunboats near the island quickly joined in and also took the A- boats operating in the Lesser Sound and the hospital ship Viola under fire. At the same time, a gunboat and a destroyer tried to take action against the attackers through the so-called Stocking Canal, a close, deep connection between Moonsund and Kassar Wiek. The Germans returned fire and withdrew. After the Russians turned off, the A boats continued their venture despite the shelling, their own bombing. Since the Russian fire was very good, the Germans suspected an observer near the coast and fired four torpedo boats at probable observation posts on the west bank of Moons for half an hour. Vice-Admiral Schmidt requested a night torpedo attack on the Russian fleet in Moonsund by the A- boats, which had finally received the torpedoes that had been missed so far. Since he feared excessive losses and did not consider the task of the A boats in the Lesser Sound to be completed - a prerequisite for the nocturnal attack - Commodore Heinrich refrained from doing so.

The III. Squadron crosses the Irben Street

October 16, 1917

The good weather that day made it possible for the German naval aviators and airships to be deployed after the naval flying station in Arensburg had resumed operations. Two twin-engine bombers, escorted by two fighters, attacked the eastern end of the Moondamm at around 10 a.m., the bombs hit gun emplacements and set an ammunition dump on fire. Two Russian fighters appeared but did not attack the bombers. In the early morning hours, the naval airship L30 and the army airships LZ 113 and LZ 120 attacked Pernau on the Estonian mainland, their bomb load of 6,000 kg hit the city center and the port. In the evening, L37 repeated the attack, but was forced to return to the base in the East Prussian Sea Horse because of a fire in the port side central motor nacelle . The SL 8 airship also had to turn around when problems occurred in three of its five engines.

The minesweepers in Irben-Strasse also took advantage of the good weather and cleared a 400 m wide canal through the barriers. The battleships and cruisers of the German association and their suppliers, preceded by lock breakers and minesweepers, ran through this gap. Immediately north of the alley through the fourth blocking line, more mines were unexpectedly found, so that the battleships and cruisers had to stop at around 11 a.m. to await their removal. The torpedo boat A 62 sighted a large barge further north, which was displaying the white flag. She turned out to be the one who had been torn away from her tractor the previous night in association with Grahdanin . Although the men were now captured, they escaped the danger of the mines. The cleared streets were jetted for the following traffic.

During the passage on Irben Strasse, Vice Admiral Behncke received new orders by radio from Vice Admiral Schmidt and his staff. Instead of initially securing Arensburg as a port for the second squadron of the transporter fleet and monitoring their unloading, he should act directly and as quickly as possible against the Moonsund. Behncke intended to anchor with his most powerful ships at night at the entrance to the Moonsund and to advance when it was light to attack the Russian fleet there. After Arensburg, the small cruiser Augsburg and the entourage as well as the IV. Mine clearing division and the III. Semi-flotilla dispatched to clear existing mines there and make the port usable. The small cruisers Strasbourg and Kolberg , the VIII. Torpedo boat flotilla, the XX. Half-flotilla and four trawlers of the Coast Guard Half-Flotilla East would together with the III. and VIII. Mine clearance half flotilla, the III. The mine-clearing division and their tender Indianola accompany the battleships King and Crown Prince to Moonsund. After the occupation of Sworbe was completed, Frederick the Great was released to Putzig for coal , and Margrave was assigned to Vice Admiral Behncke's group from Tagga Bay.

Advance of the III. Squadron to Moonsund

October 16, 1917

In the evening, the British submarine C27 , which ran from Hangö into the Gulf of Riga, sighted the German formation and at 4:30 p.m. shot two torpedoes at König , but they went wrong. The submarine broke the surface after the torpedoes were shot down, but the Germans did not open fire because they believed it was their own boat and realized the mistake too late. C27 was able to submerge and reload torpedoes, and fifteen minutes later it hit the torpedo on the Indianola , which broke down with the engine room full. The submarine had to submerge from the attacks by the German escorts, stayed underwater until dark and then came to the surface to leave the Gulf of Riga. It was attacked again by German light forces, but escaped unscathed to Hangö. The sister boat C32 also launched an attack on the unit near Cape Domesnäs on the northern tip of the Curonian mainland, but was spotted by a German aircraft and had to dive in alarm. Although the commander, Lieutenant Satow, guessed the destination of the German combat group and went to the southern end of the Moonsund, he did not find the enemy again that night. The Indianola was towed into the port of Arensburg.

At around 8:30 p.m., the German warships dropped anchor at the southern end of Moonsund and stayed there for the night, guarded by torpedo boats. Vice-Admiral Behncke ordered the commanders of the various units to a meeting aboard the flagship König in the evening and submitted the plan of attack for the next day. The positions of the Russian minefields in the area were known from a map captured on the Grom , one to the south of the entrance to Moonsund, the other further north, directly at the mouth of the sound. The battleships were to run west through the minefields and shut down the enemy fleet near Kuiwast and the coastal batteries, while the cruisers were to enter the Lesser Sound and fight the batteries at Woi. Meanwhile, the mine clearers were supposed to pave an alley into the sound west of Moon. In the event that the Russians resisted in the protection of their minefields and shot at the mine clearance boats, Behncke wanted to attack the opposing heavy ships with the battleships.

Location on the evening of October 16

On the evening of October 16, almost all of Ösel was in the hands of the German army troops, which were still busy bringing in prisoners and preparing the attacks on Dago and Moon that were scheduled for the next day. The 131st Infantry Regiment had occupied the Sworbe peninsula without encountering any resistance, and the battery on Cape Zerel had been rendered unusable. The transporter fleet in Tagga Bay had largely completed the unloading of the material, while the ships of Squadron II could expect to be able to unload in the port of Arensburg, which is expected to be ready for use again soon. The German heavy units that had finally advanced into the Gulf of Riga prepared a decision-seeking attack on the Russian units remaining in Moonsund.

The battle in Moonsund

• See article Battle in Moonsund

October 17, 1917

During the night there was unrest among the Behncke group because of the presence of the British submarines, but this turned out to be unfounded. Around 4:30 a.m., a radio report was received about a previously unknown mine lock that was supposed to run between the identified minefields in a north-south direction. The report later turned out to be false, but nevertheless messed up the German plan of attack.

At about 7 a.m. the German mine clearers began their work and cleared a wide canal south of the southern minefield. Soon after, two Russian torpedo boats were sighted just below the Estonian coast, which informed Vice Admiral Bachirew of the German advance. The Russian commander decided that between the shallows, minefields and batteries of Moonsund, despite its massive inferiority, it would be the easiest thing to keep the Germans from advancing further, and put his heavy ships into march. Slava and Grahdanin soon appeared in the roadstead of Kuiwast, accompanied by a steamer and a few destroyers, while Bachirew followed shortly afterwards on his flagship, the armored cruiser Bajan . In the meantime, all available ships anchored and some civilian tugs and steamers were released, while the Glagol and Pokoj were being prepared as block ships. German seaplanes attacked the roadstead at Kuiwast with bombs, which did little damage, but produced extremely impressive explosions that did not fail to affect the Russians. The king opened fire on the destroyers, who quickly retreated, while the Russian ships and the heavy battery at Woi in turn opened fire on the German mine clearers and the barrier breakers. The barrier breakers were ordered back, the III. Mine clearing semi-flotilla got to work in Moonsund, while the 8th mine clearing semi-flotilla worked its way into the Lesser Sound. Although the boats went slowly and the Russian fire was well aimed, none of them received a serious hit and artificial smoke walls temporarily hid the deminers from the enemy.

The blown up wreck of the Slava

At 8 o'clock the King and Crown Prince steered an easterly course south of the large southern minefield in the Bay of Riga. The Slava , which had run a little further north out of reach of the Germans, changed target and now fired at the battleships from a distance of more than 20,000 m. Although the Russian ship of the line was armed with only four 30.5 cm guns than the two German dreadnoughts, each with ten guns of similar caliber, it still had the advantage of greater range thanks to specially modified mounts that allowed the tubes to be increased more. The volleys of the German battleships were therefore too short, and they were in a bad position in the shallow and narrow sound between the mines. Again, the Russian fire was good, but there were no hits, although some grenades hit only 50 meters from the König . The Slava got after some time problems with the front heavy gun turret, which could no longer be rotated by a gearbox failure, and fought the deminers instead with the aft guns. Vice-Admiral Behncke withdrew his heavy ships for the time being and ran west.

Vice-Admiral Bachirew knew that the German attack planning would become obsolete if the minesweepers in Moonsund could not carry out their task. Accordingly, the warships and coastal batteries took the III at around 9:10 a.m. Demining semi-flotilla under heavy fire but did not score any significant hits and the deminers continued their work. Around 10 a.m. she received support from the III. Mine-clearing division while the battleships waited between the Larina and Awanasewa banks. Behncke intended the III. To let the mine-clearing semi-flotilla advance to the north of the northern minefield and then to push quickly in order to undermine the Russian fire and finally get the enemy heavy ships within range. Meanwhile, the Russian heavy ships withdrew to the north so that the crews could take food, but approached the combat area again around 10 a.m. to intervene again in the battle.

At 10 o'clock the mine clearers had reached the designated position, Vice Admiral Behncke let his two battleships dash ahead northwards with the utmost power and was soon close enough to be able to take the target. At 10:13 a.m. the king opened fire on the Slava , four minutes later the Crown Prince began to fire on the Grahdanin . The king soon aimed at the target, three shells from the third volley hit the slava about 3 to 3.5 m below the waterline. Two of them penetrated the armor, while the third could not penetrate the side armor on the port side. One of the grenades exploded near the forward dynamo room and tore a 3.6 m wide hole below the waterline in the inner hull, the wall passage and the forward ammunition magazine were also full, and the power went out in the forecastle. The other exploded near the capstan and caused another violent water ingress, about 1,130 tons of water penetrated into the foredeck, and the ship of the line soon showed 8 ° port side, which however could be reduced to 4 ° by counter-flooding. The draft increased to 10.5 m in the front and 9.9 m in the aft. The Graschdanin received two hits almost simultaneously, one of which struck near the stern and set off a fire that was quickly extinguished, the other detonated on the belt armor near a 15.2 cm tower, and splinters damaged two dynamos and several steam pipes in the engine room. At 10:24 a.m. the slava received two more hits in the forecastle, a shell struck on the port side near the forward chimney and devastated the chapel used as a first aid station, killing or wounding several seamen and a fire. The second round detonated on the battery deck, gas and smoke penetrated to the boiler room, and a nearby 15.2 cm magazine was flooded as a precaution. The fires could be extinguished after about a quarter of an hour, and at 10:30 a.m. Vice Admiral Bachirew ordered all ships to retreat to the northern Moonsund. The flagship Bajan offered itself as a distraction target to cover the retreat of the liners, and a series of rapid changes of course and voyage initially saved the ship from hits, although it was forked in by eight enemy volleys in quick succession.

At 10:39 the König scored two more hits on the Slava , again below the waterline. One of them wreaked havoc in the crew quarters and killed three men, the other broke through the armored belt and got stuck in the bulkhead of a coal bunker. The Slava was now out of range, the König now fired at the bayan and at 10:36 a.m. scored a dangerous hit with her last volley on the starboard side between the bridge and the front 20.3 cm turret, which penetrated the upper and battery deck and in the cable section detonated deep inside the ship where there was a lot of combustible material. A heavy fire broke out, which could only be finally extinguished after 24 hours. The explosion continued to tear eight frames, damaged a bulkhead and tore several panels of the double floor and some armor plates of the belt armor from their anchorages. The ammunition magazines located near the source of the fire had to be flooded to be on the safe side, and leaks caused by splinters let in even more water. A total of 1,000 tons of water penetrated, so that the draft in the front was finally 7.9 m. Two men were killed immediately when the grenade hit, three others later died from their injuries and three were wounded. The Russian ships initially continued to fire on the deminers before shooting the battleships, which remained undamaged. At 10:40 a.m., the German battleships ceased firing, and a squadron of six seaplanes attacked the smaller departing Russian ships with about forty bombs, but scored no hits. However, the heavy shelling and the simultaneous air attack impaired the morale of the crews, especially on the mine layers with their dangerous cargo, but this did not prevent the Slava from shooting down one of the attackers.

The captain of the Slava , Captain 1st rank Vladimir Antonov, soon realized that his ship could not join the retreat. Although it was not critically damaged, the large amount of water that had seeped in had increased the draft to such an extent that it could no longer pass through the dredged channel through the Moonsund. Antonov therefore proposed that after the departure of Bayan and Grahdanin , they should be sunk in the middle of the fairway as a block ship, and Bachirev accepted the proposal. The crew of the Slava , who had maintained discipline during the battle, began to panic when they had survived the heavy enemy fire. About a hundred of the youngest sailors gradually left their posts and put on life jackets. The soldiers' council on board had the engine room evacuated prematurely so that nobody carried out the commandant's engine orders and the ship did not come to a stop in time. It ran aground southeast of the desired position, where it was not an obstacle, and was instead sunk on the spot itself. Panicked sailors at gunpoint had to be prevented from simply jumping overboard into the gap between the side of the Slava and that of a destroyer walking alongside that wanted to take over the crew. Captain Antonov was the last to leave the ship, and at 11:55 a.m. the aft 30.5 cm magazine was blown up. The explosion could be seen and heard from afar, and the enormous mushroom cloud was still visible in Kassar Wiek 25 km further east. In addition, three destroyers shot six torpedoes on the wreck, only one of which actually exploded from the Turkmenets Stavropolski .

Attack on moon

October 17, 1917

After the end of the battle in Moonsund, it was clear to the Russians that they would not be able to hold their position much longer. Vice Admiral Bachirew therefore ordered the closure of the sound and the roadstead of Kuiwast for the enemy with block ships and mines. In front of Kuiwast, however, no more mines could be laid because the supply ships transporting them had already run north. The retreating Russians concentrated their efforts accordingly on the blockade of Moonsund and began to mine the Stocking Canal. The already prepared steamers Glagol and Pokoj as well as the General Zimmermann and the pilot ship Artelschtschik were sunk by destroyers as block ships in the main fairway of the Moonsund, which is only 60 m wide, which made it impossible for the German cruisers to pass. In any case, the battleships could not hope to enter the canal, which is only nine meters deep at its shallowest point. The Russian destroyers Voiskovoi and Zabaikaletz also began to mine the area around the block ships.

Location on October 17th

While the Russians were covering their retreat, the German battleships got into action with the coastal batteries. At 10:46 a.m., the Werder battery opened fire, and König shot back, whereupon the battery soon stopped fire. Here, too, panic spread and a large part of the battery crew fled. Soon afterwards, smoke and flames by the battery and the nearby signal station indicated that the Russians were about to evacuate the area. Shortly after 11 o'clock the two battleships anchored near Selglaid and got into action with their batteries at Woi. King returned fire and fired single, aimed shots. At 11:26 am there was a - false - submarine alarm, but Vice Admiral Behncke did not want to unnecessarily expose his ships to the very real danger of a torpedo attack and anchored again. The battleships now drove back and forth in the cleared channel with little speed in an east-west direction, covered by torpedo boats. At 12:06 p.m., the submarine alarm was given again: The British boat C26 had run south from Hangö and was now in a favorable position south of the Moonsund. The shallow water troubled the commander, Lieutenant Downie, and before he could get into firing position he ran aground. The boat could not free itself underwater, so Downie had the aft ballast tanks blown. The submarine broke through the surface and was immediately spotted by the Germans. The torpedo boats attacked with gunfire and depth charges and chased the submarine for more than two hours. At times it got caught in a submarine network, but was able to free itself again, whereby the screws were damaged. Only in the evening was Downie able to show up and found that the downplanes were also damaged and jammed, and went to the shipyard in Pernau. Only in December C26 was able to escape to Hangö after makeshift repairs.

In the meantime, the German ships advanced further up the Moonsund, but the deminers made slow progress due to the freshening wind from the south-southeast and increasing swell. The small motor boats of the III. Mine-clearing divisions even had to stop work. Near the roadstead at Kuiwast, the deminers encountered a strong network barrier that they were unable to break. Vice-Admiral Behncke therefore stopped work at around 3:40 p.m., and at 5 p.m. the battleships were anchored southwest of the southern large minefield, protected by torpedo boats.

In the Lesser Sound, Rear Admiral Hopman advanced with his cruisers against Moon. At first there were delays because the deminers had received an incorrect position report for the southern minefield and only cleared the southwest corner instead of concentrating on the intended fairway. On the other side, the hospital ship Viola, escorted by T 144, entered the northern Lesser Sound to rescue the wounded at Orissar. By 8:50 a.m., the A boats had replenished their ammunition stocks and, at the request of the infantry on Ösel, began to bombard the northern end of the Moondamm. The fire, guided by two seaplanes, was well aimed and caused numerous losses to the defenders. During the course of the morning, reconnaissance planes reported that Moon was only sparsely occupied by the enemy. Much of the garrison had apparently already been evacuated and preparations for the transfer were accelerated accordingly. The deminers and cruisers were only able to penetrate the southern Lesser Sound around noon. The Kolberg covered the batteries at Woi with grenades for ten minutes. The Russians did not return fire, because the crews of this battery were also trying to escape almost unified. Around 2:30 p.m., Strasbourg and Kolberg anchored at the southern end of the Lesser Sound, and Hopman put a landing party ashore to take the batteries away. Around 4:45 p.m. the 6th Company of the 138th Infantry Regiment began to translate under cover of smoke walls and heavy artillery fire from field guns near Kegova , and Captain Winterfeldt's Sturmkompanie 18 advanced across the dam towards the island. The death battalion put up heavy resistance with machine guns and artillery fire and held the attackers in the west of the island. An abandoned Russian armored car was destroyed in the explosion of a magazine near the north end of the dam. Most of the other Russian forces on Moon, however, panicked and refused to offer any resistance to the Germans. Only after midnight did they retreat to positions between Nauze and Linnust . At 5:30 p.m., the landing party reported that the battery was in their hand but had been rendered unusable, and the advancing storm company was able to gain a foothold on Moon.

In the Kassar Wiek the situation had remained calm throughout the day, only the mine clearing continued, and the torpedo boats of the II. Flotilla and XIII. Semi-flotilla took over new 10.5 cm artillery ammunition. Commodore Heinrich saw and heard the fierce battle in Moonsund from afar and decided to make a night advance with torpedo boats into southern Moonsund. An advance into the northern part appeared too dangerous, but only four boats were suitable for this task because of the damage suffered by fighting and grounding. At 10 p.m., the S 50, S 61, S 64 and V 74 were carefully plumbing into the southern Moonsund, with the S 50 remaining in the entrance of the sound as a navigation aid. Kapitänleutnant Zander, who was in command, had previously contacted Vice Admiral Behncke and learned that there were no more German ships in the area, so that there could be no doubt as to their identity during sightings. Shortly after midnight, " S 64" was shaken by a violent mine detonation, the boiler room was full and the boat was unable to maneuver, but was still swimming. Several mines laid in the area were loosened by the detonation and were now floating on the surface, and Lieutenant Zander decided to abandon the operation. However, during the tow attempt, the boat ran aground and had to be blown up. V 61 previously went alongside and took over the crew. Six men had died in the boiler room and five were injured. The other boats had leaks and screw damage when they hit the ground, so that only retreat remained.

Another attempt to land on Dagö

October 17, 1917

Meanwhile, the Ahlefeld division had made another attempt to land on Dagö. At 9:25 a.m. Kaiser began a preparatory artillery fire on the bridgehead, and at 10 a.m. the landing corps went ashore again. Patrols penetrated deep into the island, but encountered resistance and losses. Transporters tried to unload material near Toffri, but found the anchorages unfinished. The biking battalion actually involved in the landing also arrived delayed, so that the landing head should be cleared again in the evening. Since the evacuation of the wounded proved difficult, the landing head remained manned overnight and trawlers were ready for evacuation in the event of a determined Russian attack. Although there had been fierce fighting during the day, all was quiet during the night.

In the evening the Russian naval commanders gave the order to retreat into the Gulf of Finland. The bases in the area were to be evacuated and destroyed and the troops evacuated, with the garrison of Dagö remaining until the end. A short time later, Vice Admiral Bachirew also learned of the planned German advance into the Gulf of Finland, apparently the radio message from Vice Admiral Schmidt had been intercepted and decoded. Accordingly, he planned to leave Moonsund by 4 p.m. on October 18th. The fleet chief Admiral Naswosoff wanted to rush to help and began to make preparations for sailing, but was called back by the GHQ.

Location on the evening of October 17th

At the end of the day the southern Moonsund and all of Ösel were firmly in German hands. The transporter fleet in Tagga Bay had finished unloading and Arensburg would be available as a port on Ösel the next day. The German troops had formed a bridgehead on Moon and were ready to land again on Dagö the next day. Vice Admiral Schmidt therefore decided to venture into the Gulf of Finland and to enclose the Russian fleet in Moonsund; however, this undertaking required the approval of the emperor.

The capture of Dagö and Moon

October 18, 1917

In the morning, the deminers in Kassar Wiek resumed their work. Shortly after noon the large torpedo boat (destroyer) B 111 hit a mine, the detonation tore off the forecastle, but the boat remained buoyant. Two dead and sixteen injured as well as three missing were to be mourned, the damaged boat was later towed to Libau. In the meantime, Commodore Heinrich had personally reported to Vice Admiral Schmidt and was ordered to conduct offensive operations at his discretion.

The final attack on Dago began that same morning. Before dusk fell, the Emden took a bombardment position near Emmast and occupied the area with 170 shells between 7.15 a.m. and 8 a.m. In the course of the morning, T 144 , A boats, trawlers and boats put the 2nd Cyclist Battalion ashore near Serro, under whose protection field batteries and other heavy equipment could be landed. The Russians had foreseen a German landing on the southern tip of Dago and prepared themselves for resistance and an orderly retreat. When the Germans arrived, the commander, Colonel Vaselago, ordered the retreat to a prepared line of defense north of the Dagerort peninsulas and the demolition of the batteries and defenses near Serro. However, this was interpreted by the soldiers as a sign that everything was lost, and so panic soon spread and the Russian soldiers fled headless, with looting again and again. The demoralized Russians mutinied and largely refused to offer any resistance. They withdrew to the only port on the island near Helterma to await their evacuation. As on Moon, the Navy tried to evacuate at least a few men and dispatched three steamers. However, two of them ran aground, only one of which could be made afloat again, and only one steamer came back to the mainland with some soldiers on board.

German troops on the way to the beach, in the background the Kolberg

In the southern Moonsund the mine clearers had to fight with great difficulties, also because of some communication problems. The guide boats had received maps with the positions of the known minefields, but not the clearance boats themselves. The boat T 66 ran into a mine near the paternoster and sank immediately, seventeen men were killed and only the commander and six men could be saved. Meanwhile, the battleships had dropped anchor further south and steered first south, then east past the minefields. Shortly after 10 a.m. Vice-Admiral Behncke ordered the cruiser Strasbourg and the deminers of the 8th demining semi-flotilla to support the battleships to the east, while the Kolberg and the other ships of Contreadmiral Hopman remained nearby in the Lesser Sound to cover the troops. At 12:40 p.m. the margrave reported that she had run aground near Kalkgrund, but had now freed herself again. Some marker buoys for the mine-free channel had been torn loose by the wind and the swell.

Meanwhile the III. Mine clearance semi-flotilla and two boats of the VIII. Semi-flotilla reached the roadstead of Kuiwast and confirmed the sinking of the Slava , the still burning wreck was clearly visible west of the island of Papilaid . Nearby lay the four sunk steamers that blocked the sound, and further north two Russian destroyers were seen laying another minefield. The torpedo boats V 180 and V 184 ran at 2:15 p.m. with maximum speed to attack north and opened fire, but got themselves caught in the fire of another Russian destroyer and an armored gunboat that were in the Stocking Canal. Vice-Admiral Bachirew had dispatched them to escort a few flat-bottomed vehicles to evacuate the rest of the Moon garrison. The vehicles withdrew before the German attack, but the Germans in turn turned away from the well-positioned Russian artillery fire and moved south under the protection of an artificial smoke screen.

Vice-Admiral Behncke immediately dispatched Strasbourg and the Crown Prince to support them, but the Russian network blockage prevented larger ships from entering the roadstead at Kuiwast. The heavy ships tried the passage anyway, whereby both ships had ground contact, but remained undamaged. At around 2:15 p.m., the deminers found a two hundred meter wide gap in the network lock, which was intended for the passage of larger ships, and A 62 managed to open it. The water depth here was 14 m, so that Vice-Admiral Behncke could anchor with his heavy units at the southern end of the Moonsund in the evening. The minesweepers continued their work, but found no more mines up to the island of Schildau .

The Germans advanced largely unhindered on Moon, only in the northeast near Kallast there was resistance, as the Russian garrison could still hope for an evacuation. Most of the garrison was ready to surrender, only the soldiers of the death battalion insisted on crossing to the mainland. However, the Germans did not respond and asked for the handover by 1 p.m., otherwise they would attack. Since the deadline passed unused, the 138th Infantry Regiment began the attack on Kallast and finally forced the Russians to surrender. During the surrender negotiations, however, naval ships arrived and managed to rescue some soldiers while the death battalion covered the retreat. The Germans captured about 5,000 Russian soldiers.

Vice-Admiral Bachirew had planned to evacuate Moonsund around 4 p.m. with his remaining units. However, delays in clearing the departure route, on which mines laid by submarines had been discovered, meant that the departure had to be postponed by a day.

Location on the evening of October 18th

Towards evening the Germans from the southern part of Dagö and Moon had brought their hands, the second squadron of the transporter fleet began unloading their material in Arensburg, and the navy was steadily working its way north through the Moonsund. The planned venture in the Gulf of Finland was still in the planning phase, but had already been approved by the Admiral's staff, only the approval of the emperor was still pending. The Russians had evacuated their bases and were preparing to retreat from Moonsund; the garrison only held out in the north of Dagö.

Withdrawal of the Russians from Moonsund

October 19, 1917

Hardly anything worth mentioning happened around Moon that day. Mine clearing continued so that Kolberg and Strasbourg could anchor near Schildau in the evening, and more German troops were moved to Dagö. In the evening the rest of the Russian garrison surrendered, so that this island was also completely in German hands. In Arensburg the unloading of the II. Squadron of the transport ships continued, in the Gulf of Riga German net laymen and mine cruisers started their work.

At 4 p.m. the Russian fleet, accompanied by numerous steamers and auxiliary ships and shielded by destroyers and minesweepers, left the northern Moonsund in calm weather. Visibility was only about three to four nautical miles, so there wasn't much danger of being spotted. However, Bachirew correctly suspected that the canal from Moonsund to Hangö would be guarded by German submarines, and therefore chose a route further east, which led from the island of Odensholm to the north. The German submarines were not shot and all ships with the exception of a transporter that ran aground near Spithamn reached their destination safely.

End phase of the company

On October 20, the British submarine C32, trapped in the Gulf of Riga, attacked the German net-laying operator Eskimo with torpedoes, but they went wrong. When it was shot down, the boat broke through the surface of the water and the German torpedo boats S 176 and V 186 attacked it with depth charges. The British submarine suffered serious damage, the compass and the lights in the stern failed, and water ingress occurred in the tower. At a depth of twenty meters, the boat crept away in the direction of Runö and emerged at 8 p.m. under cover of darkness. The commander, Lieutenant Christopher P. Satow, came to the conclusion after a survey of the damage that the boat could not be saved, as he not only believed the Moonsund and Irben Straits were in German hands, but also the Russian port of Pernau in the Estonian Mainland. He therefore decided to sink the boat on the spot and march with his crew overland to Reval. The next morning he learned that Pernau was still in Russian hands, but since German torpedo boats were approaching his boat and it would not have had a chance to leave the Gulf of Riga even if it had escaped to Pernau, he had C32 blown up.

Aftermath and effects

When the loss of the islands began to appear on October 18, the Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky called a strategy meeting during a visit to the headquarters of the Russian Army Group Northern Front. With the loss of the islands, the flank of the Russian front was threatened and its supplies cut off by sea, and a landing in their rear posed great risks for the Reval naval base behind them, the defense of the Gulf of Finland and the capital Petrograd. While the invasion was still ongoing, preparations were made to defend the access roads to Reval and a use of the fleet to repel a sea-based attack was discussed. However, when it became clear that the German troops and ships were withdrawing to the Western Front and the North Sea, the situation calmed down somewhat. It was clear, however, that the Russian armed forces were in critical condition and that if it deteriorated further, there was a realistic risk of complete disintegration. A few days later, Russia began separate armistice negotiations with the German Reich, and shortly afterwards the Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government - the civil war and Russia's exit from the war had finally begun. With the withdrawal of the Russian fleet and the handover of the garrison on Dagö, the undertaking was over. The German armed forces had conquered the three islands with minor losses and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians.The overwhelming superiority at sea, the excellent logistical planning and the great speed with which the attack was carried out left the disorganized enemy hardly time to react. The acquisition of the islands dominating the Gulf of Riga and the entrance to the Gulf of Finland accelerated the collapse of Russia considerably and made a major battle with the remaining Russian naval units unlikely, so that the heavy shipping units of the deep-sea fleet could soon return to the North Sea. The navy had worked in excellent coordination with the army and achieved the set targets without great effort and was able to improve its reputation significantly. The lack of Russian will to resist had made a major contribution to the success. Although the German landing troops were hardly numerically superior to the defenders, the demoralized troops, disorganized by the revolution, mostly vacated their well-fortified positions very quickly and only thought of giving up or fleeing, and the will to fight of units determined to resist grew through their attitude Comrades paralyzed. Accordingly, the Army's losses remained relatively low with 54 dead and 141 wounded, while the navy had to complain about 156 dead and 60 wounded due to the risky operation in densely mined shallow waters under time pressure. The Russians had suffered far more serious losses, over 20,000 soldiers were taken prisoner and irreplaceable material had been lost or fallen into the hands of the enemy. The number of Russian casualties and injuries is unknown.

Both the Kaiser and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg congratulated those responsible on their success. In the army, Colonels Mathiass and von Tschischwitz and Lieutenant Colonel Fischer were honored with the Pour le Mérite for their achievements ; in the navy, the Admirals Behncke and Schmidt as well as Captain von Lewetzow and Frigate Captain von Rosenberg also received this award for their services.

After the actual landing ventures had ended, the battleships carried out a few more demonstrations off the Latvian and Estonian coasts, but these were unsuccessful and resulted in losses from mines, whereupon further such ventures were refrained from. The units of the Baltic Sea Special Unit were soon joined by the 1st Squadron of the High Seas Fleet with eight modern battleships on October 28th and the IVth Reconnaissance Group on October 30th. On the march back to the North Sea, the battleship Markgraf was hit by two mines in Irben-Strasse on October 29th, 260 tons of water penetrated the wall, but the ship was able to continue its voyage without difficulty. Soon after, all capital ships and most cruisers on the Baltic turned their backs, on November 2, 1917 Vice Admiral Schmidt again took over command of the 1st Squadron. The next day the Admiral's staff disbanded the Baltic Sea Special Unit.

A "Government of the Baltic Islands" was created on the conquered islands, which took its seat in Arensburg. The 255th Reserve Regiment and the 2nd Cyclist Brigade stayed behind as a garrison. The first governor was Lieutenant General Adolf Freiherr von Seckendorff , who arrived in Arensburg on October 31 on board SMS Strasbourg . The Baltic German upper class advocated the integration of the islands as well as Estonia and Latvia into the German Empire. However, this did not correspond to the wishes of the Estonians, who were striving for their own state and wanted to shake off the hated dominance of the Baltic German nobility. With the German defeat, the Estonians finally prevailed, and the last German soldiers left the islands in December 1918.

aftermath

Due to the German defeat in 1918, which was mainly decided in the west, the events in the east and with them also the Albion company were largely ignored. The later processing of the events had different priorities on both sides, the historians of the Western powers and Germany mainly dealt with the events on the Western Front and in the North Sea. In the new Soviet Union, little attention was paid to the lost war, as this defeat was attributed to the tsarist regime and the provisional government. General von Tschischwitz published a first treatise in 1931 on the enterprise which u. a. received attention from the American armed forces. Strangely, however, Albion was only used as a teaching example in Army War College seminars , and neither the Navy nor the Marine Corps appear to have paid much attention to it. The official German publication in the Admiralstabswerk Krieg zur See. 1914–1918 , Volume III War in the Baltic Sea. From the beginning of 1916 until the end of the war , the company did not appear until 1964 , due to the Second World War .

Trivia

One of the 54 soldiers killed in action was the poet, writer and officer Walter Flex , who died on October 16, 1917 from the wound he had suffered the day before.

See also

• Operation Beowulf : Conquest of Saaremaa (Ösel) and Muhu (Moon) by German troops during World War II

literature

• Michael B. Barrett: Operation Albion. The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands. Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN et al. 2008, ISBN 978-0-253-34969-9 .
• Lutz Bengelsdorf: The naval war in the Baltic Sea. 1914-1918. Hauschild, Bremen 2008, ISBN 978-3-89757-404-5 .
• Gerhard P. Groß: Albion company. The first “joint operation” of German armed forces. In: Military History. Historical Education Journal. Issue 3, 2004, ISSN  0940-4163 , pp. 4–7, ( Digitalistat (PDF; 2.54 MB) ).
• Paul G. Halpern: A Naval History of World War I. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD 1994, ISBN 0-87021-266-4 , p. 213 ff.
• Gary Staff: Battle for the Baltic Islands 1917. Triumph of the Imperial German Navy. Pen & Sword Maritime, Barnsley 2008, ISBN 978-1-84415-787-7 .

Web links

Commons : Albion Company  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

• Operation Albion: The Attack On The Baltic Islands by Gary Staff
• Report from GHQ about the capture of Osel
• Military History - Journal for Historical Education, Issue 3/2004 - Military History Research Office Potsdam (PDF; 2.7 MB)
• Landing on Ösel 1917, silent film by the Reichsstelle for the educational film from 1939 (18:14 min)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Large, pp. 4, 5.
2. ↑ Large, pp. 4–5.
3. ↑ Staff, pp. 3, 4.
4. ↑ Barrett, p. 69
5. ↑ Barrett, p. 64.
6. ↑ Barrett, p. 84
7. ↑ Staff, pp. 5-10.
8. ^ Staff, pp. 8-9.
9. ↑ Staff, pp. 11-12.
10. ↑ Staff, p. 13.
11. ↑ Barrett, pp. 64, 65.
12. ↑ Barrett, p. 71
13. ↑ Staff, p. 16.
14. ↑ Staff, pp. 17-20.
15. ↑ Barrett, p. 124
16. ^ Barrett, p. 126
17. ^ Barrett, p. 126
18. ↑ Staff, pp. 21-24.
19. ↑ Staff, p. 23.
20. ↑ Barrett, p. 127
21. ↑ Staff, pp. 23-24.
22. ↑ Staff, p. 27.
23. ↑ Staff, pp. 28-30.
24. ↑ Barrett, p. 156
25. ↑ Staff, pp. 29-32.
26. ↑ Staff, pp. 32-33.
27. ↑ Barrett, p. 132
28. ↑ Barrett, p. 136
29. ↑ Staff, p. 34.
30. ↑ Staff, pp. 33-34.
31. ↑ Barrett, p. 140
32. ↑ Staff, pp. 35-38.
33. ↑ Staff, pp. 38-49.
34. ↑ Barrett, p. 168
35. ↑ Barrett, p. 170
36. ↑ Staff, pp. 39-41.
37. ↑ Staff, p. 67.
38. ↑ Staff, pp. 51-53.
39. ↑ Staff, pp. 55-59.
40. ↑ Barrett, p. 160
41. ↑ Staff, pp. 59-67.
42. ↑ Staff, pp. 60-61.
43. ^ Barrett, p. 147
44. ↑ Staff, pp. 67-72.
45. ↑ Staff, pp. 71-73.
46. ↑ Staff, p. 77.
47. ↑ Staff, pp. 78-80.
48. ↑ Staff, pp. 78-80.
49. ↑ Staff, p. 80.
50. ↑ Staff, pp. 80-84.
51. ↑ Staff, p. 81.
52. ↑ Staff, pp. 89-94.
53. ↑ Staff, pp. 85-86.
54. ↑ Barrett, p. 162
55. ↑ Staff, pp. 91-92.
56. ↑ Staff, p. 86.
57. ↑ Staff, p. 99.
58. ↑ Staff, p. 96.
59. ↑ Staff pp. 96-99.
60. ↑ Staff, p. 100.
61. ↑ Staff, pp. 101-102.
62. ↑ Staff, p. 102.
63. ↑ Staff pp. 103-104.
64. ↑ Staff, pp. 104-105.
65. ↑ Staff, p. 107.
66. ↑ Staff, pp. 107-109.
67. ↑ Staff, pp. 108-110.
68. ↑ Staff, pp. 112-113.
69. ↑ Staff, pp. 113-114.
70. ↑ Staff. Pp. 114-115.
71. ↑ Staff, pp. 115-117.
72. ^ Staff, pp. 117-119.
73. ↑ Staff, pp. 118-119.
74. ↑ Staff, p. 119.
75. ^ Staff, 119-120.
76. ↑ Staff, pp. 120-123
77. ↑ Staff, p. 120.
78. ↑ Staff, pp. 137-139.
79. ↑ Staff, pp. 127-128.
80. ↑ Barrett, p. 183
81. ↑ Staff, p. 128.
82. ↑ Barrett, p. 183
83. ↑ Staff, pp. 131-132.
84. ↑ Staff, pp. 132-133.
85. ↑ Staff, p. 133.
86. ↑ Staff, pp. 130-131.
87. ↑ Barrett, p. 178
88. ↑ Staff, pp. 140-141.
89. ↑ Staff, p. 139.
90. ↑ Staff, p. 144.
91. ↑ Barrett, p. 221
92. ↑ Barrett, p. 224
93. ^ Barrett, p. 236
94. ^ Staff, pp. 145-149.
95. ^ Staff, p. 147.
96. ↑ Barrett, p. 227
97. ^ Barrett, p. 235