Storming the Zwinin

Storming the Zwinin

Part of: Battle of the Carpathians

Grenadier regiment "King Friedrich Wilhelm I." (2nd East Prussian) No. 3 in the sapps in front of the Zwinin

date	February 4 to April 9, 1915
place	Zwinin
output	Russian defeat
consequences	Breakthrough to Galicia

Parties to the conflict
German Empire Austria-Hungary	Russia
Commander
Peter von Hofmann Alexander von Linsingen Felix von Bothmer Hans von Hemmer Richard von Conta	Alexei Brusilov Vladimir Nikitin Vladimir Alftan
Troop strength
1st Division 3rd Guard Division 55th Austro-Hungarian Infantry Division	VII Corps 34th, 65th and 78th Infantry Division, 2nd Kuban Cossack Division
losses
unknown	unknown

The storming of the Zwinin was a battle of the First World War between the Russian Empire and the Central Powers German Empire and Austria-Hungary . This battle on the Zwinin is an exception on the Eastern Front and is unique to the First World War: a trench warfare in the mountains . The Russian Army , numerically superior, temporarily gave up its Carpathian tactics and dug itself into the ridge of the Zwinin, the Ostrog and the Ostry. There was a positional battle on a 1000 m high ridge in the middle of winter. This was an extraordinary achievement, which is currently hardly anchored in historical consciousness because it is on “a forgotten front”.

background

After the Battle of Lemberg (September 1914), the Russian army was able to advance more than 150 km into the Carpathian Mountains and threaten the Austro-Hungarian heartland. The Austro-Hungarian fortress Przemyśl was enclosed and besieged for more than 100 days. Large parts of Galicia and Bukovina with their oil fields near Drohobycz fell into Russian hands. The German Reich had lost the battle of the Vistula at the end of October and could not roll up the eastern front from north to south as planned. At the same time, the second siege of Przemyśl began , including over 100,000 kuk soldiers. At the end of November 1914, a new Russian breakthrough to northern Hungary threatened.

In this critical situation, the German Reich decided to support the Austrian ally with two divisions ( 1st Division and 3rd Guard Division ). A group of Austro-Hungarian and Prussian soldiers was hastily transported to Mukachevo by the Hungarian State Railways . On January 20, 1915, the association established itself as the German Southern Army under the command of General von Linsingen . This army, in turn, was framed between two armies: the eastern army group Pflanzer-Baltin with the aim of eastern Galicia and Bukowina and the western kuk 3rd Army of Boroëvić , which had the aim of bringing relief to the fortress Przemyśl over the Uzsok pass . After the 3rd Army had taken the position at Borynia , the other two armies joined the advance in north-west and north-east direction. The aim of the southern army was to cross the Verecke pass - also known as the "Magyar Path" - between Mukachevo and Lemberg through the Latorca valley and into the Stryj valley . In this main direction of movement, the Southern Army was divided into almost independently operating combat groups due to the pass roads: Corps Gerok ( 48th Reserve Division , 19th Austro-Hungarian Infantry Division and the 12th Landsturm Brigade) operated on the east wing, Corps Hofmann ( 1st Division ; 55th Austro-Hungarian Infantry Division and 131st Landsturm Brigade) in the center and finally the 3rd Guard Division in the west .

This force was opposed by the Russian 78th Reserve Division (309th, 311st and 312nd Infantry Regiments) under Major General Vladimir Alftan , reinforced by the 260th Infantry Regiment of the 65th Reserve Division on the road to Stryi. The 65th Infantry Division (257th, 258th and 259th Infantry Regiments) under General Pyotr Postovsky stood at the Uszok Pass, and the 2nd Kuban Cossack Division around Toronya, reinforced by the 310 Infantry Regiment of the 78th Infantry Division Division. The leader of these forces was General of the Artillery Vladimir Nikitin , who had set up his headquarters in Sambor . Nearby there are railway lines from Przemyśl to Mukachevo via Stryj and the Laborcza Valley. To make matters worse, when they retreated to the Hungarian-Galician border, the defending Austrian troops had destroyed all the railway bridges and tunnels in order to stop their pursuers. Individual villages that could have offered the enemy shelter were also destroyed. So you went through scorched earth .

The plan was to come from Hungary to penetrate the Beskids in about 14 days. From January 25, 1915, important mountain passes were conquered in quick succession: from January 25 to 28, battle at Vezerszallas; from January 29th to 30th the battle at the Verecke Pass and from January 31st to February the 2nd battle at the Lysa Pass. Then you reached Oryava at the foot of the Zwinin on February 4th, coming via Tukhol'ka.

Location and situation

The Zwinin - a postcard of the GR.1

The ridge of the Zwinin stretches for approx. 10 km from the southeast to the northwest and is over 800 m high in its entire course. The three highest peaks are (from W to E): the Zwinin II (1109 m); the height (1091 m) and the Zwinin I (992 m). Further to the east, the Ostrog (936 m) and Ostry (1026 m) join the mountain range. Between the Zwinin I and the Ostrog a pass road leads from Oryava to Koziowa and on to Skole . Upstream of the Zwinin approx. 5 km to the south and almost parallel, the Dauzki massif, also over 1000 m high, runs. In the valley between the two mountain ridges are the villages of Orjawa and, following the valley road, Pogar and Kriwe at an altitude of about 700 m. In a wood-rich valley on the other side of the Zwinin is Kosjowa with sawmills and factories. This area, with its relatively wide roads and rail connections to Skole, was ideal for Russian supplies. From here, replacement crews and ammunition could be brought in safely under cover.

At the beginning of February it was still deep winter in the Carpathian Mountains. Places as well as mountains were snowed in meters high. In the nights temperatures were well below −20 ° C.

Battle at the Zwinin

The "surprise attacks" from February 4th to 11th, 1915

On the morning of February 4, 1915, the infantry regiment "von Boyen" (5th East Prussian) No. 41 reached the village of Oryava. One began to climb the heights of the Zwinin immediately, but was forced to dig into the snow halfway by heavy infantry fire. The same thing happened on the other side of the pass road with the East Prussian Grenadier Regiment No. 1 “Crown Prince” , which had to dig itself into the slopes of the Ostrog. The commander of the 1st division, General Richard von Conta , then climbed the heights of the upstream Dauzki to get an idea of ​​the situation. The Russian entrenchment works on the crests of the Zwinin, the Ostrog and the Ostry were easy to spot. Several trenches in a row with wire entanglement had already been created. In the hope that these would not have advanced very far, he decided to launch a joint surprise attack. The Russian positions on the southwest side of Zwinin I, which rises about 300 m from the Orava Valley, were dug eight rows deep one above the other. Their position was comparable to the auditorium of a theater whose exclusive tiers and boxes had an eye on the entire valley and the slope. Without endangering themselves, they could simply let cargo loads of Ecrasite roll down the mountain and thus put the attacking German troops in danger and disorder.

So the 1st Division tried for a week to storm the mountain range of the Zwinins by repeated surprise attacks. Only the higher Russian positions had a better overview. Due to the deep snow, the grenadiers and musketeers could not storm forward surprisingly quickly, but were an easy target for the machine-gun positions of the enemy. Killed soldiers did not fall over, but were held upright by the snow. At the end of the week, von Conta had to make it clear to his pressing Austrian allies that without sufficient artillery support, storming the Zwinin was hopeless.

In total there were three major attacks - on February 7, 9 and 11, 1915 - all of which were repulsed by the enemy. Many soldiers suffered frostbite . In a back and forth the German troops now worked their way up one position after the other, taking advantage of the smallest cover. They were supplied with supplies via dog sleds and the injured and frostbitten were brought down to the valley. Due to the succession of thaw and frost, the trails in the snow had become smooth as glass.

The freezing of the front to trench warfare from February 12 to March 22, 1915

Guns are brought into position on the Dauzki

In turn, the German troops began building trenches and shelters. Both sides alternately attacked without the front line shifting significantly on the ridge. On the German side, the artillery began to be pushed in. Mortars , howitzers and all high-speed artillery were positioned in the valley. This also included a 12-inch mortar . The 1st Division, on the other hand, had hardly any vertical artillery, its field cannons had a flat track. By applying great effort for people and draft horses, it was possible to pull them onto the Dauzki opposite and to position them as batteries. “To bring a single gun into the firing position to a height of 887 meters, 14 horses were needed, all the dispensable gunners of four batteries and two platoons of engineers; Humans and animals worked half-dead on it, and after five hours it was done. ”Lieutenant Field Marshal Peter von Hofmann in particular urged us to hurry, as the news from Przemyśl became more and more worrying. In total there were three attacks with artillery support: on March 7th, 10th and 20th, which, apart from minor successes, did not take possession of the mountain. In the generally tense situation, people finally believed in espionage: the remaining villagers were expelled, the Austrian military authorities hanged a clergyman in the village of Komaniki, who is said to have given signals to the Russian army from the church tower, and the sexton. On March 9th and 20th, 1915, they had already reached the top of the ridge and still could not take possession of the Zwinin. So it came to trench warfare on the upper ridge.

Since friend and enemy could no longer be distinguished from the Dauzki, the artillery could no longer provide support. There were bitter hand grenade fights. Finally, consideration was given to withdrawing the infantry and making the summit ready for attack again by means of targeted firing of the artillery. This met with bitter resistance from the infantry. Finally fog came up, which reduced such considerations to absurdity. The artillery passed the time with competitions in the snow: “St. Moritz “they called their games of“ snowshoeing ”and building figures. Meanwhile, the infantry were still trying to take the mountain.

On March 22, 1915, the Przemyśl fortress fell into Russian hands. The race against time was lost. All Austrian and German soldiers were able to find out about it through Russian celebrations and leaflets dropped. On March 23, 1915, the Southern Army decided to combine both divisions fighting there into one army corps and to submit this to the general command of Felix Graf von Bothmers .

Preparations in the thaw from March 23rd to April 8th

From mid-March onwards, temperatures of −8 ° C were reached at night and +8 ° C during the day. This led to cloudy, brownish streams of condensation pouring down from the Zwinin during the day and covering all streets and paths with thick-flowing mud. “The roads, which are bad in themselves, have gotten into such a condition due to the heavy use that the horses - 6 to 8 in front of a wagon - sink up to their stomachs in the mud. Whole forests are disappearing and being made into billet dams. ”Or“ Because of the early snowmelt this year, the paths with deep holes were filled with mud without a reason; In a large hole on the Smorze-Krasine-Zadzieliko road a team of four drowned. All car traffic, even on the larger roads, finally stopped. "

Felix Graf von Bothmer

Finally, wagons had to be converted to the transport of pack animals. As a result, there were deficiencies in the supply situation: there was a lack of ammunition and supplies of food such as potatoes and bread. In the darkness what was there then froze to ice again. Meanwhile, fog and drifting snow prevented an attack. The question arose as to where the Russian army would use the forces that had become free at Przemyśl. Nevertheless, the time was used and a surprising Russian attack did not bother them: Russian miners had undermined front trenches at the 3rd Grenadiers and caused them to collapse by detonation. The infantry attack that followed was repulsed. Bothmer formed the Corps Bothmer from the 1st Division and the 3rd Guard Division together with parts of the 38th Honved Division . All units were now assigned their exact function and deployment. A joint, well-coordinated attack should take place.

Storming of the Zwinin I on April 9, 1915

Bothmer had the infantry withdrawn, realigned the artillery and waited for good weather. Only the evening before April 9th ​​promised suitable weather. "The 1st Inf. Div. is to storm the Zwinin on April 9th, while the 3rd Guard Inf.Div. only threaten to attack and captivate the enemy with brisk shooting and partial attacks. ”But again Russian troops seemed to be ahead of the Germans. They used the weather conditions for a surprise attack on the 3rd Guards Division on Zwinin II. “On the night of April 8th to 9th the Russian shot particularly briskly; around 3 a.m. he suddenly attacked along the entire line of the regiment. ”On the Zwinin II, after three waves of attack, the Russian army finally broke into the phalanx of the training infantry regiment.

At the same time, exactly at 7 a.m., the German artillery opened a barrage of all calibers on the Zwinin I. The hilltop was shrouded in deep black smoke, and the thunder of the cannons was intensified by the echo from the valley. The shots hit. “At 8 o'clock the artillery was silent. The infantry had been preparing in the sapps in the last few days ; At 8:15 a.m., it went over to the storm. ”The first wave of infantry ran to the enemy trench, and the soldiers threw hand grenades. After that, the trench could be conquered relatively easily. The trench crew barely offered any resistance and could, if alive, be taken into captivity. The Russian officers will have considered the attack on Zwinin I to be of no particular importance as a spontaneous sham or exonerating attack. The descriptions of Colonel Moskuli, the Russian commander of the Zwininstellung, who were so convinced of the insurmountability of his position that he ignored any warning message, until he was finally surprised by the attacking German troops over morning tea, are consistent. The first wave was followed by the second, which penetrated even deeper into the enemy rift system. The Zwinin I was captured at around 11 a.m.

“'The mountain must be taken at all costs!' was the order. We were hardly out of the trench when the Russians appeared upstairs and greeted us with rapid fire. Nevertheless, everything ran and climbed to the top. As we ran, we shot our rifles at the visible heads of the Russians. As a result, they became alarmed and did not aim so precisely. [...] The Russian position had not been very busy, for many Russians had been busy cooking breakfast in the shelters on the slope of their position. We now went to the edge of the mountain and saw that down the slope everything was teeming with Russians who fled downhill. They were shot en masse. Since the northern slope of the mountain was quite bare, they found no cover anywhere. […] Now the order came that everything should gather on the top of the mountain. The wounded, Germans and Russians, who had been bandaged in the meantime, were placed in tents and carried down to Orava by the captured Russians. A division of Russians had to help us dig large holes; the fallen in the storm as well as those who had died earlier were buried in it. [...] As we then found out, a total of 12,000 men fell on the German side on the Zwinin. "

- Dominik Richert in his autobiography Best Opportunity to Die over the storming on April 9, 1915, pp. 103-109

consequences

The Russian army evacuated the entire Zwinin on the night of April 9th. "... at dawn on April 10th, patrols, the first of GF Rüter 3rd Company, found that the Russians had withdrawn." As a result, on April 24th, 1915, the Ostrog and the Ostry were also captured.

The conquest of the Zwinins was part of the Carpathian Battle ; but it also created the necessary conditions for the further campaign in Galicia .

It turned out that the Austrian army was increasingly losing its leadership and initiative. In the further aftermath of the war she sank from an equal ally to a mere vicarious agent.

Felix von Bothmer was awarded the Military Max Joseph Order and the Pour le Mérite .

The Austro-Hungarian Army Report of April 10, 1915 mentions the events as follows: “ It is officially announced: In the forest mountains yesterday there was also heavy fighting in the sections east of the Uzsok Pass. German troops conquered a high altitude north of Tucholka that had been controversial since February 5 and stubbornly defended by the Russians; 1 colonel, over 1000 men were captured in this attack and 15 machine guns were also snatched from the Russians. "

In the Austro-Hungarian Army Report of April 25, 1915, it is stated: “The official announcement is that a new success was achieved on the Carpathian Front in the Orawatale near Koziowa. After a sapling attack that lasted for days and was carried out with great tenacity, yesterday our troops stormed the heights of Ostry, south of Koziowa. At the same time, the following German troops succeeded in gaining space on and west of the road. In total 652 Russians were captured. By storming the heights of Ostry and conquering the Zwinin Ridge at the beginning of April, the enemy has now been thrown by the allied troops from the position on both sides of the Orava Valley, which had been tenaciously defended for months. "

Some contemporaries saw the storming of the Zwinin as an outstanding military achievement:

“The storming of the Zwinin I deserves its special place in war history of all times. It dwarfs the storming of the Spicherer Heights in 1870. According to eyewitnesses, it stands high above the Japanese storming the 203 m hill near Port Arthur. The demands placed on the troops by the length of the previous fight, the season and the effectiveness of modern combat equipment were unique. "

Fallen

Most of the dead could only be found and recovered after the snow had melted. Horrible images are reported. Bodies, like sandbags, were apparently used for the parapets of the trenches. It took months before the mountain was halfway cleared. Taken together, around 30,000 dead people from the battle found their final resting place in individual and mass graves on the Zwinin. A uniform cemetery was never created. But a stone pyramid was erected for the fallen on the top of Zwinin I with the epitaph :

Brave and loyal,
blameless dead.
Guardians of the homeland,
avengers of justice.

At the end of the First World War, the mountain and the surrounding land fell to Poland . At the end of the twenties of the 20th century, the pyramid was already badly damaged. At the end of the Second World War , the country came to the Soviet Union . In 1991 the Ukraine became independent. Neither a grave nor a memorial stone can (as of 2011) be found on the Zwinin.

photos

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  The storm on the Zwinin

• 

  The thanksgiving service on the day after the storming of Orava

• 

  The mass graves

• 

  The pyramid on the Zwinin

• 

  The pyramid around 1926: "The Zwinin summit with the tomb of the 30,000 fallen from 1914-18"

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  Positions on Zwinin I can still be seen as earth walls

• 

  The Zwinin 2011 view of Orava

• 

  German postcard of the First World War from Kosjowa

Literature and Sources

• Friedrich von Friedeburg: Battle of the Carpathians and Dniester, Berlin 1924.
• Franz von Gottberg: The Grenadier Regiment Kronprinz (1st East Prussian) No. 1 in the World War, Berlin 1927.
• Fritz Schillmann: Grenadier Regiment King Friedrich Wilhelm I (2nd East Prussian) No. 3 in the World War 1914–1918, Berlin 1924.
• Alfred Bulowius and Bruno Hippler: Infantry Regiment v. Boyen (5th East Prussian) No. 41 in World Wars 1914–1918, Berlin 1919.
• Georg Dorndorf: The Infantry Regiment No. 43, Oldenburg 1923.
• Mönkeberg, Carl: Under Linsingen in the Carpathians; Berlin 1917.
• From the Swiss Major Tanner: Front reports of a neutral, Volume 1, Berlin 1915.
• Hansch, Johannes; Wedling, Fritz: The Colbergsche Grenadier Regiment Graf Gneisenau (2nd Pomeranian) No. 9 in the World Wars 1914–1918, Berlin 1929.
• Graf vd Schulenburg-Wolfsburg: History of the Guard Fusilier Regiment / according to the official war diaries and personal records, Berlin 1926.
• Dominik Richert : Best opportunity to die. My experiences in the war 1914–1918. Edited by Bernd Ulrich and Angelika Tramitz, Knesebeck, Munich 1989, ISBN 3926901152 .

Web links

Commons : Battle of Zwinin  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• Report after the storm
• Pictures from the Zwinin
• Ukrainian-Russian map of the mountain range
• Vivatband
• Searching for traces in 2007 on the Zwinin

Individual evidence

1. ^ Mönkeberg, Carl: Unter Linsingen in the Carpathians; Berlin 1917, p. 42.
2. ↑ Hansch, Johannes; Wedling, Fritz: The Colbergsche Grenadier Regiment Graf Gneisenau (2nd Pomeranian) No. 9 in the World Wars 1914–1918, Berlin 1929, p. 161.
3. ↑ Graf von der Schulenburg-Wolfsburg: History of the Guard Fusiliers / after the official war diaries and personal records, Berlin 1926, p 74th
4. ↑ Hansch, Johannes; Wedling, Fritz: The Colbergsche Grenadier Regiment Graf Gneisenau (2nd Pomeranian) No. 9 in the World War 1914–1918, Berlin 1929, pp. 162–163.
5. ↑ ^{a b} Graf vd Schulenburg-Wolfsburg: History of the Guard Fusilier Regiment / according to the official war diaries and personal notes, Berlin 1926, p. 75.
6. ^ Mönkeberg, Carl: Unter Linsingen in the Carpathians; Berlin 1917, p. 44.
7. ^ "From the Swiss Major Tanner: Front Reports of a Neutral", Volume 1, Berlin 1915, p. 172.
8. ↑ The Austro-Hungarian Army Report, Vienna April 10, 1915, The Deputy Chief of the General Staff. v. Hoefer , Lieutenant Field Marshal
9. ^ The Austro-Hungarian Army Report, Vienna, April 25, 1915 The Deputy Chief of the General Staff. v. Hoefer, Lieutenant Field Marshal
10. ^ Friedrich von Friedeburg: Carpathian and Dniester battle, Berlin 1924, pp. 71–72.