Battle in the Carpathian Mountains
Battle of the Carpathians (contemporary postcard)
| date | December 1914 to March 1915 |
|---|---|
| place | Carpathian Mountains , Galicia |
| output | Defense of the Austro-Hungarian Advance into Galicia, defense against the Russian attack on Hungary |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
|
Imperial and Royal 3rd Army , Imperial and Royal 2nd Army , German Southern Army |
3rd Army , 8th Army , 11th Army |
| losses | |
|
320,000 dead, wounded and prisoners |
around 250,000 dead, wounded and prisoners |
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Eastern Front (1914-1918)
1914
East Prussian operation ( Stallupönen , Gumbinnen , Tannenberg , Masurian Lakes ) - Galicia ( Kraśnik , Komarów , Gnila Lipa , Lemberg ,
Rawa Ruska ) - Przemyśl - Vistula - Krakow - Łódź - Limanowa - Lapanow - Carpathians
1915
Humin - Mazury - Zwinin - Przasnysz - Gorlice-Tarnów - Bug Offensive - Narew Offensive - Great Retreat - Novogeorgiewsk - Rovno - Swenziany Offensive
1916
Lake Narach - Brusilov offensive - Baranovichi offensive
1917
Aa - Kerensky offensive ( Zborów ) - Tarnopol offensive - Riga - Albion company
1918
Operation Punch
The battle in the Carpathians was one of the most costly battles of the First World War between the Central Powers and the Russian Empire . It is also known as the Carpathian Winter Battle or the Carpathian Battle .
The battle lasted from December 1914 to March 1915. Austria-Hungary and the German Reich wanted to recapture the parts of Galicia occupied by the Russians in late summer 1914 and to avert the eminent strategic danger of a Russian invasion of the front of the Danube Monarchy.
The first phase of the battle showed poor planning by the Austrian leadership. In the period that followed, the army of the Danube Monarchy increasingly assumed the role of recipient of support from the German ally.
Strategic prerequisites
After the severe military defeats of the first months of the war, the dual monarchy faced serious danger. Galicia was largely conquered by the Russian troops , who were able to penetrate deep into the Carpathian Mountains . Even the German ally, compared to the Battle of Tannenberg (1914), expressed dissatisfaction with Austrian achievements to date.
The mountain landscape of the Carpathian Mountains still offered a bad starting point for a Russian offensive in winter. This circumstance would change with the melting of the snow, however, and if the Russians broke through, the path into the Hungarian lowlands and thus into a core area of the fragile multi-ethnic state would be open to them.
In addition, on the other side of the mountains, the abandoned Austrian fortress Przemyśl with almost 150,000 soldiers was under Russian siege . The indecision of the Russian generals played into the hands of the efforts of the Central Powers. On the one hand, an advance through the Carpathian Mountains into the Hungarian Plain was possible. On the other hand, the comparatively better starting position in Galicia with the Krakow area came into consideration as a basis for a possible attack against Silesia . One of the main demands of the western allies of the tsarist empire was to carry the war on German territory. It was decided, after a consultation in the headquarters , to pursue the latter option and to continue the offensive south of Krakow in order to achieve a better starting position against Germany.
prehistory
At the beginning of December 1914, Conrad von Hötzendorf made another attempt to stop the impending catastrophe of the Austrian army. The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Southwest Front, General Ivanov , prepared the attack of his 3rd Army (General Dimitriew ) on Cracow , but this army was suddenly attacked by the Austro- Hungarian 4th Army , which was believed defeated . The interfaces between the Russian 3rd Army and the 8th Army (General Brusilov ) were in the Neu-Sandez area . On both sides of Łapanów there was a section about 30 kilometers wide, which was only weakly secured by the Russian 9th Corps and here the battle of Limanowa-Lapanow took place in early December . The commander of the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand succeeded in bringing his XIV Corps under FML Roth unnoticed to the weak point on the opposing front.
A flank thrust against the troops that had broken through at Neu-Sandez, which was surprising for the Russian Army Command, developed successfully for the Austrians. The Austro-Hungarian troops were able to push the Russian front back about 60 kilometers to the northeast, but then the Russians were able to quickly bring in reserves and stabilize the front again within a week through targeted counter-attacks. On December 14th, the advance of Conrad von Hötzendorf was stopped, from the 20th the Russian troops were again in a counterattack. By December 28, the Russian 8th Army had thrown the Austrian 3rd Army under General Svetozar Boroević back on the previously occupied Carpathian positions.
The winter battle in the Carpathian Mountains
The attack on Brusilov on December 28th resulted in the loss of the Ushok pass on New Year's Day , but not the hoped-for breakthrough to northern Hungary. At the beginning of January, the group of FML Szurmay with the 38th Division was detached from the Gromnik area and, to protect the Uschok Pass, with the 53rd Honved Division, increasingly pushed into the Carpathian Front near Ostry. The Hungarians now formed the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army and covered the endangered break-in gate to northern Hungary, they kept contact with the Hofmann Corps of the Army Group Planter. The main threat in the direction of Carpathian-Hungary for the dual monarchy was still not resolved, as the supply of the Przemyśl fortress threatened to collapse due to a lack of food and ammunition. In the contested area in front of the fortress, the Austrians were able to achieve minor tactical successes and position improvements during the previous battle. Conrad von Hötzendorf therefore planned a more extensive offensive operation to relieve the fortress in winter. He decided to launch an offensive on a broader front across the entire mountain landscape.
Reinforcements and attack planning
Since January 13, the German General Command of the II. Army Corps with 23,000 soldiers under General Alexander von Linsingen with the 1st and 3rd Guard Divisions , the 48th Reserve Division and the 5th Cavalry Division to strengthen the Austrians brought in. These new formations were inserted as the so-called German Southern Army on the eastern section of the front between the Szurmay group and the army group of General of the Cavalry Karl von Pflanzer-Baltin , which followed at Nadworna (Bukowina) . The Imperial and Royal Corps of FML Peter von Hofmann was subordinate to the Southern Army.
With these reinforcements, Conrad was able to start shifting his own forces and supplying them to the 3rd Army, which was entrusted with the task of relieving the Przemysl fortress. General of the Infantry Boroević planned to force the first attacks on the right wing by the attack group of the FZM Puhallo , while the troops of the General of the Infantry Colerus (III. Corps with 22nd and 28th Divisions) and Archduke Joseph (VII. Corps with 17. and 20th Division) should bind the enemy by diversionary attacks.
First attempt at relief for Przemysl
The first offensive of the 3rd Army began on January 23, 1915, the operation took place in stormy winter weather, claimed many victims in a few days due to the cold and frostbite and did not go according to plan from the start. In the center of the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army, the Krautwald Group (X. Corps) was supposed to carry out the main thrust via Baligród to the Przemysl fortress. The center of gravity was set on the left against the Lisko - Sanok section ; the 34th and 24th divisions had to carry this thrust, while the 2nd division was supposed to secure the left flank in advance of Bukowsko. Only the Russian VIII and parts of the VII Army Corps of Generals Dragomirow and Eck were in the attack field .
The standing to the east of the Imperial 3rd Army Group Ziegler and Puhallo (XVIII. And V Corps with the 33rd, 37th 43rd and 44th Division) led simultaneously attacks to the north, the group Szurmay should on the one hand before Uschok pass over Turka on Sambor and on the other hand from the Cisna area against Chrewl and Lutowiska on Ustrzyki. Terrain gains were achieved only in the eastern group and in the southern army, although the focus of the offensive was planned on the left attacking wing. The gains in terrain on the right wing were of little help, the extended front and the supply of the advanced troops devoured more resources there than before the attacks began.
The Russian 8th Army, for its part, started a counteroffensive west of it in the Beskids with the 12th Corps (General of Inf. Lesch ), which pushed back the Kuk VII. Corps on the Duklapass and threatened again with a break-in into northern Hungary via the Laborcza valley. The troops of the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army in the main attack area had been reinforced by the 7th and 29th Divisions brought in from Serbia, but were still unable to achieve any success. Despite minor gains in terrain, the icy temperatures and poorly scheduled operations resulted in high losses. The first phase of the attacks, which had been ongoing since December 8, cost the Austro-Hungarian armed forces 94,500 men by the end of January, including over 61,000 sick and wounded.
Fight in the Southern Army and in Bukovina
The adjoining German southern army under General von Linsingen established itself on the mountain line Vezerzallos - Volocz - Ökörmezö and participated from 23 January to cover the right flank of the 3rd Army. Heavy attacks on the Wyskower Sattel and the Zwinin were intended to bind the right wing of the Russian 8th Army. The attack by the German Southern Army came from the area north of Munkacz with the Hofmann Corps (kuk 55th Division) deployed on the left from the Kalocze - Vezérszállás line in order to break through the Vereche and Beskid passes. On the right wing, the Gerok corps attacked at Ökörmezö in the direction of the Wyszkower saddle. After three days, after the deployment of the German 1st Division (General von Conta ) against the Russian Corps Group Nikitin (64th, 65th and 78th Reserve Divisions), terrain towards Tucholka and Tuchla was gained. This enabled the right wing of the Szurmay group to be supported in conquering the Uschok Pass . After that, the Russian resistance stiffened by bringing parts of the Russian 34th Division.
Since February 1, the offensive of the Planter-Baltin group to the east against the Russian Dniester group in Bukovina has developed more successfully . Major General von Lilienhoff's division penetrated the lost Bukovina via Kirlibaba and Jakobeny. The 36th Division under Field Marshal Lieutenant (FML) from Czibulka , brought in from Serbia, advanced over the Tartar Pass to Delatyn - on February 17th, Czernowitz was taken again.
By February 26, General Ivanov had the left wing of the Russian 8th Army reinforced against the German Southern Army by the 22nd Army Corps (General of the Infantry von Brinken). At the end of February, the 9th Army (General Platon Letschizki ), drawn from Poland, with 8½ infantry and five cavalry divisions, was pushed into Bukovina on the extreme left wing of the Russian south-western front . Their task was to stop the offensive of General Pflanzer-Baltin on the Dniester .
Second attempt at relief
Between February 27 and March 14, the second offensive was resumed after a desperate call for help from the Przemysl fortress leader, Hermann Kusmanek, after the units had been replenished for a month. For this purpose, the staff of the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army under General von Böhm-Ermolli was ordered back to Galicia until February 15th after four months in Poland. The front of the 2nd Army established itself on the eastern attack front of the 3rd Army between Lupkow - Cisna to Homonna . Until the end of February, further reinforcements came from Serbia one after the other - the XIII. Corps (Feldmarschall-Leutnant von Rhemen ) with the kuk 31st and 36th divisions - entered Galicia, followed by the 8th Corps under FML von Scheuchenstuel with the 9th and 21st divisions by the end of February .
On February 27th, the kuk corps group of the General of the Cavalry Tersztyánszky with the IV., XVIII. and XIX. Corps across twelve kilometers to Baligrod . The Russian resistance was now directed by General Selivanov (Army Command 11) and commanded the Austro-Hungarian troops on the line Wetlina to Konieczna . On February 28th, the attack by the Austro-Hungarian Second Army was completely stuck; the Russians, for their part, immediately started strong counter-attacks and brought the relief operation to a complete standstill by mid-March.
Last attempt at relief
On March 20, 1915, the kuk V Corps ( Puhallo von Brlog ) carried out a desperate last attempt at relief with the freshly brought up 31st Division (FML Kasimir von Lütgendorf ), which also failed. The Przemyśl fortress then surrendered on March 22nd as a result of hunger with 117,000 men against the Russian enclosure front. Of the prisoners, only about 44,000 men were fit to fight, 28,000 men were already seriously ill from epidemics.
After General Ivanov shifted the focus of his subsequent counter-offensive from the section of the Southern Army to the section of the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army, the Austrian Army Command got into a new crisis and called the German Army Command for additional reinforcements. The so-called Beskidenkorps ( XXXVIII. RK ) was brought in and established at the seam between the Austro-Hungarian 2nd and 3rd Army in the Laborczatal in the Mezőlaborc section. At the beginning of April, the commanding general von der Marwitz was assigned the 25th and 35th reserve divisions , his troops went with the neighboring Austro-Hungarian troops on both sides of the Laborczatal to counterattack and were able to stabilize the Carpathian front.
terrain
While the Austro-Hungarian army was able to wage a war of movement in the Galician plain with sufficient success - albeit using antiquated tactics - the continuation of the operations in the Carpathian Mountains proved to be a strategic error. Every mountainous terrain naturally accommodates the forces of defense, but two other factors played into the hands of the Russians. The Western Carpathians were probably the most unsuitable part of the mountain range for a military operation, with peaks up to 2,000 meters high. From a logistical point of view, the site was actually impassable.
The climatic conditions spoke against the attack by the Central Powers. In the Carpathians there was a harsh winter typical of mountain and high altitude locations. The General Staff under Conrad von Hötzendorf failed to provide the soldiers with winter equipment at all. The Austro-Hungarian 2nd and 3rd Armies went to the front without proper clothing or winter combat training. After a few weeks, every military operation, logistical supply and organization of the transport of the wounded came to an end. The unbearable frost demanded more losses from the armies of the Central Powers than from combat.
Russian tactics
While in East Prussia the attack by Russian armies was awaited in order to oppose them in quick combat on the move supported by the laying of the railroad, the Russians on the border with Austria had generally taken the defensive. The attacking armies did not encounter provisional but well-developed Russian defensive positions. Artillery support could hardly be provided. On the one hand, the sparse supply routes forced the ammunition to be used sparingly. On the other hand, the Austrian army was generally inadequately equipped and had to deal with the difficulties typical of a multi-ethnic state. When attacking, the Russian generals used a procedure that was unknown to the German and Austrian officers in this form and was condemned by them. Regardless of the devastating machine gun fire, which threw the ranks of the attacking infantry within a very short time, new waves were led against the enemy. This practice in particular was the cause of the extremely high Russian casualties during these battles. Since the process was observed here for the first time, the German officers called it Carpathian Tactics .
consequences
As a result of the heavy defeat, the Austrians surrendered their fortress Przemyśl. The offensives in the Carpathians had cost the Austro-Hungarian army almost 250,000 soldiers since December 8, 1914. The total losses of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces on the Eastern Front were much higher, with 88,000 wounded and sick people going home and having to be replaced. These enormous losses hit the Danube Monarchy twice as hard. At the beginning of the war, German-Austrians and Hungarians, especially in the officer corps, were overrepresented in the first line associations in Austria-Hungary. As a result, the core countries of the monarchy were demanded the heaviest blood toll from the beginning. This made it necessary that in the following years, to a greater extent, replacements from the less motivated Slavic, Romanian and other population groups had to be used. The army of the multi-ethnic state lost more and more combat strength and the winter offensives were to be the last operations - apart from the South Tyrol offensive in 1916 - of the entire war, which were carried out without significant assistance from the German allies.
The severe failure of the Austro-Hungarian Army also encouraged Italy from April 1915 onwards in its efforts to play a role in this war. On the front against Russia, however, a further effort by the Central Powers was necessary. Now large numbers of German troops had to be withdrawn from the western front . A new German army, the 11th , was formed for the operation. The offensive began in May 1915 under August von Mackensen with the Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów , which was already completely under German leadership.
literature
- John Keegan : The First World War. A European tragedy. Rowohlt Taschenbuchverlag, Hamburg 2001, ISBN 3-499-61194-5 .
- Manfried Rauchsteiner : The death of the double-headed eagle. Austria-Hungary and the First World War. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1993, ISBN 3-222-12116-8 .
- Norman Stone : The Eastern Front 1914-1917. Hodder and Stoughton, London 1985, ISBN 0-340-36035-6 .
- Christian Zentner : The First World War. Data, facts, comments. Moewig, Rastatt 2000, ISBN 3-8118-1652-7 .
- Austria-Hungary's last war 1914-1918. Volume II: The war year 1915. Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, Vienna 1930.
