Great withdrawal of the Russian army in 1915

Great retreat / three-way offensive 1915

Part of: First World War

Eastern Front 1915

date	June to September 1915
place	Poland , Belarus
output	Russian retreat

Parties to the conflict
German Empire Austria-Hungary	Russia
Commander
Erich von Falkenhayn Erich Ludendorff	Nikolai Romanov Mikhail Alexeyev

The Great retreat is the task of Russian Poland and the retreat of the Imperial Russian armies in the Baltic countries and the area now Belarus and Ukraine on the Eastern Front in the First World War . It began in June 1915 and ended on September 30 of the same year.

Strategic prerequisites

The Russian Empire looked after one year war against the Central Powers in a very unfavorable situation. All offensive efforts of the Northwest Front against East Prussia had failed. The initial successes of the southwestern front against Austria-Hungary had been reversed after the breakthrough of the German 11th Army at Gorlice-Tarnów from the beginning of May 1915. In the part of Poland that was still held, three Russian armies were in a particularly exposed position. The area they occupied resembled a promontory that could be attacked from the north from East Prussia and from the south from Galicia . In addition to its strategic weakness, there were internal supply and command problems of the Russian army.

The German offensive in Courland created additional problems. There, on Ludendorff's orders , the Lauenstein Army Group managed to further endanger the position of the Russian Army. Although their offensive could be contained, the German troops could threaten the Kovno fortress in the south and Riga in the north from their new line . The difficult situation of two militarily and politically important key positions further restricted the options of the Russian army command. After the operation in June 1915, were presented at the conference of Chelm first votes in the Russian General Staff, according to which called for a general withdrawal to prevent a military disaster. Chief of Staff Alexeyev considered such a withdrawal to be politically unenforceable. His nominal superior, Grand Duke Nikolaj , saw no military necessity for this either.

Operations from July to September 1915

Summer offensive of the Central Powers

Breakthrough operations from July to September 1915

While the Russian military leadership was divided on defensive leadership, that of the Central Powers was split on the offensive. General Ludendorff wanted to carry out a large encirclement operation to cut off the Russian armies on the Polish front. This plan was rejected by the head of the OHL von Falkenhayn . The idea of ​​penetrating far into the territory of the tsarist empire hated him; rather he preferred the idea of ​​moving Russia to a separate peace through an attrition offensive. Falkenhayn was able to assert himself as the highest-ranking German officer against Ludendorff at Wilhelm II and at the end of June 1915 received permission for his offensive plans. The German and Austro-Hungarian troops were to advance from Galicia, East Prussia and the Carpathian Mountains , while the pressure in Courland was to be maintained. Falkenhayn's ultimate goal, however, was not necessarily a strategic breakthrough in the front; the main objective was to inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy.

The main German thrust from Galicia to the north, the so-called Bug Offensive , was carried forward by the central army groups Woyrsch and Mackensen on both sides of the Bug in the direction of Brest-Litovsk . The thrust in the north, the so-called Narew Offensive , was launched by the 12th Army under General von Gallwitz in the direction of Roshan and the 8th Army under General von Scholtz in the direction of Lomscha . In the south, the Austro-Hungarian 2nd and 3rd Armies were supposed to cross the Zlota Lipa and recapture the territories in eastern Galicia that had been lost at the beginning of the war. The double attack was able to break through the Russian front at the main points of attack. Both on the Narew and on the Bug the enemy was slowly pushed back, while the Russian army was forced to make new reinforcements and losses. The success also enabled the 9th Army ( Prince Leopold of Bavaria ) to proceed from the west, in the direction of Warsaw . The strategy against the Russian enemy, who had already been severely weakened in Galicia in May 1915, led to the almost non-fighting withdrawal of the entire Russian western front from the Polish territories at the beginning of August.

Russian retreat

Entry of German cavalry into Warsaw on August 5, 1915

Rear Russian trench during retreat

The high losses of men and war material through the offensives of the Central Powers had a demoralizing effect on the higher Russian military leadership. Those who had still called for a defense at all costs fell silent and the supporters of the idea of ​​retreat were able to push their idea through against the political leadership through the pressure. First of all, the evacuation of Russian Poland was decided and carried out. Here, however, there were again conflicts between the military and politics, which cost Russian soldiers their lives. On August 5, the German 9th Army occupied the XXV. Reserve Corps evacuated Warsaw without a fight by the Russian 2nd Army . General von Beseler was appointed city commander and governor general of the general government of Warsaw . Given the enormous pre-war spending on the Polish forts of Nowogeorgiewsk , Kowno and Osowiecz , Alexejew found it politically unacceptable to simply give up these fortifications. As a result of the retreat they were defended only by second-rate troops, but even a fortress that was only defended pro forma cost three divisions , whose men were senselessly sacrificed. In addition, the enormous reserves of artillery and ammunition (in the case of the siege of Novogeorgiewsk on August 19, about 1 million projectiles) remained unused for the field army and fell into the hands of the Germans. On August 15, the 9th Army reached the Toczna sector and occupied Łosice and Ruskow, on August 17, the XXV. Reserve Corps crossed the bow at Sarnocki and pursued the enemy to the Nurzuc section. At the same time, to the south of it, the Woyrsch Army detachment pushed over the Bug near Konstantinow and penetrated the Białowieża jungle . The fall of the Brest-Litovsk fortress forced the Russian army command to retreat to Pinsk by mid-September , which took place on September 16 from XXXXI. Reserve Corps of the Bow Army was occupied. After the surrender of strong forces, the forces of the newly established Army Group Linsingen were exhausted.

Further advance of the Central Powers

Falkenhayn's answer to the new situation represented a continuation of the strategy he had already started . The German center under Mackensen was supposed to exert strong pressure on the Russian front to prevent the three armies formerly stationed in Poland from retreating. Meanwhile, they were to be encompassed and cut off by the German and Austro-Hungarian flanks still advancing north and south. This plan failed twice. On the one hand, the Russian armies in the central section did not turn against their withdrawal orders in order to get bogged down in defensive battles with heavy losses, on the other hand, the flank operations did not progress as planned.

On July 21, the Russian 5th Army was pushed back into Lithuania after the battle for Schaulen . On the northernmost section of the Eastern Front, the Russian 12th Army under General Gorbatowski was activated and took over the front between Riga and Friedrichstadt . To the southeast, the fallen 5th Army joined between Jakobstadt and Dünaburg . On the other hand, the German established Niemen Army under General von Below , which by the end of September for the new Daugava section unlocked.

The German 10th Army under General von Eichhorn was able to occupy Kovno on August 18 and Vilna, evacuated by the Russians without a fight, on September 18 . By September 26, 1915, General Ludendorff had to admit the failure of the large-scale Swentziany offensive in the area northeast of Vilna and stop the advance on the northern section of the Eastern Front. According to a new Russian troops concentration between Lida and Molodetschno by a newly reorganized 2nd Army (XXVI, XIV., XXXVI and Siberian IV. Corps), the front stabilized in the space of SWIR and Lake Narach Lake to Smorgon again for trench warfare . The German 12th Army of General von Gallwitz had occupied Grodno on September 1 and reached the Berezina sector in the area east of Lida . The 9th Army and the Woyrsch Army Detachment reached the Szczara and Seretsch Sections in the Baranowitschi area south of it .

At the same time, the chief of the General Staff, General von Falkenhayn, gave priority to the necessary reinforcements of troops for the beleaguered western front , when the Allied offensive in Artois and Champagne began .

The Austro-Hungarian offensive, which had already been launched on Russian territory on the southern section of the Eastern Front across the old border in Eastern Galicia, fared worse . The campaign to Rowno initiated by General of the Infantry Conrad von Hötzendorf at the end of August brought the conquest of Lyck , but was otherwise a disaster. After total losses of 230,000 men since the start of the attack, the loss-making kuk autumn offensive was called off at the end of September.

The operations of the Central Powers failed because the Russians wanted to overstretch the supply lines and because of the inadequate preparation for the retreat of the Tsar's army. The Russian retreat continued unhindered until September 30 of the second year of the war, before the Russian high command took the new front line between Riga , along the Lithuanian lake area to Smorgon , to the former Russian headquarters in Baranowitschi via Pinsk - to the Styr section near Lyck - Dubno bis stabilized on the Sereth.

Reasons to withdraw

Leadership crisis in the Russian army

The Russian army found itself in a general crisis after the defeats. On the one hand, the battles of the first year of the war had severely decimated the number of active and therefore well-trained troop officers. Of the 40,000 active peace army commanders, only a few were left. Only 35,000 men could be won annually from the officers' schools and reserve officers. The quality of the offspring was increasingly dubious. The tsarist empire did not want to fall back on academics and students . The autocratic regime did not want to turn the liberal public against it, nor did it want critical people in the army. In the summer of 1915, the average regiment of 3,000 men had barely more than ten officers at its disposal.

But it was not just the lack of troop leaders that troubled the army. The losses of trained officers could have been limited by a functioning corps of non-commissioned officers. The western armies - above all the German army - classified the corps as a kind of lower category of the officer corps with various special rights. They also managed to better motivate these soldiers. The Prussian army as an example proved itself particularly as an instrument of limited social advancement within society. As non-commissioned officers, it primarily recruited petty bourgeoisie, craftsmen and formerly independent farmers who were exposed to great economic pressure due to industrialization . For economically threatened members of this social class, the military turned out to be a way out, since after the fixed period of service, employment with the state authorities, the railroad or the postal service was promised. The Russian army recruited its NCOs from long-serving recruits. These " sergeants " were not granted any favors compared to the common soldiers. Compared to Germany, there was no link, committed to the state, between the officers, who came from the middle and upper classes, and ordinary soldiers. Apart from that, the German army was largely homogeneous nationally - in contrast to the Russian or the Austro-Hungarian army - and in this respect had fewer leadership problems anyway.

These factors together created a crisis within the tsar's armed forces, which decisively diminished the fighting strength. The fighting troops lost confidence in their superiors. The efforts of the highest authorities to halt the collapse failed utterly in 1915. Draconian disciplinary measures such as the shelling of own, capitulating troops by rear units, made the threatening situation even worse.

Material crisis

Like all other European economies, the Russian economy was by no means prepared for modern war. The production figures for ammunition, weapons and army equipment were by no means in line with the conditions at the front. Russian politics succeeded in compensating for the ammunition crisis and the lack of other war-essential goods during and after the retreat. For the war year 1915 itself, however, the failed industrial policy of the state and large private corporations turned out to be a decisive obstacle.

consequences

Strategically, the Russian withdrawal was a temporary success. Alexeyev had managed to straighten the front and at the same time to pose serious problems for the Central Powers . Furthermore, he had succeeded in letting the opposing offensives come to nothing and still rescuing the battered Russian army intact into the passivity of the winter of 1915. On the other hand, the abandonment of territory on a large scale meant further social and economic burdens for the Tsarist Empire. Not only were cities and agricultural land lost to the war economy, but a stream of 1.5 million refugees also burdened the social stability of the autocracy and presented the Russian aid organizations with enormous tasks. In conclusion, it can be said that the army's reputation in society had suffered badly, even if propaganda attempts were made to emphasize the parallels with Kutuzov's retreat in the Patriotic War against Napoléon .

literature

• John Keegan : The First World War - A European Tragedy , Rowohlt, Reinbek 2001, ISBN 3-499-61194-5 .
• Norman Stone: The Eastern Front 1914-1917 , Hodder and Stoughton, London 1985, ISBN 0-340-36035-6 .
• Christian Zentner : The First World War , Moewig-Verlag, Rastatt 2000, ISBN 3-8118-1652-7 .

Individual evidence

1. ^ Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914-1918, Volume VIII, Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1932, p. 500 f.
2. ↑ Austria-Hungary's Last War, Volume III, Vienna 1932, p. 163.