Battle of Vilna

Battle of Vilna

Part of: First World War

Eastern front during the offensive

date	August 26 to September 29, 1915
place	Švenčionys , Russian Empire
output	German embrace fails

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Russia
Commander
Hermann von Eichhorn Otto von Garnier	Alexei Ewert Pawel Plehwe Yevgeny Radkewitsch
Troop strength
10th Army	10th Army 5th Army

The Battle of Vilnius took place on the northern eastern front between August 26 and September 29, 1915 . The Swentziany Offensive launched on September 9 (today Švenčionys , Lithuania ) was an encirclement operation of the First World War scheduled by German troops , in which a large number of cavalry units were deployed. After the tsarist high command recognized the opposing intention, they gave up their strong positions near Vilna in good time and went back to the Postavy - Narotsch - Smorgon line in coordination with the Great Retreat . The German encirclement had failed operationally, but Vilnius was captured and the front straightened at the end of September.

prehistory

By August 18, 1915, the German 10th Army under Colonel General von Eichhorn had forced the Kovno fortress to surrender, and on August 26 the operations against Vilna were initiated. According to the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the East and his Chief of Staff Ludendorff , the Higher Cavalry Command 6, under the command of Lieutenant General von Garnier, was to put an enclosure around the northern Russian wing. The goal was to push into the back of the holding both sides of Vilnius Russian 10th Army and the breakthrough of the cavalry in the direction of the railway junction Molodetschno that should be sealed off for Russian reinforcements from the east.

The Russian 10th Army under General Radkewitsch made both sides of Vilna and the Willia Front to the west and was formed from north to south by the Guard Corps, the Siberian 3rd Army Corps , the Caucasian V and the II and V Army Corps the II. Cavalry Corps available. To protect the headquarters of the Western Front in Minsk , General Ewert had formed a new 2nd Army (General of the Smirnov Infantry ), which joined the XIV., XXVI., XXXVI on the line Smorgon - Lida - Molodechno. and IV Siberian Army Corps gathered.

procedure

Otto von Garnier

russian map of the operation

In the first phase of the attack, the Garnier cavalry corps pushed Russian cavalry back north of Shirvinty to the north-east of Uzjany from 9 September. At this point the southern wing of the Russian 5th Army was being fortified by cavalry. The German 4th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were located north of the Wilia at Kiemiele at the start of the operation . The Corps Group of Eben ( I. Army Corps ) followed behind into the area between the lakes of Maliaty and Shirvinta. General von Eben was to advance directly to the Ljudjuna level crossing with the right wing ( 58th Division and 10th Landwehr Division ). The left wing of Ebens, the 2nd Division under Lieutenant General von Falk , reached the lakes east of Dubinki in the following days, approached the Scheimjana section and the large railway line to Dünaburg , where the German Nyemen Army under Otto von Below also started the advance would have.

Then the 42nd Infantry and 77th Reserve Divisions of the Hutier group had to swing south near Nyemenczyn to the Wilia, where they met the strong resistance of the Siberians and the Russian guards and ran into them completely. To the south of it the 115th , 31st Divisions and the Zenker Division were advancing towards the provincial capital Wilna, while Litzmann's group was initially only able to support the 3rd and 76th Reserve Divisions because the 75th Reserve Division was still from Wilkomir was approaching.

On September 13th, the German cavalry corps started to turn to the southeast via Swentziany. The 4th Cavalry Division under General von Hofmann attacked Soly and was able to take it on September 16. Starting from Soly, the regiments of the 4th Cavalry Division then advanced south-west, where they met strong units of the Russian 2nd Army and therefore had to hurry back north to Smorgon . On the night of September 18, the Russian armed forces evacuated Vilna surprisingly and without a fight; by retreating, they evaded the looming enclosure.

On September 22nd, Lieutenant General von Garnier received orders to reinforce the left flank of the army to the east with the following 9th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions (Lieutenant General von Hellingrath ) and to go further in the rear of the Russian units with the 1st Cavalry Division . This did not happen, the Russians took the designated assembly point at Sosenka on the same day; the German cavalry advancing south was thereby endangered. The 4th, 9th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were to take action against Russian cavalry in front of Dolhinov on September 26th. In the meantime, the tsarist high command was able to begin counter-attacks, and the intended encirclement of the German cavalry had thus finally failed. The own strength of the troops proved to be insufficient to continue such an enterprise. Despite the violent attacks by Russian troops on the Kamininka - Dolhinow - Milcza line, the troops commanded by Lieutenant General von Garnier managed to break away from the enemy on September 27. In the period from September 28 to 30, Cavalry Command VI then relocated in staggered positions to the new line Miadziol Lake - Postawy to cover the still open left wing of the 10th Army.

consequences

On September 18, the German 10th Army under General von Eichhorn occupied Vilna and reached the area west of Smorgon by September 25 . As a result of the fighting in the Vilna area, the Germans were able to gain significant land gains. The front straightened itself out in the autumn through further Russian retreats insofar as the German XXI. Army Corps on the Lithuanian sea line between Postawy, Narotsch and Swir-See went over to trench warfare and subsequently the XXXX. Reserve Corps extended the front line south via Smorgon.

In March 1916, the Russian Narotsch offensive was launched exactly on this new section of the front , which completely failed.

literature

• Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914-1918 , Volume VIII, ES Mittler and Son, Berlin 1932, p. 500 f.
• Rudolf von Borries: Army cavalry in war of movement. (Ed.) Army Inspection of Education, Berlin 1928

Individual evidence

1. ^ Rudolf von Borries: Army cavalry in war of movement. (Ed.) Heeresinspektion des Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens, Berlin 1928, pp. 110–117.
2. ^ Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914–1918 , Volume VIII, Sketch 29