Battle for Łódź
Eastern Front November 1914
| date | November 11 to December 5, 1914 |
|---|---|
| place | Łódź , Poland |
| output | Tie, consequences strategically favorable for the German Reich |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
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| Troop strength | |
| 12 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions , about 230,000 men | 22 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions, around 360,000 men |
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Eastern Front (1914-1918)
1914
East Prussian operation ( Stallupönen , Gumbinnen , Tannenberg , Masurian Lakes ) - Galicia ( Kraśnik , Komarów , Gnila Lipa , Lemberg ,
Rawa Ruska ) - Przemyśl - Vistula - Krakow - Łódź - Limanowa - Lapanow - Carpathians
1915
Humin - Mazury - Zwinin - Przasnysz - Gorlice-Tarnów - Bug Offensive - Narew Offensive - Great Retreat - Novogeorgiewsk - Rovno - Swenziany Offensive
1916
Lake Narach - Brusilov offensive - Baranovichi offensive
1917
Aa - Kerensky offensive ( Zborów ) - Tarnopol offensive - Riga - Albion company
1918
Operation Punch
The Battle of Łódź was a battle on the Eastern Front (World War I) from 11 November to 5 December 1914 between the 9th Army (German Empire) by August von Mackensen and the 2nd and 5th Army of the Imperial Russian Army to the city of Łódź in the Vistula .
background
Despite the failed offensive in the Battle of Tannenberg at the beginning of the war against East Prussia in August 1914, the determination of the Russian General Staff to carry the war onto German territory was unbroken. After winning the battle of the Vistula , five armies on the Russian northwest and southwest front advanced in a south-westerly direction and threatened Upper Silesia and Krakow .
For the push against Upper Silesia, Nikolaj Nikolajewitsch , the commander-in-chief of the Stawka , concentrated the 2nd Army under General Sergei Scheideman in the Warsaw area and the 5th Army under Pawel Plehwe south of it. The Russian Northwest Front, under the command of General Nikolai Russki , to whom both armies were subordinate, ordered eight corps to advance again to the west during the battle of the Vistula at the end of October.
The German chief of staff on the Eastern Front, Erich Ludendorff , wanted to disrupt the Russian offensive while it was still in its development phase and then advance on the supply center of both armies, the city of Łódź . His strategic goal was to capture the Russian deployment in the right wing and back and, if possible, to roll it up in order to avert an advance on German territory. In the area southwest of Thorn , the German 9th Army, under the command of General of the Cavalry August von Mackensen , gathered for this counter-attack , which had previously covered the left flank of the Austro-Hungarian army front and moved 200 kilometers to the north at the beginning of November unnoticed by the Russians had been. For the protection of Silesia only the army division Woyrsch remained. In addition, two corps of the 8th Army defending East Prussia were added to the 9th Army .
March
During their deployment, the 9th Army placed the focus on the center and on the left wing; on the right, only cavalry divisions and Landsturm troops of the Posen Corps covered the deployment. The left wing of the 9th Army, starting from the northern Vistula front in the area on both sides of Thorn, deployed three corps to encompass the Russian forces in the Łódź area :
- The XXV moved on the far left. Reserve Corps (General Reinhard von Scheffer-Boyadel ) with the 49th and 50th Reserve Divisions to Włocławek . On the opposite bank of the river, the 21st Landsturm Brigade under Major General Wrochem covered the Russian VI, which was concentrated in the Plock area. Army Corps.
- Before that, the Higher Cavalry Command 1 under General von Richthofen clarified with the 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions .
- At the same time, the I. Reserve Corps (General Kurt von Morgen ) marched with the 36th Reserve Division in front and the 1st Reserve Division behind.
- The XX followed to the right . Army Corps (General Friedrich von Scholtz ) with the 37th and 41st Divisions , followed by the 3rd Guard Division to push.
The center of the 9th Army - advanced simultaneously with two corps towards Kutno against the north and north-east fronts of Łódź. Starting from the western section of the Warta, two corps were to swing head-on across the Bzura to the northern and western aprons of Łódź:
- The XVII. Army Corps (General Günther von Pannewitz ) with the 35th and 36th Divisions on Klodawa .
- The XI. Army Corps (General Otto von Plüskow ) with the 22nd and 38th Divisions against the Russian XXIII. Army corps via Kolo on Chełmno .
On the right wing of the 9th Army, the independently operating Higher Cavalry Command 3 under General Frommel accompanied the advance against the southern wing of the Russian 5th Army (Plehwe) with the Austro-Hungarian 7th and 5th Cavalry Divisions . The Austro-Hungarian Cavalry Corps Hauer was connected to the front of the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army deploying in the Bełchatów area further south .
With the Russians, the right wing of the 2nd Army (General Scheideman) had advanced about 90 kilometers from the Vistula in a south-westerly direction. The 2nd and 5th Armies stood on November 10th on the Uniejow line east of the Warta to Novo-Radomsk. The cavalry corps of Generals Charpentier and Novikov , who were investigating in front of the front of the Russian 5th Army, had encountered the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry Corps Korda before Kalisch . To the northeast of Warsaw, the Russian 1st Army (General Rennenkampff) had advanced with two corps (1st Turkestan Corps, VI Army Corps) to the right of the Vistula via Mława , another corps, the 5th Siberian, stood as flank protection on the left Vistula Bank against Wloclawek , the 6th Siberian Corps was concentrated on the other bank of the river near Plock.
course
German breakthrough
On November 11, 1914, Mackensen's troops started their offensive. General Ludendorff had started his main attack against the section of the V Siberian Corps (General Sidorin) - part of the 1st Army under General von Rennenkampff - with the I. and XXV. Reserve corps from the Thorn- Hohensalza line to Wieniec- Włocławek, the XX. Army corps around the Goplosee to the east on Lubraniec . The German forces managed to wipe out the infantry of the enemy corps almost completely, and the artillery assigned to them withdrew. During the storming of Włocławek on November 12, the vanguard of the XXV. Reserve Corps involved in heavy fighting; the leader of the 49th Reserve Division, General Alfred von Briesen, fell .
According to the reconnaissance results available on the German side, the Russian leadership had not yet recognized the deployment of the 9th Army by November 13th; they ordered the 2nd and 5th Armies of the Northwest Front to advance south-west. The Russian 1st Army was to be deployed to cover the right flank of this advance. General Mackensen therefore decided to proceed from the Koło - Lubień line in a southerly direction towards Łęczyca and to penetrate the gap between the 2nd and 1st Army. The German 9th Army managed to cross the Bzura on November 16 and push the Russians back to a distance of 50 kilometers to their supply center in Łódź by November 17. General Russky misjudged the situation at the front completely. He believed that the best way to repel the German attack was to counterattack the 5th and 2nd Armies in the north as quickly as possible. These were to make a front to the north and, in cooperation with the 1st Army, smash the German force grouping, while the armies of the southwest front were to advance further towards Czestochowa . Neither the 5th nor the 1st Army were able to occupy the rooms assigned to them in time.
The 5th Army under General Plehwe on the south wing of Łódź finally strengthened the southern front of Łódź. The Russians reached the city before the approaching Germans and built a strong line of defense. Thus Mackensen's troops did not encounter a single disorganized army, but six enemy corps. The Russian army command had concentrated the 4th, 19th and 23rd Army Corps, the 1st and 2nd Siberian Army Corps and the Novikov Cavalry Corps with almost 250,000 men around Łódź and was determined to vigorously defend the threatened city.
Russian consolidation
On November 19, the first two combat-ready corps of the Russian 5th Army appeared in the southwest of Łódź and forced the right wing, fighting west of Łódź (XI. Army Corps / Plüskow Group) to go back over the Ner . In the east of the city, however, succeeded the XXV. Reserve Corps (Scheffer-Boyadel) with the 49th and 50th Reserve Divisions and the 3rd Guard Division to break through to the south of the city at Rzgów . Although Łódź was thus encompassed from three sides on November 20, the troops of the 2nd Army in it were not inclined to surrender. From November 20, the Russian 1st Army (General Rennenkampff ) advanced from the north-east against the back and flank of the German troops fighting north of Łódź. The German I. Reserve Corps, which had been left behind at Płock to cover the rear of the 9th Army, was unable to stop the enemy troops at Łowicz . The XVII. and XX. Army corps suddenly had three new Russian corps behind them northeast of Łódź. The XX. Army Corps (Scholtz) had to front again on the Moszczenica near Stryków to the north and withstand the Russian counterattacks. In addition, the use of Russian reserves from Petrikau in the south of Łódź had to be expected. The encirclement operation against Łódź had thus failed, which was expressed on the afternoon of November 22 in the order to the Scheffer group to march back.
The Scheffer group is cut off
The Russian IV Army Corps was able to defeat the German XX. Army corps at Stryków to throw back to the north and thus between this and the XXV. Push Reserve Corps. The connection of the XXV. Reserve Corps with the XX. Army corps had been lost. From the east from Łowicz and Skierniewice , the troops of the Russian 1st Army, which had been gathered to the west of Warsaw, advanced to Brzeziny . Three German infantry and two cavalry divisions of the Scheffer group were briefly cut off and had to fight their way back through the Russian lines. In order not to fall into captivity himself with his corps, General von Scheffer gave the order to break out immediately on November 22nd. The troops of the 3rd Guard Division under General Karl Litzmann fought their way to the north via Brzeziny on November 23 and 24, with heavy losses. South of Chrusty Stare, against the Russian cavalry corps Novikov, the cavalry corps Richthofen secured with the 6th and 9th cavalry divisions . The XX. Army Corps tried to regain the old position they had lost at Nowosolna and to push General Litzmann's troops to Glowno in the southeast. The successful outcome was not only owed to their own performance, but also to the inefficiency of the Russian leadership, which failed to encircle and destroy the numerically inferior German troops. General Plehwe feared to the end that the positions of his army in the south of Łódź would be bypassed by the German troops. As reinforcement, he had ordered the Russian 10th Division of the 5th Army Corps from Petrikau to the north and the 1st Division of the 1st Siberian Corps from Lutomjersk to Rschgow to the moved section. The Russian VI was written on the Bzura front. Army corps before Lowicz, to the north of it the V and VI closed up to the Vistula . Siberian Corps.
During the course of November 26th, the German leadership succeeded in closing the gap in the front between the XX. Army Corps and I. Reserve Corps to close. The left wing of the XX, which advanced via Strykow to Sierznia. Army Corps had thus re-established contact with the 3rd Guard Division.
Reinforcement of the German 9th Army
On November 26, the crisis in the German 9th Army was averted and the front around Łódź solidified again. General Ludendorff had to realize, however, that the German forces were far too weak in the first phase of the attack. Already in mid-November, it was the Chief in the East, Colonel General von Hindenburg succeeded, head of the OHL , Falkenhayn to convince four divisions from the Western Front for the Eastern theater of war deducted. Of the German 8th Army was the first Division of General Conta introduced to the hard pressed I Reserve Corps of General morning northwest reinforce Łowicz in space. On the right wing of the 9th Army, the 2nd Army Corps established itself with the 3rd and 4th Divisions on the Ner section. South of it, the XXIV Reserve Corps was brought in at the end of November , while the 47th Reserve Division was made available to the Austrian Army Command and moved to the Krakow area , and General von Gerok established himself with the 48th Reserve Division on the Widawa .
On November 27, the 26th Division reached as the advance guard of the XIII , who had also been brought up from the Western Front . Army Corps ( Fabeck Group ) the area around Gostynin . After receiving the reinforcements, General von Mackensen was ready to take up the battle for Łódź with the 9th Army. In front of the left wing of the 9th Army ( Group Morgen ), the Russian troops went back to Sobota opposite the 1st Division on the south bank of the Bzura. The II Corps under General von Linsingen had been pushed into the front to the east of Sieradz , and the 48th Reserve Division was then deployed to the south with the Breslau Corps . At the beginning of December, the Linsingen attack was a complete success and advanced rapidly from the west in the direction of Łódź.
result
After the end of the fighting the picture was different. Both sides had suffered heavy losses without achieving their strategic goals. The Russian attack on Silesia and Poznan had become a long way off, as it had been disrupted during the construction phase. The goal of the German leadership, to obtain strategic security for the imperial borders by conquering Łódź and to prepare for the conquest of Russian Poland , has not yet been achieved. Ludendorff , however, presented the undecided battle as a great success.
After General Russki was completely fixated on his offensive strategy during the waning battle, he now switched to the defensive. He argued that the flanks of the three Russian armies would first have to be secured for another attack. The best way to do this is to withdraw the front at Łódź, as the city is in an unfavorable location. He also blamed supply problems for his decision. All Russian army leaders involved were successively replaced by General Russky. On December 1, 1914, General Scheidemann was replaced by General of the Infantry Vladimir Smirnov in the 2nd Army , and on December 6, General Rennkampff had to surrender his 1st Army to General of the Infantry Alexander Litvinov . Most recently General Plehwe was replaced, his 5th Army was taken over by General Alexei Tschurin from January 1915 .
On the night of December 5th to 6th was against the front of the German XI., XVII. and XX. Army Corps brisk artillery fire and heavy infantry attacks on the part of the Russians. A general offensive was expected on the German side - but the Russians proved to be consummate "masters of retreat". The morning of December 6th brought the great surprise that the Russians had withdrawn from the fortified position of Łódź, with all the war material and supplies carried. On December 6, 1914, Łódź was also evacuated, although the Russians had previously defended this city so doggedly and successfully. On the evening of December 6th, the German XI. Army corps entered Łódź without a fight.
losses
The German casualties are given in the medical report on the German Army for the 9th Army in the period from November 11, 1914 to November 30, 1914 as follows:
- Average strength of 9th Army: 272,107
- fallen: 4,493
- missing: 9,458
- wounded: 19,419
- sick: 14.092
The bloody losses of the 9th Army were thus 33,370 men.
literature
Contemporary writings
- The Battle of Lodz. Using official sources, edited by Major von Wulffen, Oldenburg 1918 (= The Great War in individual representations ; published by the General Staff of the Field Army, issue 19).
- Reichsarchiv (Ed.): The World War 1914–1918 , Vol. 6. Berlin 1929.
- General Friedrich von Bernhardi: Germany's heroic struggle. J. Lehmanns Verlag, Munich 1922, pp. 120-130.
Secondary literature
- John Keegan: The First World War. A European tragedy. Rowohlt-Taschenbuch-Verlag, Reinbek near Hamburg 2001, ISBN 3-499-61194-5 .
- Christian Zentner : The First World War. Data, facts, comments. Moewig, Rastatt 2000, ISBN 3-8118-1652-7 .
- Norman Stone: The Eastern Front 1914-1917. Penguin, London 1998, ISBN 0-14-026725-5 .
Web links
- Map of the battle on firstworldwar.com
