Skirmish at Stallupönen

Skirmish at Stallupönen

Part of: First World War

date	17th August 1914
place	east of Stallupönen, a few kilometers west of the German-Russian border near Eydtkuhnen
output	undecided, tactical withdrawal of the German I. Army Corps
consequences	Combination of the 1st Army Corps with the main body of the 8th Army in the Gumbinnen area, Battle of Gumbinnen on 19/20. August 1914

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Russia
Commander
Hermann François Richard von Conta Adalbert von Falk	Paul Rennkampff
Troop strength
1st Infantry Division and parts of the 2nd Infantry Division (1st Army Corps), a total of around 18,000 men	25th, 27th (III. Corps) and 29th Infantry Division (XX. Corps), about 50,000 men in total
losses
around 1,200 dead and wounded	about 6,600 men (dead, wounded and prisoners) in the 27th Infantry Division, total losses unknown

The battle at Stallupönen took place on August 17, 1914 between parts of the German 1st Army Corps and units of the Russian 1st Army. The vastly outnumbered German troops caused considerable losses to the Russian units and were largely able to hold their own during the fighting, but at the end of the day had to evacuate the field of battle under cover of darkness as they ran the risk of being encircled by the enemy on both wings . It was not possible for the main German forces to intervene because the commander of the 1st Army Corps had assembled his units far from the designated area without consulting the High Command of the 8th Army .

background

Location of the Vistula-Nogat line

Division locations in 1914

The concept developed by the German General Staff for the initial phase of a war against Russia was based on the defensive assertion of German territory near the border, but also calculated from the outset the possible evacuation of the areas east of the Upper Oder , the Posen fortress and the Lower Vistula - i.e. the Surrender of parts of the provinces of Silesia , Poznan and West Prussia , but above all the entire province of East Prussia .

Only after a forced retreat to the line mentioned were the local commanders to use their forces to the full and assert themselves under all circumstances until the arrival of reinforcements from the western theater of war ; on the other hand, to the east of the Vistula- Nogat line (with the fortified squares of Thorn , Kulm , Graudenz and Marienburg ), which was built before the war, battles could only be accepted if there was a sure chance of success.

In line with this disposition, the German troops in East Prussia were supposed to attack the Russian units, which were separated from one another by lakes and vast forests, and so achieve local success.

However, this active defense should only begin on the geographically favorable line Gumbinnen - Angerapp - Masurian Lakes . In mid-August 1914, the High Command (AOK) of the German 8th Army planned to attack, encompass and defeat the north wing of the Russian 1st Army advancing westwards from the Gumbinnen-Angerapp area, expected at the Rominter Heide .

Contrary to what was ordered by AOK 8, the commanding general of the I. Army Corps, Hermann von François (who took the view that Colonel General von Prittwitz was acting too “cautiously”), his two infantry divisions and the units that were also subordinate to the corps ( 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd Landwehr Brigade) were not assembled in the area between Insterburg and Gumbinnen as planned until August 16, 1914 , but pushed forward to the east near the border and set up far apart (more than 60 kilometers).

The 2nd Infantry Division stood near Goldap and Tollmingkehmen on the western edge of the Romintenschen Heide, the 1st Infantry Division north of it near Stallupönen , the 1st Cavalry Division near Pillkallen and the 2nd Landwehr Brigade far northwest near Tilsit .

The units of the 1st Army Corps had thus moved more than 40 kilometers from the main body of the 8th Army behind the Angerapp. AOK 8 did not find out about this until August 17th. François ordered several reconnaissance expeditions across the Russian border and also planned such an undertaking for August 17th.

A major Russian attack was not expected at the 1st Army Corps, although on the evening of August 16, in front of the front of the 1st Infantry Division near Eydtkuhnen, deployments of Russian infantry and artillery had been observed. For the morning of August 17th, François reported to the 1st Infantry Division for inspection purposes.

course

In the early morning of August 17, the Russian 1st (Nyemen) Army began to advance westwards across the entire front width between Suwalki in the south and Schillehnen in the north.

In the center of the advance strip, in the section of the Russian III. and XX. Corps, were the positions of the German 1st Infantry Division. When François arrived at the division around 8 o'clock, its two brigades were already being attacked across the entire front width northeast, east and southeast of Stallupönen by forces of three Russian infantry divisions.

Towards noon, the German association appeared on both wings. Nevertheless, François and the division commander, Lieutenant General Richard von Conta , decided to hold the position. François ignored an order from AOK 8 (which had received knowledge of the exposed position of the 1st Army Corps on the night of August 17), which ordered him to break off the battle and to withdraw immediately to Gumbinnen .

Meanwhile, the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Adalbert von Falk , who had become aware of the noise of the battle, had decided on his own responsibility to deploy four battalions of his division to the northeast in support of the 1st Infantry Division.

This association met in the late afternoon on the southern part of the battlefield and attacked the Russian 27th Infantry Division, which at the same moment a counterattack of standing here Grenadier Regiment "King Frederick William I" (2 Ostpreußisches) no. 3 exposed saw , at Göritten in the flank. As a result, panic broke out in the ranks of the Russian division, and some regiments fled back towards the border. When crossing the border river direct fire by German artillery caused considerable losses, several thousand Russian soldiers surrendered; the 105th Infantry Regiment alone lost about 3,000 men.

On the north wing, however, the German units gradually had to retreat towards Stallupönen in the course of the afternoon. After dark, however, the Russian commanders stopped the attacks.

During the battle, Russian units had bypassed the German positions in the north and reached Kussen towards evening , about 40 kilometers northwest of Stallupönen. The 1st Infantry Division was in danger of being cut off from the Gumbinnen-Insterburg area within a short time. A Russian brigade was also able to advance in the rear of the German positions in the evening southwest of Stallupönen.

Even so, François still refused to initiate the withdrawal. Instead, he planned to resume the battle the next day, although it was obvious that the Russian superiority would then be far greater. Only a new relevant order from AOK 8 caused him to leave with his troops in the late evening in the direction of Gumbinnen.

consequences

Traces of the fighting in Stallupönen

Due to the unauthorized action of the I. Army Corps, the disposition of AOK 8 was outdated in several respects.

The Russian right wing did not, as initially assumed, only extend as far as the Romintenschen Heide, but rather - much further north due to the extensive encircling movements undertaken during the battle - much further north.

Surrounding this Russian grouping seemed hardly possible any more, on the contrary, the 8th Army itself ran the risk of being outflanked by Russian troops from the northeast at its place of assembly.

In addition, the 1st Army Corps had delayed the Russian advance and at the same time prevented the rest of the 8th Army from intervening in the battle through its isolated deployment.

It was therefore questionable whether the 8th Army was still able to force a decision against the Neman Army before the Russian 2nd ( Narew ) Army broke into East Prussia in the south.

In addition, the Russian high command and the field commanders of the Neman Army had become aware of the presence of strong German units in the Gumbinnen area and were now acting accordingly cautiously, which - again at François' insistence - launched the German counter-attack three days after the battle at Stallupönen (cf. . Battle of Gumbinnen ) made even more difficult.

literature

• Hermann von François: Battle of the Marne and Tannenberg. Considerations on German warfare in the first six weeks of the war. Scherl, Berlin 1920.
• Reichsarchiv (Ed.): The Liberation of East Prussia (The World War, Volume 2) , Mittler, Berlin 1925.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ The strength of a German infantry division was about 13,000 men (2 brigades with 2 regiments each). In total there were not quite three German brigades in action. See Reichsarchiv (Hrsg.), Die Befreiung Ostpreußens (The World War, Volume 2), Berlin 1925, p. 76 and Annex 2.
2. ↑ The strength of a Russian infantry division was about 17,000 men at the beginning of the war. See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 76 and Annex 2. According to other information, an average Russian infantry division initially had a head strength of 21,000 men. See Otto, Helmut, Schmiedel, Karl, The First World War. Military historical outline, 3rd, completely revised and supplemented edition, Berlin 1977, p. 62.
3. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 78.
4. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 76.
5. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 39f.
6. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 41.
7. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 53ff.
8. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 57.
9. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, pp. 70, 74.
10. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 72.
11. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 73.
12. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 74.
13. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 73.
14. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, pp. 74, 75f.
15. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 75.
16. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 75.
17. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 76.
18. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 78.
19. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 79.
20. ↑ See Reichsarchiv, Befreiung, p. 82f.