Autumn battle in Champagne
Autumn battle in the Champagne
Lage on September 25, 1915
| date | September 25 to November 6, 1915 |
|---|---|
| place | Champagne , France |
| output | Defensive victory of the Germans |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
Erich von Falkenhayn |
Joseph Joffre |
| Troop strength | |
| 3rd Army - 12 divisions with 220,000 men | 4th Army and 2nd Army - 27 divisions with 450,000 men |
| losses | |
|
72,000 dead and wounded, 17,500 prisoners, 121 guns |
145,000 dead and wounded |
.svg){kind=small}
The autumn battle in the Champagne took place between 25 September and 6 November 1915 and was a further attempt of the Entente a frontal breakthrough battle in the First World War . The French army command wanted to force the decisive breakthrough with a drum fire that was again increased compared to the previous winter battle in Champagne (February 16 to March 18, 1915) . This time Army Group North also carried out an equally strong attack in the Arras and La Bassee area in order to tie up the German reserves there. At the beginning of the attack in Champagne there were 27 French divisions with 450,000 men against only 7 Germans with around 160,000 men, but by the end of the month they could be reinforced by reserves to 12 divisions with 220,000 soldiers. The German Supreme Army Command under General Erich von Falkenhayn was able to adequately strengthen the threatened front with reserves brought in from the Eastern Front in October and thus prevent the Allied breakthrough.
prehistory
After the allied Russian army collapsed on the southern section of the Eastern Front and the fight there had not yet been decided, the Allied leadership in the west was forced to take another offensive at the urging of the English Minister of War Herbert Kitchener, 1st Earl Kitchener . After another war conference of the Entente in Chantilly on July 7, 1915, the Allied Commander-in-Chief Marshal Joseph Joffre and Sir John French agreed to launch their next offensive on the Western Front simultaneously on two different sections, in Champagne and in the Lens area , the 150 km at a distance from each other. The German Army Command was to be deprived of the possibility of efficiently bringing its reserves to the breakthrough points and thereby stabilizing threatened sections of the front. In the autumn of 1915, the Allies on the Western Front had a total of 150 divisions with 2.8 million men at their disposal thanks to enormous reinforcements from the colonies. On the other side, the chief of the German army command, Erich von Falkenhayn, had reduced his forces to the minimum of 100 divisions with 1.9 million men, just enough to defensively withstand the Allies in the west. Falkenhayn felt justified in taking this dangerous step because the offensive on the Eastern Front in May 1915 in the breakthrough battle between Gorlice – Tarnow had not yet led to a decision. In addition, the allied Austro-Hungarian troops were stopped by a Russian counter-offensive in the Battle of Tarnopol in mid-September and again needed German troop help. However, Falkenhayn also generally tended to underestimate the French opponent. On September 24th, while the barrage of the opposing armies was already raging, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army, Karl von Eine, that "the French have no guts", which is why their attack is not to be feared. The next day, only two hours before the offensive began, he let the emperor know: “The 6th and especially the 3rd Army are far too black, the French are at the end of their tether and are no longer able to attack . "
Marshal Joffre began his heavy artillery bombardment with 1650 guns on September 22nd around 7 a.m., which, with its long-range guns, was aimed particularly at the Challerange-Bazancourt railway line. In the rear of the French 4th Army , 128 infantry battalions had been deployed, which, according to plan, were to relieve the infantry deployed in front again and again after the first breakthrough. Seven cavalry divisions made available were to advance immediately if the first successes were to be seen. The fire stopped on September 24th, and reconnaissance teams were now advancing across the front to see for themselves the effect of the fire. General Noël de Castelnau , the commander-in-chief of the middle army group, had changed Joffres' attack regulations so that the divisions of the assigned 4th and 2nd Army each had to deploy three regiments side by side, which should lead to terrible losses. Among the ten attack corps deployed there was the XII on the left of the 4th Army in the front line. and IV. Corps, in the center the XXXII. Corps and the 2nd Colonial Corps, on the right wing with the 2nd Army the XIV., XI., XX. Corps and the 1st Colonial Corps. Behind it stood the VI in the second meeting. and XVI. Corps ready as a reserve, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Corps were also available.
On the German side, the XII was on the right wing of the battlefield . (Royal Saxon) Reserve Corps (General der Artillerie Hans von Kirchbach ), the border between the 23rd and 24th Reserve Division lay along the course of the Suippes; the large village of Aubérive projecting into it still belonged to the sector of the 24th Reserve Division. In the section north of Souain to Perthes to the east, the 50th Division (Lieutenant General von Engelbrechten ) followed up to the Tahure section, followed by the 16th Reserve Division (Major General Kurt von Ditfurth) in the 2nd meeting . The VIII. Reserve Corps was with the 15th Reserve Division (Lieutenant General von Liebert ) at Ripont and Massiges. At Cernay-Servon then the 21st Reserve Division followed , which at the same time the right wing of the XVIII. Reserve Corps (General of the Infantry Kuno Arndt von Steuben ) formed.
Course of the battle
After the three days of shelling from the artillery position on the Suippes Line had subsided, the French infantry attack began on the morning of September 25th at 9:15 am in the sector of General Langle de Cary's 4th Army on an attack front of 32 kilometers between Aubérive - Souain– Perthes - Le Mesnil to Ville-sur-Tourbe . Nineteen divisions were assigned to attack primarily, followed by a further eight divisions as reserves in the second line. Opposite were the positions of the German 3rd Army under Colonel General Karl von Eine , which had only 7 divisions in the attacked section. When the attack was imminent, there were no reserves except for a cavalry division at Rethel. From the first attack, the center of the 3rd Army between Auberive to Tahure with the VIII. Reserve Corps (Lieutenant General Paul Fleck ) and the XVIII. Reserve Corps, recorded as the right wing of the 5th Army. A right wing - the XIV Army Corps , which extended the German front westward to the northeastern apron of Reims, was not affected by the French attack. The deep French advance of the attack divisions quickly led to a front indentation 17.5 km wide and up to three kilometers deep between Auberive- Le Mesnil; by the XXXII. Corps led by General Berthelot with main forces on Somme-Py brought 7,000 prisoners and 24 field guns on the first day. After the loss of the heights of Tahure, the second position of the German 50th Division (Lieutenant General von Engelbrechten ) was also in danger. The withdrawal of the 16th Reserve Division (General Ditfurth), which followed to the east at Ripont, and the advance of the reserves to this section were just able to prevent the front from tearing down. At the same time, the German 15th Reserve Division struggled in vain to maintain the elevation positions at Massiges ("La Main de Massiges"), and the entire Cernay position threatened to collapse. There was heavy fighting around the height 199 north of Massiges, the Mont Têtu, which the Germans called "Kanonenberg"; the fighting raged to and fro, but the German troops managed to assert themselves here. Lieutenant General Fleck considered retreating behind the Dormaise with his 8th Reserve Corps, but then withstood the attacks on the Rouvroy-Cernay-en Dormais line. In front of the second line of defense, which had not been destroyed, the infantry advance of the French slowly came to a standstill by evening. On the other western part of the battle, the XII. Reserve Corps with its 24th Reserve Division stop the attacks on Auberive and after the intervention of the 5th Division (Lieutenant General Georg Wichura ) restore it from the reserve at the front near Somme-Py. The advanced 16th Reserve Division wrestled around 196 at Le Mesnil. In some places even French artillery fire struck their own, tightly packed ranks. From noon on, light rainy weather set in, which, accompanied by cutting winds, intensified over the next few days. Only in the afternoon did the Supreme Army Command order further reinforcements to be deployed; the 56th Division from Saarburg , the 192nd Infantry Brigade from the 7th Army and the 20th Division from Flanders. On the evening of the first day of the battle, the French had not been able to achieve the breakthrough; they were now standing from left to right on the line south of Epine-Vedegrange across the St. Hilaire-St. Souplet-Höhe von Navarin Ferme-south Somme-Py-southern slope of the Arbre-Höhe, - southern edge of the Butte de Tahure-Höhe 192-terrain north of Ripont, then sharply to the southeast on Ville sur Tourbe - ending in the right section with altitude 199 north of Massiges . Advancing towards Bemont Ferme, the 5th Division, arriving first from the reserve, received orders to quickly relieve the beleaguered 50th and 15th Reserve Divisions via the Somme Py-Tahure road.
On the morning of September 26th, Colonel General One was already considering giving in to the enemy pressure by withdrawing his troubled army. However, the army command guaranteed that the Xth Army Corps (Lieutenant General Walther von Lüttwitz with the 10th and 20th Divisions) and the 113th Division approaching from the Eastern Front would arrive on time by the evening of the next day. At around 5 p.m., the French renewed their attempts to break through on Somme-Py in three successive waves of attack, and they managed to conquer Ferme Navarin. In the section of the 16th Reserve Division near Tahure, the four regiments of the 16th Reserve Division mixed, then the Saxon Infantry Regiment No. 183 of the 183rd Infantry Brigade, the Leib-Grenadier-Regiment “King Friedrich Wilhelm III . "(1st Brandenburg) No. 8 of the 5th Division, the Fusilier Regiment" Prince Heinrich of Prussia "(Brandenburg) No. 35 and parts of the 56th Division, that is, eight regiments from four different divisions fighting for same height position. On the left, the 21st Reserve Division with Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 81 still held the so-called "Ehrenberg". By the evening of the day, the French attempt at breakthrough failed again, the bloody front on the line “La Main de Massiges” -Maisons de Champagne-Tahure-La Butte de Souain-Ferme Navarin-Height 165-Auberive froze.
On September 27, the bulk of the 56th Division (Lieutenant General Sontag ) arrived across the railway line from Vouziers and immediately entered the battle of the VIII Reserve Corps at Aure. General Castelnau still intended to break through the badly damaged second position in another attack. A general attack, however, only turned into incoherent partial advances that were shattered in the fire of the defenders. The French cavalry formations of General Baratier , already advancing on the road north of Souain on Somme-Py, suffered heavy losses and had to retreat to the protection of their infantry. The fresh 20th Division (Major General von Lüttwitz ) finally replaced the worn-out 15th Reserve Division on September 30th, which was reorganized behind the front. Behind the left wing, the 53rd Reserve Division (Lieutenant General Leuthold ) was deployed from Flanders, while the 113th Division (Lieutenant General Max von Wienskowski) was held back as a reserve at the Amagne unloading point.
Colonel-General von Eine noted in his diary on October 3rd: “Our losses can now be overlooked. We carried away 16,000-17,000 wounded men or were still lying here. The dead must be estimated at 6,000 men and the prisoners at 11,000, so that we will have suffered a loss of 35,000 men. We have prisoners or dead of almost all regiments of the French divisions, and we also know whether a regiment has attacked once or several times. On this basis we estimate the French casualties at 97,000 men. A nice and soothing blood drain. "
Castelnau took a break to regroup its units and on October 4th opened another two-day bombardment of the new German lines with its artillery. On October 6th, the French 10th Corps was replaced by the 9th and the infantry were sent forward again, but even here no one believed that the breakthrough would be a redeeming success. Only the German 20th Division to the west and then the 5th Division east of the Somme-Py-Souain road succeeded in making small incursions, which were eliminated by counter-attacks by October 8th.
From October 7th on, reinforcements arrived continuously from the east: First the 50th Reserve Division reached the combat area, then the 5th Bavarian Division , the 22nd Reserve Division and the 4th Infantry Division . The incoming IX. Army Corps replaced the X Army Corps at the focus of the battle.
Because of this, the attack by the French on October 13 was no longer successful. Since the middle of October, the Germans have been carrying out individual counter-attacks to clean up protruding fronts. On October 30th, a strong German counterattack took place at Mesnil: The attack was made by the VIII Reserve Corps with the newly subordinated 7th Reserve Division , 5th Bavarian Division and 4th Division (Gelt. Erich Freyer ). The Butte de Mesnil could be captured, but then the thrust at the rear positions of the enemy came to a halt due to artillery fire. On November 3rd, on the left wing of the army, the 56th Division brought Elevation 199 north of Massiges (the Kanonenberg) back entirely into German possession. Also in other places, at the XII. Reserve corps at Navarin Ferme and the IX. Army corps on the Arbre-Höhe, slight advantages in terms of terrain could be achieved. The Entente then stopped the last attacks on November 6th, as the human losses and also the enormous use of materials with almost 5.4 million shells, which were fired in Champagne alone, were in no relation to the small gains in land.
consequences
The attacking French lost almost 145,000 men in this battle, the Germans 72,000 men (17,500 of them prisoners) and 121 guns. Overall, the Allies lost almost 240,000 dead and wounded in the autumn battle in Champagne and the Lens area, while the Germans lost 150,000 soldiers in both sectors. The failed offensive and the heavy losses it had brought in vain led to a domestic political crisis among the French. Prime Minister Viviani has been replaced by the more energetic Aristide Briand . Marshal Joffre was able to keep his overpowering position, but his critic General Joseph Gallieni became the new Minister of War . The commander in chief of the 4th Army, General Langle de Cary , was replaced on December 12th by General Henri Gouraud . In the case of the English, who also ran unsuccessfully at Loos , Field Marshal French was replaced by the previous leader of the 1st Army, Lieutenant General Douglas Haig .
→ see also: List of French troops in the autumn battle in Champagne
literature
- Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The First World War , Econ Verlag Düsseldorf 1988, pp. 200–207.
- Gerhard Hirschfeld , Gerd Krumeich, Irina Renz in connection with Markus Pöhlmann (Ed.): Encyclopedia First World War. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2003, ISBN 3-506-73913-1 . Extended and updated study edition Paderborn 2009, ISBN 978-3-506-76578-9 . P. 349 f., 410 f.
- John Keegan : The First World War. A European tragedy . Translated from the English by Karl and Heidi Nicolai. Kindler, Reinbek near Hamburg 2000, ISBN 3-463-40390-0 . Further edition Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2001, ISBN 3-499-61194-5 , p. 285 ff.
- Hew Strachan: The First World War. A new illustrated story. Translated from the English by Helmut Ettinger. Bertelsmann, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-570-00777-4 . Taschenbuch Pantheon Verlag, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-570-55005-2 (Orig .: The Oxford illustrated history of the First World War. New York 2000). P. 203 ff.
- Ian Westwell: World War I. A chronicle. Translated from the English by Heiko Nonnenmann. Gondrom Verlag, Bindlach 2000, ISBN 3-8112-1748-8 , p. 76 ff.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Holger Afflerbach: Falkenhayn - Political Thinking and Action in the Kaiserreich , Munich 1994, p. 358
- ↑ Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914-18, Volume IX., Supplements Sketch 1 and 2.
- ↑ see French Wikipedia
- ^ Franz Sontag (ed.): An army leader experiences the world war - personal notes of Colonel General v. One , Leipzig 1938, p. 163