Battle of the Marne (1914)

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First battle of the Marne
Part of: First World War
Map of the battle
Map of the battle
date September 5. bis 12. September 1914
place On the Marne , France
output Victory of the Entente
consequences Failure of the Schlieffen Plan ; 4-year trench warfare on the western front
Parties to the conflict

Third French RepublicThird French Republic France United Kingdom
United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire

Commander

Third French RepublicThird French Republic Joseph Joffre (Chief of Staff) John French ( BEF ) Joseph Maunoury ( 6th Army ) Louis Franchet d'Espèrey ( 5th Army ) Ferdinand Foch ( 9th Army )
United Kingdom 1801United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland 
Third French RepublicThird French Republic 

Third French RepublicThird French Republic 

Third French RepublicThird French Republic 

German EmpireThe German Imperium Helmuth von Moltke (Chief of the General Staff) Alexander von Kluck ( 1st Army ) Karl von Bülow ( 2nd Army ) Max von Hausen ( 3rd Army )
German EmpireThe German Imperium 

German EmpireThe German Imperium 

German EmpireThe German Imperium 
Troop strength
at the end of the battle more than 1,000,000 soldiers at the end of the battle just over 750,000 soldiers
losses

Fallen: 80,000 French and 1,700 British; approximately 250,000 dead, wounded and prisoners

unknown; approximately 250,000 dead, wounded and prisoners

The First Battle of the Marne was a decisive battle of the First World War and took place from September 5 to 12, 1914 along the Marne east of Paris . The German advance of the five armies of the German right wing, which began on August 2, was quite successful until the Battle of the Marne, but was stopped on September 5 by a surprising Franco-English counter-offensive under Marshal Joseph Joffre and Sir John French , starting on September 9 even transformed into a tactical retreat of the Germans to the Aisne . The battle marks the first turning point of the First World War and the failure of the Schlieffen Plan . The plan of the German army command under Colonel General Helmuth von Moltke to defeat France with his concentrated main forces in a short time had failed after this battle. Their tactical victory gave the Allies enough time to bring further reinforcements from their colonies to the Western Front and to counterbalance the initial German superiority in terms of troops. In 1914, both warring parties had a chance of breakthroughs only in the northern section, in the Belgian-Flemish border area, which still offered room to maneuver.

prehistory

Helmuth von Moltke the Younger

The chief of the German General Staff, General von Moltke, had distributed the attacking right wing of the army in a modification of the Schlieffen Plan in a ratio of 2: 5 (left, southern wing: right swivel wing) (Schlieffen Plan: 1: 7). The right wing of the army - the 1st to 5th Army - marched through Belgium and northern France and stood at the beginning of September between Verdun as the "pivot point" of the swivel wing (chord length about 170 kilometers) and the westernmost point of the wing north of Meaux near Nanteuil-le- Haudouin , about 50 kilometers northeast of Paris . The 1st Army had deviated from its planned direction of advance after the capture of Brussels (August 20), as Commander Alexander von Kluck was pursuing the French troops and the British Expeditionary Corps (BEF) and above all tried to encompass the latter. After the attack by the French 5th Army on the German 2nd Army under Colonel General Karl von Bülow at St. Quentin , ordered by the French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre , the French 5th Army had been in retreat since August 31 the Marne on the Seine .

The English expeditionary corps under Field Marshal John French withdrew to the Seine after the defeat at Le Cateau on August 26th. Joffre had meanwhile organized the formation of the new 6th Army under General Joseph Maunoury by regrouping from Lorraine , it was supposed to cover the threatened Paris in the northeastern apron and at the same time was preparing a flank thrust against the open western flank of the Germans. As the front expanded, the surprise effect of the German offensive dwindled, the numerical superiority of the right German wing was also lost with the expansion, the lines of communication between the Germans and the French became ever shorter. The stretched German front threatened to tear apart at the end of August, the right wing had to change its thrust due to counterattacks and swivel south and southeast, the encirclement of Paris was abandoned on August 30, of which Joffre was informed on September 3.

German infantry take cover

The defense of Paris had been under the command of General Joseph Gallieni since August 25 ; the government under President Raymond Poincaré moved its seat to Bordeaux on September 2nd . Since August 27th, Colonel General Alexander von Kluck and his 1st Army were advancing south east of Paris; this movement was subsequently approved by the German headquarters in recognition of the situation. On September 3, 1914, French reconnaissance planes observed that the 1st Army was changing its direction and was now heading for Paris. This led Joffre to launch his new counter-offensive on the Marne. In the meantime, the Supreme Army Command stationed in Luxembourg lost track of the operational situation, in particular there was no telephone connection to the threatened right wing. The technically inadequate radio traffic could not make up for this, and the aircraft reports often remained unused. The 1st Army tried to enclose the British expeditionary army with forced marches and neglected the flank protection of the entire German advance against Paris, which had been left lying to the west, they had covered more than 500 kilometers in heavy fighting.

After the long marches, the German troops were generally exhausted. The supply of the troops at least 125 kilometers from the nearest intact railway terminus was problematic. Communications between the armies and the high command were also difficult, as the Allies had also destroyed the telegraph and telephone lines as they retreated. Unlike the Germans, the Allies were able to use a largely undamaged transport and communications infrastructure. In addition, the right wing of the army was already weakened by five corps since August 20 by Moltke's instructions - the 1st Army (Colonel General Alexander von Kluck) had to take the III. and IX. Reserve corps to bind the Belgians in the area from Brussels to Antwerp and for the siege of Antwerp itself, the 2nd Army (Colonel General Karl von Bülow) deployed the VII Reserve Corps for the siege of Maubeuge . Marching and combat losses and supply difficulties caused stoppages. Furthermore, the Guard Reserve Corps and the XI had been in East Prussia since August 25 because of the danger . Corps being transported to the Eastern Front . The German army command had to enter the decisive Marne battle with only thirteen available infantry corps (27 divisions) and two cavalry groups (6 cavalry divisions). Nevertheless, the morale of the German troops was good and there was general confidence in victory.

Starting position

The German advance until September 5, 1914

After the failure of the counter-attack by the French 5th Army in the Battle of St. Quentin , General Lanrezac was dismissed by Joffre on September 3 and replaced by General Franchet d'Esperey . Joffre ordered the 5th and 4th Armies to retreat while resisting at a slow pace in order to gain time for a counterattack. On September 4th, General Gallieni urged his Commander-in-Chief Joffre to agree to an attack by troops from the Paris military district on the open flank of the 1st Army and for the simultaneous support of this attack by the 5th Army. Joffre was convinced and, on the eve of the Battle of the Marne, ordered the withdrawal and the counterattack for September 6th.

The French 6th Army (Maunoury) stood before the start of the battle on the Dammartin-en-Goële line to Claye-Souilly . The retreat of the English corps (General French) reached the line Gretz - Armainvilliers and Tournan-en-Brie , to the east the French 5th Army (General Franchet d'Espèrey) from the plateau north of Provins to Sézanne . The Conneau Cavalry Corps maintained contact with the newly established 9th Army (General Foch ), which camped in positions across from the marshes of Saint Gond (near Val-des-Marais). A wide gap in the front to the east was filled by the Mitry Cavalry Corps (9th and 6th Cavalry Divisions) to Mailly. This was followed by the French 4th Army (General Langle de Cary) pushed back into Champagne by the German 4th Army on the line from Saint-Souplet to Vienne-la-Ville to the Argonne . In the Varennes area, this was followed by the connection to the left wing of the 3rd Army (General Maurice Sarrail ) extending from Souilly to Revigny-sur-Ornain . The end of the line was the arch around the Verdun fortress, which was already covered by the German 5th Army , from where the eastern wing of the French front extended into Alsace .

On the morning of September 5, the German 1st Army (Alexander von Kluck) had reached the line Coulommiers ( IV. AK ) - Courtacon ( HKK 2 ) - Montceaux-lès-Provins (III. AK) - Esternay ( IX. AK ) , followed by the 2nd Army (Karl von Bülow) via Montmirail ( VII. AK ) - Orbais ( XRK ) - Étoges ( XAK ) to Écury-le-Repos ( Guard ), followed by the 3rd Army ( Max von Hausen ) via Normée to Huiron , the 4th Army ( Albrecht von Württemberg ) pursued via Vitry-le-François to Sainte-Menehould , the 5th Army ( Crown Prince Wilhelm of Prussia ) closed from Passavant-en-Argonne via Triaucourt-en- Argonne , Froidos-sur-Aire to the Meuse at Montfaucon-d'Argonne to Consenvoye . On September 5, new orders were issued by Moltke to his right wing of the army: The 1st and 2nd Armies were to remain on the eastern front of Paris in order to be able to take offensive opposition to hostile undertakings from Paris. The 3rd Army was to advance on Troyes and Vendeuvre , the 4th Army in the Vitry-le-François area.

Course of the battle

5th September

Situation on September 5, 1914
French soldiers awaiting an attack

Moltke's order for the 1st Army on September 5th no longer corresponded to the current situation, as Colonel General von Kluck and his corps had already crossed the Marne. In the evening the IV. Army Corps had the line Amillis-Choisy, the III. Sancy-Montceaux, and the IX. Army Corps reached the area between Neuvy- Esternay . The II. Army Corps under General von Linsingen was left behind as a security to protect its right flank against Paris and was on the line La Celle-St. Augustine proceeded.

On that day General Joffre went to the English headquarters to see General French and, by means of a dramatic appeal to the honor of England, wrested his consent to support the French offensive and to advance again. Since the British forces were already south of the Marne on the Grand Morin , they would only need a day to catch up with the French at all.

Battle on the Ourcq

To the north of the Marne, the left behind IV Reserve Corps under General Hans von Gronau had reached its march destination Varcy- Chambry , the 4th Cavalry Division cleared up to Oissery . Due to conflicting reconnaissance results, von Gronau ordered a limited attack with the aim of clearing up the situation in front of his front ( violent reconnaissance ). The 7th and 22nd Reserve Divisions met strong opposing forces via Saint-Mard - Dammartin, advancing between Marcilly and Saint-Soupplets . Thus the flank thrust planned by the French 6th Army (General Maunoury) was uncovered at an early stage and there was no longer any surprise. When the IV Reserve Corps was attacked, it first repelled the attack division and then withdrew. General Gronau withdrew about 10 kilometers east to the Thérouanne by evening and reported this dangerous situation to Kluck's headquarters in Rebais . The II. Corps was alerted for the first aid and marched to the aid of the Gronau troops via Lizy the following day .

September 6th

Joseph Joffre

At 6 a.m. on September 6, Joffre began his counter-offensive across the front and issued the following order of the day for that day:

«Aux armées… Au moment ou s'engage une bataille dont dépend le sort du pays, il importe de rappeler à tous que le moment n'est plus de regarder en arrière; tous les efforts doivent être employés à attaquer et refouler l'ennemi. Une troupe qui ne peut plus avancer devra, coûte que coûte, garder le terrain conquis et se faire tuer sur place, plutôt que de reculer. Dans les circonstances actuelles, aucune défaillance ne peut être tolérée. »

“To the armies… at a moment when a battle is unfolding on which the fate of the country depends, it is important to remind everyone that this is not the time to look backwards; every effort must be made to attack and repel the enemy. A troop that is stuck must - cost what it may - hold the conquered terrain and let themselves be killed in their place instead of backing away. In the current circumstances, further hesitation cannot be tolerated. "

- Joseph Joffre

A nasty surprise for the Germans was the counterattack of the 5th Army (General Franchet d'Espèrey), which had already been believed defeated, and which attacked the center and the left wing of the German 2nd Army (Bülow) with extreme force, followed by the newly formed army further to the right 9th Army ( Foch ) also carried out attacks against the German 3rd Army ( Hausen ).

North of the Marne closed General Maunoury at Ourcq again and renewed his attack, his troops pushed Gronau Corps to 15 pm after Étrépilly back. The French 6th Army reached the Chambry - Acy - Étavigny line and was stopped on this line after the intervention of the 4th Division . In the evening the advance guard of the IV Corps (General Sixt von Armin ), which had been regrouped from the Marne to the north, appeared .

Colonel General Kluck, concerned about the right flank of the army, also had the removal of the IX. and the 6th division of III. Corps from its not yet attacked center on the Petit Morin and sent these formations behind the IV Corps in the direction of Mareuil on the Ourcq. The British who were not yet in combat noticed the withdrawal of the German II Corps in front of their front until they joined the French 6th Army. General French forced von Joffre to supply the French 8th Division as a precondition for the resumption of the English advance on the next day.

The front on the Ourcq on September 6th

In the center, the heavily pressed German 2nd Army (Bülow) was able to repel all French attacks on September 6th. The attack of the 9th Corps under General Dubois at Sézanne - Concy failed, as did the action of the 42nd Infantry Division ( General Grossetti ) at Villeneuve-lès-Charleville due to the resistance of the German X. Army Corps under General von Emmich . On the left wing, the German Guard Corps under General von Plettenberg was able to continue its attack against the French 11th Corps under General Eydoux even on Fère-Champenoise . On the left wing of the Franchet d'Espèrey army, the French 3rd Corps (General Hache ) and his 6th Division (General Petain ) break the front at Saint-Bon and Montceaux-lès-Provins , while the 18th Corps ( Maud'huy ) with his 35th Division ( Marjoulet ) the advance of the cavalry corps under General Conneau in the direction of Marne on Château-Thierry followed.

7th of September

Colonel General Karl von Bülow

In the battle center, the French 5th Army between the Petit Morin and Fromentières achieved the first break-ins at the German X. Reserve Corps (General Johannes von Eben ) and the VII Army Corps (General Karl von Eine ). Further to the east, the French 4th Army ( Fernand Louis Langle de Cary ) opened the attack at Vitry-le-François on the seam between the opposing German 3rd and 4th Army. In this section, the troops fought with the French 9th and 4th Armies in the marshland of Saint-Gond and in the Vitry area on this and the following day with heavy use of artillery , without either side being able to gain decisive ground.

On the western side of the battle, General Joseph Gallieni reinforced the 6th Army with his reserve - the 7th Division (General Trentinian ) - which was brought to the Ourcq via Paris via Paris. With five men each, the so-called " Marnetaxis " brought a total of 6,000 men to the front in Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. This use of taxis was completely unimaginable for Germans, because horses were more important in the wars before; In addition, French automobile production in 1914 was significantly larger than German. In addition, General Joseph Maunoury was sent to the 61st Reserve Division as reinforcement at Dammartin-en-Goële .

In the evening General Kluck saw the French flank thrust on his northern flank repulsed and wanted to counterattack himself for the next day - after 80 kilometers on foot, his reinforcements appeared on the Ourcq by September 8th. In the center of the battle, Kluck's left wing - the III. Army Corps (General Lochow ) advancing near Courtacon and in the forest of Crécy-en-Brie - again in contact with the British troops advancing again. After Kluck had withdrawn strong forces to the right flank for two days, the 2nd Cavalry Corps (General Marwitz ) and only half of the III. Corps with the 5th Division (General Wichura ) almost isolated from the British at Rebais , which resulted in a gap in the front of 10 kilometers to the east over the next few days, which was caused by the simultaneous withdrawal of the heavily attacked right wing (Xth Reserve Corps) of the 2nd Army was dangerously expanded the next day.

This gap, about 30 kilometers wide, was only more veiled than covered by the cavalry corps under Manfred von Richthofen . The French 5th Army took advantage of the withdrawal of Kluck's infantry and broke in with the 18th and 3rd Corps on the right flank of the 2nd Army - the VII Army Corps - with the intention of cutting off its rear lines.

September 8th

Battle of the Marne on September 8, 1914 (eastern section)

In the morning Moltke decided to send his adjutant Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch to the armies again in order to gain an overview and to coordinate the actions. Hentsch began his journey with the 5th Army on the far left and then went to the 4th, 3rd and 2nd Army one after the other. He found the staff of 3rd Army almost completely weakened by dysentery or typhoid , but the situation here was good after a bayonet attack carried out the night before . The commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army, Colonel-General Karl von Bülow , at whose headquarters Champaubert Hentsch arrived that evening, assessed the situation quite differently . Bülow was not able to close the gap to the 1st Army with his right wing, rather he had withdrawn it to the north that day. As a result, the gap to the 1st Army that had already arisen as a result of Kluck's maneuvers had increased to 40 kilometers. Strong British and French forces advanced into the gap between the 1st and 2nd German Army around noon.

At the urging of General Joffres, the English had advanced 15 km to the north since the beginning of the day. General French crossed the Grand Morin with two corps at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and at Viels Maison ( Département Aisne ) and forced his advance to the Marne. The German Higher Cavalry Command 1 (von Richthofen) covering there to the east also had to decline as a result of the withdrawal of Bülow's right wing, which now created a dangerous gap in the front, and the Marne crossings between Dormans and Château-Thierry were reopened for the English.

The connection between the German front and the German front was torn, the danger of an operational breakthrough and the encirclement of the German armies increased hour by hour, there was a threat of cutting off German armies, and in the worst case even of encircling the entire German western army at the rear. In view of the situation, Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch, who was sent to the High Command of the 1st and 2nd Army, initially recommended the withdrawal order for the 2nd Army.

German withdrawal on September 9th

The battle climaxed on September 9, 1914
Overall situation on September 9, 1914
Alexander von Kluck

On the morning of September 9th, Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch appeared in Mareuil , at the headquarters of the 1st Army. He described the situation on the right wing of the Army in a very gloomy manner to the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, Major General Hermann von Kuhl , and referred to the complete isolation of the 1st Army through the initiated withdrawal of the 2nd Army. Colonel-General von Kluck was still confident that he wanted to attack the French 6th Army under General Maunoury decisively that day and to resume the advance on Paris. In the morning the IX. Army Corps ready after a long march on the right wing of the 1st Army on the Mareuil-sur-Ourcq - La Ferté-Milon line to encompass Maunoury's left wing at Nanteuil-le-Haudouin . General Ferdinand von Quast , in command here, reported that the opposing infantry was already on the way. The southern corps of the 1st Army were also able to repel all attempts to break through by the French 7th Corps (General Vautier ) on the line Nanteuil-le-Haudouin - Villers-Cotterêts - Bouchy-Saint-Genest on Silly-le-Long . In addition, the 43rd Reserve Brigade had been approaching Nanteuil-le-Haudouin from Belgium for four days and was already at Verberie . The 10th Landwehr Brigade followed and had already reached Ribécourt-Dreslincourt - both units successively reinforced the open flank of the 1st Army to the west, which had been additionally threatened for days by raids by the cavalry corps under General Bridoux.

Compared to the action of the English in the gap in the front at Château-Thierry, only the German 5th Cavalry Division secured that day , which had been reinforced in the evening by the Landwehr Brigade Kraewel and the 5th Division . Colonel-General Kluck discussed the dangerous situation of his army with his Chief of Staff, Kuhl, and was forced to stop all attacks between Crepy en Valois - La Ferte Milon and the upper reaches of the Ourcq. At about 2 p.m. he ordered the general withdrawal of his troops via Villiers-Cotterêts towards Soissons. On the Aisne, the connection with the 2nd Army, which had already returned there, was supposed to take place again, thereby closing the gap again. The Higher Cavalry Command 2 (General Georg von der Marwitz ) and the Kraewel Brigade covered the open left flank of the 1st Army in the area south of Compiègne . The X Reserve Corps ( Johannes von Eben ) and the 13th Division had to hold their southern positions between Champaubert and Mareuil to cover the retreat of the 2nd Army.

On the evening of September 9, the parts of the 2nd Army that had retreated first reached the Mareuil en Brie - Vertus line. On their left wing, the Xth Army Corps and the Guard Corps under General Plettenberg remained as rearguard until the end on the southern bank of the Marne to cover the retreat .

Chief of Staff Moltke wrote on that day: "It is going badly [...] The beginning of the war, which began so hopefully, will turn into the opposite [...] how different it was when we opened the campaign so brilliantly a few weeks ago [...] I'm afraid, our people in their enthusiasm for victory will hardly be able to bear the misfortune. "

September 10

The German Supreme Army Command also subordinated the 1st Army to the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army during the period of retreat, so Colonel-General Bülow was primarily responsible for building the new front north of the Aisne. The withdrawal was hasty, but largely orderly. During the day the marching troops of the 1st Army returned to the Aisne through the forest north of Villers Cotterets . The IV Army Corps ( Sixt von Armin ), returning to the right via Villers-Cotterêts, was to reach the area north of Juvigny with the 8th division , the 7th division the line south of Tartiers.

The German 4th Cavalry Division (General Otto von Garnier ) advanced north and secured the southern Aisne bridgeheads from Attichy to Soissons . The right flank going back via Compiègne was covered by the 43rd Reserve Infantry Brigade under General Lepel and the 11th Landwehr Brigade, the left flank of the 1st Army by the II Higher Cavalry Command (Marwitz). Under the protection of the divisions still south of the Aisne (from west to east - 7th , 8th , 3rd and 5th divisions ), the units that were retreating first were directed to the north bank of the Aisne in such a way that they were behind their division belonging to the corps unit came to a standstill: the 6th division came to the Crouy area, i.e. north of the 5th division standing with Billy, the 4th division went to Pasly, i.e. north of the 3rd infantry division standing near Saconin. The IX. Army Corps (General Quast) formed until the arrival of the IX. Reserve Corps at Noyon the extreme right wing of the 1st Army. The 17th division went back over the Aisne at Berneuil, the 18th division initially stayed south of the river. The Lepel Brigade of the IV Reserve Corps had to cover the French cavalry corps of General Bridoux at Compiègne to reach Nampcel. The IX. Army Corps (General Ferdinand von Quast ) followed behind and secured the Aisne crossing on both sides of Morsain.

On the evening of September 10th, enemy pressure against the right wing of the 2nd Army and also against the armies adjoining to the east was felt again. The 2nd Army stood with rear guards on the line Boursault - Moussy - Avize - southeast of Flavigny, while the advance guard of the X Reserve Corps - Pourcy, the X Army Corps - Sermiers, the 14th Division - Germaine and the Guard Corps die Line Tauxières - Mitry reached. The VII Army Corps (excluding the 14th Division) blocked the Marne crossings between Port à Binson and Jaulgonne and thus covered the right flank of the 2nd Army. The 3rd Army held the line Mourmelon le Petit - Francheville (southeast of Châlons) following the 2nd Army.

September 11

Ferdinand Foch

On September 11th, General Moltke himself went to the army headquarters and thereupon ordered the 4th and 5th Armies to join the retreat. The left wing of the 2nd Army remained south of the Marne, the rearguard of the Guard Corps (General Plettenberg) was initially left at Flavigny so as not to expose the right wing of the 3rd Army. At Dormans, the X. Reserve Corps (General Eben) was violently attacked by the left wing of the French 5th Army, the 18th Corps (General Maud'huy). The rearguards of the 2nd Army had moved to the north bank of the Marne at daybreak, but were supposed to keep the north bank occupied after the bridges were destroyed. In order to avoid the still threatening encirclement of their right wing (X. RK), the march back of the 2nd Army had to be hurriedly continued with the west wing strongly made. The 13th Division (General von dem Borne ) intended to be in contact with the 1st Army occupied the Vesle section between Braisne and Fismes. The 1st Cavalry Group (General von Richthofen ) covered the retreat of the right wing of the 2nd Army northeast of Épernay . The pursuing French 5th Army reached the line Fère en Tardenois - Verneuil - Épernay - Mareuil that evening.

The German 3rd Army still had the opportunity on September 11th to resume its own offensive, which after the passive behavior of the French 9th Army (General Ferdinand Foch ) seemed promising. In the evening, however, the radio message from Colonel General Bülow arrived, stating that the 2nd Army now intends to pull back all rear guards behind the Marne and that therefore the 3rd Army also had to march back in a north-easterly direction. The 3rd Army should initially go back to the line Mourmelon - Francheville (13 kilometers southeast of Châlons sur Marne), Colonel General Max von Hausen , the sick commander in chief of this army , was replaced by General of the Infantry Karl von Eine .

Consequences of the battle

The necessity of the withdrawal - especially that of the 1st Army - was later controversial, but today an opinion such as Holger Afflerbach formulated: “Operationally, the withdrawal order was correct and absolutely necessary, but its psychological effects were fatal. “The Schlieffen Plan had failed, the constriction of the French army on the eastern border (Lorraine and Alsace) had failed.

Joffre, still unsure of whether he had won the battle on September 10th, only let his strength be cautiously advanced. Although he became aware of the victory in the evening and now ordered an energetic pursuit, his troops were too weak and exhausted for this. So the Germans reached the Aisne on the 12th and occupied the strategically favorable heights. The battle of the Marne was over. In the subsequent Battle of the Aisne , the Allied attacks could be repulsed, but it was not possible to resume the offensive. From the search for an open flank of the respective opponent, the " race to the sea " developed, which found its bloody final in the First Battle of Flanders . The widely held Western Front froze in trench warfare , which for grave war developed.

Moltke was relieved of his post immediately after the Battle of the Marne on September 14th and replaced by Lieutenant General Erich von Falkenhayn , the previous Prussian Minister of War . Falkenhayn announced Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg on November 18, 1914 that the war had been lost for Germany due to the failure on the Marne and Ypres and in view of the opposing resources, and pleaded for a negotiated peace, but this was rejected.

Work-up

With the succinct message of September 13, 1914 ...

“In the western theater of war, operations, about which details cannot be published today, have led to a new battle which is favorable. The news that is unfavorable for us, spread by the enemy by all means, is false. "

... the Supreme Army Command concealed the outcome of the Battle of the Marne. An investigation of Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch's voyage, which the latter had carried out against himself in 1917, remained internal. The publicly perceptible reappraisal of the battle on the German side did not begin until after the end of the war in 1918. While military-historical critics primarily attributed responsibility to Moltke Völkisch-national circles to underpin their stab in the back legend also Hentsch in their sights.

The following mistakes are ascribed to those involved from the serious criticism:

  • Moltke did not have his armies under control because he was too far from the right wing at his headquarters in Luxembourg and, weakened by a gallbladder disease, had renounced personal visits to the army high command.
  • The dispatch of the two corps to the Eastern Front was unnecessary; these corps could have made a decisive contribution to strengthening the right flank.
  • In addition, the dispatch of Hentsch without a clear mandate, instead of convincing himself of the situation with the army commandos and making direct decisions, led to an unnecessary retreat and a victory was thus given away.
  • Hentsch himself are accused of exceeding his mandate and his competence as well as an overly pessimistic assessment of the situation.
  • Kluck's advance past Paris, as well as his subsequent solution, are held against Kluck by Bülow's 2nd Army, which led to the opening of the gap in the front.
  • Bülow is said to have adhered too rigidly to the principle of the closed front line and overestimated the danger posed by the invading English.

Depending on the author, the weighting of responsibility is shifted between the above factors. At the same time, other well-known authors take the view that the Schlieffen Plan on the Western Front could not be carried out with the available resources and that the errors in operational management were insignificant or inevitable against this background.

The German and English discussions hardly noticed how the French and British came to terms with the Battle of the Marne. There are some critical voices here that do not agree with the myth of the “miracle on the Marne”. Henri Mathias Berthelot in particular , head of planning under Joffre in the French General Staff, described the Battle of the Marne as a lost opportunity to crush the Germans. According to his presentation, his plan, approved by Joffre, to allow the German 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies to advance to the Seine and only then to encircle them by the simultaneous advance from Verdun and Paris, was nullified by Galliénis premature attack. Apart from such views, Joffres Ordre général No. 15 of September 12, 1914 a victoire incontestable (for example: undisputed / undisputed victory ). The term “miracle on the Marne” was coined in France only after the end of the war.

In England the presentation is even more sober. Reference is made to the decisive role of the BEF troops advancing into the gap, but otherwise the battle is not given any outstanding importance. Neither the standard work by John Keegan nor popular scientific works such as Great Military Battles and World War I use the term miracle in connection with the Battle of the Marne.

literature

Publications of the Reichsarchiv

The publications of the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam describe the battle in great detail, but are one-sided due to the temporal context and the history of the archive. Due to its destruction in April 1945, it is no longer possible to check the information there without further ado.

  • Thilo von Bose , Alfred Stenger: The Marne Drama 1914. 1st part . (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and edited on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 22.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928.
  • Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: The Marne Drama 1914. 2nd part. (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 23.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928.
  • Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 1st section of the 3rd part. (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 24.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928.
  • Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 2nd section of the 3rd part. The outcome of the battle . (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 25.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928.
  • Reinhold Dahlmann, Alfred Stenger: The battle before Paris. The Marne Drama 1914. 4th part. (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and edited on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 26.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928.
  • Reichsarchiv (Ed.): The World War 1914 to 1918 . Military operations on land . Volume 3: The Marne Campaign. From the Sambre to the Marne . Mittler , Berlin 1925.
  • Reichsarchiv: The Marne campaign - The battle. ES Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1926.

TV documentary

Web links

Commons : Battle of the Marne  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Gerhard Hirschfeld (Ed.): Encyclopedia First World War. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2003, ISBN 3-506-73913-1 , p. 697.
  2. ^ A b Spencer C. Tucker: Battles That Changed History. An Encyclopedia of World Conflict. ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara 2010, ISBN 9781598844290 , p. 401.
  3. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The First World War. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , p. 59 ff .; Jean-Jacques Becker, Gerd Krumeich: The great war. Germany and France 1914–1918 . Translated from the French by Marcel Küstner and Peter Böttner. Klartext-Verlag, Essen 2010, ISBN 978-3-8375-0171-1 , p. 209.
  4. ↑ www.wegedererinnerung-nordfrankreich.com .
  5. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , p. 59 ff .; Jean-Jacques Becker, Gerd Krumeich: The great war. Germany and France 1914–1918 . Translated from the French by Marcel Küstner and Peter Böttner. Klartext-Verlag, Essen 2010, ISBN 978-3-8375-0171-1 , p. 209.
  6. ^ General Friedrich von Bernhardi : Deutschlands Heldenkampf , Lehmann Verlag Munich 1922, pp. 51-71; Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf / Vienna / New York 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , p. 61 f .; Jean-Jacques Becker, Gerd Krumeich : The great war. Germany and France 1914–1918 . Translated from the French by Marcel Küstner and Peter Böttner. Klartext-Verlag, Essen 2010, ISBN 978-3-8375-0171-1 , p. 207 ff.
  7. ^ Reichsarchiv: The Marne campaign - the battle . ES Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1926, pp. 3-30.
  8. ↑ Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 1st part . (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 22.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 9 ff., Map 2 ("1., 2. and 3. Army am September 5 and 6, 1914 ").
  9. ^ Reichsarchiv Volume IV: The Marne Campaign, Mittler and Son, Berlin 1926, p. 27.
  10. ↑ John Keegan : The First World War. A European tragedy . Translated from the English by Karl and Heidi Nicolai. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag . Reinbek near Hamburg 2001. ISBN 3-499-61194-5 , pp. 169 f .; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: The Marne Drama 1914. 1st part . (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 22.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928. P. 16 ff., Supplement: Map 2 (“1., 2. and 3. Army on September 5 and 6, 1914 ”); Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 1st section of the 3rd part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and edited on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 24.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 5 ff .; Reinhold Dahlmann, Alfred Stenger: The battle before Paris. The Marne Drama 1914. 4th part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 26.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 12 ff., Supplement: map 1; Wolfgang Paul: Decision in September. The miracle on the Marne in 1914 . Bechtle Verlag, Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7628-0356-0 , S: 203 ff.
  11. ^ Reichsarchiv: Der Marnefeldzug - Die Schlacht , ES Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1926, p. 31 ff.
  12. ↑ Chemins de Mémoire . Text on the National Monument of the Marne Victory website.
  13. ^ Duff Cooper: Haig - A man and an epoch , Schlegel Verlag, Berlin 1936, p. 82.
  14. ^ Wolfgang Paul : Decision in September. The miracle on the Marne in 1914 . Bechtle Verlag, Munich 1974 (2nd edition 1976), ISBN 3-7628-0356-0 , p. 232 ff. [1] ; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: The Marne Drama 1914. 1st part . (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv . Volume 22.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 36 ff., Supplement: cards 2 to 12; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 1st section of the 3rd part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 24.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 17 ff. Supplement: cards 2 to 4; Reinhold Dahlmann, Alfred Stenger: The battle before Paris. The Marne Drama 1914. 4th part. (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 26.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 50 ff., Supplement: map 2.
  15. ↑ John Keegan: The First World War. A European tragedy . Translated from the English by Karl and Heidi Nicolai. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. Reinbek near Hamburg 2001. ISBN 3-499-61194-5 , p. 176.
  16. ↑ Critical to the myth of the Marne taxis, the article by John Lichfield: A history of the First World War in 100 moments: The legend of 'the taxis of the Marne' . ( online ). In: The Independent of April 11, 2014.
  17. ^ Arnd Krüger : A Horse Breeder's Perspective. Scientific Racism in Germany. 1870-1933. In: Norbert Finzsch , Dietmar Schirmer (Ed.): Identity and Intolerance. Nationalism, Racism, and Xenophobia in Germany and the United States. University Press Cambridge, Cambridge 1998, ISBN 0-521-59158-9 , pp. 371-396.
    Anita Kugler : From the workshop to the assembly line. Stages of early automobile production in Germany. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 13 (1987), pp. 304–339.
  18. ↑ Georges Blond: The Battle of the Marne . Zsolnay Verlag, Augsburg 1992, p. 247.
  19. ↑ Hermann Stegemann's History of War - Volume 1, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt Stuttgart 1917 p. 193.
  20. ↑ John Keegan: The First World War. A European tragedy . Translated from the English by Karl and Heidi Nicolai. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. Reinbek near Hamburg 2001. ISBN 3-499-61194-5 , p. 175; Wolfgang Paul: Decision in September. The miracle on the Marne in 1914 . Bechtle Verlag, Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7628-0356-0 , p. 273 ff .; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: The Marne Drama 1914. 2nd part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 23.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 5 ff., Supplement: cards 1, 3 to 5; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 1st section of the 3rd part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 24.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 75 ff., Supplement: cards 5 to 7.
  21. ^ Duff Cooper: General Haig - A man and an epoch, Schlegel Verlag, Berlin 1936, p. 81 ff.
  22. ↑ John Keegan: The First World War. A European tragedy . Translated from the English by Karl and Heidi Nicolai. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. Reinbek near Hamburg 2001. ISBN 3-499-61194-5 , p. 168 ff .; Holger Afflerbach: The military planning in the German Reich . S. 286. In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War. Effect - perception - analysis . Licensed edition for Seehamer Verlag GmbH, Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 ; Wolfgang Paul: Decision in September. The miracle on the Marne in 1914 . Bechtle Verlag, Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7628-0356-0 , p. 289 ff .; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: The Marne Drama 1914. 2nd part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and edited on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 23.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 85 ff., Supplement: cards 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 1st section of the 3rd part. (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 24.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 138 ff., Supplement: cards 8 to 10; Reinhold Dahlmann, Alfred Stenger: The battle before Paris. The Marne Drama 1914. 4th part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 26.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 186 ff., Supplement: map 4.
  23. ^ Reichsarchiv: The Marne campaign - the battle . ES Mittler Verlag Berlin 1926, p. 371.
  24. ↑ John Keegan: The First World War. A European tragedy . Translated from the English by Karl and Heidi Nicolai. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. Reinbek near Hamburg 2001. ISBN 3-499-61194-5 , p. 179 f .; Wolfgang Paul: Decision in September. The miracle on the Marne in 1914 . Bechtle Verlag, Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7628-0356-0 , p. 342 ff .; Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 2nd section of the 3rd part. The outcome of the battle . (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 25.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 5 ff., Supplement: cards 1 to 6; Reinhold Dahlmann, Alfred Stenger: The battle before Paris. The Marne Drama 1914. 4th part. (Battles of the World War. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 26.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 242 ff., Supplement: Map 5.
  25. ↑ Quoted from Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914 . 2nd edition, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , p. 776.
  26. ^ Thilo von Bose, Alfred Stenger: Das Marnedrama 1914. 2nd section of the 3rd part. The outcome of the battle . (Battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv. Volume 25.) Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 183 ff., Supplement: cards 1 and 2.
  27. ↑ Reinhold Dahlmann, Alfred Stenger: The battle before Paris. The Marne Drama 1914. 4th part (=  battles of the world war. Edited in individual representations and published on behalf of the Reichsarchiv . Vol. 26). Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg iO / Berlin 1928, p. 324 ff.
  28. ↑ Holger Afflerbach: The military planning in the German Empire. In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War. Effect - perception - analysis. Licensed edition for Seehamer Verlag, Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 , p. 286.
  29. ↑ Holger Afflerbach: The military planning in the German Empire. S. 286. In: Wolfgang Michalka (Ed.): The First World War. Effect - perception - analysis. Licensed edition for Seehamer Verlag GmbH, Weyarn 1997, ISBN 3-932131-37-1 ; Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krumeich and Irina Renz in connection with Markus Pöhlmann (Ed.): Encyclopedia First World War. Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn 2003, ISBN 3-506-73913-1 , pp. 468, 697 ff., 726; John Keegan: The First World War. A European tragedy. Translated from the English by Karl and Heidi Nicolai. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. Reinbek near Hamburg 2001. ISBN 3-499-61194-5 . P. 180 ff .; Fritz Fischer: War of Illusions. German politics from 1911–1914. 2nd edition, Düsseldorf 1970, ISBN 3-7700-0913-4 , pp. 779, 783.
  30. ↑ Germans completely exhausted. New representations of the Marne Battle of 1914 , review by Paul and Lange in Spiegel, No. 24, 1975 .
  31. ^ Karl-Heinz Janßen : Without powder smoke and fire. Die Zeit , May 13, 1977, accessed on September 25, 2014 .
  32. ↑ Heinz Höhne : Strange blindness. Der Spiegel , April 25, 1977, accessed September 25, 2014 .
  33. ↑ Sebastian Haffner, Wolfgang Venohr: The miracle on the Marne. Reconstruction of the decisive battle of the First World War. Luebbe, Bergisch Gladbach 1982, ISBN 3-7857-0314-7 .