First Battle of Flanders
Map of the battle
| date | October 20 to November 18, 1914 |
|---|---|
| place | Nieuwpoort to Ypres , Belgium |
| output | allied victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
John French |
Albrecht von Württemberg |
| Troop strength | |
| GB: 7 InfDiv., 3 KavDiv. FR: around 10 InfDiv., 3 CavDiv., BE: 6 InfDiv., 2 CavDiv. |
around 20 div. |
| losses | |
|
GB: approx. 58,000 |
over 100,000 dead, wounded and missing |
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The First Battle of Ypres or Battle of Ypres ( English First battle of Ypres , Dutch Eerste Slag om Ieper , French Première bataille d'Ypres ) found towards the end of the first phase of the First World War from October 20 to November 18, 1914 between German and Allied troops in Area of the Belgian Channel Coast in West Flanders. Despite severe loss of life, the intention of the German leadership to cut off the British Expeditionary Force from its supply lines by an attack by the 4th Army along the Channel coast could not be realized. The conflict is counted among the four battles of Flanders .
prehistory
The German Schlieffenplan, with the aim of taking Paris in one swift thrust and thus ending the war, failed on September 9 with the German retreat to the Aisne in the Battle of the Marne . The following race to the sea , in which the opponents tried to win each other's northern flank , had ended in a draw. In the course of this "race" the German III. Reserve Corps under General von Beseler took the fortress of Antwerp and pursued the Belgians to the Yser . On October 10 and 11, 1914, the transport of four newly formed reserve corps began on the German side via Brussels to Flanders.
General Erich von Falkenhayn , Chief of the German Army Command, decided to attack with five corps side by side between Nieuwpoort in the north and Ypres in the south. In mid-October, the German 4th Army under Colonel General Albrecht Herzog von Württemberg received the order with the newly subordinated III. Reserve Corps and its four own corps (a total of eleven divisions) on the right wing of the German Army via Nieuwpoort on Dunkirk and Calais , the supply ports of the British troops, to take these cities and then, following the Channel coast, to the south Turn towards the Somme .
Introductory battle on the Yser
After the conquest of the fortress of Antwerp, the III. Reserve Corps had the task of following the retreating Belgians and distracting them from the southern deployment of the 4th Army. The corps was subordinate to the 4th Army as a northern wing and pushed between the XXII. Reserve Corps entered the new front along the gap in the front from the Yser to the sea.
On October 17th, the 4th Replacement Division deployed on the coast pushed the Belgian 2nd Division back from Westende to Lombardsijde . For the attack on October 18, General von Beseler had assigned the 4th reserve division via Middelkerke to Nieuwpoort and the 5th reserve division to Mannekensvere. The 6th Reserve Division, which had previously failed in the attack on Dixmuide, was regrouped to Schoore and Keyem and was supposed to force the Yser crossing there. On October 18 and 19, the British fleet intervened effectively in the fighting at Westende and began bombarding the German replacement division advancing on Nieuwpoort, whose goal - the capture of the Furnes road junction - failed. Nevertheless, the planned breakthrough on Dunkirk continued to be pursued over the following days.
Two-sided deployment
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On the Yser and Ypres , after the operations in the Artois, there was still freely maneuverable terrain. In order to close this gap in the front, the Allied Commander-in-Chief on the northern sector, General Ferdinand Foch , deployed the newly established French Army Department Détachement d'armée de Belgique under General Victor d'Urbal . Between Dixmuiden and Ypres the 1st Cavalry Corps de Mitry , the XXXII. (General Humbert ) and XVI. Corps (General Taverna , from November 16, Grossetti), a total of 7 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions. The Belgians oppressed at Dixmuide were first reinforced by the French naval brigade under Admiral Ronarch , which was brought in via Dunkirk . The group of General Bidon (87th and 89th Territorial Divisions), who had previously been securing this area, was taken from the front line as insufficiently powerful and assembled behind it as a reserve. The Belgian field army (six divisions under General Wielemans ) was reinforced on the northern Yser section with the French 42nd Division under General Grossetti .
The main efforts of the Allies, however, were directed towards the newly formed front arc around Ypres, which they were able to occupy in good time and secure against German attack. By October 19, 1914, the majority of the British expeditionary corps under Field Marshal John French , brought in from the Soissons area, had taken up their new positions in the Ypres area. The area east of Ypres on the Zonnebeke line via Gheluvelt to Zillebeke was provisionally secured by the French IX. Corps (General Dubois ) and the newly landed British IV Corps (General Rawlinson with the 6th and 7th Divisions). The I. Corps (1st and 2nd Division) under General Douglas Haig arrived at Ypres via the Cassel railway line , and the III marched south of it. Corps (General Pulteney with 4th and 6th Divisions) on both sides from Armentières . East of Béthune , the 2nd Corps (General Smith-Dorrien with 3rd and 5th Divisions) had been fighting for a new front line in the La Bassée area since October 10th . On the evening of October 18, the 7th Division under Major General Capper advanced and secured Menin , the left wing of the IV. Corps, the 3rd Cavalry Division under General Byng , which was connected to the Cavalry Corps under General , which was concentrated at Messines Allenby made. The French 2nd Cavalry Corps under General Conneau then secured in the Fromelles area . It was not until the climax of the Battle of La Bassée that it was cleared on October 25th by the first Indian soldiers appearing at the front. The Lahore Division arriving first was combined with the Meerut Division, which arrived later, to form the Indian Corps under General Willcocks and replaced the II Corps at the Givenchy - Festubert - Neuve-Chapelle section .
The attack by the German 4th Army was initially to be supported by its left neighbor, the 6th Army . Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria was to push his northern wing from the Lille area to the north, ie into the rear of the Allied troops. The German 4th Army consisted only of reserve troops, which did not have the full training level and the level of equipment of active units and who were also faced with British professional soldiers. All forces were determined by the plan of the army, so it had no detailed structure and went on to attack without any noteworthy artillery support , which therefore suffered from considerable difficulties, some of which it had caused itself, from the start.
The assigned thrusts of the German 4th Army were:
- III. Reserve corps under General der Infanterie Hans von Beseler with 4th spare division and 5th and 6th reserve divisions in the north on Nieuwpoort
- XXII. Reserve Corps under General der Kavallerie Eugen von Falkenhayn with the 43rd and 44th Reserve Divisions on Dixmuiden
- XXIII. Reserve Corps under General of the Cavalry Georg von Kleist with the 45th and 46th Reserve Divisions on Bikschote (today part of Langemark-Poelkapelle)
- XXVI. Reserve Corps under General der Infanterie Otto von Hügel with the 51st and 52nd Reserve Divisions on Langemarck (now part of Langemark-Poelkapelle)
- XXVII. Reserve Corps under General der Infanterie Adolph von Carlowitz with the 53rd and 54th Reserve Divisions on Beselare (now part of Zonnebeke)
First phase October 20-30, 1914
The general attack on October 20, 1914
The high command of the 4th Army had moved its new headquarters to Tielt and determined despite the failure of the III. Reserve Corps October 20th for general attack. The left wing of the III. Reserve Corps should try again to cross the Yser at Keyem. The XXII. Reserve Corps (Falkenhayn) opened its attacks from the north and south on Dixmuide, which had already been considerably reinforced by the French Ronarch Brigade. General Dorrer's 44th Reserve Division ran aground at Vaerst and the Vladsloo Canal, and the 43rd Reserve Division advanced at least onto the Eessen-Kasteel line.
At about 9 o'clock in the morning the main attack of the three other corps followed on the line Staden - Ledeghem - Houthulster Wald - Poelkapelle - Gheluwelt . In the north was the XXIII. (Kleist), in the middle the XXVI. (Hill) and in the south the XXVII. Reserve Corps (Carlowitz) with 6 divisions against the Ypres section held by the French Corps de Mitry and the British I and IV Corps. During the attack in the direction of Noordschoote - Bixschoote on the northern edge of the Houthulster Forest, the 45th Reserve Division came across the insurmountable positions of the French. The 46th Reserve Division, advancing via Staden , was stuck on the eastern edge of the forest between Tolphoek and Vyswege, opposite units of the French IX. Corps firmly. The 51st Reserve Division succeeded in taking the village of Poelkapelle; however, it failed because of the resistance of the British 1st Division under General Lomax in the further action on Langemarck. The 52nd Reserve Division under General Waldorf , attacking via Passendale , pushed the British 2nd Division under General Monro back onto the Broodseinde - Zonnebeke line . In the south, the 53rd and 54th Reserve Divisions did not get beyond the Oesthoek-Becelaere line in battle with the British 7th Division (Capper). The right wing of the 6th Army had to support the Higher Cavalry Command under General von Hollen (3rd, 6th and 9th Cavalry Divisions), but met the British 3rd Cavalry Division under General Byng . The attack of the German cavalry in the direction of Messines on both sides of the Douve brook came only a little beyond Warneton until the afternoon, then the attack was halted in the increasing artillery fire of Allenby.
III. Reserve Corps - The Battle of the Yser
General von Beseler had completed his new deployments, and on October 21 the attack took place with the 5th and 6th Reserve Infantry Divisions and the 4th Replacement Divisions. The associations managed to reach the Yser Canal at various points; however, this could not be exceeded anywhere. For October 22nd, it was planned to push in the front loop parallel to the Yser Canal between Tervaete and Schoorbakke, to cross the Yser Canal and then to widen the opening to the left and right. In the course of the day the 6th Reserve Division managed to cross the canal at one point and to form a bridgehead , which could also be held. Since the 4th Replacement Division in the dunes was continuously exposed to the fire of English ship artillery and was heavily exposed here, the division was reduced by one brigade and this (9th Replacement Brigade) was placed behind the 5th Reserve Division.
On October 23, the 5th Reserve Division was also supposed to force the crossing over the Yser Canal, and also penetrated to the canal bank at various points, but then had to abandon the project without success. The 6th Reserve Division's bridgehead was in danger of being dented.
On the night of October 24, pioneers succeeded in building a pontoon bridge over the canal about 800 meters northeast of Tervaete , over which the bridgehead could be reinforced. The 5th Reserve Division had also crossed the canal in three places. The 6th Reserve Division succeeded in widening the bridgehead and taking the hamlet of Schoorbakke around noon. The Yser Canal had been crossed over a length of eight kilometers.
In the meantime, the army command had recognized that in the area of the four corps (XXII., XXIII., XXVI. And XXVII.) No successes could be achieved for the time being, and they concentrated entirely on the area of III. Reserve Corps. By the evening of October 25th, the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions were able to achieve some gains in the direction of Pervyse and Ramscapelle against bitter resistance. In order to take the key area around Pervyse, another attack was ordered for October 26th at 10:00 a.m.
The 6th Reserve Division was supposed to penetrate Pervyse on October 26th and thereby grab the opponent of the 44th Reserve Division standing to the left in the flank in order to take the pressure off the 44th Reserve Division. The 5th Reserve Division, reinforced by the 9th Replacement Brigade, swiveled to the right in the direction of Nieuwpoort. This attack was to be supported by the two brigades of the 4th Replacement Division by tying up enemy forces in front of Nieuwpoort.
At 3 p.m. the heads of the 5th Reserve Division reached the embankment at Ramscapelle. The 6th Reserve Division was still unsuccessful in front of Persvyse, whereupon the corps command ordered another attack. The 4th Replacement Division under General von Werder was meanwhile advancing along the coast against Nieuwpoort, but was unable to advance beyond the sea lock system.
Repeated attacks by the III. Reserve Corps had no measurable result on October 27th, 28th and 29th. The General Command of III. Reserve Corps ordered on October 29th that the target could be reached by the next day under all circumstances, which in the night of October 29th to 30th again resulted in heavy fighting between the two divisions and the 44th Reserve Division attached to the left . In the meantime, the Belgians had begun to use the Nieuwpoort sea locks to raise the water table in the disputed area. They opened the lock gates at high tide and closed them at low tide to keep the water in the land (the alleged blowing up of the lock gates is a legend. From a technical point of view, it would have been useless anyway, because the water that entered was always based on the ebb and flow principle expired again). In spite of the rising water level, the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions still managed to advance to Pervyse and Ramscapelle. After that, the water made it impossible to proceed further.
On October 31, at 1:00 am, the command of the corps was given the order to retreat. The struggle in this section was over. The German units had to retreat behind the Yser after the end of the battle . The French and Belgians held the line Nieuwpoort –Dixmuide – Houthoulster Wald – Langemarck– Beselare , the German lines were opposite them. The associations of the III. Reserve Corps were largely in their original positions on October 21. It was ordered to be in reserve for the second phase of the attack at Langemark and Bixschoote in the rear of the XXIII. and XXVI. To set up reserve corps.
XXII. Reserve Corps - Fight for Dixmuide
The XXII. Reserve Corps with its 43rd and 44th Reserve Divisions had received the order on October 20, south of the III. Reserve Corps together with this force at Dixmuide to cross the Yser . The main thrust was aimed at Dixmuide and was to be carried out by the 43rd Reserve Division. For this purpose, the division advanced in the evening with the Reserve Infantry Regiments 201, 202, 203 and the Reserve Jäger Battalion 15 to the village of Eessen, which is on the Ypres –Dixmuide – Cortemark railway about two kilometers east of Dixmuide. An incident that has not yet been resolved occurred here: After dark, a lively firefight suddenly broke out without anyone knowing who had triggered it and who was shooting whom. As a result, the church of Eessen burned down, and the Belgian troops launched an attack from Dixmuide, which was however repulsed.
As a result of inadequate clarification, it was only discovered on the morning of October 21 that the Belgian army had strongly fortified the city of Dixmuide and expanded it as a base. Nevertheless, the 43rd Reserve Division was assigned to the city itself from the east and south, and the 44th Reserve Division to the north of Dixmuide across the road to Berst and Keynem on the large Yser loop.
At 10 a.m. two regiments of the 43rd Reserve Division began the attack over an area about two kilometers deep, with little cover, which was made unusually difficult by hedges and watercourses. The connection between the troops was broken, attack columns came into strong machine gun fire and had to turn back. This created further confusion among those who only heard the gunfire but could not see anything. Despite these difficulties, parts of the division managed to advance to the southern outskirts of Dixmuide near the village of Woumen and to keep the embankment occupied.
At 2 p.m. infantry and fighters of the 43rd Reserve Division Dixmuide attacked again from the east, but were barely able to penetrate the heavily fortified city, so they had to be withdrawn in the evening. A night attack, scheduled around 7 p.m., only reached the embankment on the south-eastern outskirts of the city and ended at 10 p.m. in a real escape, which could only be stopped after three kilometers at Hoogmolen.
In the north of Dixmuide, however, the 44th Reserve Division had advanced over the railway embankment to just before the Yser Canal. The attack plan for October 23rd saw an advance of the 44th Reserve Division over the Yser and a support of the 6th Reserve Division from III. Reserve Corps, then the division was to attack Dixmuide from behind in a left turn.
The 43rd Reserve Division was to attack the city from the east and south. The 44th Reserve Division crossed the Yser Canal with its right wing and fought its way forward with the 6th Reserve Division, while the left wing of the division launched attacks on the city from the north. In the evening all attacks by the 43rd Reserve Division had failed and the regiments found themselves in their starting positions.
The General Command again ordered the city of Dixmuide to be captured by the 43rd Reserve Division on October 25th. The attack took place from 1 p.m. and was initiated by the now reinforced artillery, but had to be unsuccessfully stopped at 6 p.m. with great losses . At 7 p.m. there was another attack in which the foremost German troops (3rd and 4th Company Reserve Infantry Regiment 201) made their first attempt to reach the town's market square, where they were, however, wiped out. A second wave (3rd Battalion of the Reserve Infantry Regiment 202) was able to fight its way to the canal bridge of the Handzaeme Canal, but was forced to retreat that morning with great losses. Belgian counter-attacks against the hamlet of Eessen-Kappel were repulsed.
Renewed attacks on October 28 were unsuccessful, which is why the 4th Army High Command ordered the attacks to cease on October 29. Since the units of the corps had to withdraw from the area, which had meanwhile been submerged, they were back in their starting positions of October 20th on November 1st.
XXIII. Reserve Corps - fighting at Bixschoote-Nieucapelle
The XXIII. Corps had rallied with the 46th Reserve Infantry Division at Hooglede and the 45th Reserve Infantry Division at Cortemark in order to proceed from there against the Bixschote – Nieucapelle line.
The 45th Reserve Division attacked on October 21 in two columns north of the Houthulster Forest in the direction of the hamlets of St. Pieters and Nieuwe Stede. After fierce resistance, the two columns managed to advance to the Ypres – Dixmuide road by afternoon; however, they could not exceed this at any point. Parts of the division turned right to support the units of the 43rd Reserve Division before Dixmuide, the rest pursued the retreating English and were involved in heavy fighting in front of Merckem.
The 46th Reserve Division tried in vain all morning to take the village of Bixschoote, but was repeatedly thrown back with considerable losses. Only with the support of the corps reserve, the Reserve Infantry Regiment 211, was it possible to penetrate Bixschoote at 5.30 p.m. and even advance a little further in the direction of Steenstraate. Due to misunderstandings and unclear commands, the German troops withdrew from Bixschoote at nightfall. The village was reoccupied by the English that night.
On the same evening the corps command announced that heavy fighting was to be expected the next day and that the corps had to break through the Noordschoote – Bixschoote line. After days of unsuccessful attacks, an order was given on the evening of October 24th to secure the positions reached and to hold them under all circumstances.
XXVI. Reserve Corps - Battle of Langemarck
The corps and its two divisions were to attack on October 20 from 9:00 a.m. with a total of seven columns from Poelkapelle via Langemarck , three kilometers away , towards Steenstraat, Het Sas, Pilkem and Boezinge . At Ypres should thereby pass right and the city to the XXVII. Corps are left. Against strong infantry fire, the 51st Reserve Division reached Langemarck with its left wing and the hamlet of Mangelaare with its right wing, but had to return to its starting positions with heavy losses due to insufficient artillery support. The 52nd Reserve Division had two columns from Moorslede to target the road from Langemarck to Zonnebeke . The attack by the northern column got stuck on the Mosselmark – Fortuin road after gaining ground by about two kilometers. The southern column was able to achieve next to no gains in terrain; the bandages remained in strong shrapnel fire about 800 meters from Broodseinde .
On October 21, the corps' units received the order to dig in on the lines they had reached. Since folding spades were not yet part of the normal equipment and large bulwarks were not available on site, the execution of the order caused great difficulties.
On October 22nd, the corps command decided that a repeated frontal attack on Langemarck was impracticable with the forces available. The Army High Command agreed, but considered the capture of Langemarck indispensable and shifted the responsibility for this to another unit (XXIII Reserve Corps). After days of unsuccessful attacks, the order was issued on the evening of October 24th to secure the positions reached and to hold them under all circumstances.
XXVII. Reserve Corps - fighting at Becelaere
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On October 20th at 9:00 a.m. the 54th Reserve Division under General von Schaefer , which had gathered in the area west of Courtrai , was to advance in two columns southwest over Moorseele against Gheluvelt and Wevelghem to Menin . After reaching and passing through the hamlet of Terhand, the division's units remained in the strong defensive fire from Becelaere, ten kilometers from Ypres, at around 4 p.m. After Becaelere and the English posts had been shelled by German artillery, the place could be taken by the reserve infantry regiments 245 and 246. At that time, however, it was impossible to advance beyond the western edge of the town.
The 53rd Reserve Division under General von Watzdorf pushed towards the hamlet of Terhand and was initially supposed to support the troops of the 1st Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment fighting to the left near Koelberg. Due to irregularities in the transmission of orders, the 248 regiment suddenly found itself embroiled in the fighting for Becelaere. Overall, however, the division managed to hold the positions it had reached and to dig in between Bercelaere and Broodseinde in the evening.
The 54th Reserve Division had advanced north of the 53rd Division as far as the Hollebusch forest on October 21 and initially remained in the enemy defensive fire. After supporting artillery fire, parts of the division advanced against the hamlet of Reutel at 4 p.m. , but were immediately brought to a standstill by British machine gun fire and forced to turn back.
Overall, on the afternoon of October 21, the General Command of the XXVII. Reserve Corps orders to take Ypres that same day and advance to Dickebusch.
Despite multiple attempts to advance across the line reached, the attacks had to be stopped after heavy losses. On October 22nd, the General Command of the XXVII. Reserve Corps again launched the attack. To do this, the 53rd Division had to attack from Terhand via the Reutelbeek (Reutelbach) against Vieux-Chien south of Becelaere. This attack did not begin until 3 p.m. in pouring rain and was repulsed before reaching the specified destination. The demoralized associations withdrew to their original positions.
On October 24th, the units of the division received the order to take the hamlet of Reutel and the polygonal forest behind it, in order to give new impetus to the generally halting attack. The school-style attack began at 7:00 a.m. (two battalions of a regiment in a column, the third battalion behind as a reserve), which in turn led to great losses. After overcoming the first English line, the attack finally got stuck in the polygonal forest, and the attackers withdrew to the English trenches previously taken. The Reserve Infantry Regiment 244 recorded losses of 51 (of 57) officers and 1,881 (of 2,629) NCOs and men. After days of unsuccessful attacks, an order was given on the evening of October 24th to secure the positions reached and to hold them unconditionally. Some Landwehr formations were assigned to the corps as replacements .
Front gap between 4th and 6th Armies
In the approximately 30 kilometers wide gap between the left wing of the 4th Army and the right wing of the 6th Army, which was around Arras, La Bassée and Armentieres, there was only a veil of cavalry and a few hunter battalions under the until October 30th Command of the General of the Cavalry von der Marwitz. The task of these units was not to attack, but only to cover the gap in the front and maintain the connection between the 4th and 6th Armies. After the ever-increasing Anglo-French attacks in this area, the high command was forced to react and on October 25th put the Bavarian and 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions, reinforced by Jäger Battalions 4, 9 and 10 , to attack on the Kruiseik – Zandvoorde line. On October 26th, the hamlet of Kruiseik could be taken and by October 29th it had been possible to advance to Gheluvelt .
The end of the first phase of the battle thus brought an unsatisfactory result for the German side.
Second phase October 30 to November 3, 1914
In the meantime, the headquarters of the 4th Army had come to the conclusion that the goals set could not be achieved with the available forces. The from XXIII. Reserve corps achieved successes (advance to Bixschote) should be rounded off by a pincer movement from south to northwest and Ypres so encircled. A new army group was pushed into the gap in the front covered by the Marwitz cavalry corps. The main forces for this were provided by the 6th Army . These were the II. Bavarian Army Corps and the XV. Army Corps as well as the Royal Bavarian 6th Reserve Division and the 26th Division (1st Royal Württembergische) . The commander in chief of the army group was General of the Infantry Max von Fabeck .
October 30, 1914
The attack by the Fabeck group (all units of the 4th Army had to attack again in order to split up the enemy forces) began in the area from Messines to Gheluvelt. (The left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps should also be involved).
The 39th Infantry Division under General Hugo von Kathen succeeded in taking the village of Zandvoorde, parts of the 26th Infantry Division penetrated Wambeke and the Division's 51st Infantry Brigade was able to advance until shortly before Messines. That in the area of the XXVII. Reserve corps village Gheluvelt could not initially be captured.
October 31, 1914
There was an attack by the 54th Reserve Division and the 30th Infantry Division on Gheluvelt, which was successfully completed around 3:00 p.m.
During this time the II. (Bavarian) Army Corps and the 6th (Bavarian) Reserve Division fought for the ridge of Wytschaete– Messines on the Wytschaete-Bogen . The fight continued all night; After hours of house-to-house fighting , Wytschaete ( Wijtschate ) was taken around 5:00 a.m. after a counterattack by the French XVI. Army corps had to give up the place and the ridge again.
The same morning at 10:30 am, the 26th Infantry Division attacked Messines and was able to capture half of the village by the end of the day. The front ran right through the town.
November 1, 1914
In the afternoon Bavarian troops succeeded again in penetrating Wytschaete. Again they were pushed back by a counterattack. The house-to-house fighting in Messines continued.
November 2, 1914
In the morning the (Bavarian) 6th Reserve Division attacked Wytschaete again and was able to penetrate the village. With the help of the 3rd Infantry Division, the village was reported as captured at 5:00 p.m.
Third phase November 3 to 18, 1914
November 3, 1914
After the 4th Army had regrouped its units (the flooded area between Dixmuide and the sea no longer needed to be taken into account and was used to observe and secure the 38th Landwehr Brigade, the 4th Replacement Division and parts of the 43rd Reserve Division assigned), new attacks of the XXIII. Reserve Corps in the Noordschote – Bixschote area, the III. Reserve Corps in the section on both sides of Langemark and the XXVI. and XXVII. Reserve corps in the Poelkapelle – Gheluvelt area.
On November 3, troops of the XV. Corps Veldhoek, and on November 4th General von Deimling had the famous medieval cloth halls of Ypres under artillery fire against the express instructions of the Commander in Chief of the 6th Army . By November 10, the German troops had worked their way up to the outskirts of Langemark and Bixschote, but no further success was recorded.
November 10, 1914
At midnight the new attack by the 43rd Reserve Division with the Reserve Infantry Regiments 201, 202 and the Reserve Jäger Battalion 15 began on Dixmuide. In order not to be outflanked and cut off, the last French navy fusiliers and infantrymen evacuated the place after nineteen hours of bitter house-to-house fighting at nightfall. 1,417 English and French soldiers were captured in and around Dixmuide that day. On the German side, the Reserve Infantry Regiment 201 and 202 as well as the Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 15 lost a total of 206 dead, 241 wounded and 102 missing. On this day the so-called attack "young regiments west of Langemarck" took place, which, taken up by the Army Report on November 11th and highlighted, was to form the origin of the Langemarck myth : The 45th and 46th Reserve Divisions of the XXIII. Reserve Corps and the III. The 44th Reserve Division, subordinate to the Reserve Corps, was able to penetrate almost four kilometers wide, reach the Yser Canal with parts and bring in French prisoners. However, the III. Reserve Corps failed to capture Langemark. Especially the III. Reserve Corps subordinate 9th Reserve Division had suffered heavy losses and lost over 2,000 men.
November 11, 1914
The previous Fabeck group was split and the Linsingen group was formed in the northern area . The latter were subordinate to the XV between Klein-Zillebeke and Gheluvelt . Army Corps under General von Deimling with the 30th and 39th Divisions as well as the newly introduced Corps Plettenberg with the 4th Division and the 2nd Guard Division .
The Fabeck group was assigned the attack section southwest of the canal leading from Comines to Ypres. In the area of the village of Hollebeke, the 2nd Bavarian Corps ( Otto von Stetten ) attacked with the Bavarian 3rd and 4th Divisions . In the center of the Fabeck group near Wytschaete, the Gerok group carried out the main attack on St. Eloi with the Bavarian 6th Reserve Division and the 25th Reserve Division . South of Wytschaete to Messines, the Urach group attacked with the 3rd division and the 26th division .
The 30th Division , assigned to the Linsingen group , succeeded in conquering the "Höhe 60" ridge , which was part of a flat range of hills in a semicircle east of Ypres between Zwarteleen and Zandvoorde , on November 11th . As long meters from about 230 and was easy to overlook from the space between Ypres and Zillebeke about 46 m high hill, the field for both attackers and defenders in came trench warfare a strategically important role. The Linsingen group also tried to attack the extensive forests around Schloss Hooge with mass between the canal and Gheluvelt. Against the bitter resistance of the British 1st Corps, no breakthrough could be forced here until November 17th. The attack of the southern group Fabeck against the French XVI. Corps in the direction of the Kemmelberg only advanced about a kilometer. All further efforts only led to the front bulging of the now forming Wytschaete arch.
End of battle
On November 18, Army High Command 6 received the long-announced order to release stronger troops for use on the Eastern Front, where the battle of Łódź had begun a week earlier . In detail these were the 26th Division with the General Command XIII. Army Corps, the General Command II. Army Corps with the 3rd and 4th Divisions, the Bavarian 6th Reserve Division, the 25th Reserve Division and the 48th Reserve Division with the General Command XXIV. Reserve Corps.
In the order, unspoken but inevitable, was the decision to suspend all offensive operations in the Ypres area and thus also on the western front as a whole. A return of the surrendered troops was not expected until a few months at the earliest. The exhausted German troops, weakened by numerous failures, which also received insufficient artillery support due to a lack of ammunition supplies, could only fight with the prospect of holding the land they had won.
backgrounds
There were already glaring material bottlenecks when the new German troops were set up. Above all, there was a lack of shoes, uniforms, rifles, saddles and harnesses for the artillery. Even food and food for the horses were scarce. Then there was the hasty training of a maximum of eight weeks for the infantrymen. Adequate artillery training was even less guaranteed. The Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 46 received equipment, the directional means of which the reservists were not aware of. For this purpose, an exercise was not carried out until September 28, during which the ammunition columns had to be left behind because there were not enough harnesses available. On October 8, 1914, there was only one single sharp shot before the regiment was loaded to the front on October 10. As a result, the artillerymen were unable to fire from a concealed position and had to aim roughly over the barrel.
There were also weaknesses in the officer corps. The active service of the deployed Landwehr officers was many years ago; these troop leaders were for the most part no longer able to cope with modern requirements. There were even officers who had served in the war of 1870/71 and only knew the old column tactics. Many of the aged Landwehr officers were no longer able to cope with the exertion. Quite a number of them were granted sick leave, parting or other use because of mental overexertion - a way out that was usually out of the question for teams.
For example, they were relieved within a regiment for these reasons:
- on October 22nd the regiment commander Reserve Infantry Regiment 208,
- on October 23, the battalion commander of the 1st / Reserves Infantry Regiment 208,
- on October 25th the battalion commander III./Reserve-Infanterie-Regiment 208,
- On October 26th, the battalion commander II./Reserve- Infantry Regiment 208.
These circumstances led to the well-known result in the end.
Result
The "race to the sea" was over and both sides had been able to move enough troops in time; the respective losses were correspondingly high. Now it was no longer possible for either side to break through the enemy lines. The war continued in an extremely grueling trench war until almost the end .
The World War II work in the Reichsarchiv shows that there are only incomplete information on losses for the First Battle of Flanders, which lasted around a month. According to this, the two German armies involved, the 4th and 6th Armies, lost at least 100,000 men during this period.
Langemarck myth
Main article: Myth of Langemarck
This first great battle of Flanders became known primarily because the four reserve corps of the German 4th Army are said to have consisted to a large extent of voluntary high school graduates , students, apprentices, etc. However, this is not true.
The four army corps did not consist of up to 75 percent of schoolchildren, teachers and students, as often stated, since this would not have been possible in purely numerical terms. The statistical yearbook for the German Reich indicates a total of 40,761 students as being in military service for the summer semester 1914 and the winter semester 1914/15. With an actual strength of the four army corps of 120,000 men, all German students should have concentrated here in order to finally reach a share of 30 percent. The regiments actually consisted for the most part of reserve reservists, land soldiers, volunteers, reservists and a few active soldiers.
As an example, the Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 211 gives as personnel:
- 166 active soldiers
- 299 reservists
- 970 volunteers (certainly not all of whom were students or pupils)
- 1499 soldiers
- 1 reserve reservist
The Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 244 states that seven percent of 2,883 men had a one-year volunteer certificate and that a third of them were students, bringing the total to 66 students.
Another example is the 1000-strong Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 26 from Freiberg , which is said to have been formed mainly from the students of the Freiberg Mining Academy - but according to the Statistical Yearbook 1914/15 there were only 160 military service members here Students.
Subsequent reports that the young regiments took action against the enemy at Langemark while singing the Deutschlandlied are vehemently defended up to the present day, but could never be proven and must be rejected as unrealistic. The proponents of the theory claim that some groups may have tried to maintain their cohesion in the thick fog by singing or to avoid their own fire , although this action is incomprehensible, both in view of the extremely adverse circumstances described above and in practical terms. (The artillery standing three to four kilometers further back cannot hear it.) Singing in columns without stepping is already an impossibility on the street; in a loamy field, under fire, but completely impossible if thrown down continuously.
The corps , which were hurriedly deployed without adequate training and with inadequate equipment and leadership, and were thrown to the front, suffered devastating losses near Ypres . Thousands of soldiers fell who had only come to the front as briefly trained recruits at the end of October. In order to cover up their failure on this section of the front, the German leadership later invented the alleged sacrifice of the German youth, knowing full well that this was not the truth. The "Myth of Langemarck" was based almost exclusively on the communication in the German army report about an attack by "young regiments [of the XXIII. Reserve Corps "west of Langemarck" on November 10, 1914. At this point in time the failure of the German attempt at breakthrough at Ypres had already become obvious. That is why they felt compelled to disguise their failure in public with a heroic epic. Especially during the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, the narrative was politically instrumentalized, stylized and repeated until it was finally accepted as a fact. The German national myth of Langemarck as well as the invented story of the "singing regiments" has its followers to this day.
Deployed forces (German Reich)
| XXII. Reserve Corps - KG : General of the cavalry Eugen von Falkenhayn | XXIII. Reserve Corps - KG: General of the cavalry Georg von Kleist |
XXVI. Reserve Corps - KG: Kgl. Württ. General of the Infantry Otto Freiherr von Hügel |
XXVII. Reserve Corps (II. Royal Saxon) - KG: Kgl. Saxon. General of the Infantry Adolph von Carlowitz | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Divisions | ||||
|
43rd Reserve Division Kdr .: Genlt. from Hoffmann |
45th Reserve Division Kdr.:Gen. Ladle |
51st Reserve Division Kdr .: Genlt. Waenker from Dankenschweil |
53rd Reserve Division (3rd Royal Saxon) Kdr .: Kgl. Saxon. Genlt. Hans von Watzdorf |
|
| Regiments and battalions | ||||
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 201 ( Berlin and Potsdam ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 209 ( Frankfurt (Oder) ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 233 ( Stettin ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 241 (Dresden) | |
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 202 (Berlin) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 210 ( Brandenburg ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 234 ( Kassel - Göttingen ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 242 (Bautzen) | |
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 203 ( Spandau ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 211 ( Stargard iP ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 235 ( Koblenz ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 243 ( Zwickau - Plauen ) | |
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 204 (Berlin and Potsdam) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 212 ( Altona ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 236 ( Cologne ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 244 ( Chemnitz - Döbeln ) | |
| Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 15 (Potsdam) | Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 17 ( Lübben ) | Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 23 ( Goslar ) | Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 25 (Dresden) | |
| Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 43 ( Jüterbog ) | Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 45 ( Belgard - Kolberg ) | Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 51 (Kassel) | Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 53 | |
| Divisions | ||||
|
44th Reserve Division Kdr.:Kgl.Württ. Genlt. from Dorrer |
46th Reserve Division Kdr .: Genlt. Rooster |
52nd Reserve Division Kdr .: Genlt. Waldorf |
54th Reserve Division Kdr .: Kgl. Württ. General of the Infantry zD Paul von Schaefer |
|
| Regiments and battalions | ||||
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 205 ( Frankfurt (Oder) ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 213 ( Rendsburg ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 237 ( Trier ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 245 ( Leipzig ) | |
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 206 ( Brandenburg ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 214 ( Rostock ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 238 (Neustadt) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 246 ( Stuttgart - Ulm ) | |
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 207 ( Prenzlau ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 215 ( Lübeck ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 239 ( Mannheim ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 247 ( Ulm ) | |
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 208 ( Hanover ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 216 ( Osnabrück ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 240 ( Rastatt ) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 248 ( Ludwigsburg - Heilbronn - Zuffenhausen ) | |
| Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 16 ( Berlin-Lichterfelde ) | Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 18 ( Ratzeburg ) | Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 24 ( Marburg ) | Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 26 (Freiberg) | |
| Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 44 (Brandenburg) | Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 46 ( Güstrow ) | Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 52 (Karlsruhe) | Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 54 | |
| Assigned to 4th Army: | ||||
| III. Reserve Corps - KG: General of the Infantry Hans von Beseler | Kgl. bay. 6th Reserve Division - Kdr .: Kgl. Bay. General of the cavalry Maximilian von Speidel (from the end of October under the 6th Army, Fabeck Group) | |||
| Divisions | ||||
| 5th Reserve Division Kdr .: Genlt. Voigt | 6th Reserve Division - Kdr .: Genlt. Schickfuß zu Neudorf | |||
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 8 ( Landsberg aW / Frankfurt (Oder)) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 20 (Potsdam-Spandau-Berlin) | Kgl.bay. 16th Reserve Infantry Regiment (Munich) | ||
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 48 (Küstrin-Woldenberg-Angermünde) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 24 (Neuruppin / Prenzlau) | Kgl.bay. 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment (Augsburg) | ||
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 12 (Calau-Perleberg-Berlin) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 26 (Magdeburg-Stendal-Burg) | Kgl.bay. 20th Reserve Infantry Regiment (Nuremberg) | ||
| Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 52 (Cottbus-Crossen-Guben) | Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 35 (Brandenburg-Jüterbog) | Kgl.bay. 21st Reserve Infantry Regiment (Fürth) | ||
| Reserve Dragoon Regiment No. 2 | Reserve Uhlan Regiment No. 3 | Kgl.bay. 6th Reserve Cavalry Regiment | ||
| Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 5 | Reserve Field Artillery Regiment No. 6 | Kgl.bay. 6th Reserve Foot Artillery Battalion | ||
| Reserve Jäger Battalion No. 3 ( Lübben ) | ||||
See also
- Second Battle of Flanders (from April 22nd to May 25th 1915)
- Third Battle of Flanders (from July 31st to November 6th, 1917)
- Fourth Battle of Flanders (from March 18 to April 29, 1918)
literature
- Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914 to 1918 . Volume 5: The autumn campaign of 1914: in the west up to trench warfare, in the east up to retreat ; Volume 6: The autumn campaign of 1914: the conclusion of the operations in the west and east . Berlin 1929.
- Rudolf G. Binding: From the war . 1919.
- Alfred Grill: The Saxon Reserve Infantry Regiment 241 in the World War 1914–1918: War memories of a troop doctor . w. Limpert, Dresden 1922.
- Reichsarchiv: Battles of World War Volume 10 -YPERN 1914- . Oldenburg 1925.
- Karl Unruh: Langemarck - Legend and Reality . Bernard & Graefe, Koblenz 1986, ISBN 3-7637-5469-5 .
- Martin Gilbert: The Routledge Atlas of the First World War . 2nd Edition. Routledge, 2002, ISBN 0-415-28508-9 .
- Anthony H. Farrar-Hockley: Death of an Army . Barker, London 1967.
- Ian Beckett: Ypres: The First Battle 1914. Routledge, 2013, ISBN 978-1-4058-3620-3 .
References and comments
- ↑ The World War from 1914 to 1918. Volume 5, p. 401; Volume 6, p. 25, Berlin 1929.
- ^ Reichsarchiv: The World War 1914-1918, Volume 5, p. 302.
- ^ Reichsarchiv Volume 10, p. 111.
- ↑ Fallen, wounded and missing persons resp. captive
- ↑ Since these were certainly not all from the Freiberg area, a large number of them will have reported to military units close to their home - which means that the number of students in this battalion is considerably lower.
- ↑ The Reichsarchiv Volume 10 “Ypres” from 1923, on which this article is largely based, nowhere mentions a song, which is why this thesis is contradicted here
- ↑ A large number of the officers belonged to the Landwehr, many of whom had even taken part in the war of 1870/71
