Battle of St. Mihiel

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Battle of St. Mihiel
Part of: First World War
U.S. forces return from battle (September 1918)
U.S. forces return from battle (September 1918)
date September 12. bis 15. September 1918
place Saint-Mihiel in the Meuse department ,
France
output Allied victory
Parties to the conflict

United States 48United States United States of France
Third French RepublicThird French Republic 

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire Austria-Hungary
Austria-HungaryAustria-Hungary 

Commander

United States 48United States John J. Pershing Hunter Liggett George H. Cameron Ernest Blondlat
United States 48United States
United States 48United States
Third French RepublicThird French Republic

German EmpireThe German Imperium Georg von Marwitz Georg Fuchs Eduard von Below Georg von Gayl Ludwig Goiginger
German EmpireThe German Imperium
German EmpireThe German Imperium
German EmpireThe German Imperium
Austria-HungaryAustria-Hungary

Troop strength
1st US Army with 9 US divisions and 4 subordinate French divisions,
a total of 660,000 men
3,000 guns
400 tanks
1,400 aircraft
8 divisions of Army Group Gallwitz,
35th kuk division
losses

4,500 killed,
2,500 wounded

2,000 killed,
5,500 wounded,
approx.15,000 prisoners,
approx. 450 guns

The Battle of St. Mihiel was a battle of the First World War that took place from September 12 to 15, 1918 on the strategically important promontory at Saint-Mihiel , which had been held by the German side for years . The American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), reinforced by French troops, under the joint command of John Pershing and the German Army Division C inside the front arc, were involved.

The attack on St. Mihiel was the first independent action by the American expeditionary force in World War I. The newly founded United States Army Air Service , which held air sovereignty from the beginning , played a significant role in the battle , as did the massive use of tanks .

background

The attack was part of a larger Pershing plan of operations. He intended to disconnect the "Arch of St. Mihiel" named after the small town on the Meuse and to break through the German lines to the city of Metz . For four years the French had tried in vain.

Before the Battle of St. Mihiel, US troops were deployed in scattered locations along the front lines in support of the Allies during the German offensives of 1918 , most recently in the Second Battle of the Marne in July. On August 10, the headquarters of the 1st US Army were activated. On August 30, they took command of the front section from Port-sur-Seille east of the Moselle to Watronville , 11 kilometers southeast of Verdun .

At the conference of the Allied Supreme War Council in Bombon on July 24th the offensive against the promontory had been decided. Pershing's 1st US Army was subordinated to the 2nd French Colonial Corps, in addition to its own three corps. At another meeting in August, Pershing was instructed by Foch , the Allied commander-in-chief, to limit his offensive to clearing up the promontory, as a capture of the strong fortress Metz appeared unlikely and his troops would later be used elsewhere.

Pershing's plan of attack

Pershing's main attack was directed against the southern front of the arch and was to be led by two American corps between Apremont and Pont-à-Mousson . On the right wing was the 1st US Corps (from right to left with the 82nd, 90th, 5th , and 2nd Divisions in front and the 78th Division in reserve) between Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle set to the west except for Limey . As an operational target, the commanding General Hunter Liggett was assigned the main attack west of the Priest Forest (Bois le Prêtre) in the direction of Thiaucourt . On the left wing, the 4th US Corps (from right to left with the 89th , 42nd and 1st Divisions , as well as the 3rd Division as reserves) had to break through the German front on the line Limey - Seicheprey to Marvoisin , The aim of the corps commander, General Joseph T. Dickman, was to reach the Yron section at Vigneulles-lès-Hattonchâtel in order to establish communication with the V Corps, which was set up in the west of the front arch.

Major General George H. Cameron, Commanding General of the United States V Corps

The 5th US Corps under Major General George Cameron on the western front of the front arc had to deploy its 4th Division (Major General Hines ) on the left wing against Fresnes and the Combres-Höhe, in the center the French 15th Colonial Division led its thrust against the Meuse - Heights at Les Esparges, while the 26th Division under Major General Clarence R. Edwards was to force the breakthrough to the southeast on Vigneulles. The 8th US Brigade adjoining it on the right reinforced the ranks of the French 2nd Cavalry Division, which stood to the south and remained defensive in order to attract the German forces. Upstream to the southwest, the French 2nd Colonial Corps under General Ernest Blondlat also had to remain in defense, but should try to hold the German forces on both sides of St. Mihiel. On the right the 39th Colonial Division was concentrated in front of St. Mihiel, the French 26th Division under General Jean de Belenet maintained the connection to the neighboring IVth US Corps on the southern front of the front arch. General Pershing had three other divisions, the 35th, 80th and 91st, as army reserves.

The Americans mobilized aircraft under General William Mitchell for the attack section 1481 and thus enforced their complete air superiority. A total of 419 tanks were drawn together for the ground battle. The 1st and 3rd US tank brigades under Colonel George S. Patton and Daniel D. Pullen of the AEF tank corps were formed by 144 French Renault FT and were trained for the attack in Bourg under the command of Brigade General Samuel D. Rockenbach been. The 344th and 345th Battalions were part of the IV Corps and operated on Thiaucourt. The attack was reinforced with 275 tanks (216 Renauld FT and 35 Schneider CA1 and 24 medium St. Chamond ), but they remained under the direction of the French Brigadier General Estienne and Lieutenant-Colonel Chanoine .

German defense

General of the Infantry Georg Fuchs

The German defense in the front arch was incumbent on Army Department C under Lieutenant General Georg Fuchs , consisting of eight divisions and a brigade in the front, as well as three divisions in reserve.

The " Group Combres " (General Command VAK under General of the Infantry Eduard von Below ) lying in the west on the Maas Heights between Fresnes and Seuzey were the 8th and 13th Landwehr Divisions , the kuk 35th Infantry Troop Division , and behind them Subordinate to the 88th Division as a reserve .

The " Group Mihiel " (General Command XII. (Royal Saxon) Reserve Corps ), advanced in the frontal promontory to the southwest near St. Mihiel, was under the command of Lieutenant General Max Leuthold , with the 5th Landwehr Division and 192nd Division in the front , placed under the 31st Division as a corps reserve.

The General Command 57 under Lieutenant General von Hartz had the XXXVIII on May 8, 1918 . Reserve Corps replaced as " Gruppe Gorze ", it held the eastern part of the front arc and the hinterland up to the Moselle, subordinated to it were the 10th Division , the 77th Reserve Division and the 255th Division on both sides of the Moselle . The 107th and 123rd divisions acted as army reserves behind at the so-called "Michael position" .

course

Sketch of the battle
The combat area of ​​the kuk 35th Infantry Division in the section of the "Corps Group Combres" (General Command VAK )

The attack began at 5:00 a.m. on September 12th after four hours of heavy preparatory fire. He met the German troops in the middle of the preparations for the so-called Loki movement , the already ordered backward movement on the tendon position of the front arch. The imminent attack had been correctly foreseen by General von Gallwitz , the commander-in-chief of the superior army group. The dismantling of the German artillery on the southern front of the front arc, which was already under way due to the planned rearward shift, prevented effective combat against the strong American tank units. The Americans thus enjoyed an extraordinary and rapid success. The section of the German 77th Reserve Division between Richecourt to Regnieville was pierced by strong infantry and armored forces and the division, in which many Lorraine people also fought, was completely destroyed in the attack.

In the western arc of the front, the 13th Landwehr Division under General von Gayl lost the strategically important Combres height on the Woëvre plain, but was regained for a short time by a counter-attack quickly. In the meantime, however, the front of the kuk 35th Infantry Division (Major General Gustav Funk) collapsed completely after the return of the 192nd Division, which was mining at Seuzy, and they lost around 3,300 men that day alone. Nevertheless, the Allied attack on the western front of the front arch came to a halt for the time being; the positions there were held by the Germans until noon. From the west, the V US Corps with the 26th Division and the French 15th Colonial Division assigned to it finally overran the entire main battle line of the "Group Combres". Around noon, after the complete collapse of his southern front, Lieutenant General von Fuchs had to order an immediate retreat to the "Michael position". German war historians later criticized him for having used up his only powerful army reserve, the 123rd Division, in counter-attacks, contrary to the instructions of the Supreme Army Command.

On the morning of September 13, from south could Lahayville bumping and Nonsart north US 1st Division under Major General Charles P. Summerall with extensive from the west 26 Division under Major General Clarence R. Edwards in space Vigneulles gain connection and the Germans cut off the retreat. At the end of the second day, the American troops captured a large part of the German "Group Mihiel". The small town of St. Mihiel, including the fiercely contested Fort du Camp des Romains in September 1914, was taken almost without a fight by French colonial troops under General Blondlat. The French had insisted on taking the city on this section of the front in view of the high blood toll they had suffered in previous years. The American attack finally stalled in front of the Michael position prepared by the Germans after the Allies were out of range of their artillery and supplies stalled.

consequences

President Poincaré visits Saint Mihiel (October 1918)

The Battle of St. Mihiel raised the United States' reputation with its allies France and Great Britain . It again showed the outstanding importance of artillery during the First World War and the difficulties of supplying large units in the movement. The American troops were after the battle in preparation for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive , which should start before the end of the month in the Argonne laid. An advance on Metz planned for November 15, 1918 was not carried out by the 2nd US Army , because on November 11 the war was over.

"Open attack at St. Mihiel" (Jonas, 1927)

Trivia

In the run-up to the Battle of St. Mihiel, the US armed forces used the terms D-Day and H-Hour for operational tactical times for the first time .

literature

  • Mark Ethan Grotelueschen: The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. Cambridge University Press, 2006, ISBN 0-521-86434-8 .
  • James H. Hallas: Squandered Victory: The American First Army at St. Mihiel. Praeger Publishers, 1995, ISBN 978-0-275-95022-4 . limited preview in Google Book Search - USA
  • Maurer Maurer: The US Air Service in World War I, Volume III: The Battle of St. Mihiel. Office of Air Force History, Washington DC
  • Anne Venzon (Ed.): The United States in the First World War: An Encyclopedia. Garland Publishing, 1999, ISBN 0-8153-3353-6 .

Web links

Commons : Battle of St. Mihiel  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. Mark Ethan Grotelüschen: The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. Cambridge University Press, 2006. S. 109th
  2. ^ Alan Palmer: Victory 1918. Grove Press, 2001. p. 209.
  3. ^ William R. Griffiths: The Great War: Strategies & Tactics of the First World War. Square One Publishers, 2003, p. 161.
  4. ^ Donn A. Starry, Dale E. Wilson: Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of US Armored Forces. The University Press of Kentucky, 1999, p. 11 f.
  5. ^ Reichsarchiv : The World War 1914-1918, Volume XIV. ES Mittler & Sohn , Berlin 1944, p. 600.
  6. Major General Funk led the kuk 35. ID on behalf of FML Eugen von Podhoransky.
  7. ^ Vienna War Archives : Austria-Hungary's Last War, Volume VII. Vienna 1938, p. 435.
  8. Christine Ammer: Fighting words: from war, rebellion, and other combative capers. Paragon House, 1989, p. 78.