Meuse-Argonne offensive
Map of the battle
| date | September 26 to November 11, 1918 |
|---|---|
| place | Verdun sector north of Verdun |
| output | Cessation of the offensive at the end of the war |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
 Expeditionary Forces 4th Army 5th Army total approx. 550,000 men
 |
.svg){kind=small} Army Group Crown Prince 3rd Army Army Group Gallwitz 5th Army |
| losses | |
|
125,000 (USA) |
90,000-120,000 |
The Meuse-Argonne Offensive ( English Meuse-Argonne Offensive , French Offensive Meuse-Argonne ; Meuse is the French name for the river Maas ) was a major battle in the First World War . It was the greatest victory for the US Expeditionary Forces in this war. The offensive took place between September 26 and November 11, 1918 in the Verdun sector, immediately north and northwest of the city of Verdun . It was part of the so-called Hundred Days Offensive planned by Marshal Ferdinand Foch , which was intended to put pressure on the Germans along the entire Western Front .
prehistory
After the Entente offensive launched on August 8, 1918, the German Supreme Army Command had to take the decision on September 2 to bring the Western Army back to the Siegfried position it had already taken in March 1917 . The monthly German losses had become extraordinarily high since the spring offensive (from March 1918). In September they totaled 236,000 men, 21,200 dead and 96,000 wounded. It was particularly worrying that almost half of the total (119,000) were reported missing, and that the information in the enemy army reports on prisoners brought in largely coincided with these missing numbers. In the autumn of 1918 the battalion strength had already sunk to an average of 540 men, and this number could only be maintained by disbanding several divisions. As a result, the number of dissolved divisions had risen to 22 since July. Last were the 108th , 183rd , 222nd , 223rd , 225th , 233rd , 14th Bavarian. , 3rd , 43rd , 53rd , 54th , 77th , 78th Reserve Divisions were disbanded. Regiments with battalions of less than 400 men were to be divided into two battalions in future.
Of the Austro-Hungarian forces requested in June 1918, again urgently requested on July 19 and again on August 29 , two divisions had arrived by mid-September, so that the German Western Army counted 190 divisions again on September 25 . Of these, 125 divisions were at the front and 65 as reserve divisions behind. Of the latter intervention divisions, 21 were behind the left wing of 17th Army and behind 2nd and 18th Armies.
Between September 12 and 15, the Americans, who were operating independently for the first time, managed a successful offensive in the Battle of St. Mihiel , which led to the capture of the entire promontory of St. Mihiel . Encouraged by this success, the 1st US Army was again designated for the next main attack , this was under the command of General John Pershing until October 16 , then under Lt. General Hunter Liggett . General staff work was carried out by Lieutenant Colonel Hugh A. Drum , while the logistics were planned and managed by Colonel George C. Marshall .
March
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Marshal Foch's “Grande Offensive” was directed against the inner wings of the German Crown Prince and Gallwitz Army Groups . In the western section of the front in Champagne , the French 4th and 5th Armies took part in the offensive. While the French 4th Army was wrestling with the German 3rd Army , the Americans (15 divisions) came into confrontation with the right wing of the 5th Army under General Georg von der Marwitz .
The offensive of the 1st US Army was directed against the Carignan – Sedan – Mezieres railway line , an important German supply line that was about 50 kilometers behind the front. The cutting of this line would have made the German positions in the northwest of Verdun untenable. Between the Meuse and the front through the Argonne there were four German lines of defense. The first main line of battle was just behind the front. The second line crossed the Argonne south of Apremont and included Montfaucon . The third line, the so-called "Kriemhild position", formed part of the Hindenburg line . This position ran along the Bois de Foret, over the heights of Cunel and Romagne in the area north of Grandpré . The fourth line ran along the heights of Baricourt, to the west via Buzancy and Thénorgues.
General Pershing's objective was to break through the positions of the German 5th Army between the Meuse and Argonne in a northbound direction. The German General Command 58 under General Alfred von Kleist and the Maas West Group ( Gen. Kdo XXI. AK ) under General der Infantry Ernst von Oven defended against the main attack area of the 1st and 5th US Corps . The group Maas Ost (Gen. Kdo. V. Res. Corps ) under General der Infantry von Soden, holding on the east bank of the river and north of Verdun , was not attacked until the second phase of the attack in mid-October. While the Americans were to attack east of the Argonne as far as the Meuse, the French 4th Army under General Henri Gouraud had deployed 40 kilometers north between Suippes and Massiges .
Under cover of the darkness of September 25, the troops of the 1st US Army east of the Argonne were able to take their staging rooms for the attack unnoticed.
- On the left wing, the 1st US Corps (General Hunter Liggett ) with the 77th , 28th and 35th Divisions had to strive for the breakthrough over Varennes on Grandpré .
- In the center, the 5th US Corps (General George H. Cameron , from October 12th General Charles P. Summerall ) with the 91st , 37th and 79th Divisions was deployed against Montfaucon .
- The right wing, formed by the III. US Corps (General Robert Lee Bullard ) was to attack the Meuse northwards. Here the 4th Division (General John Leonard Hines ) took the left wing, the 80th Division (Major General Adelbert Cronkhite ) the central and the 33rd Division (Major General George Bell Jr. ) the right section.
Each of the three attack corps had a division as a reserve (3rd, 32nd and 92nd divisions ), and the 1st, 29th and 82nd divisions were also available as army reserves. In the Consenvoye area the connection to the French XVII. Army Corps (General Claudel , under General Frédéric Hellot at the end of October ), which remained defensive in the first phase. In the offensive, the American Expeditionary Forces deployed 15 divisions in the first phase of the attack and 22 in the final phase. The US divisions were twice as strong as those of the Central Powers: 16 battalions per division, compared with the German division only had 9 battalions.
First phase: September 26th to October 3rd
On September 26th at 2:25 am, fire from 2,775 guns initiated the 1st US Army's offensive between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse, 189 smaller tanks and 821 aircraft supported the attack, which was about 50 kilometers wide. The American infantry attack began at 5:30 a.m., the most successful of the offensive developed on the right wing of the 1st Army, at III. Corps under General Bullard. Here a strong artillery preparation completely destroyed the German defense line, the 4th Division (General John L. Hines) quickly gained ground towards the Maas. The attack led through a narrow valley, the 7th Infantry Brigade crossed it swiftly and reached the second line of defense at Cuisy at 9 a.m., the 4th Division advanced eleven kilometers in the first two days. To the left of it attacked the 79th Division (Major General Joseph Kuhn ) between Haucourt and Malancourt in order to break through on Montfaucon together with the 37th Division (Major General Charles S. Farnsworth ). In the sector of the I. Corps, the 1st Tank Brigade was deployed by Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton , who supported the attack of the 35th Division with 127 Renault FT light tanks and 28 French-operated Schneider CA 1 tanks . The 3rd US Tank Brigade was assigned 250 tanks with French crews to support the 5th US Corps. General George H. Cameron provided his 37th and 79th divisions with one French light tank regiment and two St. Chamond medium tank divisions , while another French light tank regiment with two St. Chamonds divisions was the 91st. Division added. Opposite the I. US Corps, the 2nd Landwehr Division and the 5th Guard Division had to bend their left flank back along the eastern edge of the Argonne to secure the left flank.
Before Montfaucon, the attack of the 79th US Division, which had not yet been deployed on the front, came to a standstill. It did not succeed in pulling its artillery in time, and so the still inexperienced troops stormed against the well-developed and deeply structured second position system of the German 117th Infantry Division (Major General Hoefer ) and suffered heavy losses. The 37th Division was able to occupy the Bois de Montfaucon and in the afternoon advance into the southern outskirts of Ivoiry and the western approaches to Montfaucon, but exhaustion and disorder prevented them from coming to the aid of the 79th Division, which had come to a standstill. In the west of the V. Corps sector, the 91st Division advanced eight kilometers, fought its way through the Bois de Cheppy and briefly captured Épinonville , but was then pushed back by German counterattacks.
After the divisions of the III. Corps made their way through the Bois des Ogons and Bois du Fays, they encountered German counter-attacks and heavy artillery fire. While the I. Corps was still able to advance slowly through the Aire Valley, the V. Corps made hardly any progress towards the German defense on the Barrois Plateau. By the evening at the end of the first day, the 1st US Tank Brigade had lost more than a third of its strength as a result of enemy actions and technical failures. The French tanks used in the area of the V. Corps had similar losses. Montfaucon remained in German hands at nightfall, and the V Corps fell far short of its daily goals. On the eastern flank of the 1st Corps, the 35th Division, with the support of tanks, captured Cheppy and the Butte du Vauquois after heavy fighting , but had to retreat to the southern area of Charpentry before dark , heavy losses and leadership problems slowed their advance. In a struggle with the German 1st Guard Division and the 117th Division, the 5th US Corps was able to reach the Montblainville - Charpentry - Epinonville line by the evening of the day , the 4th US Division command moved the headquarters to Cuisy .
On September 27, the Americans advanced further along the western Meuse and pushed the German troops back onto the line from Cierges to Brieulles. The 35th Division (Major General Peter E. Traub) succeeded in taking Varennes and by the 28th with the advance to the Aire, the occupation of Apremont . On the same day, the 157th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier General Nicholson ), which had lost contact with the 314th Infantry Regiment, penetrated Montfaucon with the 313rd Infantry Regiment .
On September 29th, six German reaction divisions had reinforced the front to withstand the American-French attack. On September 30, Pershing's offensive was halted, but the battle continued until October 3, without any significant changes in the front, while the area furrowed by barrage made it increasingly difficult to bring in supplies and troops. General Pershing wrote: "... We had to carry out a direct frontal attack against strong enemy positions which were fully manned with determined forces."
In view of the stubborn German resistance, the attacks of the I. and III. Corps hardly any more progress. On October 1, units of the 77th US Division (Major General Robert Alexander ) on the left wing of the I. Corps, south-east of La Viergette, held strong patrols across from the German 76th Reserve Division . On October 2, the Americans continued their attacks, particularly in the Argonne Forest, towards Binarville and Montblainville . On the right wing of the German Res. Inf. Reg. 254, the Americans had broken through the Toter-Mann-Mühle section the previous evening, and the positions on the so-called Teufelsgrund could not be cordoned off. An American combat group under Major Charles W. Whittlesey with parts of the 307th and 308th Infantry Regiments and the 306th Machine Gun Battalion penetrated deep into the German defense at the Charlevaux mill. Whittlesey had followed orders from his regimental commander, Colonel Cromwell Stacey, to press ahead with the attack and had not made any security on his flanks. After Whittlesey had stopped his advance on the evening of October 2, his combat group was cut off by German troops. The men of the so-called "Lost Battalion" dug themselves into a hill to hold their own until October 7th and wait for relief. Of the 679 soldiers in the Lost Battalion, only 252 survived these battles.
On September 30th, Marshal Foch proposed to General Pershing that the 1st US Corps be placed under French command in order to free the Argonne Forest faster. Unsurprisingly, Pershing immediately turned down the request, but it put him under immense pressure to produce better results for the Maas-Argonne offensive. After the impenetrable traffic jams in the rear area of the 1st US Army prevented him from visiting the American front, the French Prime Minister Clemenceau concluded that General Pershing would be unable to cope with the leadership of his army. He urged Foch to replace the American commander in chief and even threatened to ask President Wilson to appoint a new leader for the AEF . Although Foch managed to dissuade Clemenceau from this hasty move, he also had reservations about Pershing's military capabilities. Pershing scheduled the new general attack for October 4th.
Second phase: October 4th to October 28th
preparation
The second phase of the battle began when the foremost American troops were adequately supplied and reinforced. After a few days of rest, 1st Army was to continue its efforts with a broad frontal attack, which was to begin on October 4th at 5:30 a.m. with the aim of breaking through the German Hindenburg Line. The V Corps under General Cameron again received the most difficult mission and should take the heights of Romagne and a plateau in the Bois du Moncy and the Bois du Romagne in the middle of the army. The I. and III. Corps would support these efforts on both wings by increasingly threatening the enemy flanks on the plateau and simultaneously attacking the enemy in front of their sectors. The I. Corps (Ligett) would advance further north through the Argonne and Aire valleys to conquer the hills of Cornay, Châtel-Chéhéry and Exermont, clear the forests there from the disruptive enemy artillery and establish a connection with the French 4th Create an army. If the I. Corps succeeded in taking the hills north of Exermont, it would weaken the German defenses which the V. Corps faced on the heights of Romagne. At the same time the III. Corps to conquer the heights northwest of Cunel and assist the V Corps in conquering the heights north of Romagne. General Pershing hoped that the addition of the tried and tested units of the 1st and 3rd Divisions to the V Corps would give the impetus to carry out the attacks successfully.
Battle on the western bank of the Meuse
The main thrust of the III. Corps should take place on the right wing towards Brieulles zur Maas. The attack section of the 4th and 33rd Divisions ran between Béthincourt (right) and the area west of Vilosnes . The 33rd Division (Major General George Bell) was deployed against the north corner of the Bois de la Cote Lemont, 2 kilometers west of Vilosnes. The 4th US Division (Major-General Hines) at the head of the German "Maas-West Group" got stuck on the northern edge of the Bois de Fays while trying to reach the Brieulles-Cunel road.
In the central section, the 35th, 37th and 79th divisions had been replaced by new troops. The 35th Division (Brigadier General Peter E. Traub), which was used up in the battle with the German 52nd Division (General von Borries ), had been replaced by the 1st Division (Major General Charles P. Summerall ) and went into reserve. With the Germans, the worn out 117th Division had been withdrawn after heavy losses and replaced by the 5th Guard Division . The 28th Division was wrestling on the line Fléville-Cornay-Cote 244-Friedhof on Le Chene Tondu, on its left wing the 77th Division was stuck in the Bois de La Viergette. In fierce fighting until October 7th, the 28th Division captured the plateau between Le Chêne Tondu and Châtel-Chéhéry . During the same period, the newly introduced 1st Division penetrated five kilometers into the German defense at Sommerance and advanced on Exermont.
On October 5, the line Ferme d'Arietal-Cote reached 240-Fleville on the left wing of the I. Corps, but a gap in the front of about 800 meters formed. The 28th Division had to shift its direction of attack from north to west in order to conquer the height 244. In the middle, the V Corps had now set up the 32nd Division (Brigadier General William G. Haan) against the heights south of Romogne, opposite the newly arrived German 115th and 236th Divisions . The success of the 1st Division gave General Liggett the opportunity to turn the attack of the 1st Corps successfully. While the Germans the III. and V. Corps could continue to hold back, the American divisions had advanced far enough in the Aire Valley to create the space the 82nd Division needed from the reserves to move along the line south of Fléville to north of the positions of the 28th Corps . Division at Châtel Chéhéry and placed on the front line. Liggett's plan was to set up the 82nd Division to the west in the north-eastern edge of the Argonne Forest at Cornay and towards Height 223. At the same time, the eastern flank and the rear of the main German defense in the Argonne were to be threatened. If the plan was successful, the Germans would be forced to either clear the forest or be encircled there.
On October 7th, the 82nd Division attacked the northeastern edge of the Argonne Forest in the direction of Cornay without the 163rd Infantry Brigade and occupied the high 180 and 223. The next day parts of the right wing penetrated Cornay while the south-eastern slope on the left the hill northwest of Chatel-Chéhéry was reached. On October 9, their left flank advanced to a line south of the Rau de la Louvière. On October 10, the 82nd Division took over from the 1st Division and occupied the line north of Fléville to the new corps border of the 1st Corps, which led through Sommerance. The troops attacked at Cornay, on October 11 the right wing of the 82nd Division occupied Sommerance and the hill north of La Rance, while the left wing advanced on the railway line south of the Aire. By October 10th, the German 2nd Landwehr Division (General Franke ) had to give up the northern part of the Argonne Forest and also leave Grandpré to the Americans. The 82nd Division broke into the Hindenburg Line and reached the line north of the road from St-Georges to St-Juvin on October 12 .
Attack on the eastern bank of the Meuse
On the eastern bank of the Meuse, the German V Reserve Corps ( Maas Ost Group ) had put the 228th Division and the 7th Reserve Division into position. The French XVII, reinforced by two American divisions. Corps was given the task of attacking the heights of the Meuse in support of the 18th Division (General Andlauer ) lying near Samogneux , as well as the section of the German 15th Division (Lieutenant General Tappen ) in the Bois de la Grande Montague . On October 8, after half an hour of annihilation fire north of Verdun , another American-French attack broke out east of the Meuse. Four divisions (29th and 33rd US divisions as well as French 18th and 26th divisions) of the XVII attacked the mass group east (V. Reserve Corps) of General von Soden. Corps (Division General Claudel). After one hour of artillery fire from the Meuse to the Wavrille forest , the attack began at 6 o'clock and hit the front of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Infantry Division (FML Metzger ). The Allied advance at Kronprinzen-Höhe was initially intercepted, but it was lost the following day. The 33rd Division (Major General George Bell Jr.) crossed the Meuse and took Consenvoye . The 29th Division also advanced rapidly three kilometers north towards the center of the Bois de Consenvoye. The French 18th Division took Haumont-près-Samogneux and advanced towards the hamlet of Ormont, while the French 26th Division advanced cautiously through the Caures forest.
On October 9th, the fighting continued unbroken on both banks of the Meuse. General von Gallwitz urgently demanded reinforcements and pointed out to the OHL that the enemy wanted to come out of the front triangle Sivry - Caures-Wald - Samogneux and reach the Chaumont - Flabas line as a basis for further action on Damvillers . The attack by the 29th US Division (Major General Morton ) between the east bank of the Meuse as far as Étraye was particularly threatening , despite the German reserves standing there. On October 9th, the III. Corps launched the attack after another artillery strike, the 4th Division continued their attack and crossed the line Bois de Foret - Cléry-le-Grand - Bois de Babiemont. Several limited German counter-attacks were made and local advantages gained, but the enemy could not be stopped. On October 10th and 11th, in addition to the French 18th Division, parts of the 26th US Division (Maj. Gen. Edwards ) intervened in the fighting against the German 15th Infantry Division in the area of the Caures Forest . From October 11th, parts of the 3rd Guard Infantry Division , the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division, the 1st Landwehr Division and the 224th Infantry Division arrived, which eased the situation of the German army in Gallwitz for a short time. The troops of the American 29th and 33rd Divisions were stranded at Molleville, the Bois de Consenvoye, the Bois de Chaume and the Bois de la Grande Montagne and were exposed to German counterattacks and heavy artillery fire. By October 16, both American divisions were exhausted and the attack of the XVII. Corps came to a standstill just before the heights of Sivry-sur-Meuse were taken.
Reorganization of the US Army
In perhaps his wisest decision as AEF commander, General Pershing realized that it was too overwhelming for one man to command the entire AEF in northern France while directing 1st Army operations. On October 12, the command area of the 1st US Army was split, Pershing ceded the command to General Hunter Liggett. The line east of the Moselle , from Port-sur-Seille to Fresnes-en-Woëvre , 18 kilometers southeast of Verdun, was transferred under the command of the newly established 2nd US Army under Lieutenant General Robert Lee Bullard . On October 13th, the 4th was relieved of the 3rd US Division (from October 17th under Brigadier General Preston Brown ) and pulled from the front on October 19th.
The appointments of Liggett and Bullard resulted in the appointment of Maj. General Joseph T. Dickman to command of the 1st Corps and the promotion of Maj. Gen. Hines to command of the III. Corps. Pershing also took advantage of the restructuring to replace a number of other AEF commanders. Believing that the V Corps' lack of aggressiveness during the opening phase of the offensive had contributed to the sad situation of 1st Army, he dismissed General Cameron. Pershing hoped that Cameron's successor, Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, would bring the V Corps the same drive and tactical acumen he had shown as commanding the 1st Division. After the reorganization, Pershing also removed the commander of the 3rd Division, Major General Beaumont B. Buck on October 17 , after he nearly incapacitated the division in six days with poorly coordinated attacks against the Bois de Cunel and its adjacent heights due to the high losses would have. Similarly, he dismissed the commander of the 5th Division, Major General John E. McMahon , who had refrained from ordered attacks on the Bois des Rappes and the Bois de la Pultière. On October 22nd, Pershing also dismissed the commander of the 26th Division, Major General Clarence R. Edwards, with whom he had been at odds for a long time. These measures helped create a climate of fear among the higher ranks of the AEF that led commanders to press ahead with their attacks without hope of success.
In the first week of October, the US 1st Army recorded 6,589 deaths on the battlefield. By the end of the second week of October, over 12,600 Americans had fallen since the offensive began. At the beginning of October the weather turned cold and rainy, and more and more soldiers fell ill with influenza and dysentery. The chief physician of the 82nd Division reported that an average of 700 soldiers in his unit had to be hospitalized every day because of influenza, diarrhea or exhaustion. Due to the losses and exhaustion of the soldiers, not insignificantly caused by the second wave of the so-called Spanish flu , which started rolling in from September , General Pershing requested 90,000 replacement workers, but received only 45,000 by November 1st. He discussed the situation with Allied Supreme Commander Marshal Foch, who insisted that the attacks continue as they were aimed at the main German line of retreat.
During the entire Meuse-Argonne offensive, bad weather and rough terrain hindered the effective use of the air force. American aerial observers found the weather clear enough for only 10 of the 47 days of the campaign to be able to accurately identify and reconnaissance the enemy. These problems meant that Billy Mitchell's decision to focus most American flight operations on targets in the rear of the enemy had only limited success and thereby drew the wrath of many American soldiers.
Burglary on the Hindenburg line
General Ligett's next goal was to break through the German Hindenburg line between Landres-et-Saint-Georges and the heights of Romagne with a double enclosure. The new attack of the V. and III. Corps started on October 14th.
After the American troops broke into the German defense, they used their success to capture the Bois de Bantheville. The task of the I. Corps was to protect the left flank of the V Corps by pushing the Germans back on a line that led from Imécourt in the east to the heights in the Bois de Bourgogne in the west. The left wing of Liggett's enclosure formed the 42nd Division (Major General CT Menoher ) of the V Corps. This division was to advance through the Bois du Romagne and take the heights of St. Georges to the Côte de Châtillon and then pivot east into the Bois de Bantheville . On the right wing of the encirclement operation, the 3rd and 5th Divisions (III. Corps) were supposed to drive the Germans from the heights at Cunel and the hills east of the Romagne, then push to the northwest, in order to help the V Corps to conquer des Bois de Bantheville. The 32nd Division was in the middle of the attack section and had to attack the Côte Dame Marie in order to prevent the Germans from shifting their forces to the wing battles. To divert attention from the main directions of attack, the 32nd Division should begin its attack three hours before the attacks of the 5th and 42nd Divisions. To attack St. Georges and Landres and St. Georges, the left flank of the 42nd Division, the 83rd Infantry Brigade, had to cross a mile of open ground and work its way through a barbed wire belt. On the right wing of the 42nd Division, only the 84th Infantry Brigade under Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur battling his way up the crest of the slopes of the Côte de Châtillon and La Tuilerie Farm. The losses in the eventful battles were high. The attack by the 42nd Division had secured Liggett a break in on the Hindenburg Line, but that success cost the division 2,895 men in losses.
The advance of the newly brought forward 5th Division to the heights around Cunel and Romagne took place under German artillery fire and brought heavy losses. The division managed to capture Cunel and advance to the southern edge of the Bois de la Pultière. On the morning of October 15, the 5th Division resumed its attacks, but the artillery could not adequately support the advance of the infantry. The division managed to fight its way through the Bois de la Pultière and after heavy fighting with the 9th Infantry Brigade to reach the northern edge of the Bois des Rappes. The division commander, Major General John E. McMahon McMahon ordered a false report to give up the land gains and to retreat to the Bois de la Pultière. When the 5th Division was withdrawn from the front on October 22, it had already suffered losses of 779 dead and 3,108 wounded in its short deployment. In order to be able to continue the offensive successfully, Persching gave in to Liggett's demand to deploy new units. The American 4th, 33rd and 77th Divisions had been fighting since the offensive began and urgently needed rest. In addition, the losses in the 3rd, 5th, 32nd, 42nd and 82nd divisions had been decimated to reduce the combat strength by half. While these units were being taken from the front line for reorganization, the 1st Army launched a series of local attacks from October 18-27, both east and west of the Meuse, in order to gain better positions for the next general attack. In the sector of the I. Corps the 78th Division was now in the Grandpré area, in the Bois de Bourgogne and Bois des Loges. At the same time, the V Corps fought to force the enemy to retreat from the woods of Bantheville, Romagne and Chavignon. On the Meuse the III. Corps to invade the Bois des Rappes and Les Clairs Chênes. East of the Meuse tried the French XVII. Corps to resume its deadlocked efforts to conquer the heights of the Meuse by launching attacks between Sivry-sur Meuse and Crépion from October 23-28. On October 25th, the 1st Division was again assigned to the V Corps as reinforcement. In the 2nd US Army, the 33rd Division released the 79th Division in the Troyon section on October 26 and took over the section between Ville-en-Woëvre and Fresnes-en-Woëvre , where the connection to the French 39. Division of the II Colonial Corps took place. When the American divisions extended their lines via Hattonchâtel to the village line Xammes - Charey by October 29, the connection to Prény , to the 7th Division (Brigade General CH Barth) of the VI. US Corps manufactured.
Third phase: October 28th to November 11th
Marshal Foch persistently and tirelessly coordinated the attacks of the Allied armies across the front. Pershing's forces now operated across the board with two armies. The French 5th Army headed for the area north of Givet ; the French 4th Army retained the old thrust on Mézières . As early as October 21, Pershing had given instructions to his 1st Army to prepare thoroughly for the new general attack scheduled for October 28. In Liggett's experience, gained from fighting in the Argonne forests, the breakthrough terrain for the offensive that followed was in the Barricourt Heights sector . The heights that ran from Villers-devant-Dun - Dun northwest to Fossé were the fulcrum of the last German defenses south of the Meuse. The 1st Army's immediate objective was to break through at Buzancy and take the heights of Barricourt. As a result, the Argonne Forest should be freely fought to the north of Grandpré in order to establish a connection with the French 4th Army near Boult-aux-Bois on the left wing. General Liggett wanted to begin the attack on October 28th as planned, but because the neighboring French 4th Army needed more time to prepare, Pershing and Foch agreed not to resume the coordinated attacks until November 1st. This gave the 1st US Army several days to replenish its ranks, to better plan and coordinate its important artillery and supply preparations for the upcoming attack. American troops now operated on a large scale with two armies. On October 31, the front ran about one kilometer north of Grandpré on the western border of the army along a line extending east from south of Landres-et-St. Georges and further through the northern edges of the Bois de Bantheville, the Bois des Rappes and the Bois de Forêt near the left bank of the Meuse. The 1st Army under General Liggett continued to aim for the Carignan - Sedan - Mézières railway line . The 2nd Army to the east was given the task of breakthrough on Metz . The two armies faced about 31 German divisions, 19 of the 1st Army alone, ten of them west of the Meuse and nine against the sector of the French XVII. Corps east of the river. Responsibilities were changed to give the French an opportunity to retake Sedan. During this phase, both sides made extensive use of air forces and bombed the enemy in daylight.
The final offensive from November 1st
The new general attack was launched on November 1 at 5:30 a.m. after two hours of artillery preparation: three corps were ready on the line between the Meuse and the Bois de Bourgogne to attack northwards against the fourth German line of defense. In order to ensure sufficient firepower, the 1st Army assembled 1,576 guns, including three batteries with 14-inch railroad guns, which were manned by senior officers of the US Navy. For the attack, each gun would have twenty meters of frontage and each would fire an average of 235 shells a day. For the first time in the war, Americans also used their resources in chemical warfare. Liggett specifically instructed that the German artillery positions on the heights of the Meuse, the Bois de Sassey and on the hills of the Bois de Bourgogne should be bombarded with mustard gas in order to put out a flanking fire on the American attack columns. On the right side was the III. Corps with the 5th and 90th Divisions (Major General HT Allen ); in the middle formed the V Corps with the 2nd and 89th Divisions (Major General WM Wright ) and on the left side the 80th, 77th and 78th Divisions were deployed as before. The heavy artillery was brought into position to act on the Carignan – Sedan railway line and to cut connections to Longuyon and Conflans. The Americans had broken through the enemy position in the Bois de Foret and were directed against the heights of Cunel and Romagne and on the Cote de Chatillon, and 3,600 prisoners were brought in on these days. The 2nd Infantry Brigade of the 1st US Division reached the area 13 kilometers southeast of Oches , near Bayonville and was accompanied on the left flank by the 2nd US Division (Major General John A. Lejeune ). The right wing of the 80th Division used the break-in of the 2nd Division in the German defense to take Imécourt and advance to Fontaine des Parades. Before nightfall the V Corps had advanced about eight kilometers in the middle, reached the Bois de la Folie, and taken the heights of Barricourt. The III. Corps had taken Aincreville and Andevanne on the right wing . The troops of the I. Corps had also advanced quickly to the left in the forest north of Grandpre.
The V Corps (in the front with 2nd and 89th Divisions) advanced from the area 15 kilometers south of Yoncq in daylight in two columns, the left on Beaumont and the right 10 kilometers southeast of it on Laneuville-sur-Meuse . The right wing of the V Corps advanced northward along the west bank of the Meuse, while the 80th Division of the I Corps crossed the Beaumont- Stonne road to the left and reached the Ferme La Harnoterie with the advance guard. Buzancy was occupied by the 80th Division . Although all German reserves intervened in the defense, the forces of General Command 58 and XXI. Army corps pushed back six to seven kilometers north of Buzancy and Barricourt.
On November 2, the 1st Corps advanced over 9 kilometers, on the right wing the 80th Division captured Buzancy. In the center of the corps, the 77th Division advanced north against the weak German defenses in order to occupy Champigneulle, Thénorgues, Harricourt and Bar one after the other. To the left of the I. Corps, the 78th Division had advanced more slowly to avoid the German positions in the Bois de Bourgogne. By evening the 78th Division had also advanced 6 kilometers and had driven the Germans from Briquenay. The success of the day put the I. Corps in a good starting position to resume the pursuit of the Germans in the next few days. At midday the German Supreme Army Command had ordered the beleaguered Army Groups Kronprinz and Gallwitz to move to the Conde-Avesnes- Hirson - Charleville- Sedan-Stenay line, the right wing of the 5th Army had already been forced by the opposing forces to retreat completely behind the Maas . The left wing of the German Crown Prince Army Group - the German 3rd Army - had to return to the La Neuville- Briquenay line on the night of November 2nd after breaking into the 5th Army .
Heavy fighting led the 89th US Division in the neighborhood of Bantheville and Barricourt on November 3, and the following day they captured Beaufort. The German troops were in full retreat between the Meuse and Bar section. The General Command 58 and the XXI. Army corps were directly subordinate to AOK 5 for fighting on the left bank of the Meuse , which ordered the retreat to the Oches-Heights line south of Beaumont- Wiseppe . The German XXI. The Army Corps was fighting a retreat on the east bank of the Meuse with the front facing southwest and the Meuse in the back. After reaching the poorly prepared Antwerp-Maas position , AOK 2 and AOK 18, including five general commands, were to be detached and made available to the Supreme Army Command along with eight detached divisions. The border between the Army Groups of Rupprecht of Bavaria and the German Crown Prince now ran north of Charleroi , and that between the Army Groups of the German Crown Prince and Gallwitz near Mouzon .
New attacks began east of the Meuse on November 4th; at Brieulles the Americans crossed the river. The American attacks between Grandpré and Aincreville began around 7:00 a.m. Now in close contact with the French 4th Army, the American left wing (I. and V. Corps) pursued vigorously in the direction of Sedan to the Meuse section. The penetration on the heights west of the Meuse brought the next German position into American hands, the positions west of the Meuse became untenable for the German troops. On the right wing was the III. Corps in advance on Stenay and forced the Meuse crossing south of Dun. East of it accompanied the French XVII. Corps by advancing through Damvillers . On the evening of November 4th, the III. Corps reached the town of La Neuville and had invaded the Foret de Dieulet. The I. Corps was on the left wing in the area 8 km north of Boult-aux-Bois . The German forces had to be withdrawn to the Mouzay- Brandeville-Etraye line before the American superiority .
Advance on Sedan
By conquering the heights of Barricourt, Sedan and the important German railway line Metz-Montmédy-Charleville were within range of the American heavy artillery. On November 5th, the American attack in the direction of Sedan continued. The Germans were in retreat to the Antwerp-Maas position. The rearguard was supposed to hold the line Yoncq- Chémery-sur-Bar - Vendresse and then the line between Pont-Maugis and Cheveuges-Sapogne until the evening of the 6th. The interface between the 3rd and 5th Armies on the German side now ran in the area south of Sedan. The 1st US Army (General Ligget) had the Meuse-Beaumont line with the V Corps (89th and 2nd Divisions) and the 1st Corps (80th, 77th and 42nd Divisions) on the advance to the Meuse reached the Beaumont-Bar line. To the left of the 77th Division, the 42nd US Division (Brigadier General CT Menoher) was called in as reinforcement and was in contact with the French 4th Army, which was advancing with the 40th Division (IX Corps) on both sides of the bar . The 80th Division on the right wing of the I Corps was to be relieved the next day by the 1st Division, which was to reach the area southwest of Mouzon. The now at III. Corps deployed 5th US Division (Major General Hanson Edward Ely ) attacked the heights of Dun-sur-Meuse . On the evening of November 5, the 1st Corps ordered the 42nd Division to advance directly on Sedan. The new section boundary of the 42nd Division ran right between Raucourt and Remilly to the 77th Division and left to the French via Chéhéry -Frenois (Sedan), so that the road from Chemery to Sedan was reserved for the 42nd Division alone.
On the morning of November 6th, a war bridge was built over the Meuse section. On the left wing of the 1st US Army, the new border with the French 4th Army ran via Chemery-Pont-Maugis to Bazeilles . The 26th US Regiment, which was moved to the far left wing of the 1st US Army, crossed the bar at Chemery and hit the French advance routes at Omicourt . The 77th Division had occupied the heights south of Remilly and west of Raucourt. At 11 o'clock, under French pressure, the American I. Corps had to order the withdrawal for their 1st division, and later the 42nd division was also withdrawn beyond the original army border to the southeast.
Until November 7, the right wing of the III. Corps expanded the Maas bridgehead to ten kilometers to the east and forced the German defenders to retreat in the area northwest of Verdun.
The offensive ended with the November 11th armistice . The 1st US Army had suffered losses of around 125,000 soldiers, including 26,277 dead and 95,786 wounded. For its part, since the offensive began, it had brought in or captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannons, 3,000 machine guns and large quantities of other war material.
literature
- Robert H. Ferrell: America's deadliest battle: Meuse-Argonne, 1918. University Press of Kansas, 2007. ISBN 0-7006-1499-0 .
- Edward G. Lengel: To Conquer Hell: The Meuse-Argonne, 1918. Henry Holt and Company, 2008. ISBN 0-8050-7931-9 .
- American Battle Monuments Commision: American Armies and Battlefields in Europe A History, Guide, and Reference Book. Washington DC 1938
- Lawrence Stallings: The Dougboys. Harper and Row publishing 1963 ISBN 0-06-013975-7 , ISBN 978-0-06-013975-9 .
- Edward M. Coffman: The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I. Oxford University Press, NY (re-printed by the University of Wisconsin Press in 1986, and the University Press of Kentucky in 1998) ISBN 978 -0-8131-0955-8 .
Web links
- Fight for Montfaucon near Verdun 1914-18
- Meuse-Argonne Offensive, Pershings Report (English)
- Summary of operations in the World War , by the American Battle Monuments Commission (1944), (digitized version)